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Abstract 
AMALGAMATED SECURITY COMMUNITIES 
 
By Andrew S. Harvey 
 
This dissertation examines the process of the formation and dissolution of Amalgamated Security 
Communities, a topic that has been ignored by the academic community except as a side note when the 
origins of Pluralistic Security Communities are examined. Amalgamated Security Communities (ASC) 
must have some level of military integration. A multiple case study design examines the process of 
integrating military forces and capabilities to generate military power in the context of the formation of an 
ASC. The cases chosen were restricted to those in which the various previously independent political 
entities voluntarily and formally merged. Once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, 
especially the integration of the capacity to produce military capability, an ASC will form as a result; this 
process is the mirror image of state dissolution. The degree of integration of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability is the independent variable which has been divided into a number 
of categories used to compare cases. This study argues that it is the decision to become “brothers-in-
arms” that is crucial to the development of an “us” vs. “others” identity.  It is military integration that 
creates and reinforces a new identity among and between amalgamated political entities rather than being 
a byproduct of an identity. This connection between military integration and identity formation is a 
critical foundation of this study.  Findings include, that how military forces are created, controlled, 
organized, equipped, and by whom, has a political impact on the formation of an ASC. Multiple 
jurisdictions with control over military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capabilities 
creates a politically unstable ASC. This study permits prediction of how stable an ASC is and the 
likelihood of its violent fracture as well as providing methods to prevent violent conflict regardless of the 
geographic, cultural, and economic context of the ASC and whether it is an authoritarian political regime 
or not. Finally, this study places Constructivism as an approach at the heart of the creation of military 
forces, as well as at the forefront of military fracture and civil war. 
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1-1. Introduction  
Unlike Pluralistic Security Communities which have been the object of significant academic 
interest since 1998, the concept of Amalgamated Security Communities (ASCs) has received scant 
attention from the academic community since it was first proposed by Karl Deutsch in 1957.1  This paper 
seeks to correct this omission and proposes that Amalgamated Security Communities are in fact very 
important and have significant ramifications for both the academic community and policy makers.      
 Although this paper will expound in greater detail the particulars of the argument for 
Amalgamated Security Communities, it is necessary first to outline the basis for the paper and establish 
some definitions to thereby create the framework needed to discuss the concept.  The start point is the 
definition of Amalgamation as proposed by Karl Deutsch.    
“By Amalgamation we mean the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into 
a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common 
government may be unitary or federal.  The United States today is an example of the 
amalgamated type.  It became a single governmental unit by the formal merger of several 
formerly independent units.  It has one supreme decision-making center.”2  
 
Integration according to Deutsch is “…the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and 
of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a “long” time, dependable 
                                                 
1  Karl Deutsch et al., eds., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1957)  
2  Ibid., 6 
 2
expectations of “peaceful change” among its population.”3  According to Deutsch amalgamation and 
integration do not completely overlap, so that there can be amalgamation without integration and vice 
versa.  The distinction is diagrammed in such a way as to illustrate that amalgamation without integration 
leads to entities such as the Hapsburg Empire, while amalgamation with integration leads to 
Amalgamated Security Communities such as the United States.4  Deutsch provides definitions for; 
“security communities”, “integration”, “sense of community”, “peaceful change”, “amalgamation ”,“ 
pluralistic” and what constitutes a successful and unsuccessful security community, but he does not 
provide a direct definition of an Amalgamated Security Community.   He does indicate however that there 
are certain conditions that should exist for the formation of an Amalgamated Security Community.  These 
conditions include: mutual compatibility of main values (political, and religious); a distinctive way of life 
and the formation of a common sense of “us”; positive expectations of stronger economic ties and gains 
and noneconomic gains; an increase in political and administrative capabilities; superior economic 
growth; unbroken links of social communication as well as multiplicity of mutual institutions and 
common transactions; a broadening of the political, social, and economic elites as well as links among the 
elites of different states; geographical mobility of the population; a not infrequent change of group roles; 
and considerable mutual predictability of behavior. 5 Another implicit factor must be security 
relationships and military structures within a ‘security community.’  Considering these conditions as 
implicit parts of the definition of Amalgamated Security Communities, and combining them with the 
explicit definition of Amalgamation, should give a workable definition that is in line with Deutsch’s 
intent.  The operational definition for Amalgamated Security Communities proposed by this paper 
therefore is that; Amalgamated Security Communities are states (de facto or de jure) composed of two or 
more previously independent political entities that have integrated a portion of their respective militaries 
and that have voluntarily and formally merged so that they are subject to some form of common 
government.   
                                                 
3  Ibid., 5 
4  Ibid., Diagram. p.7 
5  Ibid.,  46-58 
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The next step is to acknowledge and incorporate the seminal work done by Adler and Barnet in 
Security Communities.6  In this work, building on and adapting concepts from Deutsch, they were able to 
establish the concept of pluralistic security communities as a viable research program using a 
constructivist approach.  Their work is at the conceptual heart of this paper and is wholeheartedly 
accepted; except for one key item. Adler and Barnet describe two types of “mature” security communities 
that can emerge; these are loosely coupled and tightly coupled security communities.  They describe 
indicators for the existence of each type.  One indicator for tightly coupled security communities is:  
“A high level of military integration. Although a security community does not require that there 
be military integration, it is quite likely that shared identities and a high degree of trust will 
produce a desire for the pooling of military resources; this will be particularly true if there was 
military cooperation in earlier phases of the emerging security community.  We expect that if 
there was no military cooperation in earlier phases, then the emergence of a common threat at this 
stage would produce the desire for it.  This indicator reflects not only high trust but also that 
security is viewed as interdependent.”7   
In order to create the conceptual space needed for examining the process of creating Amalgamated 
Security Communities, it is necessary to modify this description of tightly coupled security communities 
by replacing - A high level of military integration with A high level of military cooperation.   Adler and 
Barnet’s description of tightly coupled security communities uses the term military cooperation but seems 
to use the terms integration and cooperation interchangeably.  This is not precise and is unfortunate 
because military cooperation is not the same as military integration.  Cooperation by definition implies 
more than one actor working together to achieve a common end.  Integration on the other hand indicates a 
process of unification by making a composite or combination of parts into a whole entity.  This whole 
entity is a single actor and cannot be the same as cooperation between multiple actors.  Substituting 
military cooperation in lieu of military integration in the description of tightly coupled security 
communities makes the description more precise and corresponds better with multiple actors in a 
pluralistic security community.    
                                                 
6  Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds.,  Security Communities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
7 Ibid., 56 
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What this paper proposes with both the description of tightly coupled security communities and 
the definition of Amalgamated Security Communities is to make the definitions more precise.  This is 
done in order to “increase the conceptual differentiation”8 between tightly coupled security communities 
and Amalgamated Security Communities.  This is critical in order to provide a basis for understanding the 
process of Amalgamated Security Community formation and the main argument of this paper.  
1-2. Vignette   
Why have I chosen to examine the topic of Amalgamated Security Communities and how does 
this rarely mentioned subject relate to anything of current interest?   The answer is that in the fall of 1994 
I made a trip to Brussels.  Living in Europe in 1994 was quite different than when I had last lived there in 
the late 1980s.  I no longer needed a visa to travel to other countries, although I did have to process 
through customs in lines for “non-EU” travelers.  I was extremely interested to visit the US Embassy to 
the EU and to learn that EU law superseded national law in those areas in which it had jurisdiction.  I also 
visited the Western European Union (WEU) Planning Cell; a type of Military Coordination Headquarters 
that I also did not know existed previously.  There I found that the WEU had some nascent capabilities, 
and had conducted several limited operations in the past few years.9  I of course knew about NATO but 
was fascinated by the presentation given to me by a very kind British Officer assigned to the WEU 
Planning Cell that not only opened my eyes to an organization older than NATO but one that intended to 
increase its capabilities and conduct more operations.  Other U.S. military officers interested in European 
affairs tended to focus on NATO and denigrate the WEU as not being a “real” defense organization. I on 
the other hand thought I had seen a glimpse of something important for the future of Europe.  The 
development of a European capability outside of NATO (now under the aegis of the EU) has held my 
attention for 17 years as it has slowly evolved and developed to the point where today it is a topic that 
                                                 
8 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative 
Research,” World Politics, 49, no. 3 (1977): 442. 
9 These operations were: "Operation Cleansweep"1988 - Strait of Hormuz; "Operation Sharp Guard" 1993 - 
enforcing the embargo against Yugoslavia in the Adriatic along with an operation to enforce sanctions along the 
Danube; as well as a WEU police contingent assisting the EU administration of Mostar. 
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deserves serious investigation.  My study of the topic led me to Amalgamated Security Communities as 
the best fit for the problem I encountered years ago in Brussels.  
1-3. The Problem  
A common thread that runs through Post-World War II Western European history is one of 
increasing integration across national boundaries in almost all aspects of life from the mundane to the 
core elements of national sovereignty.  The increase in European Security and Defense Cooperation that 
is shifting toward integration under the aegis of the EU is a critical yet puzzling development. Some 
scholars (and military professionals) dismiss the idea of European Security Cooperation much less any 
type of integration as amounting to nothing more than talk. Recent research however, has demonstrated as 
an empirical fact that there has been an increase in security cooperation within the EU.10  This paper will 
examine any empirical evidence regarding a shift toward EU military integration as well.11  Current 
research describes what is happening regarding increased European security cooperation, but what has yet 
to be adequately addressed is the cause for the shift towards integration.  To date the official explanation 
and various alternative theoretical approaches do not give a satisfactory explanation as to why the EU is 
developing its own defense capability and why increased security cooperation and the shift towards 
integration of defense is continuing to broaden and deepen in scope.  There is no military threat to the 
states of Europe that would explain this trend.  NATO is a necessary precondition that habituated the 
Europeans to close cooperation in the area of collective defense, but it is not sufficient to explain why the 
EU is developing defense structures known as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). This is 
particularly interesting given the fact that all of the EU members of NATO view NATO as the primary 
collective defense organization that guarantees their security and that in an era of little conventional 
military threat, defense spending by the EU states has declined sharply.  This follows what would be 
expected by a Public Goods approach to alliance formation in which overall defense spending declines as 
various states free ride and divert resources into non-defense areas. Given the deficiencies of current 
                                                 
10  Seth Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
11 (e.g. EU Satellite Centre, SALIS initiative, European Air Transport Center (EATC), EU Institute for Security 
Studies, Synchronized Armed Forces Europe (SAFE) etc…) 
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explanations, both official declarations and theoretical approaches: What accounts for the creation of 
ESDI given the lack of a conventional military threat to Europe and the presence of NATO? 
1-4. Alternative Explanations and Theories 
1-4 (a). Official Explanation and Public goods 
The officially stated rationale for developing the European Security and Defense Identity is to 
strengthen the "European Pillar of NATO" and whose capabilities will be “Separable but not Separate” 
from NATO in order to be able to ''act in situations where NATO as a whole was not involved''.  If true 
then ESDI would appear to be a collective defense organization; a type of sub-alliance within NATO.  
Numerous studies demonstrate that the larger powers in an alliance will tend to provide a 
disproportionate share of the public goods in an alliance.  For many years the U.S. (especially the U.S. 
Congress) complained about the relative levels of allied contributions to NATO using the phrase 
"burdensharing" to describe what it views as an inequitable distribution of obligations vs. benefits.  The 
official rhetoric surrounding ESDI would seem to suggest that ESDI is the method the Europeans have 
chosen to respond to longstanding U.S. criticism.  This would indeed be the case if ESDI is meant to be, 
as its proponents claim, the method to "strengthen the European Pillar of NATO".   Is this rationale of 
new found virtue in increasing European contributions to the Atlantic Alliance satisfactory enough to 
explain the creation of ESDI? 
Public goods are by definition nonrivalrous in consumption and nonexcludable in use.12  National 
Defense is often used as an example of a public good in that each citizen benefits from the protection 
provided by the army without reducing in any way that benefit to all other citizens, and that citizen’s use 
of protection provided by their army does not exclude any other citizen from that same protection.  This 
holds true whether or not one of the other citizens has paid taxes to support the army or not.  The same 
analogy regarding states within alliances, and defense as a public good applies.  In fact much work has 
been done in examining the public goods aspects of alliances (especially NATO) and the relative 
                                                 
12 David Weimmer and Aidan Vining, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 3d ed., (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1999), 75. 
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contribution made by member states to the alliance.  Although much other work has been done in 
examining burdensharing in terms of trying to accurately quantify the measures used for comparing 
relative contributions to alliances (in areas such as relevance, efficiency, strategic value, quality, and even 
firepower), and even the question of "discounting" the contribution of one nation by others in an alliance, 
this paper is not concerned with that level of detail due to the focus on the creation of a new organization 
rather than in detailing the contributions to an existing alliance.13  In their seminal 1966 study, Olson and 
Zeckhauser proposed that "When a nation decides how large a military force to provide in an alliance, it 
must consider the value it places on collective defense and the other non-defense goods that must be 
sacrificed to obtain additional military forces".14   They developed a method to demonstrate the effects of 
opportunity costs on alliance defense provision.  When not in an alliance a country will produce a 
quantity of defense (X) based on its perceived needs.  When in an alliance "the amount a nation spends on 
defense will be affected by the amount (of defense) its allies provide".15   The increase or "spill in" of 
defense capability which comes from the jointness of the defense public good is actually a free increase 
provided by the defense spending of the other country.  Because of this the country in an alliance can 
spend less on defense (Y) and still obtain a higher or equal defense capability.  The nation can now spend 
the difference of X-Y on non-defense goods.  Olson and Zeckhauser also showed that in an alliance, as 
one nation’s defense expenditure increases the other nation’s defense expenditure tends to decrease.16   
Furthermore, the "defense expenditure decisions made by alliance nations are such that the larger nation - 
the one that places the higher absolute value on the alliance good- will bear a disproportionately large 
share of the common burden".17   In alliances with conventional weapons this will lead to some amount of 
"free riding" (consuming a public good without contributing or contributing very little to it) by lesser 
                                                 
13 Charles Cooper and Benjamin Zycher, Perceptions of NATO Burdensharing, Chapter II, (Santa Monica: RAND, 
1989). 
14 Mark Boyer, International Cooperation and Public Goods; Opportunities for the Western Alliance. (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 14. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 15. 
17 Ibid., 16. 
 8
powers in the alliance.  There are some problems with Olson’s and Zeckhauser’s analysis in that this 
model does not take all aspects of contributions to an alliance into account, that it assumes that decisions 
are taken without consultation, and that defense can be produced equally by all countries.  However, 
though further work by Bruce Russett, Todd Sandler and others have refined the model and shown that 
there are various outputs from defense spending, not all of which are public goods (joint product model), 
it has not been repudiated in terms limited to the public goods provision of defense capability in alliances.  
Two key but countering findings were that because some defense spending has dual public and private 
use (a soldier and his weapon can put down domestic uprisings as well as contribute to an alliance) 
nations will tend to spend slightly more than predicted by the model, and that in an alliance with nuclear 
weapons those states that join can consume the public good of nuclear protection with out any 
contribution in providing that good (strong free riding).  
Work by Sandler and Murdoch looked at NATO burdensharing in the 1990s.  They found that the 
joint product model, with an increasing level of publicness as the larger allies adopted precision 
munitions, applied to the data available for NATO in the 1990s.  They also describe the link between the 
security environment and the alliance’s strategic concept as being directly related to the level of pure 
public goods in the alliance over time.   Under MAD deterrence was a pure public good while Flexible 
Response engendered a provision of joint products, and the move to precision munitions provided more 
public goods within the alliance.18  In other words, the strategic environment directly relates to the 
amount of public goods produced by an alliance.  If the strategic environment is characterized by the 
absence of a threat to sovereignty or territorial integrity, what would be the motive of states to increase 
their contribution of joint products to the alliance? 
What is the implication of this for the creation of ESDI?  The model described above has been 
used to understand the problem of burdensharing within NATO.  It rightly predicts that the larger power 
in the alliance will provide a disproportionate share of the public goods used by an alliance (even if most 
                                                 
18 Todd Sandler and James Murdoch, “On Sharing NATO Defense Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond,” Fiscal 
Studies 21, no. 3. (2000): 297-327. 
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goods within an alliance fit the joint product model), but it does so for its own interest.  What would 
influence the Europeans to divert additional resources toward defense?  The U.S. has proved throughout 
the Cold War and beyond that it is not only willing to provide the extra defense capability, but also to use 
its capabilities in the European region (Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia). The Europeans claim that the 
creation of ESDI will respond to long standing U.S. complaints about burdensharing and will increase the 
European capabilities within NATO.  What is seen in practice is something entirely different.   
NATO, in response to the growing gap in capabilities between the US and its allies (demonstrated 
in operations over Kosovo), initiated in April 1999 a “Defense Capabilities Initiative” (DCI) designed to 
improve European forces in those critical areas where they had been left behind by emerging technologies 
in command, control, communications, computers, information, precision weapons, deployable forces, 
sustainment, and survivability.19   DCI, despite the persistent and energetic appeals of the NATO 
Secretary General Lord Robertson, was an abysmal failure. DCI was quietly buried at the November 2002 
Prague Summit, where the idea of the European allies providing  “niche capabilities” was proposed by the 
US as an alternative method for improving the quality of European forces.  The Europeans simply would 
not increase their defense spending to improve capabilities; in fact they continue to cut defense budgets.  
Data published by the Europeans themselves continues to demonstrate the lack of investment in 
defense by the Europeans.20  The 2007 data shows that while Europe had a larger overall GDP and greater 
governmental spending, their defense spending was less than half that of the US, and that defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP continued on a downward spiral.  Furthermore, EDA data that compares 
the levels of defense investment year to year within Europe for 2005 to 2007 shows a continual decrease 
in Research and Development.  
If ESDI was designed to strengthen the European Pillar of NATO, then funding of the DCI 
(which would have improved precisely those critical capabilities the Europeans need to undertake 
                                                 
19 Elinor Sloan, “DCI:Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs,” NATO Review 48, 
(Spring/Summer 2000):  4-7. 
20  See Appendix I of this study on page 462 for tables comparing defense spending and investment in defense. 
European Defense Agency, available from  http://www.eda.europa.eu/defencefacts/  Internet; accessed 12 
September 2009.  
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operations without the US), would have demonstrated that.  The reality is that in the current strategic 
environment (characterized by the absence of a conventional threat to sovereignty or territorial integrity), 
the European allies lack a motive to increase their contribution to NATO’s collective defense.      
What is observed is Europe relying on NATO to provide for its collective defense, and within 
NATO the US providing the bulk of the public goods.  No European state has claimed that ESDI should 
replace NATO as the collective defense organization for Europe.  Why should they? ESDI would not 
have the capabilities without NATO to provide for their defense.  There is no empirical reason for Europe 
to increase its defense capabilities absent a threat with the U.S. providing the level of defense capabilities 
in the alliance that it currently does.  Given the current security environment why should Europe do 
more?  ESDI is clearly not based on a new found public virtue by the Europeans to finally answer US 
complaints about burdensharing, otherwise they would have increased their defense investment.  The 
result of the demonstrated lack of increased European defense investment is that the official explanation 
of building the "European Pillar of NATO" as the reason for the creation of ESDI is clearly suspect.  
1-4 (b). Theories of European Integration 
There is a considerable body of literature dealing with theories of European Integration.  These 
are theories that have been developed to explain what has been observed with the ever increasing 
integration in the EU.  These theories have been useful in explaining some aspects of EU integration 
which as a process has been notable for its incremental advancement as well as various setbacks.  U.S. 
observers often discount this incremental approach as it runs counter to our experience of major 
endeavors undertaken and completed relatively quickly. This incremental integration process is outlined 
in the major theories on integration, chief among these are Federalism, Functionalism, Transactionalism, 
and Neo-functionalism.   
Federalism as a theory has a long history21 but is marked by considerable conceptual and practical 
ambiguity.22  Conceptually it can encompass centralizing as well as decentralizing tendencies, there is no 
                                                 
21  Abbé de Saint-Pierre, The Project for Settling Perpetual Peace in Europe, 1713 
22  Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 23. 
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agreed formula on how powers should be apportioned among units, whether it follows from interactions 
among peoples or from constitutional design, or whether it is born of an incremental process or a single 
act of constitutional construction.  What is agreed is that it is a political problem.23  Generally in relation 
to the experience in the EU “It is very difficult to separate federalist theorizing from federalist advocacy 
and, by the same token, it is difficult to find a single coherent body of European federalist theory.”24  A 
general idea about Federalism as a theory in the EU context would be the use of a contract or contracts 
(series of intergovernmental treaties or agreements) to create supranational institutions which share power 
with national governments.  A crucial flaw in the use of Federalism as a theory of integration is that 
Federalism does not postulate why governments or peoples would chose to integrate in a Federal 
framework.  The assumption is that Federalism is an end in itself. 25   It cannot answer why increased 
military cooperation shifting toward integration in the EU would be a public good or a goal; Federalism 
therefore falls short in providing an explanation. 
Functionalism as a theory can be seen as a precursor to a number of current theoretical 
approaches in the liberal-idealist tradition such as interdependence theory and regime theory.26  
Functionalism does have a widely acknowledged leading scholar, David Mitrany, who wrote before and 
after World War II.27  For functionalists “form follows function”28 in creating institutions that are focused 
on meeting human needs not the demands of territorially defined political concerns.  Functionalist 
integration focuses on meeting these needs by the linking of governmental responsibility to specific 
technical tasks and functions across territories so that the task oriented institutions created in the process, 
over time, become supranational in scope.  This would involve a small bit of each state’s sovereignty 
being transferred to the authority that deals with each particular function.  This occurs in various areas 
until there is an attainment of a ‘community’.  In this manner functionalism “evolves” in an unconscious 
                                                 
23  Ibid., 23-29. 
24  Ibid. 29. 
25 Gulnur Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation 1945-1991, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1997), 12-14. 
26  Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 31. 
27  Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation 1945-1991, 17. 
28  Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 34. 
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manner.29   On the other hand functionalism needs the agency of state actors to create institutions but does 
not address the political interactions that would be required, especially the reason that states would 
voluntarily relinquish part of their sovereignty.  In addition, the method or reason for how a group of 
functional supranational institutions would integrate into a larger entity is not specified.  In fact Mitrany 
was against regional integration.30   Four key criticisms of functionalism are that: it is not scientifically 
rigorous and lacks a foundational theoretical statement; it has a weak predictive ability; its assumption of 
technical necessity trumping political determinations in conflictual systems is not valid and perhaps 
naive; and finally its assumption that governments would follow rational utilitarian logic in policy choices 
simply because of rationality itself is flawed.31  Although military integration would have to be an 
incredibly technical and functional undertaking, Functionalism does not provide a sufficient explanation.   
Neo-functionalism incorporates elements of functionalism and federalism and is perhaps the most 
prevalent integration theory regarding Europe. Chief among the neo-functionalist scholars is Ernst Haas 
who first articulated key neo-functionalist ideas in 1958 in The Uniting of Europe.32  A key difference 
with functionalism was the acceptance of politics and agency back into the integration process.   
“Neo-functionalism was built around the proposition that an international society of states can 
acquire the procedural characteristics of a domestic political system.  The interested actor and 
group-based politics assumptions meant that neo-functionalists held that the industrialized, 
pluralistic and bureaucratic nature of modern Europe ensured the inevitable presence of self-
interested groups. The aggregation of the actions of these groups created patterns of behavior that 
would come to constitute a system.” 33 
These groups in the pursuit of their interests, would desire access to the technical regional supranational 
institutions created to manage the functional area affecting them so as to influence policy, and would over 
time, trans-nationalize their interest groups and even change their loyalties from the national to the 
supranational.34  Neo-functionalists thought that States would be compelled to integrate in an economic 
sector based on calculations of interest and economic advantage in discrete technical areas.  Integration 
                                                 
29 Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation 1945-1991, 16-21. 
30  Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 37. 
31  Ibid., 39-41. 
32  Ibid., 54. 
33  Ibid., 56. 
34  Ibid., 56. 
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would then be adopted as a conscious goal, as a shared commitment between elites and leaders of the 
different states involved for that particular technical area.  These functional activities in technical areas 
based on contractual agreements and institution building when successful creates a positive feedback so 
that other interest groups in related technical areas seek to create their own integrated functional area.  
This is described as a “spillover” effect from one functional area to another which then leads to 
agreements in other areas as interest groups lobby their governments to support integration.  This process 
multiplies until the spillover effect leads to the attainment of a sense of community.35   In addition, the 
supranational institutions would act to further their interests working to expand jurisdiction and 
establishing direct links to the sub-national functional technical communities they were involved with.   
There are however, preconditions for neo-functionalism to work. These preconditions are that the 
participating states must have a high level of economic and industrial development, common ideologies 
and values, and have pluralistic social structures.36  All these factors were and are present in Europe. 
Neo-functionalism, of the theories of integration, offers the best explanation, for example, of the 
dynamics of the successful European Monetary Union (EMU). In both the French and German cases of 
the process leading to EMU there were key aspects of Neo-functionalism that were at work.  Both saw 
integration to be in their best interest; for France it is a chance to moderate German economic power and 
gain some economic benefit, Germany saw EMU as part of the integration process further binding 
‘Europe’ together.  In the technical areas of creation of the single market, integration was adopted by both 
countries as a conscious goal.  The consistent support for EMU by the major political parties in both 
countries can be viewed as a shared commitment between elites and leaders.  The functional activities in 
the creation of the common market (the EMS, ecu, Single European Act) based on contractual agreements 
and institution building, (which were successful) led to the agreements in other areas, (the EMU process) 
until the spillover effect led to the attainment of a sense of community  (or to a common currency). 
                                                 
35 Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation 1945-1991, 16-21. 
36  Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 69.  
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As useful as neo-functionalism is in this case, it has some inherent limits.  The preconditions 
enumerated by Hass seem to limit the theory to the case of European integration as he himself admitted.  
Work by Joseph Nye pointed to additional structural preconditions and explanations other than spillover 
as being behind the observed integration in Europe.  Among these were perceptions by participating states 
regarding the equity of integration outcomes which could hinder integration, perceptions that the costs of 
integration were low or exportable would speed and deepen integration, and perceptions of external 
threats and agreed policy responses could explain integration as well.37  The key problem however, is the 
continued and persistent activity of states in the process as well as nationalism as a force that limited 
integration.  In addition neo-functionalism suffers from a dependent variable problem. “It was simply 
impossible to establish accurately what a successful prediction might be, given that the theory had a 
highly ambiguous notion of the terminal conditions of integration.”38  The question then is how far will 
integration based on neo-functionalism extend?  Although this theory has some explanatory power in 
other fields such as economic integration; no research to date has shown that integration in any other area 
has had a spillover effect into the area of defense.  Therefore, while Neo-functionalism and the concept of 
integration spillover from one policy arena into another may answer questions of economic integration it 
does not approach the key act of security integration.  Without the key decision to integrate defense, 
integration will stall and fail on the hard reality of security dilemmas in an anarchic world. 
Transactionalism also has a widely acknowledged leading scholar; Karl Deutsch.   
Transactionalists seek to explain regional integration as a process in which the volume and rate of 
communication and transactions among peoples changes public opinion overtime leading to a sense of 
“community” within the region.39  These transactions and communication can take place through all 
possible topic or policy areas, be they political, economic, social, or cultural, and through all possible 
methods.40  This development of a sense of community is thought to be an incremental process which 
                                                 
37  Ibid., 72. 
38  Ibid., 87. 
39  Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation 1945-1991, 23. 
40  Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 42. 
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does fit with the observed incremental EU integration process.  For transactionalists integration happened 
in ‘security communities’ that were a product of their hypothesis that “a sense of community among states 
was a function of the level of communication between states.”41  Deutsch defined integration as “the 
attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough 
and widespread enough to assure for a ‘long time,’ dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among 
its population.”42  Key to the development of this a sense of community among states was the level of 
reciprocal responsiveness of the transactions between them which could be impeded by technology, 
economic or industrial limitations, cultural dynamics, population movements, or international concerns.  
Deutsch did not agree with functionalists that international civil servants in technical functional 
organizations would be able to create a sufficient volume or impact public opinion positively enough to 
create the conditions for any sense of community between states.43  If however a ‘security community’ 
forms, Deutsch proposed two types; ‘pluralistic security communities’ and ‘amalgamated security 
communities’.  In pluralistic security communities, states maintain their own governments and only had 
three requirements; compatibility of key values, the ability of important political groups to respond 
reciprocally without violence, and mutually predictable political, economic and social activities.44  
Deutsch believed pluralistic security communities were more probable in practice and were more durable.   
Transactionalism can be criticized on several counts.  First, there is an assumption that increased 
communication would inevitably lead to a positive change of attitude between peoples.  Second, even if 
that occurred, how do informal transactions lead to formal institution building?  Finally, there are 
problems of measurement and operationalization given the concept of integration as being dependent on 
the degree of intensity felt regarding the mutual identification of identities among groups.45   On the 
positive side since Deutsch viewed these concepts as quantitative there would be a large number of 
historical cases that could be compared regarding attitudinal change and identification, and 
                                                 
41  Ibid., 44. 
42  Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 5. 
43  Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 45. 
44  Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 6. 
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transactionalism has the potential to be a better general theory than neo-functionalism because of the use 
of multiple historical cases of the creation of security communities to offer a number of theoretical 
propositions.   The chief problem for this study with transactionalism is that there is no explanation of 
how the process of transition from transactions to integration to amalgamation would occur.46  It did 
however provide a basis for further inquiry by Adler and Barnett that will be examined in the section on 
constructivism and pluralistic security communities.  
1-4 (c). Realism and Neo-Realism 
 If the Europeans are creating a type of sub-alliance within NATO then there are a number of 
attributes that will be incorporated in some combination within that alliance.  First is the type of bond that 
defines a state’s commitment to the alliance.  There can be either a formal bond, when the states have 
ratified the commitment in accordance with their legal procedures, or an informal commitment.  A formal 
commitment creates a binding contract on the member states recognized by international law.  An 
informal commitment in contrast may or may not be reciprocal.  This is formed as a by-product of formal 
alliances, arms deals, executive agreements, or the extension of a "security umbrella" over a state or area.  
The second attribute of an alliance is the membership of the alliance.  The two aspects of this are the size 
of the membership, and the power of the members.  The third attribute of an alliance is its type.  This is 
the definition of the obligation assumed by the members, and exists in several categories; offensive or 
wartime alliances, defensive or mutual security, neutrality or nonaggression pacts, and what is called an 
"entente" or an understanding that can range from offensive to defensive pacts.  The final attribute is the 
scope of the alliance.  This involves the duration of the pact, the obligations or burden-sharing 
agreements, the conditions that will activate the alliance, and the decision making process that will be 
used within the alliance.47   The attributes of an alliance that describes ESDI (if it were the European 
pillar of NATO) are: that it is a formal mutual security alliance incorporating the WEU’s Article V 
                                                 
46  Ibid., 46-47. 
47 Alan N. Sabrosky, Alliances in U.S. Foreign Policy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 2-4.  
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guarantee with a membership that only partly overlaps that of NATO; whose members do not have the 
power (capabilities) of NATO; and its decision making process is internal to the EU with no set duration.   
A Realist explanation for the formation of alliances focuses on the power possessed by a state in 
terms of its military capability, and the addition to that power of the capabilities of another state.  A state 
will enter into an alliance when it sees the benefit of an increase in its military capability.   This will either 
be in response to an external threat (balancing), or in aligning with the dominant military power or threat 
to preserve its existence (bandwagoning).  The Neo-realist perspective relies on the distribution of 
power/capabilities in the international system to explain balance of power behavior of states in within the 
system.  This means that the relative power of the units in the system (distribution of capabilities) 
determines how the system functions.  Capabilities are an attribute of the unit, while the distribution of 
capabilities is a function of the system.  Waltz believes that at a minimum states seek their own 
preservation, not to maximize power. Their first concern is to maintain their position in the system.  
Therefore, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions in order to maintain their position in the 
system and this leads to balances of power.48   Realism and Neo-Realism both explain alliance formation 
in terms of balance of power politics. 
The central idea of traditional balance of power theory is that weaker states form alliances in 
order to counter a strong power from dominating them.  This is done in order to primarily preserve the 
existence of the state.   Weaker states ally with those states that cannot easily dominate them.  States will 
also tend to join the weaker side not only because of the reduced probability of being dominated, but also 
because the weaker side is in greater need of assistance and will offer the opportunity for the state to 
increase its influence vis-à-vis the other states in that alliance.   Allying with the stronger side gives the 
weaker new member state little influence because it adds less to the power of the alliance.49      
Bandwagoning behavior is the opposite of balancing. The underlying theme of bandwagoning is 
that states are attracted to strength, or put another way, "in international politics, nothing succeeds like 
                                                 
48 Kenneth Waltz, “Chapters 4-5,” in Neo-Realism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986) 
49 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987) Chapter 2. 
 18
success".50   The more demonstrably successful and powerful a state is the more likely other weaker states 
are to ally with it.  On the other hand if a powerful state declines in its relative power, its allies may either 
defect to the other side or become neutral.  In this view most alliances are very fragile.  Two reasons may 
be given for this behavior.  Bandwagoning could be thought of as a form of appeasement.  By aligning 
with the rising state or coalition the bandwagoning state hopes to preserve the state by diverting the 
powerful to attack in another area.  The other reason for bandwagoning is that a state will join the winning 
side in wartime in order to share in the spoils of victory.51    
Power or capabilities, however, may not be the only factor that nations use to determine which 
side to ally with.   Stephen Walt argues that threat is a more important factor in determining who a state 
will ally with.  He believes that it is more accurate to say that "states tend to ally with or against the 
foreign power that poses the greatest threat".52   Walt subdivides the concept of threat into the component 
elements of aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intention.53   
Aggregate power can be a factor for either balancing or bandwagoning in that powerful states can either 
reward allies or punish enemies.  Geographic proximity is a factor in that states that are closer can project 
military power more easily than those that are distant, so states are likely to make decisions based in 
response to nearby powers rather than on what is happening in a faraway country.   Offensive power is a 
factor in that states with a large offensive capability are likely to engender the formation of a counter-
balancing alliance, vice a state that may be powerful but lacks the ability to threaten the sovereignty or 
territorial integrity of another state.  Aggressive intentions are the final factor in that states that are 
aggressive will provoke other states to balance against it.  An overly aggressive state will not be seen as a 
viable bandwagon partner in that the weaker power cannot be sure that it too will not suffer at the hands 
of its erstwhile partner.54    
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Geoffery Blainey, The Causes of War, (New York: Free Press, 1988). 
52 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 21. 
53  “Aggressive intention” has been noted by other scholars to be an inherently Constructivist concept.  
54 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 21. 
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Walt paints a sharp contrast between the types of systems produced by balancing and 
bandwagoning.  A balancing system will be more peaceful because threatening states will provoke other 
states into resisting them.  A bandwagoning system will be much more competitive in that appearances of 
strength and potential aggression by great powers will be rewarded by alliances of weaker states trying to 
gain favor or spoils.  A statesman then must be careful to ensure that he understands which system he is 
operating in.  Aggressive behavior appropriate for a bandwagoning system in a balancing world will 
cause other states to oppose you more vigorously, and moderate behavior appropriate for a balancing 
system in a bandwagoning world will cause your allies to defect and leave you vulnerable to an 
aggressive coalition.  In terms of bandwagoning versus balancing, Walt concludes that weaker states will 
tend to bandwagon in that they must choose the winning side in a conflict because they add little to a 
defensive coalition but will suffer from the more powerful winner.  Only if they are strong enough to 
affect the outcome of a conflict is it appropriate for them to balance.  On the other hand stronger states 
will tend to balance because they will gain greater rewards for their contribution to an alliance which 
meant the difference between victory and defeat. 
Traditional realist explanations for alliance formation in the international system do not assist in 
explaining what the EU is doing.  First and foremost there is no conventional military threat to provoke 
the formation of an alliance.  No state in Europe or in geographic proximity to Europe has the offensive 
military capability to threaten a European NATO, or EU member, state’s sovereignty or territorial 
integrity and no state in Europe or in geographic proximity to Europe is currently seen as an aggressive 
power.   Neither do any transnational threats, the unresolved Balkan conflicts, or Islamist terrorism 
present a threat to Europe’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.  Non-traditional threats such as terrorism 
are also, to a large degree, being addressed by existing alliance and multinational security arrangements.  
Therefore, no external cause exists for the EU to form a “European Pillar of NATO” to balance against 
another state or group of states.  Second, an alliance already exists that includes Europe with the 
remaining world superpower.  In such an alliance it would be expected that bandwagoning behaviors 
should be seen (and quite evidently are) in regards to NATO expansion. This is despite the fact that 
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NATO, according to some realists, should naturally have disbanded following the Cold War.55   The 
continued existence and growth of the North Atlantic Alliance poses a fundamental problem for realist 
explanations for the increased defense cooperation and shift toward integration in the EU.  If alliances are 
formed to increase the power and capabilities of states, or in response to a threat in the international 
system, why would an “EU pillar of NATO” be needed if NATO already performs the function of 
collective defense for its member states much better than anything the EU could provide lacking the link 
to the U.S. superpower?  The EU is not balancing against NATO because ESDI is presumably being 
formed as a “separable but not separate” part of NATO.  Balance of power Realist explanations for the 
formations of alliances in the international system do not explain what the EU is doing. 
Neo-Realist explanations view the increase in security cooperation in the EU as a byproduct of 
the changes in the international system following the Cold War.  Seth Jones 2006 book “The Rise of 
European Security Cooperation” takes this view, and furthermore ascribes increased defense cooperation 
to a “binding” strategy that would keep a unified Germany under control by subsuming its military 
capability under the aegis of the EU.56  Other Neo-Realists propose that a relative weakening of the 
current Hegemonic Power could provide a rational for the push by Europe to build a European defense 
capacity.  The problem with these arguments is that they ignore the history of previous post WWII 
European defense integration efforts and specifically the developments with the WEU and its relationship 
with the EU in the late 1980’s and 1990’s.  The decision to move forward with defense integration in 
Europe predates the changes in the post-cold war international system. There were several attempts to 
integrate European militaries such as the European Defense Community (EDC, 1952-1954) and the 
Fouchet plan (1958-1962), neither of which came to fruition.  The key however, is found in the "Platform 
on European Security Interests" adopted by the WEU Ministerial Council on 27 October 1987; also 
known as the Hague Platform. The WEU Hague Platform is a decision taken prior to end of the Cold 
War and Maastricht.   The Hague Platform preamble states that:  
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"We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European 
Act, which we all signed as Members of the European Community. We are convinced that the 
construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include 
security and defense."57   
 
This decision was carried forward as the WEU was revived in the late 1980’s through the  1990’s and 
then incorporated into the EU as it absorbed the WEU crisis management function in December 1999 at 
the Helsinki Council meeting.  Increased military cooperation moving toward integration within the EU is 
therefore not a result of change in international structure; rather it is the latest of several previous attempts 
which indicates a prior existing motive and impetus.  Neo-Realist explanations also ignore the internal 
changes to German society that had already negated the “German problem” as well as the German 
government’s clear decisions to “bind” itself to Europe prior to the end of the Cold War.58  All of this 
serves to reemphasize a chief criticism; Realism and Neo-Realism cannot explain cooperation in a system 
of anarchy outside of Balance of Power Politics.59  
 1-4 (d). Neo-Liberalism 
If Realist explanations fall short in explaining why Europe is experiencing increased military 
cooperation shifting toward integration, then perhaps neo-liberalism can provide an answer.  This may be 
productive since the European Union is often pointed to as the primary and most successful example of 
neo-liberal institutionalism at work.   Whereas Realism leads to a focus on the formation of alliances and 
collective defense mechanisms as an explanation for increased military cooperation moving toward 
integration within the EU, neo-liberalism looks at collective security mechanisms in explaining the ability 
of states to work together in terms of their mutual security.  Collective Security is based on the idea of all 
against one.  States may retain autonomy in their foreign policy but, within the collective security regime 
or organization each member has a binding commitment to join a coalition to confront any aggressor with 
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overwhelming power.  This should produce a more stable system by preventing war and aggression 
through confronting an aggressor with an unbeatable opposition, and by fostering a cooperative 
atmosphere that mitigates the rivalry and hostility of an anarchic world.60      
Collective security is not an alliance.  It does not guarantee that states will join a balancing 
coalition but, because of their commitment, it makes the formation of a coalition more likely.   Under 
anarchy only those states which are directly threatened will join a coalition to oppose aggression, but with 
a collective security system those states with an interest in protecting the international order will 
contribute to a coalition even if not directly threatened, but there is no prior agreement to a defense 
structure (as in a collective defense organization or existing alliance).  However, collective security has 
several desirable and observable attributes: 
"Collective security facilitates identification of aggressor states.  ....collective security 
organizations enhance transparency and encourage states to maintain relatively low levels of 
military-especially offensive- capability.  Because of these features, it would be very difficult for 
a state to develop robust offensive capability without being detected."61 
Before a collective security organization can take shape there are several necessary preconditions that 
must be present in the international system.62   First, no state in the system can be so powerful that no 
possible coalition could overcome it.  Second, all major powers must have similar views of what is an 
acceptable and stable international system.  There can be no major power that desires to overturn the 
international status quo.  The final condition is that the major powers must enjoy a minimum of political 
solidarity and moral community.63  This precondition is similar to Kant’s "Federation of Republican 
States" which is also in part the basis of the Democratic Peace theory.   
 What then can be said about Europe and ESDI in light of the preconditions and observable 
attributes of collective security?   In "Primed for Peace- Europe after the Cold War", Stephen Van Evera 
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makes the case that in fact Europe is different now.64  The causes of war between the major powers of 
Europe have dissipated.  There are no more aggressive militaristic states, and Germany especially has 
been transformed.  All of Western Europe is solidly in the community of democratic states, so that if 
Democratic Peace theory has any validity no Western European state will ever again fight another 
Western European state.   The economic integration of the EU ensures that no European state even 
considers military action against its partners as a viable option.  Countries that wanted to enter NATO or 
the EU have been forced to reach accommodations with their neighbors concerning borders and ethnic 
minorities to the point where those issues have been eliminated as points of contention between them.  No 
European state has a preponderance of power such that it could overcome any coalition that could be 
brought against it.  Collective security is what best describes the current environment in Europe, and this 
regime has become embodied in an organization; the OSCE.   
The OSCE has become the collective security organization for Europe, and demonstrates the 
observable attributes of a collective security organization.  The OSCE has been extremely successful in 
promoting transparency and reduced levels of conventional military capabilities through the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Open Skies agreement, and other Confidence and Security Building 
Measures (CSBMs).  The elimination of a Cold War threat and the budget reductions needed to meet the 
criteria for European Monetary Union (EMU) have also contributed in no small part to the sharp 
decreases in military capabilities of European states. Additionally an ideal collective security organization 
is inclusive because it is based on the principle of security for all.  In this regard the OSCE is the most 
inclusive European security organization with 54 member countries including Canada and the U.S. and 
has expanded its activities in election monitoring, treatment of ethnic minorities and citizenship 
requirements, along with peacekeeping and monitoring activities.   
On the other hand ESDI is clearly not a collective security organization.  Though obviously based 
in part on the Kantian "Federation of Republican States" in terms of the membership being western 
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industrialized democracies, it is also in that regard an exclusive organization, currently limited to 
members of the EU (or previously to the Western European Union - WEU).   A collective security 
organization also is focused on reducing military capabilities and is defensive in nature. ESDI is exclusive 
and focused on improving power projection capabilities for intervention operations (i.e. a rapid reaction 
“battlegroups” and deployable HQs) not for defense of member states’ territorial integrity or sovereignty.   
In the end while neo-liberalism explains the current environment of European security, and its 
collective security organization the OSCE, it does not provide an explanation for increased military 
cooperation shifting toward integration.  Collective security in the final analysis is to set the conditions 
for cooperation and formation of coalitions to oppose aggressor states.  However, as noted previously 
there is no aggressor state to function as an impetus for formation of an opposing coalition or for 
increased military cooperation shifting toward integration in the EU.   
1-4 (e). Constructivism 
There is one final approach to investigate that may shed some light on the problem.  Though 
Constructivism is methodologically and epistemologically interpretive, it is not necessarily post-
positivist.  For this reason some scholars view it as occupying a middle ground between positivism and 
post-positivism.  Constructivism as an approach proposes that subjective ideas shared among actors 
determine the interests and identities of those actors.  This is because these shared ideas (e.g. what 
constitutes self and other) give meaning to material objects and forces (e.g. the UK view of French 
nuclear weapons versus Soviet nuclear weapons).  Meaning or purpose is therefore constructed from the 
shared perceptions of identities and interests which are in turn ideationally based.  These identities and 
interests shape the behavior of actors, and this behavior either reinforces existing ideas about their 
identities and interests or gives new meaning to them.  This intersubjective knowledge is the basis for a 
structure constraining and shaping behavior through social interaction.  Through a socialization process 
actors ‘co-constitute and co-determine’ each other within this structure.  So though the structure shapes 
the actors, the structure itself is also constructed and altered by the interaction of its constituent actors. 
This portrays actors as having identities and interests that are both historically path dependent, yet also 
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highly changeable depending on the context and behavior of other actors.  An actor can change its identity 
and interests either in reaction to other actors, or as an act of will to change a structure that is 
disadvantageous.  In Constructivism ideas and process are the foundation of international politics.65 
The Constructivist approach so far has tried to explain EU defense integration as an out-growth of 
the creation of a “European Identity” developed in response to integration in other areas.  Identity has 
deep roots in international relations theory although it has not always had a prominent role in the 
dominant theories of Realism/Neo-Realism.  For instance, the recognition that perception of threat is key 
in explaining balance of power decisions of states is based on issues of identity; either as aggressor or 
non-aggressor.  Kant’s federation of republican states is clearly based on the concept of a common 
identity (as republics) which shows identity has a long history in Liberal thought, but Neo-liberalism has 
tended to focus on structural issues not identity.66  Constructivism in contrast brings issues of identity to 
the center of international relations theory.  Alexander Wendt argues that “constructed identities can 
directly affect how states perceive each other and therefore their interactions in the international 
system,”67 and Katzenstein puts issues of identity front and center regarding issues of national security 
decisions taken by states, and defines “identity as a shorthand label for varying constructions of nation- 
and statehood. The process of construction typically is explicitly political and pits conflicting actors 
against each other.”68   
In terms of integration, identity can be seen as a topic in the literature concerning nationalism.  
There are three major viewpoints regarding identity and nationalism.  The first view is primordialism 
which views national identity as unchangeable and as something ‘real’ rather than constructed.  Anthony 
D. Smith, as the chief proponent of primordialism, argues that nationalism draws on a pre-existing history 
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and attempts to fashion this history into a sense of common identity based on ethno-symbolism.  This 
does not require that all members should be ethnically identical but rather that they must feel a deep 
attachment to the nation.  Smith also admits that many nationalisms are based on inaccurate parts of their 
history.  This tends to undercut his argument in that as Napoleon once suggested “history is but a fable 
agreed upon” and therefore could itself be constructed.  On the other hand, Smith points to the failed 
ideological and cultural indoctrination efforts of the communist elites in Eastern Europe for almost fifty 
years to construct new national identities as an example of a primordial limitation on efforts to construct 
nationality.69 
The constructivist view in contrast holds that nothing that is fixed or predetermined in the concept 
of the nation.  Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities - Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism can be seen as the start of a constructivist view of national formation.  Anderson believed 
that decline of religion, the development of capitalism, and the technology of print made it possible to 
imagine the nation.  He defined “the nation: it is an imagined political community - - and imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion.”70  This process of imagining or creating a national identity is the 
result of complex social interactions.  What is crucial about this view is that:  
“national identification can change if and when these social interactions change. A nation in this 
conception is anything but immutable. It is wholly subjective, dependent on psychology rather 
than on biology. It could be conceived almost as an affair of the heart, a spiritual communion 
born out of the complex web of social structures constituting people’s interests, perceptions, and 
identities.”71 
In addition, constructivists believe that individuals have multiple identities based on differing 
relationships, (e.g. father, worker, religious membership, political affiliation etc.) that various factors can 
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trigger a shift from one identity to another, and that identities can change across time and space.72  People 
can change identities for example because of economic incentives such as changing jobs, in which case 
identity becomes a choice based on interests.  Identities can be shaped by elites and politicians who either 
have access to, or control of, the media which gives them great influence in guiding the social interactions 
that constitute the mechanism of identity formation.73  At a certain level a new identity can reach a tipping 
point from which it spreads throughout the population and becomes dominant.74     
The Modernist Theory of Nationalism espoused by Ernest Gellner also does not view national 
identity as a given.  Gellner argues that nationalism is feature of modern industrial society. Previously 
states were not structured by nationalist forces, which seems to indicate that industrial states deliberately 
manufactured nationalism for their own advantage.  Nationalism is seen as a tool created by the elites for 
the purpose of economic gain and economic cohesion.  Gellner states 'Nationalism is not the awakening 
of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.'75   “Nationalism uses the pre-
existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very 
selectively, and it most often transforms them radically. Dead languages can be revived, traditions 
invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored.” 76  In essence this instrumentalist argument is really a 
variation of constructivism that posits a deliberate rather than organic creation of nationalism.77  
In regards to investigating EU defense integration as an out-growth of the development of a 
“European Identity” produced in response to integration in other areas; so far the research looking at 
defense arms production and identity has only disproved this proposition.78  I believe that the process 
works in reverse; identity results from military integration.  I propose that the decision to become 
“brothers-in-arms” is crucial to the development of an “us” vs. “others” identity.  Furthermore, this 
                                                 
72 Rousseau and van der Veen, “The Emergence of a Shared Identity,” 688. 
73 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's  Romania, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 15. 
74 Rousseau and van der Veen, “The Emergence of a Shared Identity,” 689. 
75  Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
76  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 55–56.  
77  Adeed Dawisha, Nation and Nationalism: Historical Antecedents to Contemporary Debates.   
78  Willie Eugene Cobble, The Politics of Identity and Interest in European Defense Industrial Collaboration,  (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Cornell University, 2004). 
 28
identity cannot fully develop without the assurance that the members of “Europe” are not only not a threat 
but are in fact fighting to defend “Europe” together rather than each constituent state separately.  This 
paper will endeavor to show that an increase in defense integration should, over time, increase the level of 
identification of members of the EU with a European identity. 
This argument follows the literature of “security communities” of sovereign states first articulated 
by Karl Deutsch in 1957 specifically looking at Europe and North America.79  A security community is a 
group of states that have established a durable peace and have determined to avoid military conflict to 
settle disputes.  Security communities are able in some fashion then to overcome the security dilemmas 
found in an anarchic world.   The more recent work by Adler and Barnett from a constructivist 
perspective took Deutsch’s idea of a pluralistic security community (where states retain separate 
governments) and refined it by ascribing three main characteristics for a community: (1) shared identities, 
values and meanings; (2) many-sided and direct relations amongst the units; and (3) diffuse reciprocity.80  
Members of such a community expect peaceful change and resolution to their disputes so that in a 
“mature” pluralistic security community there is reciprocal trust, a shared identity, and almost no 
possibility of war.81  For Adler the key to security communities is shared values, identities, and norms so 
that in examining the NATO enlargement process he notes:  "new members can be admitted only after the 
'applicants' have learned and internalized their norms.  For the original members it's not enough to behave 
like us, you have to be one of us". 82   
Norms are commonly defined as an accepted standard way of behaving or doing things. 
Katzenstein defines norms as "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given 
identity”.83  Another definition is one that ascribes to ‘institutions’ a similar function of being “a stable 
collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific 
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situations, ...embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation.”84   Finnermore and 
Sikkink clarify this seeming conflation of definitions by describing institutions as “aggregations of norms 
that interrelate and are structured together.”85  James Fearon's definition of a norm is that "good people do 
(or do not do) X in situations A, B, C" and directly ties the concept of norm to a moral basis within the 
context of its being observed, even though there cannot be a bad norm since its morality is contingent on 
its social acceptance.86   This aspect of moral authority does two things, it can regulate behavior and it can 
form part of an actor’s identity.87  Functionally, norms operate using two aspects; a prescription or 
proscription that instructs actors what they should or should not do, and the parameters within which the 
norm applies (when it should be done and to what degree).  Furthermore, norms exist at all levels of 
social life; individual, community, national, regional, and international. 88    Not all norms command the 
same level of adherence or authority, since they are based on the degree of their social acceptance.89 
These norms are constructed by interactions of various security community members often 
through institutions and organizations:   
“An extremely important role in the construction of the identity of the community 
is played by international organizations and institutions, namely those social 
institutions and material practices that establish behavioral norms, monitoring 
mechanisms and sanctions in case of non-application of the established norms, 
and can push the members of the security community to develop mutual expectations and to 
identify with each other.”90 
There is additional literature regarding security communities and the development of norms and identities 
closely tied to the spread of democracy and “Democratic Peace” that presents security communities as 
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linked to democratization.91  However, it is important to note that security communities are not limited 
conceptually to a democratic context.  Pluralistic security communities can either be “loosely-coupled” or 
“tightly-coupled.”  Loosely-coupled security communities simply meet the required properties of a 
security community but tightly-coupled security communities have a “mutual aid” society and “possess a 
system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized government.”92  
There are several “indicators that demonstrate the existence of a tightly coupled security community; 
cooperative and collective Security, policy coordination against “internal” threats, free movements of 
populations, internationalization of authority, a “multiperspectival” polity,93 and a high level of military 
cooperation  (changed from a high level of military integration ).94  A tightly-coupled security community 
is just a couple of steps away from an “amalgamated” security community.   
Deutsch proposed that amalgamated security communities are those that have a formal integration 
of their constituent states (a common government) to create a larger entity.  Furthermore, Deutsch 
believed that amalgamated security communities are not as common as pluralistic security communities 
and are susceptible to factors that make them unstable such as; increased military burdens, shifts in social 
differentiation, a decline in administrative capabilities, a gap between social expectations and government 
activity, as well as increased political participation and social mobilization.95 
For the formation of am Amalgamated Security Community Deutsch believed that several 
conditions must exist.  These conditions include: mutual compatibility of main values (political, and 
religious); a distinctive way of life and the formation of a common sense of “us”; positive expectations of 
stronger economic ties and gains and noneconomic gains; an increase in political and administrative 
capabilities; superior economic growth; unbroken links of social communication as well as multiplicity of 
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mutual institutions and common transactions; a broadening of the political, social, and economic elites as 
well as links among the elites of different states; geographical mobility of the population; a not infrequent 
change of group roles; and considerable mutual predictability of behavior. 96 A socialization process 
occurs within the security community of peaceful states leading to the creation of a collective identity and 
eventually to a shared sense of “we-ness” among the cooperating states.  An Amalgamated Security 
Community is formed when such conditions are met.97 Another implicit factor must be security 
relationships and military structures within a ‘security community.’  Taking these conditions as implicit 
parts of the definition of Amalgamated Security Communities and combining them with the explicit 
definition of Amalgamation provides a definition that is in line with Deutsch’s intent.98   
Almost no work has been done on Amalgamated Security Communities.  This is perhaps due to 
the dominance of realist and neo-realist paradigms in international relations followed by the ascendance 
of neo-liberalism and the relative newness of the constructivist approach. Another reason proposed by 
Adler and Barnett are problems with the concept developed by Deutsch. “Deutsch’s conceptualization of 
security communities contained various theoretical, conceptual, and methodological problems that 
undoubtedly scared off future applications.”99  Perhaps a refining of the concept of Amalgamated Security 
Communities can provide an understanding of what is occurring in the EU with ESDI. 
 1-5. The Argument 
 
All of the current theoretical approaches share a view of the problem as being a question of a 
security dilemma between states in a system of anarchy.  There is reason to question this view of anarchy 
and sovereignty regarding what is occurring within the EU as group of states in an era of fractured 
sovereignty and variable anarchy.  This paper proposes that since the use of force cannot be undertaken 
by one European state against another independently (because of NATO as well as the other European 
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institutions, WEU / EU / COE etc…) that there exists at the very least a Kantian Anarchy in Europe, and 
in actuality the existence of a supranational EU (often described as multi-level governance or shared 
sovereignty) indicates that there is no “anarchy” at all as is usually described in international relations 
theory.  The contribution and purpose of this study is therefore to propose a process for the creation of 
Amalgamated Security Communities that will serve as an alternative explanation for the creation of ESDI 
given the lack of a conventional military threat to Europe and the continued presence of NATO.   It is an 
attempt to provide a more precise illumination of the specified phenomena of military integration in the 
context of state formation and does not attempt to reject or replace other theories relating to the formation 
of alliances, collective security organizations, or cooperative regimes leading to integration in economic 
or other policy arenas.  
The argument is that once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, especially the 
integration of the capacity to produce military capability, an Amalgamated Security Community (i.e. a 
state or state like entity) will form as a result.  A crucial caveat is that the degree of integration of military 
capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability has a direct and serious impact on the internal 
coherence, war fighting ability, and survival of the resulting state or state like entity.100  In this schema the 
administration and bureaucracy associated with defense activities are critical to preparation for war and 
the founding of an Amalgamated Security Community.  The integration of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability is the elemental step in the creation of a state.  This is a variation 
of Charles Tilly’s argument that “war made the state; and the state made war,”101 in that preparation for 
war makes the state.  Certainly in Tilly’s construct this is a more accurate statement because he ascribes 
the establishment of the bureaucratic apparatuses of the modern state to the task of preparing for war.  
The creation of the ESDI with its increased defense cooperation and move towards integration of forces, 
and creation of an agency to promote integrated defense production (the EDA) can be best explained as 
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part of the process of Amalgamated Security Community formation following a decision to integrate.  
The process can be thought of in the same way that the development of a new norm reaches a tipping 
point which then leads to cascade effect.  In the case of defense integration the tipping point or crucial act 
is the decision to integrate military forces and capabilities to generate military power. This is key because 
it indicates a trust and willingness to depend on a combined military for security thereby redefining who 
is included as a ‘brother-in-arms’; i.e. redefining the ‘us vs. other’ identity at the most basic level. It is 
vital to understand that this is an integration of organizations and structures that determines who is a 
soldier, for whom the soldier fights, and what agency equips and organizes those soldiers.   
One of the aspects of this process involves military institutions which are “formal bounded 
frameworks of rules, roles and identities.”102  This includes but is not limited to aspects such as laws, 
regulations, standard operating procedures, professionalism, ritual, ceremony, and symbols.103  This is a 
part of military culture that extends back to primitive warrior bands before recorded history that continues 
today.  Military Institutions are so common that they allow individuals in different military forces from 
different states to have an almost instant understanding of each other.  On a deeper level they bind 
individuals within a military force to each other and are critical in developing unit cohesion and 
willingness to fight for each other.  They also have a wider application in the community they defend 
when the armed forces incorporate rituals, ceremonies and extensive symbolism designed not only to 
create, but also to affirm, a communal identity.  In terms of collective identity, rituals serve both an 
integrative function as well as to delineate distinctions.  Rituals do not however, have to be separate from 
common group practice on special occasions; they can function to affirm group identity when common 
practice is ritualized.104 This aspect will be examined further in regards to the functions of the militia in 
the U.S. in a later section.   
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 The process of military integration (in contrast with military cooperation), also has an impact on 
the range of identity choices available to a population.  Recent scholarship regarding Social identity and 
self-categorization theories examining the salience of race categories and American national identity 
showed that when people identify with broader groups they deemphasize competition, conflict, and 
negative assessments among the members of subgroups nested within those broader groups, and that 
when people re-categorize others from being members of an out group to being members of a shared in-
group, the same biases that increase the positive assessments of in-group members will be directed toward 
these new members of their in-group.  In terms of policy, when a sub-group identity is salient, e.g., an 
individual state, the focus will be on the consequences of a policy for that state, whereas if a superordinate 
identity is salient, e.g., the nation, then the focus will be on the consequences of a policy for the nation.105  
The relationship of this work to the process of military integration is that the process of integration 
eliminates the sub-group identity of local or sub-state military forces leaving only the superordinate 
identity of national military forces; i.e. the forces of the Amalgamated Security Community.  In other 
words, the structural choice of integrating military forces has an impact on potential identity formation by 
eliminating a previous identity carried by the former military organization and substituting a new identity 
associated with the new military organization.  This mechanism in turn reinforces a new national identity 
in an Amalgamated Security Community.  Therefore, as the number of common (integrated) military 
institutions increases the sense of “us” or a common bond of identity will increase.  This process of 
identity development proposed as an alternative explanation for ESDI is that integration of military 
capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability will, over time, produce an increased sense of 
identity in the context of state formation.  Military institutions, shared combat experiences, the perception 
of being “brothers-in-arms”, and above all integrated military structures, will over time, engender a sense 
of identity in contrast to “others” who are not part of the community.  In this manner military integration 
would lead to identity formation rather than identity causing military integration as previously considered.  
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It is also important to note that the military is seen by some scholars as a crucial component of national 
identity.   
“State militaries are not only fighting forces. Militaries are bearers of national identity. They 
represent nations symbolically to both domestic and international audiences.” “Militaries and 
national identity are inextricably linked. The military is an embodiment of state power (when a 
state projects military force, it is generally, in one way or another, literally projecting the bodies 
of its soldiers), a physical representative of the state and a symbolic representative of the people. 
Cultural constructions of soldiering - representations of ideas about what it means to be a soldier, 
who should be a soldier, and what soldiers should do or not do—help to create national identity. 
They do this by projecting ideals and defining roles for the nation. Our image of our soldiers - be 
it of aggressive warriors, defenders of freedom, defenders of a faith, or humanitarians keeping the 
peace - reflects our idea of what our role in the world should be. The relationship between 
national identity and cultural constructions of soldiering is reflexive: how we define ourselves as 
a people and the role we imagine for ourselves in the world shapes how we define soldiering, at 
the same time that our vision of our military shapes how we understand our role in the world.”106 
How the military is created and the structure of jurisdictions for the capacity to create military capabilities 
has a direct impact on the identity of that force and the nation.  
Another aspect of the military integration process is that the process leads to a further centralizing 
of authority and development of bureaucracy and capacity to generate military force, although the process 
may not necessarily be rapid absent an immediate threat.  The argument presented here differs from Tilly 
on the other hand because the degree of integration matters.  Tilly argues that the modern state was 
created by those states that could best mobilize resources (raise revenue) through coercion or capital to 
wage war.  In contrast, the degree of integration of forces and production (the efficiency of military 
institutional arrangements) will have a direct effect on the ability to wage war and provides an 
explanation for the survival of smaller entities (although obviously not for micro-states like Monaco or 
Andorra).  Spruyt in “The Sovereign State and its Competitors” in contrast to Tilly argues that:  
“…the ability to wage war is itself determined by the efficacy of particular institutional 
arrangements. For example, the ability of a particular mode of organization to raise revenue and 
prevent freeriding will affect its war-making capacity.  That is, the ability to wage war is an 
intervening variable, itself determined by institutional makeup.”107   
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This process of military integration is the mirror image of state disintegration in which the key 
step is the decision of sub-state entities to create a military force to oppose that of the state. The success 
or failure of the state disintegration process is the ability of sub-state entities to produce military power 
sufficient to contest the state’s monopoly on the use of force and even establish and enforce their own 
sovereignty in a defined geographic area.   Integration in the EU can be seen therefore as not being a 
unique phenomenon, but rather just another example of a process that has been repeated numerous times 
with varying success.  What is unique is the scale of the process as experienced in the case of the EU, but 
not the process itself.    
Amalgamation of military forces and functions is most easily seen in history when one state or 
entity conquers another.  This is done by first destroying the military capacity of the victim, and then not 
only absorbing its territory and resources, but also by assuming the security function previously exercised 
by the conquered state.  Amalgamation in these cases is achieved using violence and coercion and is no 
means voluntary nor is it based on integration. This “Amalgamation” without integration in Deutsch’s 
view leads to entities such as the Hapsburg Empire.  What are not as readily apparent are those instances 
where more than one state or entity voluntarily joins together by following a process in which integration 
is consummated by the decision to integrate military forces and capabilities to generate military power.  
Integration in any and all other areas may occur, but without the decision to integrate military forces and 
capabilities to generate military power the result will not be an Amalgamated Security Community; it will 
not fully merge into a single entity.  It is also important to note that Amalgamated Security Communities, 
when formed by a voluntary merger and integration of some or all of the previous entities military 
capabilities and capacity to generate military capabilities, are not required to be democratic nor are they 
bound to be peaceful.  Autocratic and militaristic Amalgamated Security Communities are valid examples 
of the process so long as the initial merger was not by conquest but done voluntarily by the entities that 
form the Amalgamated Security Community.  In addition, this process of voluntary merger and 
integration of some or all of the previous entities military capabilities and capacity to generate military 
capabilities, while not requiring an external threat as a cause for integration does not preclude that factor 
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as being important to the formation of some Amalgamated Security Communities.  Some cases of ASC 
formation clearly result from the external pressure a potential aggressor has on two or more weaker 
communities to merge over time.  On the other hand ASCs may form without such pressure in some 
cases.  This is why, for this paper, the decision to integrate military capabilities and the capacity to 
generate military capabilities regardless of the motivation to do so is the key. 
 Another aspect of the argument put forward in this paper is based in part on the concept of 
Military Legitimacy as explained by James Gow.  James Gow’s analysis of civil-military relations builds 
on work by Finer (The Man on Horseback), Huntington (Political order in Changing Societies, The 
Soldier and the State), Janowitz (Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing World), and Welch 
and Smith (Military Role and Rule).  For Gow a key concept in civil-military relations is Military 
Legitimacy.  Gow illustrates the difficulty of examining legitimacy by reviewing the development of the 
concept which has been approached from both normative and positive perspectives.  The positive 
objective concept of legitimacy beginning with Weber (Economy and Society) attempts to explain ‘why’ 
power relationships function whereas the normative approach limits the content of those relationships 
based on moral considerations that must be recognized as de jure legitimacy (Merquior, Rousseau and 
Weber).  An objective approach however, does not limit the basis of the power relationships and accepts 
what exists de facto.  The problem then is that if legitimacy can be based on acceptance by the masses of 
domination by elites because they ‘believe’ it is proper, or because there is an implied contract, or simply 
because of fear of reprisal, legitimacy must be based on context; in other words there exist a wide range 
of possible legitimacies.  Since legitimacy can be composed of different factors based on context it 
becomes difficult to identify legitimacy.  Gow then turns to the idea that legitimacy can best be examined 
during a crisis during which the components of legitimacy in that context can be identified by their 
breakdown (Habermas, Legitimation Crisis).108  The legitimacy crisis attacks the sources of legitimacy 
and according to Gow:  
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“Environmental support, effectiveness, and the bases of legitimacy are the key components we 
must consider. Together, these areas of contract must be understood as a crasis – that is, a 
necessary combination of certain elements. A legitimacy crisis represents a breakdown in this 
crasis.”109   
Gow then identifies Military Legitimacy as being separate from regime legitimacy (not derived from it) 
and the legitimacy of civil political institutions and proposes that the term has the advantage of allowing 
examination of the military’s linkages with the sociopolitical environment in which it exists.  Gow 
defines Military Legitimacy as;  
“that quality in an army’s relationship with its sociopolitical environment by which the 
relationship may be justified; it is why the army has force and powers that are denied the rest of 
society; it is why the military can act on behalf of and make claims on the political community.” 
110 
Military Legitimacy is also described as a crasis composed of its bases of legitimacy, performance and 
environmental approval.  Gow divides the bases of Military Legitimacy into two parts which are; 
functional and sociopolitical.  Functional Military Legitimacy involves the tasks associated with 
defending the state from external threat and (as per Clausewitz) as an instrument of the state’s foreign 
policy.  Military Legitimacy would be greatly reduced if it could not defend its political community from 
attack.  This can be accomplished through deterrence or in the effective application of violence.  A 
legitimate military then functionally will be a professional corporate institution expert in the application 
of violence and responsive to its state.   
The sociopolitical base of legitimacy includes all the non-functional tasks given to the military.  
Gow gives three categories of the sociopolitical base of legitimacy; political activity; agency; and the 
nature of the relationship between the armed forces and society.   While militaries in liberal democracies 
tend to be politically neutral, political activity by the military in communist systems is based on direct and 
formal links between the army as the ‘party in uniform’ and the participation in policy making bodies by 
senior military officers.  Other systems can also have praetorian military intervention in politics to replace 
the political leadership or even become involved in the process of leadership selection (e.g. secular 
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Turkish government guaranteed by the army according to the Turkish constitution).  Another 
sociopolitical basis of Military Legitimacy is military agency which is found in all political communities.  
Military agency includes the military’s “role as a symbol of political unity; its contribution to the 
socioeconomic infrastructure of the state; and its operating as an instrument of education and 
socialization.”111   Armies of nation-states may function as a symbol of national pride and unity through 
military tradition and previous actions such as heroism or winning of a conflict.  The military can also be 
used as an ‘emulative model’ to encourage sacrifice on the part of the population which in turn reinforces 
national unity through the perception of shared hardships; the military is then both symbol and model 
(e.g. Pearl Harbor, Mao’s Long March, 101st at Bastogne, Marines at Iwo Jima).   The military’s 
contribution to the socioeconomic infrastructure of a state can be quite significant, especially in a 
developing country.  Usually these contributions are based on military needs but engineering and 
construction efforts such as roads, buildings, railroads, communications (telegraph to satellite GPS) and 
even assistance to agriculture, such as irrigation systems have been critical to the economic development 
and infrastructure of most states.  Gow notes that in communist systems the most advanced sector of the 
economy tended to be related to defense or military production.  Military agency also includes its aspect 
as the ‘school of the nation.’  The military is always tied to cutting edge scientific research as well as to 
educational institutions.  “In all political systems, the army acts as an educator, imparting technical skill; 
in communist armed forces this role is augmented by politico-ideological and moral training.”112  Another 
factor in military education and socialization (process of changing a civilian into a soldier) is patriotism 
and education about the linkage of the military to the society; inculcating a sense of duty to the country.                   
 Gow believes that the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and society is the most 
significant sociopolitical basis for Military Legitimacy.  The military must have an ‘identity with a society 
at large’ in such as way so that its organization and quality reflects the society.   
“Army personnel in an appropriate way must embody values widely held in sectors of the 
political community – and the armed forces’ composition must be generally representative of 
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social and ethnic cleavages within society. The legitimacy of the armed forces is considered 
suspect if significant discrepancies exist.”  “Some nationalist content is inevitable where one 
military role is to be a national symbol, one of the ‘trappings of national sovereignty’. But this is 
not the limit of such a role.  The nationalist element is important in generating community 
support of the military. As stated already, the armed services’ legitimacy is dependent, to some 
considerable extent, on their congruence with the society that spawns them. Patriotism increases 
the identification of the population with the military.  Even within army ranks, it is the fountain-
head of political loyalties in the junior cadre.”113  
Military Legitimacy is then a crasis of the components of functional legitimacy and the sociopolitical base 
of legitimacy (political activity; agency; and the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and 
society) that exist in varying degrees.  Military Legitimacy that exists separate from regime legitimacy 
allows for the analysis of a political role for the military.  According to Gow the relationship between 
Military Legitimacy and Civil Legitimacy is an interaction, such that weak Civil Legitimacy is a 
precondition for a significant and successful political role for the military.  However, the military can only 
act politically if it has its own legitimacy.114 
 The concept of Military Legitimacy helps to illustrate why the process of military integration ties 
to the process of identity construction.  Functional military legitimacy is not the focus, but rather the 
sociopolitical base of military legitimacy and the nature of the relationship between the armed forces (as 
an entity) and society are the relevant points.  Consider the new integrating military force of an 
Amalgamated Security Community that is being formed.  Setting aside a political role and looking at 
military agency; an integrating military could be playing a role as a symbol of political unity, be engaged 
in building the socioeconomic infrastructure of the state, and at the same time performing activities 
directly related to education and socialization.  A new integrating military force of an Amalgamated 
Security Community will have a relationship with its society.  The nature of this relationship between the 
military and society involves the reflection of the society by the military in its organization and quality, 
and the identification of the population with the military.  That is the military’s identity as an entity 
reflects the society and the society’s identity (e.g. national unity) is impacted by the military.  This 
process then involves an intersubjective construction of identity between the military and its society and 
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should be even more salient during the process of creating a new Amalgamated Security Community than 
in an established state.    
Ronald Krebs however, has cast significant doubt on the traditional mechanisms used to assert 
that military service has the ability to construct cohesive national communities.115  This assertion has been 
made through history but gained popularity in the late nineteenth century when military forces were seen 
as a “school for the nation” that could be used to build national communities using soldiers as a ‘captive 
audience’.  The traditional mechanisms, occurring in the context of universal military service, that are 
asserted to connect military service to the construction of national communities, are, according to Krebs; 
socialization, contact, and elite transformation.  The armed forces may socialize soldiers to accept beliefs 
regarding the national community that reflect the military’s norms.  The military brings individuals with 
various ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds together focused on achieving a common goal 
which creates an environment where barriers between groups are greatly reduced; a so called “contact 
hypothesis.”  Elite transformation as a mechanism would have its effect after military service, when either 
by a socialization process or through contact, soldiers’ views are altered so that when they later become 
leaders in society they use their positions to spread the revised definition of the nation in society.  Krebs 
believes that the view of the military as a key institution for the labeling and transmission of social values 
or as a potential nation builder is unjustified and is based on faulty logic and a lack of empirical analysis.  
Krebs’ critique is focused on the claim that military service can permanently alter an individual’s 
identity.116  
“All three mechanisms suggest that, under certain conditions, military service leads individuals to 
reconsider their identity, their attachments, and the definition of their political community, 
bringing these into accord with their personal experiences and hence with military policy. Once 
officers and soldiers have internalized the military's national norms, they diffuse this new vision 
throughout civilian society.”117 
                                                 
115 Ronald R. Krebs, “A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might,” 
International Security 28, no. 4. (2004): 85-124 
116 Ibid., 85-124.  
117 Ibid., 87-88.  
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Krebs attacks both socialization and the contact hypothesis for the implicit conceptualization in them of 
an individual’s identity as being a property of the individual that can be remade by the military.  He notes 
that identity is “more usefully conceptualized as a property of social relationships.  Identity is not 
subjective and universal, but rather intersubjective and hence contextual.” 118  Furthermore, national 
identity is not an aggregation of individual identities but rather a collective identity resulting from a 
process of political contestation and negotiation.  Therefore, psychological mechanisms (socialization and 
contact) based on individual mental concepts of the nation “cannot ultimately account for the boundaries 
of nationality.”119 
A further critique is that the traditional mechanisms asserted to change individual identity through 
military service do not stand up to close examination.  Research on socialization seems to indicate that 
military service, as well as schools and families all have only modest socialization effects as an 
individual’s political attitudes are formed based on numerous influences.  There are limits to 
indoctrination or education efforts by the military especially when perceived as propaganda, and soldiers 
are not passive receivers of information but rather are active participants.  The result is that while military 
education can and does teach skills it is less able to change attitudes, and empirical studies indicate that 
veterans leave service with most of their preexisting values and beliefs mostly intact.  A critical factor that 
seems to mitigate socialization by military service is that the military is not closed off from society and 
therefore rather than having total control over what a soldier comes in contact with, must compete with 
other elements in society to influence the soldier’s values and beliefs.120  Likewise the contact hypothesis 
suffers from several faults, the first of which is that it is theoretically indeterminate so that contact can 
just as easily confirm or even bolster stereotypes, prejudices, and perceptions of incompatibility rather 
than reduce them.  Research has failed to verify the causal claim of the contact hypothesis.  Interpersonal 
friendships do not automatically result in intergroup amity since individual relationships do not inevitably 
erase group boundaries or create bonds between groups, and misperception and miscommunication hinder 
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the development of positive intergroup relations.  Krebs also points out that the history of mixing groups 
in military units has not led to the elimination of ethnic, racial, or regional cleavages.121  Socialization and 
contact mechanisms share several additional flaws.  Individuals have multiple identities so that identity is 
contextual and while soldiers will conform to military norms while in uniform, they may take on other 
identities in a different environmental context even if the mechanisms worked in the military context.  
The example is race relations in the U.S. military which made significant advancement but did not 
directly transfer to society at large and tends to not change after hours social associations.  Contact and 
socialization, even if successful during military service, may not have a long term effect, and few studies 
have been done on socialization and national identity.  Work has been done that suggests that long term 
attitudes are more the product of stable social networks with other compatible people and that when social 
networks are disrupted attitudes are subject to change as beliefs are challenged.  Learning therefore occurs 
throughout life but for military values to have long term impact there would need to be a supportive social 
network which is not the case for most veterans who face pressure to adopt civilian norms.  Neither 
contact nor socialization explains how civilians obtain a definition of their nation corresponding to 
military norms when diffusion of values is seen to work to transform veterans back into civilians rather 
than spreading military norms throughout society.  Socialization and contact assume almost universal 
military service which has rarely been the case which makes application of the processes inherently 
weak.122  Krebs also points out the flaws in the elite-transformation hypothesis; the first being that it relies 
on military socialization or contact to reconstruct the veteran’s identity.  The second is that military 
service is neither necessary nor sufficient for political success and that various studies have not shown a 
correlation between military service (even wartime experience) and political activism.123  
 Krebs does not however, completely discount that military service has an impact.     
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“Military service undoubtedly has effects in the short run as well as in the long run, in times of 
peace as well as in times of war, on individuals' personalities, capacities, and prospects.”124 
His critique is that socialization and contact have only a modest effect.  More importantly he completely 
rejects the concept that national identity is an aggregation of individual identities and therefore the idea 
that individual psychological mechanisms are tied to the construction of national identity.   
“Nations are collectives, and processes of "collectivization" (as opposed to aggregation) are 
necessarily political, as groups negotiate and continually renegotiate the boundaries of their 
community.” “First and foremost the product of intergroup contest, the nation does not spring 
whole from individual decisions with regard to affiliation. The internal structures of militaries can 
exert a profound impact on their surrounding society and politics and even on the definition of the 
national political community, but not through apolitical and individualist mechanisms such as 
formal socialization and informal collaboration and communication.”125 
Krebs argues that since national identity is a collective identity resulting from a process of political 
contestation and negotiation that the military as an organization has a critical role.  The military as an 
organization can participate in the process of political contestation which shapes and reshapes imagined 
national identities.  
“Militaries are undeniably social as well as functional institutions, shaped by but also shaping 
social structures and values. Debates over who serves continue to arouse passion in part because 
the military's manpower policies are widely viewed as having important implications for 
citizenship and national identity-arguably a polity's most central questions. At the heart of the 
debate over gays and lesbians serving in the U.S. military, for example, lies less some careful 
calculus of costs and benefits to the effectiveness of U.S. fighting forces, than fears and hopes 
regarding what military inclusion and exclusion would mean for the status of homosexuals in the 
larger society.”126 
Krebs sees a relationship between the design of militaries and the boundaries of nationality that deserves a 
new theoretical approach.  He suggests that since the “deep politics of national identity” have been seen in 
debates over the boundaries of citizenship, that examining the issue of citizenship and membership in the 
community would be useful.   
“For those interested in the nexus of militaries and nations, this conceptual move-associating 
nations with citizenship-may be particularly productive, for, at least since the time of the 
republican city-states of ancient Greece, the history of citizenship in the West has been 
intertwined with military service. It suggests a new, potentially rich set of research questions 
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regarding the relationship between the policies of militaries and the struggle of social groups for 
citizenship (both formal and effective).”127 
Krebs offers an example of how a focus on militaries and the politics of citizenship could frame a 
research program by identifying three ways in which military service could be used by minorities to fight 
for more effective citizenship.  They could attempt to extract concessions during mobilization for war, or 
use their military record of sacrifice as a rhetorical device to illustrate the inequity of their political 
condition.  The third way involves the military's manpower policies, which, by indicating how the state 
may react to minority demands for rights, would “shape the objectives for which the minority strives, the 
strategy the minority pursues, and the timing of the minority's mobilization; key elements in any process 
of political contestation.”128  For Krebs civil-military relations should encompass “a wide range of 
questions about the relationship between the armed forces, the polity, and the populace,” but the absence 
of political scientists in this field has left it in the realm of sociological studies.  He believes that this 
should be changed by a new research program that would examine questions about the relationship 
between the military and society that he considers to be fundamental to the understanding of politics and 
contemporary affairs.129 
“The military is the key hinge institution sitting astride and mediating between domestic and 
international politics. The performance of militaries affects the state's standing and even survival 
in the international arena, and the armed forces can have a distinct impact on domestic political 
outcomes. The traditional literature on civil-military relations has long grappled with the armed 
forces as an actor on the domestic scene and in particular with their role in determining who rules. 
But an equally ancient tradition asserts the military's potential role in defining the boundaries of 
the political community. In the absence of identity and the (at least temporary) stability that it 
brings, political strategizing and action become impossible: Identity is the foundation of politics. 
Insofar as the configuration of the armed forces shapes the political contestation through which 
identities are negotiated and renegotiated, the military demands entry into the heart of scholarly 
analyses-not as an actor but as an institution. Studying the consequences of military service may 
then elucidate the most basic of political questions.”130 
The argument of this paper is based on the impact of integrating military organizations not on individual 
psychological identity mechanisms; although those do have some effect.  The focus of the argument is on 
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the integration of organizations and structures that determines who is a soldier, for whom the soldier 
fights, and what agency equips and organizes those soldiers.  The desire of this paper and the argument to 
be examined regarding the process of the creation of Amalgamated Security Communities through the 
integration of military structures and their subsequent impact on identity formation, is that it may in a 
modest way advance a research program in line with the one outlined by Ronald Krebs.   
1-6. Research Design 
 
 Since the purpose of this study is to propose an alternative explanation to observed phenomena, it 
is clear that the research to be conducted is concerned with why this is happening and how it is occurring 
in terms of the process.  These questions lend themselves to a Case Study approach.131  In contrast to 
some views of the EU as a unique and singular historical phenomenon this study takes the view that it is 
not unique and that the process which provides an explanation for why the EU is creating ESDI can be 
observed in various historical and contemporary cases.    
Social Constructivist methodology is based on the conviction that the political environment is the 
product of social interactions which can be measured and analyzed by scientific means.  Therefore, 
Constructivism is founded on a subjective ontology (an endogenously derived environment) and an 
objective epistemology (‘which can be measured and analyzed’).132  This objective epistemology and 
methodology allows various constructivist scholars (Wendt) to claim constructivism as positivist.  In that 
regard this study takes a positivist approach epistemologically that there is a world which can be 
measured and analyzed, although the subject of constructed identities will play an important part in 
understanding the process under investigation.  A successful use of this approach to investigate a problem 
dealing with military security, which has to date, been almost the exclusive domain of realism and neo-
realism, would be a significant demonstration of the utility of the approach.   
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A Case Study approach may be criticized as not providing results that can be generalized.133  This 
study attempts to counter that by using a Multiple Case Study design that examines the process of 
integrating military forces and capabilities to generate military power in the context of the formation of an 
Amalgamated Security Community.  This is done so that although the behavior of the subject cannot be 
manipulated or controlled, the logic of an experimental design can be followed and results can be 
generalized to support the proposed alternative theory.134    
 For this study the unit of analysis is the state, including possible states in the context of state 
formation.   The proposition is that once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, especially 
the integration of the capacity to produce military capability, an Amalgamated Security Community (a 
state or state like entity) will form as a result, and that this process is the mirror image of state dissolution.  
This proposition leads to a dichotomous dependent variable: state formation / state dissolution.  For 
Amalgamated Security Community formation the key act is security integration which is a tipping point, 
while for state dissolution the key act is security disintegration as sub-state elements establish 
independent military generation capability.  The independent variable is the degree of integration of 
military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability.  The null hypothesis is that 
Amalgamated Security Community formation or dissolution can occur without integration of military 
capabilities or dissolution of military capabilities.  The majority of evidence that will be used is 
documentary evidence of historically observed phenomena.  This study is concerned with the effects and 
scope of decisions taken to integrate military forces and capability to produce combat capabilities not 
“why” the decisions were made.    
1-6 (a). Categories of the Independent Variable 
With a multiple case study design each case can assume the role of an experiment as the different 
variations in the categories of the independent variable outlined below are examined to analyze the 
resulting change in the dependent variable.  The degree of integration of military capabilities and the 
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capacity to produce military capability (independent variable) has been divided into a number of 
categories that will be used to compare cases.  These are:  
- Category 1. Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces.  Militaries 
consist of elements that perform two functions 1). Administrative preparation such as organizing, 
training, equipping, and providing for their administration and support and 2.) Combat 
operations.135  These functions may be accomplished by discrete organizations or may be found to 
some degree in a single unit depending on organizational structure.  Integration however, can be 
observed in both functions either separately or together.  The least integrated force is one in 
which only operational (combat) forces work together.  The most integrated is one in which the 
administrative staff is a coherent whole supporting the entire force.    
Category 1 Measure of levels of integration: 
No integration will be scored as a 0. 
Some combat forces integrated = very low, will be scored as a 1. 
Integrated combat forces = low, will be scored as a 2. 
Integrated Combat forces and some Admin functions = medium, scored as a 3. 
Complete integration of forces = high, will be scored as a 4. 
- Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production.  This category is 
critical to examining integration of the capability to produce military capabilities.  Arms 
production in International Relations literature and research is often used because of the ability to 
quantify and observe tangible items.  Furthermore, arms production is often seen as being at the 
very heart of national issues of sovereignty and defense identity (e.g. the F16 as a symbol of US 
power; the MiG 29 for Russia) as well as an economic concern.  In addition technology in arms 
production is often the most observed area of open relative gains concerns among states (e.g. The 
Missile Technology Control Regime – MTCR; non-proliferation of nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons). 
Category 2. Measure of levels of integration: 
No integration will be scored as a 0. 
Sharing low tech production = very low, will be scored as a 1. 
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Sharing some high tech production = low, will be scored as a 2. 
Sharing in high tech and prestigious equipment = medium, scored as a 3. 
Complete sharing in production = high, will be scored as a 4. 
- Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces.  This is a clearly 
observable indicator of the degree of integration of forces. Units that are equipped with different 
technology find working together difficult.  This was observed recently in the mid-1990’s as the 
U.S. Army began to adopt digital technology.  National Guard and Reserve forces along with 
Allied Forces were quite concerned that they would not be able to work with Active U.S. Army 
units in a crisis.136   
Category 3. Measure of levels of integration: 
No integration will be scored as a 0. 
Commonality limited to non-essential equipment = very low, scored as a 1. 
Common basic equipment = low, will be scored as a 2. 
Using key compatible equipment = medium, will be scored as a 3. 
Using all of the same equipment = high, will be scored as a 4. 
- Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, 
Materiel, and Soldiers. (DTLOMS)137 These are functions that are used by the U.S. Army to 
describe how it creates land forces but for this paper it will be used to assess integration of the 
creation process of all types of forces be they land, sea, or air.  “Doctrine” provides a common 
frame of reference, facilitates communication, and helps standardize operations by establishing 
common ways of accomplishing military tasks.138   In short it is how a force intends to fight and 
in this paper will include tactics, techniques, and procedures.  “Training” is how a military 
teaches doctrine as well as use of equipment in units.  “Leader Development” includes selection, 
leadership training, and mentoring of junior leaders by more senior ones.  “Organization” is the 
way in which units are constructed and determines the combat capabilities inherent in each unit. 
“Material” is equipment provided to each unit. It is closely related to arms production but could 
also include purchasing civilian items, foreign arms, or confiscating enemy equipment and 
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reusing it.  “Soldiers” is shorthand for the personnel aspect of force generation and includes 
recruiting, and all aspects of human resource management such as promotion or assignment.  
Category 4. Measure of levels of integration : 
No (DTLOMS) integration will be scored as a 0. 
DTLOMS integration limited to non-essential areas = very low, scored as a 1. 
DTLOMS integration in basic areas = low, will be scored as a 2. 
DTLOMS integration in critical areas = medium, will be scored as a 3. 
DTLOMS completely the same = high, will be scored as a 4. 
- Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) communications, 
logistics.  These aspects are key factors to examine the degree of integration of operational forces.  
“Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders 
perform command and control functions through a command and control system.”139  This is 
often the first area of weak integration in which forces from one military are controlled on the 
battlefield by the commander of another force or a combined headquarters.  The strength of 
NATO in large part is that unlike any other alliance it has an “integrated command structure”.   
Communications are the foundation of the command and control system but can be examined as a 
discrete element.  Integrated communications implies tremendous openness and trust in that no 
order or secret can be transmitted without everyone in that system having access to it.  Logistics 
is the “planning and executing the movement and support of forces.”140 An integrated logistic 
system ties operational forces very closely together because it is what provides all the necessities 
of life and tools for war, i.e. beans and bullets. 
Category 5. Measure of levels of integration : 
No integration will be scored as a 0. 
Commonality limited to non-essential areas = very low scored as a 1. 
Commonality in basic areas = low, will be scored as a 2. 
Integration in critical areas = medium, will be scored as a 3. 
Completely the same = high, will be scored as a 4. 
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- Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing.  This aspect is important to 
integration in considering whether defense monies are being used to purchase joint public goods 
defense capabilities or whether they are being used in purchasing separate capabilities.  
Category 6. Measure of levels of integration : 
No integration will be scored as a 0. 
Limited joint spending on basic requirements = very low scored as a 1. 
Some spending from a single multinational source = low, will be scored as a 2. 
Funding key functions from single multinational source = medium, scored as a 3. 
Funding completely from the same source = high, will be scored as a 4. 
A concern that must be addressed here is the issue of Concept Stretching in regards to using 
contemporary military categories and concepts in examining historical cases.  The Military Historian 
Michael Howard warned that:  
“The differences brought about between one war and another by social or technological changes 
are immense, and an unintelligent study of military history which does not take adequate account 
of these changes may quite easily be more dangerous than no study as all.” 141 
 
This issue involves the possible distortion of concepts as they are applied to new cases that go beyond the 
original context in which they were used.   There are a number of methods that can be used to address the 
problem; making the categories more general to lessen the required minimum attributes, creating radial 
categories that share a core characteristic but differ in specifics, creating diminished subtypes that are 
incomplete instances of a category, précising a definition of a category by adding additional defining 
attributes, and finally changing the overarching concept to either loosen or tighten the meaning of the 
concept.142   On the other hand, although much has changed in terms of technology and war fighting 
throughout history the categories selected for the Independent Variable (The degree of integration of 
military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability) are not fixed to one particular time.  
The selected categories do not involve comparison across time periods but within the historical context of 
each case.  The cross case comparison views the degree of integration (high, medium, or low) between 
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cases, not the technological, organizational, or fighting abilities of various militaries through time.  In 
addition each of these are enduring categories that can examine the issue of integration regardless of the 
specific time period involved due to the particular nature of organizing men to fight.  To clarify, no 
category has a problem with concept stretching:   
Category 1. Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces is the most obvious 
measure of integration and it does not matter what type of forces are integrated.  It doesn’t matter if two 
entities are merging forces of musketmen or fighter aircraft, but rather the degree to which they integrate. 
Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production does not imply comparing 
bows and arrows to hellfire missiles or how each is made. But rather, do the two entities share production 
and/or technology as they create their military capabilities as a measure of integration. 
Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces as a category may involve 
comparing dissimilar forces as an indicator of their ability to operationally integrate.  The further apart the 
forces are in technological level the more difficult it is to integrate and lower the level of integration will 
be.  However, it is within the context of the case and only the measure of the level of integration will be 
used in cross case comparison.    
Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers. (DTLOMS)  What is important here is the similarity of how the two integrating entities 
create combat power as a measure of integration, not how effective any particular doctrine, organization, 
method of recruitment, or equipment is.  For example an entity with a conscripted force will have 
difficulties integrating in this category with an entity that has an all volunteer force.   
Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) communications, 
logistics.  This is not a measure of effectiveness but of similarity / integration.  It doesn’t matter if the two 
forces use semaphore, telegraphs, or digital satellite; or railroads and aircraft; what matters is to what 
extent they use the same methods and if they use these jointly to support all their forces.  
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Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing simply looks at funding and 
proportional contributions within the context of each case as a measure of integration; not to compare 
levels of defense spending between cases. 
The categories selected for the Independent Variable above do not suffer from the problem of Concept 
Stretching because they measure integration within each case not the effectiveness of dissimilar forces 
across cases or between time periods.   
1-6 (b). Selection of Cases  
As part of the explanation proposed by this study, the creation of ESDI by the EU is not viewed 
as a unique occurrence.  Unlike other research regarding the EU in which it is viewed as unique the 
population of possible cases is greater than 1.  As stated earlier, military integration by a conquering 
power that absorbs its victim has been seen repeatedly throughout history.  Less common are instances 
where integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability has happened 
voluntarily.  It is those cases that match this paper’s definition of Amalgamated Security Communities.143  
Excluded from consideration were some cases included by Deutsch in his work such as the union 
between Sweden and Norway.  This example was discarded because on examination the Union was found 
to be extremely limited and not a voluntary amalgamation.  The Union was created by the 1814 Treaty of 
Kiel in which Denmark ceded control of Norway to the Swedish King (Bernadotte; a former French 
Marshal under Napoleon); it did not however, result in a merger of Sweden and Norway.  They each kept 
their own government, separate military establishments, and separate economic systems.  The only 
“union” between the two was in foreign policy and a shared King.  There was a real possibility of armed 
conflict between the two as they each mobilized their separate forces prior to the peaceful split in 1905.144  
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available from http://www.norway.org.uk/ARKIV/Other/history/norway1905_2005/warorpeace/ ; Internet; accessed 
 54
For similar reasons other potential cases were discarded as not meeting the criteria of voluntary 
amalgamation with some form of military integration.    
In addition it is important to consider cases that could disprove the null hypothesis; that state 
formation or dissolution can occur without integration of military capabilities or dissolution of military 
capabilities.  Therefore, this paper will use a multiple case study design of those instances where 
integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability leading to creation of an 
Amalgamated Security Community (state like entity) were not imposed by conquest.  This includes cases 
of full military integration, partially integrated cases, cases of potential integration that failed, a critical 
case to test the null hypothesis regarding state dissolution, and of course an examination of the EU case 
itself.  These cases will then be analyzed to determine whether the argument of this study is valid or not 
and to illuminate any other points found as a result of this study.  
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Chapter 2 Cases of Strong Amalgamated Security Communities: 
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2-1. Introduction   
A strong Amalgamated Security Community (ASC) is one in which the central government has 
the preponderance of capacity and authority to generate military capability.  This authority of the central 
government would be to the exclusion of any sub-state element being able to create military capabilities 
or possessing the capacity to create military capabilities.   A strong ASC must be at a fairly high level of 
military integration.  This chapter intends to examine three cases and an additional example of strong 
ASC s that occurred in different historical periods, in different cultures, with different economies, and 
with different governmental systems. These cases of strong ASC s are; The Zulu and Mongols, German 
Unification, and the Dutch Republic.  They provide concrete examples of the process in which military 
integration and the formation of Amalgamated Security Communities leads to the creation of national 
identities in the process of state formation. 
2-2. (a).   History of the creation of the Zulu kingdom 
 The case of the creation of the Zulu kingdom is significant for several reasons.  It is a case that is 
not European, it is not in a democratic setting, it is a case of primarily preindustrial technology, and it 
highlights the construction of identity through military integration.  In addition there were outside 
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observers (European explorers, traders, military and colonial officials and settlers) who documented the 
history of the rise of the Zulu kingdom as it happened.  This case is focused primarily on the creation of 
the Zulu kingdom by Shaka from about 1787 to 1828, and does not extend to later wars such as the one 
with the British in 1879 that ended the independent kingdom of the Zulus.  This period covers the 
transition from a less complex socio-political organization, the chiefdom, to a more complex and stratified 
state like entity; the Zulu Kingdom.145  In exploring this case this paper is not seeking to explain why 
Zulu expansion or the Mfecane (also called the crushing – a spasm of violence and large displacement of 
numerous tribes in the region) occurred.  There are too many arguments and theories among historians 
and anthropologists to deal with that here.146  This paper is circumscribed and only seeks to explain the 
process of creation of Amalgamated Security Communities; specifically between the Zulu and Mthethwa 
tribe.  It is also important to point out that some scholars have noted that consolidation of tribes was 
occurring in other parts of Africa at this time, as well as other Northern Nguni besides the Zulus such as 
the Ndwandwe.  Those consolidations are outside the bounds of this case as well.  
 The Zulus were not a significant tribe of the Nguni speaking Bantu people in 1787 when Shaka 
was born to Nandi, a princess of the neighboring eLangeni tribe.147  Shaka’s father, Senzangakona was the 
chief of the Zulu’s.  Unfortunately for Shaka the union was an extramarital affair that brought shame to 
both the mother and father because it produced a child.  Their society allowed liaisons but not ones 
resulting in pregnancy; furthermore a chief was supposed to demonstrate better control of his affections.  
This case was particularly shameful because Senzangakona’s mother was from the eLangeni tribe as was 
Nandi, and therefore the lovers were related.  Initially when the eLangeni informed the Zulu chief of the 
pregnancy the tribal elders responded by saying that there was no pregnancy but rather that Nandi must be 
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suffering from an “i-Shaka,”  a type of intestinal parasite often blamed for false pregnancies.  The 
eLangeni tribe was further shamed by this response but waited until the child was born and then sent word 
for Senzangakona to come pick up Nandi and his “i-Shaka.” Nandi became Senzangakona’s third wife.  
The relationship was stormy and after six years Senzangakona banished Nandi and Shaka who went to 
live with the eLangeni tribe.  The shame of the circumstance of his birth was compounded by the disgrace 
of his mother’s return to her family since in their society a discarded wife had no legitimate place and 
depended on charity.  The eLangeni despised Nandi for shaming them twice and therefore Shaka was 
made to suffer.  He grew up without a father, poor, bullied, teased and scorned.  In 1802 when he was 
fifteen the eLangeni cast out Shaka and his mother because a drought made it impossible for the eLangeni 
to continue feeding them.  Having no resources Nandi took her children to live with a man who had been 
her lover.  After a short time the eLangeni and Zulus soon sent word that they wanted Shaka as a warrior.  
Shaka hated the eLangeni and feared the Zulus wanted to kill him to remove a potential competitor for 
Senzangakona’s throne, so Nandi sent Shaka to live with his aunt among the Mthethwa tribe.148        
 The Mthethwa149 tribe at this time was a significant entity.  Under chief Dingiswayo the 
Mthethwa had become the dominant tribe of the northern Nguni speaking Bantu people.150  Dingiswayo 
had established Mthethwa dominance over between thirty to fifty weaker tribes in the region, but was 
bounded by other strong tribes; particularly the Ndwandwe tribe to the north and Qwabe to the south.  
Dingiswayo’s method of expansion was both by conquest and negotiation.  Once another tribe recognized 
Mthethwa dominance they could keep their ruling family, so that the result was more of a loose 
confederation rather than a tightly controlled kingdom.151  One of the keys to the success of the Mthethwa 
was Dingiswayo’s formation of age based regiments called “amabutho” as the basis for his army.  The 
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young men of the tribes subject to the Mthethwa were conscripted into these regiments which weakened 
their ties to their old tribe and strengthened the control of the Mthethwa chief. 
“Uncles, brothers, cousins, fathers and sons were then fighting in different regiments, under 
different leaders.  Thus, the new regimental identities and loyalties cut across kinship, residential 
and ethnic ties and undermined the role of the traditional chief as war leaders and independent 
arbitrators. The age-old circumcision rituals were replaced by military training. Socially the 
traditional roles of ancestral groups such as the household, lineage and chiefdoms were greatly 
undermined to inculcate a higher level of individualism. Power, prestige and self-fulfillment were 
no longer merely functions of birth, inheritance, age or class.”152   
 
This enabled Dingiswayo’s army to grow rapidly as he absorbed additional tribes.   
 After Shaka went to live with his aunt he was drafted into the Mthethwa army as part of the “Izi-
cwe” regiment and served for six years as a warrior for Dingiswayo.  Mthethwa warriors were equipped 
with a cattle hide shield and a light throwing spear called an assegai.  Warfare in this context was not 
particularly bloody.  It involved the belligerents meeting at a predetermined location and then engaging in 
skirmishing by throwing light spears and blocking them with shields until one side would concede and 
agree to pay an appropriate tribute.   There were also often personal challenges and single battles between 
champions.153   Casualties were usually light.  Shaka completely changed this arrangement.  He 
redesigned the assegai from a light throwing spear too flimsy for hand to hand combat to a heavy broad 
bladed spear with a short handle called an “iklwa.”154  Shaka wielded it underhanded so that it became a 
close combat stabbing weapon.  He devised a technique for using his shield to catch onto the left side of 
an opponents shield and then by twisting both shields expose the left side of an enemy to a thrust from his 
new spear.155  The first time Shaka used his new spear and fighting technique was in a fight against the 
Butelezi tribe when he stepped forward as the Mthethwa champion to engage in single combat.  Shaka 
blocked the assegais thrown at him with his shield and charged his opponent and quickly killed him with 
his new method.  As he charged at the remaining Butelezi warriors the rest of the Mthethwa regiment 
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followed him and the Butelezi fled after a short fight.  This brought Shaka to the attention of Dingiswayo 
who promoted him.  Soon Shaka was the commander of his regiment; the Izi-cwe.  
 As the regimental commander Shaka began to implement a number of changes.  He got rid of the 
light throwing spears and made everyone use the iklwa.  He taught them his close combat fighting 
method.  He taught them new methods of holding and using their shields to deflect thrown spears.  Shaka 
found that he could move better and had better footing without his oxhide sandals and had his warriors 
discard theirs.  He developed a logistic system of having teenage boys of fifteen or sixteen, called “udibi”, 
who carried food, water, cooking utensils and bedding for three warriors.156  He also had doctors 
(inyanga) go with the regiment to tend the wounded.  He devised a new tactical formation called 
“i’mpondo zakhomow” (beast’s horns) in which the regiment was divided into three parts.  The center or 
“chest” was the largest group whose job was to fix an enemy in place while the two “horns” circled to the 
side and behind to attack from the side and rear.  The center also had a reserve force that was called the 
“loins”.157   Shaka’s regiment fought for Dingiswayo in multiple battles as the Mthethwa chief expanded 
his territory, and Shaka became Dingiswayo’s protégé.158  In the Mthethwa army Shaka also learned the 
use of hand signals, smoke signals and the use of scouts and spies.  Shaka also instructed his troops to 
move with their shield under their arms, running in a stooped position, and then place the shield in front 
of them when they were close to the enemy.  This was done partly for ease of movement through the bush 
but also for the psychological effect of suddenly seeing a mass of shields appear.159 
Dingiswayo arranged with Senzangakona for Shaka to succeed him as chief of the Zulus, which 
would ensure Zulu loyalty as well as create an inland buffer state.  However when Senzangakona died in 
1816 he reneged on his promise and a son from another wife was made chief.  Dingiswayo in turn sent 
Shaka with an escort from his Izi-cwe regiment to claim the throne.  Before Shaka arrived his half brother 
suddenly died so that when Shaka arrived he simply began to rule as chief.  He was twenty nine and had 
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not lived with the Zulus since he was six.160    He eliminated any opposition and then began to organize 
his army along the lines of the Mthethwa system that he had helped create.161 
 He first called up all the fighting age males of his tribe which only amounted to 400 warriors.  
He divided them as the Mthethwa did by age groups (called “amabutho”) into four regiments as the basis 
for his army.  The oldest married men were forced to move to a new kraal (fortified village) to live 
together but were allowed to keep their wives. The next oldest group who had not married were forced to 
remove their ‘headrings” (a sign of being eligible to marry) and were not allowed to marry until Shaka 
permitted.  The remaining mature men formed the third group and the senior herd boys the forth 
regiment.162   He then trained them in the use of the iklwa and close combat techniques as well as their 
respective tasks in the beast’s horns tactical formation.  Shaka had new larger shields made and used the 
Mthethwa system of specific colored shields for each regiment.163  He implemented the logistic system of 
udibi (teen boys) as bearers as well as the other innovations he had made with the Mthethwa army.  Each 
regiment also had its own distinctive “uniform” of animal hides and feathers.   
Once his small army was trained he started conquering his neighbors; the first were the eLangeni 
who offered no resistance.  Shaka exacted revenge on those who had mistreated him and then 
incorporated them into his army effectively doubling his strength.164  As Shaka absorbed new tribes he 
would incorporate them into the age based amabutho system of his regiments and would have the 
regiments build “amakhanda” (regimental barracks) where they would live and undergo military 
training.165  Shaka absorbed several small neighbors until he was ready for his first large battle.  The 
target was the Butelezi tribe who thought the Zulus were still the weak insignificant tribe as they had been 
under Shaka’s father.  They were the same tribe on who Shaka had first tried out his new method of 
fighting, but they were not ready for the Zulu onslaught.  In the end only a few Butelezi survived and 
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Dingiswayo recognized that he now had a strong ally.  Shaka absorbed several more small clans so that 
within a year of becoming chief, Zulu lands had quadrupled and his army numbered 2000 warriors.  
Shaka then fought as Dingiswayo’s ally in the 1817 campaign against the powerful emaNgwaneni tribe.   
In early 1818, Zwide, chief of the Ndwandwe tribe to the north murdered Dingiswayo’s son-in-
law.  Zwide and the Ndwandwe tribe were an old threat that Dingiswayo had wanted the Zulus to be a 
buffer against.  So now he decided that with the Zulus help he could attack the Ndwandwe.  Dingiswayo 
marched his force to invade the Ndwandwe and instructed Shaka to join him.  Before Shaka arrived 
however, Dingiswayo for some unknown reason wandered away from his army in the company of a few 
women and was captured by the Ndwandwe.   Zwide cut off Dingiswayo’s head and attacked the 
leaderless Mthethwa force.  Shaka arrived and took charge of the Mthethwa retreat preventing a complete 
defeat.  This was a key turning point for the merger of the Mthethwa with the Zulus.   
“The entire Izi-cwe regiment now flocked to Shaka's standard, as did many individual 
Mthethwas, bring his total fighting force dose to 5,000.”166 
One of Dingiswayo’s half brothers was made chief of the Mthethwa tribe.  Unfortunately for them he was 
incompetent and weak and his rule caused dissention and division.  Mthethwa control over the 
confederation Dingiswayo had created waned as Mthethwa power declined.  After a year Shaka was able 
to replace the incompetent chief with someone loyal to him which at that point merged the Mthethwa with 
the Zulus.   
“Thereafter Shaka killed the legitimate heir of Dingiswayo, appointed a favorite to be the new 
Mthethwa chief, but soon subsumed the Mthethwa regiments under Zulu control and proclaimed 
himself the new ruler of the Zulu Kingdom.”167 
Although the weakness of this chief made it easier to replace him there were other factors that 
strengthened Shaka’s ability to merge the tribes.  First, Shaka was more Mthethwa than he was a Zulu. He 
had been a prominent Mthethwa commander, sitting in their councils known for offering wise advice, and 
had been Dingiswayo’s protégé.  He had been a despised outcast from the Zulus since he was six; he even 
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had to import chefs to cook his food because he found Zulu food to be substandard.168  Second, following 
Dingiswayo’s death, disaffected Mthethwas began to join with Shaka, and this intensified to include 
whole tribes subject to the Mthethwas after Shaka’s victory over a vastly superior force of the Ndwandwe 
at Gqokli Hill.169  Third, there was a continued threat from Zwide and the Ndwandwe.    
“The Mthethwa hegemony and many smaller ones now rallied to Shaka, enlarging his territory to 
more than 7,000 square miles.”170 
So although Shaka had to eliminate Dingiswayo’s heir to complete the merger of the two tribes, it was 
just the final step in an ongoing process started voluntarily by the Mthethwa who looked to Shaka as the 
preferred stronger ruler.  By May of 1819 when Zwide sent an army of 18,000 Ndwandwe to finally crush 
Shaka, the amalgamation of the Mthethwa and Zulu was complete.  Shaka was able to completely defeat 
the Ndwandwe and then consolidated his rule.  After only three years as chief Shaka was in absolute 
control of an area much larger than that of the Mthethwa confederation (over 11 thousand square miles) 
and could field an army of almost 20,000.171  He had his new regiments build new amakhanda (barracks) 
throughout the territory in critical areas. They were also considered the home of the King and he stayed 
there whenever he traveled.172     
Shaka however, was not a benign ruler as Dingiswayo’s had been.  Shaka, became increasing 
tyrannical and capricious maintaining his throne by the use of terror.  When his mother died thousands of 
his people were killed, for a year there was to be no planting of crops, cows milk was to be dumped on the 
ground, and no couple could become pregnant or they would be killed, all so that the Zulus would mourn 
with him.  Finally his half-brothers, the sons of Senzangakona, assassinated him in 1828 when he was 
forty one.  One of the assassins, Dingane became the next king.  Despite his cruelty, Shaka had created a 
new society and kingdom in only about 10 years which, although eventually defeated by the British in 
1879, still exists as a distinct group within South Africa today.  
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2-2 (b). The Government 
Recalling the definition of Amalgamated Security Communities,173  it is clear that a key aspect of 
the process of creation of Amalgamated Security Communities is the creation of some form of common 
government.  That the Zulu government was outside of a European context and non-democratic is 
important for the ability to generalize the process of the creation of Amalgamated Security Communities 
proposed by this paper.      
 The first item for examination is the economy and social structure of the Nguni speaking Bantu 
people on the East coast of southern Africa during this time period.   
“A consistent picture emerges from these early accounts of the East coast Nguni: that their 
societies were well fed and healthy, practicing cattle-rearing as the main economic activity of 
men, supplemented by the agricultural pursuits of women.  Milk, either fresh or sour, formed the 
staple food, with varieties of grain and many other vegetables providing bulk and nourishment. 
Meat, mostly garnered from hunting, was also quite commonly eaten, although domestic cattle 
were too highly valued to be slaughtered for their meat.”174 
So although there were a variety of foods, the key economic activity was cattle in this society.   Cattle 
were the measure of wealth and status.  This did not however mean that there was a good deal of trade.   
“The Nguni did not treat the meat and milk from the cattle as capital commodities for marketing.  
In general, trade played a very minor role in the Nguni society.  There were no regular, 
centralized markets” 175  
In fact wealth tended to accumulate in the hands of notable families.   
“Meat and milk were, like the cattle, privately owned, non-cash commodities and their 
consumption was based on the criteria of kinship and neighborhood.  Milk, for instance, generally 
was drunk only among relatives, thus making it very difficult for cattleless lineages or displaced 
individuals to make a living.” 
Shaka himself experienced this during his time with the eLangeni tribe when he and his mother had to 
rely on charity to live.  Although there was not much trade activity, wealthy Nguni developed a system 
whereby they collected a form of rent based on cattle.   
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“Chiefs and wealthy commoners actually could rid themselves of manual labor altogether by 
using milk as wages.  Under the common practice of clientship they loaned their cattle to the poor 
and cattleless Nguni who herded the animals in return for milk and occasional gifts of some of the 
offspring.  The client-herdsmen were required to perform certain menial services for the patrons, 
including assisting in the building of cattle byres, and in fencing the fields and attending the 
patron his journeys, court attendances and wars.  The patron always could recall his cattle at any 
time if the client-herdsmen did not comply with his wishes.  In this way, individuals became both 
rich and powerful by astutely distributing their herds and thus attracting dependents and 
followers.  The chiefs acquired more cattle from booty, court and death fines and from marriages.  
They enlarged their followings by absorbing newcomers, and controlled them by generous gifts 
of cattle and women as well as by acts of economic deprivation or threat of expulsion.”176 
This traditional system of creating dependents as well as the desire for a better standard of living on the 
part of the cattleless Nguni would be very important factors for the government that Shaka was to 
establish. 
The structure of the society was based on villages or homesteads often called ‘kraals’.   The Zulus 
practiced a form of primogeniture along with polygamy.  This tended to create haves and have-nots 
within the family.  Homesteads also included these distinctions in the arrangement of homes for favored 
wives (right side) and junior wives (left side).   Zulu politics was in many ways family politics writ large 
as was Medieval European politics with dynastic squabbles among competing heirs.177 Marriages between 
royal families were political arrangements, but new wives from other tribes were often suspect as being 
agents of their fathers, uncles or brothers.  Princesses on the other hand, could have prominent positions 
of their own within their family especially if they remained unmarried.178  This was the society Shaka was 
born into, and he used both marriages consolidate his power among the royal families, and unmarried 
Princesses to govern critical settlements for him.   
 The critical administrative organization of the Zulu government however, was the regiments and 
their associated barracks; the amakhanda.   These were tangible representations of royal power since each 
one was considered a homestead of the king. One European observer estimated Shaka’s homestead had a 
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circumference of over two miles, but others might only be outposts controlled by members of the king’s 
family.179    
“Shakas regiments were assigned permanent barracks strategically scattered throughout the 
kingdom where the soldiers lived and fought together until they were 40 years old when they 
were allowed to return to their original villages and marry.  They maintained their regimental 
name and identity until they died.  “Regiments averaged between 2000 and 5000 professional 
soldiers who were separated from the civilian pursuits of pastoralism, farming, and family 
life.”180 
Men were not prevented from marrying to control population as some researchers have suggested, 
because women were allowed to marry from about the age of 15 and most men were polygamous so there 
was no impact on the rate of reproduction.181  This prohibition was specifically to prolong the period of 
service by warriors until they were no longer useful in the field.  Physically the barracks were constructed 
on the same plan as a typical homestead with an outer palisade, inner rows of huts for the warriors, cattle 
pens, an a area set aside for royal family (such as an unwed princess who might be the local ruler), or 
members of a female regiment in service to the king, and an area for the king when in residence.182  All of 
the regimental amakhanda had multiple functions.  They were training camps where soldiers were trained 
in the Zulu fighting methods.  They were also boarding schools for the udibi boys (equipment bearers), 
and new cadets (inkwebane), young boys of sixteen or seventeen who had not been made into a regiment 
yet.183   The regimental amakhanda were also administrative centers deciding minor judicial matters.    
 Another of the important innovations of the regimental system was the appointment by the king 
of two officers (induna) to be commanders of the regiment.  Izinduna (plural of induna) were Zulu 
administrative functionaries and often they were not royals but men who had achieved distinction in some 
way.  Since they were appointed by the King they owed him their position and therefore their loyalty to 
him.184   A new bureaucracy of commoner indunas selected on merit created opportunities for political 
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participation and economic self-improvement, while military service provided opportunities for those who 
were cattleless.185  It is clear that the system of administration and centralization put in place by Shaka 
relied on the Mthethwa structure of age based regiments (amabutho) spread throughout the kingdom to 
impose the king’s rule.  Shaka had also learned from his experience with Dingiswayo in the Mthethwa 
army the value of promotion based on merit.   The motor that made this system work however, was the 
king’s control of cattle.  
  When young boys became cadets and reported to their local regimental barracks the process was 
called “ukukleza” or drinking the king’s milk.  This implied that they were coming into the king’s service 
and were dependent on him for their living.186  It has been proposed that the ability of the king to control 
the supply of milk in Zulu society was the foundation of his political power.187  This control was based on 
the acquisition of new cattle from raids or absorption of new tribes.   
“Whenever new or additional wealth was obtained from tribute, wars, raids, court fines or foreign 
trade, it automatically belonged to the king, who was free to distribute it in the form of gifts, 
grants, patronage and pensions.” “Through centralized redistribution especially of the much 
prized cattle and women, the king not only became the richest individual in the nation, but also 
the director of all economic and political affairs.  He personally appointed and rewarded all 
administrators, military officers and regiments.  Hence all bureaucrats, subjects, regiments and 
villages were dependent upon the king and his central government for redistribution, gifts and 
favors.”188 
When it is remembered that the Zulus under Shaka started out as a very small group, Shaka had 
dramatically and rapidly increased his wealth in cattle.  This allowed him to implement the Mthethwa 
system of each regiment having a single color of cattle from which to make their shields.  European 
observers living among the Zulu in Shaka’s time noted that a redistribution of cattle segregated by color 
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masses.  Ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity, class, birth and age generally were no longer considered 
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to each regiment occurred after each campaign.189  Under Shaka, conquest and absorption of cattle, 
people, and land directly bolstered the authority and centralization of the administration which created 
new regiments and reinforced the army to start the cycle again.  For the Zulus under Shaka truly it was a 
case where; “war made the state and the state made war.”190  An underlying factor in this proposition was 
the economic advancement of those people who under traditional Nguni society were poor and cattleless.  
These people were quite willing to fight and become Zulus to improve their lot in life.  Although 
dependent on the king, their economic and social status had an opportunity to improve based on merit 
rather than birth.     
“Military conquest and despoliation of non-Zulu peoples became the basis of their nationalism 
which in turn explained and fortified the revolutionary process. The revolution offered every 
able-bodied male an economic opportunity to acquire cattle, meat and milk against the pre-
revolutionary disadvantages of birth rank class and political power.”191 
Clearly Shaka created a common government and administration that was centralized and dependent on 
the king.  Although the merger of the Zulu and Mthethwa happened fairly early during Shaka’s reign, 
Shaka had already absorbed the eLangeni and other small tribes prior to the merger to begin the process.  
Merging with the Mthethwa and incorporating them into the administrative system should also have been 
easier than with any other group because Shaka’s administrative organization was founded on the 
Mthethwa regimental system itself.  In fact Shaka’s Mthethwa regiment joined him prior to the formal 
merger of the Zulu and Mthethwa tribes without any problem.  Therefore, the merger of the Zulu and 
Mthethwa tribes under a common government is well within the scope required for an Amalgamated 
Security Community.   
2-2 (c). Integration 
The focus of this case is the integration of the Zulu and Mthethwa tribes to form an Amalgamated 
Security Community based first, as the argument of this paper proposes, on an initial integration of 
military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability.  This case is a direct example of this 
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process.  Shaka had more experience as a Mthethwa than as a Zulu when the merger of the two tribes 
began. He had been a despised outcast from the Zulus since he was six but had found prominence among 
the Mthethwa.  He had been a prominent Mthethwa commander, sitting in their councils known for 
offering wise advice, and had been Dingiswayo’s protégé. He developed a new method of close combat 
warfare based on a weapon he developed that he introduced to his Mthethwa regiment, the Izi-cwe, and 
then to the rest of the Mthethwa force.  His use of signals scouts, and spies were all begun under 
Mthethwa tutelage.  As chief of the Zulu Shaka incorporated the Mthethwa age based regiment 
(amabutho) system along with the Mthethwa use of different colored shields for each regiment.  He 
incorporated the logistic support system of udibi bearers that he had developed for the Izi-cwe.  What 
Shaka did as Chief of the Zulus was to refine the Mthethwa system.  Once he had organized, equipped, 
and trained the Zulu they operated with the Mthethwa in the 1817 campaign against the emaNgwaneni 
tribe.  
Production of military capabilities includes the forging of the iklwa blades and spears.  There 
were clans who lived in areas where there were surface deposits of iron.  A number of them made 
agricultural implements but only a few made spears.  Some of the best smiths were the Mbonambi clan 
near the coast and the Chube clan near the Nkhandla forest, which were known for their iron work.  After 
they made the blade they would give it to the spear-makers.  The Spear-makers would find the proper 
wood for the shaft and attach the blade using glue and fiber.192  This process was used by all the Northern 
Nguni peoples but it was Shaka with the new iklwa blade that made the difference for the Mthethwa and 
then the Zulu.  Although it was reported that the smiths would bring bundles of blades to the king’s 
residence, and be paid with cattle by him, the majority of spears were purchased by the individual warrior 
and were his personal property.193   
Another item of greater significance was the war shield.  There were several types of personal 
shields; a small one for dancing, one used by young men when courting, and one about twenty four by 
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twelve inches for everyday use.  However, the war shield (isihlangu) was much larger; about fifty four 
inches by thirty inches.  More importantly it belonged to the king not the individual.  They were made 
from the hides of the king’s cattle and kept at the regimental amakhanda and only issued when the 
regiment was mobilized.  They required skill to make and were made either at the king’s residence or the 
regimental amakhanda.   The war shield symbolized the warrior being under the protection of the king as 
well as the warrior’s acceptance of his responsibility to obey the king.194   
Shaka was known also for being an accomplished dancer, singer, and speaker.  Dances and song 
were important parts of Zulu culture and there were songs and dances for almost every aspect of life.195  
Each of Shaka’s regiment had its own song and war cry.196 Traditional dances even today in Zululand 
include those that have detailed choreographed use of the shield and stabbing spear.  It has been noted 
that these were probably one of the methods used for weapons training in Shaka’s time.197  Regiments 
preparing to go on campaign were tended by an “isangoma” (a “state” doctor) who would perform various 
rituals and give them different potions or food, all in an attempt to bind them as a group.198  The Zulu 
regiments were also encouraged to compete with each other to build their regimental loyalty.  Shaka 
would have them perform a traditional process  called “giya” in which individuals would step forward, 
boast and act out their past deeds while challenging a warrior of another regiment. Following the limited 
fighting between the regiments, brave warriors would be rewarded and cowards executed.199   Shaka also 
understood the use of ceremony and ritual to foster reverence and loyalty.   
“The Kingship was reinforced by elaborate customs, rituals, taboos and official rules of etiquette 
which were vigorously enforced by Shaka and his officers.”200 
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These rituals, ceremonies, and shared experiences all had an impact.  The Zulu regiments were noted for 
their loyalty to their regiment as well as the high level of unit cohesion and high morale.   The amabutho 
regimental system was the greatest integrator of the Zulus.  
“The regiment was the Zulu’s answer to the universal problems of parochialism, ethnicity and 
xenophobia.  Regiments were state-supported units receiving their land, weapons, regalia, cattle 
and wives from the royal treasury.”201 
Following the defeat of the Ndwandwe, only three years after becoming chief of the Zulus and only a year 
after the death of Dingiswayo; 
“a new phenomena began to manifest itself.  There were scores of clans within Zululand, but such 
chieftains as survived had been relegated to a status hardly higher than induna, and their royal 
blood, no longer of political significance, was only a matter of social standing.  The clans began 
to identify themselves with the Zulus, even to refer to themselves as Zulus, and the clan basis of 
activity began to fade. The political voices of the future would speak not for two or three 
thousand clansmen, but for a nation of a quarter of a million”202   
In the case of the Zulus, creation of a national identity was clearly based first on military integration.  It is 
also clear that the merger of the Zulu and Mthethwa was preceded by military integration.  Shaka had in 
effect transformed every able bodied male Zulu into a warrior on the same basis as one of the warriors 
from his Mthethwa Izi-cwe regiment. 
2-2 (d). Measuring the Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities 
and the capacity to produce military capability 
This paper argues that once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, especially the 
integration of the capacity to produce military capability, an Amalgamated Security Community (a state 
or state like entity) will form as a result, and that this process is the mirror image of state dissolution.  
This proposition leads to a dichotomous dependent variable: state formation / state dissolution.  For 
Amalgamated Security Community formation the key act is security integration which is a tipping point 
while for state dissolution the key act is security disintegration as sub-state elements establish 
independent military generation capability.  The independent variable is the degree of integration of 
military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability.  Measuring the independent variable 
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by category in the case of the Zulu based on the evidence that has been presented provides the following 
results. 
Category 1 - Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces.  In this case there 
was a great deal of integration of forces prior to the merger.  The Zulus organized, trained and equipped 
in the same fashion as the Mthethwa, and were significant partners in the 1817 campaign.  In addition the 
Mthethwa immediately after the death of Dingiswayo, under threat from the Ndwandwe, turned to Shaka 
to lead them and the Zulus as part of the force that prevented a complete defeat. In addition the Mthethwa 
Izi-cwe regiment along with other disaffected Mthethwa joined Shaka immediately after Dingiswayo’s 
death and during the year that Dingiswayo’s incompetent heir ruled.  The remaining Mthethwa regiments 
merged with the Zulus once Shaka placed a loyal chief over them without any problem.  The overall 
assessment for category one – military forces; must be at least medium which equals a score of three.  (A 
high level of integration would have required all of the Mthethwa to join Shaka prior to the merger so 
there would have been “complete integration”) 
Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production.  The Zulus and Mthethwa 
used the same equipment of Shaka’s design.  They were dependent on the same smiths to forge their 
spears.  They used the same type of war shields.  Therefore this category must be assessed as being at a 
high level of integration which is a score of four.  
Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces.  Again since the Zulus were 
recreated in the image of the Mthethwa regiments this category must also be assessed at a high level of 
integration which equals a score of four.  
Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers. (DTLOMS).  Shaka’s creation of the tactical formation called “i’mpondo zakhomow” 
(beast’s horns), the close combat fighting method, carrying of the shield when moving, and going 
barefoot are all examples of creating a unified doctrine that first guided the Mthethwa and then the Zulus.  
Shaka developed his training methods for his Mthethwa command first and then implemented and refined 
them for the Zulus, most likely using songs and dances as part of their training.  Shaka learned from 
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Dingiswayo the value of promoting leaders based on merit rather than bloodlines and he made extensive 
use of that when he appointed “indunas” to command the regiments.  The organization of the Mthethwa 
regiments on the amabutho system was completely implemented by Shaka with the Zulus.  The material 
used by the Mthethwa regiments particularly the iklwa and system of different colored shields for each 
regiment was also completely adopted by Shaka for the Zulus.  Again, the recruitment method was the 
age based amabutho system used by the Mthethwa and completely adopted by the Zulus.  This category; 
Creation of combat power based on DTLOMS can be assessed as: Doctrine high 4, Training high 4, 
Leader Development high 4,  Organization high 4, Materiel high 4, Soldiers high 4.  This category is 
assessed as being at a high level with a score of four. 
Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) Communications, 
Logistics.  Again in this area what Shaka had learned and invented when he was a Mthethwa commander 
is key.  Shaka implemented the hand signals, smoke signals, as well as use of scouts and spies he had 
learned as Dingiswayo’s protégé.  He implemented the use of the logistic system of having “udibi” boys 
who carried food, water, cooking utensils and bedding for his Mthethwa command with the Zulu 
regiments as well as having doctors to tend the wounded.  This category can be assessed as: Command 
and Control high 4, Communications high 4, Logistics high 4, for an overall level of high with an average 
score of four.  
Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing.  In this area there is really only a 
slight convergence.  The Mthethwa did not provide support materially to the Zulu, and although there is 
an instance of Shaka sending captured cattle to Dingiswayo in tribute, Dingiswayo returned the cattle to 
show his approval of Shaka’s activities.  War material was provided by the individual (spear) and chief 
(shield).  There was no need nor was there a method for joint production of military capabilities.  Where 
there is convergence is the method of acquiring wealth, namely by subjugating other tribes and 
demanding tribute.  For this category there is only minimal integration to speak of so it must be rated as a 
1 very low.   
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When all of the scores of the categories of the independent variable are taken together (Category 
1=3, Category 2=4, Category 3=4, Category 4=4, Category 5=4, Category 6=1) the result is an average 
score of  3.3 which indicates a medium to high level of integration overall in this case.   
2-2 (e). The Mongols: another example of a non-European, non-democratic, aggressively 
expansionist entity formed by an initial voluntary amalgamation. 
Although the historical record is in many points contradictory and the chronology of his early life 
is debatable, there is an interesting parallel to the Zulu case in the story of the rise to power of Temuchin; 
otherwise known as Genghis Khan.  Temuchin’s early life has some interesting similarities to that of 
Shaka.  Temuchin’s mother Ho’elun, was kidnapped by Temuchin’s father Yisugei from her first husband 
and forced to become his second wife, and although a fairly common practice did have an impact on 
Temuchin’s fortunes and future wife Borte.  Yisugei was the leader of a small clan (the Borijin) but his 
great-grandfather had been Kabul Khan who had first united the Mongols. When Temuchin’s father was 
poisoned by Tartars after leaving the boy Temuchin with his future in-law’s family (a common practice 
for the steppe people to earn their future wife) Yisugei’s followers abandoned Ho’elun and her children, 
including Temuchin who returned after Yisugei’s death, as well as his other wife and two sons to join 
with the Tayichi’ut tribe.  Ho’elun, Temuchin and the other family members became outcasts left to fend 
for themselves; which to an extent parallels Shaka’s early history of being an outcast.   Furthermore, 
Temuchin and his full brother killed their older half brother Bekhter, supposedly for stealing but also to 
prevent Ho’elun taking him as a husband and thereby becoming head of the family.  Shaka’s half brother 
also was likely murdered to eliminate a family rival for power, but not directly by Shaka. Temuchin was 
then captured and used as a slave (possibly as punishment for Bekhter’s murder) by the Tayichi’ut tribe 
(who had abandoned his family) which has parallels to Shaka’s treatment by his relatives in the eLangeni.  
Temuchin escaped and returned to his mother.  As the head of his family he married Borte, and with her 
dowry he went to Toghrul (also called Ong Khan) the leader of the powerful Kerait tribe, who had been 
blood brother to his father, to offer himself as a vassal, and in return to obtain protection. Toghrul plays a 
role in Temuchin’s life almost exactly the same as Dingiswayo did in Shaka’s life as mentor, protector, 
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and military ally, to whom Temuchin was faithful even when Toghrul was ousted from power.  The 
relationship was as a son to a father.  It was only when Toghrul, under pressure from his biological son, 
reluctantly joined with Jamuka (blood brother to Temuchin) to openly fight against Temuchin that the 
bond was broken.  At this point the Merkit tribe, to avenge the kidnapping of Ho’elun, kidnapped Borte.  
Temuchin asked for help from Toghrul who raised an army and with Temuchin’s blood brother Jamuka 
waged a very successful campaign against the Merkit tribe, recovering Borte and a good deal of loot.  
Temuchin and Jamuka stayed together after the campaign but when they split apart they became rivals for 
Mongol leadership although both were subordinate to Toghrul and the Kerait tribe. Following this split 
numerous individuals, families, and some clans chose to follow Temuchin.  They were drawn to him by 
his generosity and fairness in dividing the loot from the Merkit campaign and his propensity for 
rewarding loyalty and merit without regard to family relationship or seniority.  Jamuka on the other hand 
was the legitimate ruler of the Jadarat tribe and the tribal chiefs remained loyal to him. Temuchin 
attracted people who challenged tribal hierarchy and sought to gain a better and freer life, especially serfs 
who abandoned their masters, by following Temuchin.  There were people from many different tribes 
who joined but especially those subject to the Tayichi’ut tribe found Temuchin to be kinder and more just.  
This creation of a tribal following from the lower classes of tribal society is similar to the poor and 
cattleless in traditional Nguni society who joined with Shaka to improve their lives, but it is quite 
different from Shaka’s assumption of power over his pre-existing native tribe.  As Temuchin’s reputation 
as a military leader and kind ruler grew, four clans whose leaders were related to Temuchin but senior to 
him in the family decided to join with him.  These senior leaders voluntarily decided to elect Temuchin 
Khan and join forces with him.  Although Jamuka retained a larger following (and later had himself 
named Gur-Khan or supreme ruler) the voluntary election of Temuchin as Khan legitimated his claim to 
be ruler of the Mongols.  This is different than the amalgamation or merger of the Zulu and Mthethwa 
which were existing units, but the creation of a new entity from the voluntary merger of several existing 
clans would seem to meet the definition proposed for Amalgamated Security Communities by this paper.  
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The election as Khan was only the beginning of Temuchin’s consolidation of power over the Mongols, as 
he was betrayed and had to conquer both his blood brother Jamuka and his patron Toghrul.203                        
Besides the early life parallels between Shaka and Temuchin and the voluntary amalgamation of 
tribes and clans as each initially rose to power, a more important similarity exists in how each reorganized 
their military forces and thereby integrated their societies.  Shaka promoted leaders based on merit rather 
than bloodlines allowing disadvantaged commoners a path to social and material advancement and used 
age based regiments to weaken tribe loyalties and reinforce dependence on the king.  Temuchin followed 
a similar policy.  Perhaps because of family betrayals as well as those of his blood brother and patron, 
Temuchin valued loyalty above all else.  He promoted followers based on demonstrated loyalty and 
ability.  Commoners, such as shepherds, carpenters, and blacksmiths who had performed loyal service 
were valued over those who could only claim royal familial relationships. This was a social revolution 
where even former slaves could become army commanders and even enemies who had proven loyal to 
their leaders could be absorbed into the new Mongol army and society. This ended the instability and 
tribal rivalries in Mongolian society and replaced it with a disciplined system loyal to Temuchin.  The 
army as organized by Temuchin played a crucial role in stabilizing the Mongol society.  Temuchin 
organized his army with ten men in a squad or arban, one hundred men in a company or jaghun, one 
thousand in a regiment or mingghan, and a division of ten thousand men called a tumen.  In the Mongol 
army the key rule was that superior and subordinate should serve each other loyally and obediently.  Unit 
commanders of the small units were either the oldest in the unit or were selected by the members, but the 
larger units were commanded by men personally loyal to Temuchin. The arban of ten men, regardless of 
tribal origin, were to live and fight together loyally as brothers never abandoning each other to capture by 
the enemy.  Even more importantly no one could transfer or leave his arban, jaghun, mingghan or tumen 
on penalty of death. Although close family were allowed to be in units together, and the jaghuns and 
mingghans were arranged among the clans and tribes in such a manner that the army could be mobilized 
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quickly, the arrangement of the Mongols and the tribes they absorbed into new units that they could not 
leave broke the power of the clans and tribal leaders.  The leaders of the jaghuns and mingghans tended to 
be from the clans and tribes that formed the unit and these commanders who were loyal to Temuchin 
became the leaders of the clans and tribe by virtue of being their military commander. The clans and 
tribes then became organized in conformity to the army which prevented them from disintegrating in the 
way that Temuchin’s father’s tribe disintegrated.  He also instituted another barrier to treachery in the 
composition of his elite bodyguard unit that eventually numbered ten thousand men. The guards included 
the sons of the unit commanders who had special privileges, rank equal to their fathers, and in a dispute 
would be favored over their fathers.  A unit commander could not betray Temuchin while his son was in 
effect a hostage but the guards’ loyalty was to Temuchin so that personal loyalty superseded family ties.   
In addition all those who could not fight were still required to provide service to the Khan which included 
caring for the logistic needs of the army.  Discipline was strict and often was enforced by the death 
penalty but at the same time in the division of war booty (only if looting was authorized by Temuchin) 
was done on an equal basis from soldier to commander. The only exception was that beautiful young 
women were taken to Temuchin. There was one additional change; Temuchin referred to his people not 
by any ethnic or tribal name but as ‘the People of the Felt Walls’ indicating the material from which they 
made their homes.204   Temuchin was clearly reorganizing Mongol society and integrating the tribes 
through the organization of his army as Shaka did.      
“The entire Mongol tribe became integrated by means of the Army” “Temujin the boy, who had 
faced repeated rejections ascribed to his lower-status birth, had now abolished the distinction 
between black bone and white bone. All of his followers were now one united people.” “Some of 
the earlier Turkic tribes used a similar military organization based on units of ten, and Temujin 
may well have borrowed it from them. Temujin, however, not only utilized the system as a 
military tactic for war, but he also employed it as the permanent structure for the whole 
society.”205 
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Temuchin also created a common government and administration that was centralized and dependent on 
the king as Shaka did. Two key elements of administration were the Yam, a pony express like 
communications system and the Yassa or code of laws.  The Yam was developed to support the army and 
provide intelligence but over time was also used by merchants for protection as they traveled which 
increased trade in the Mongol areas.206 The Yassa was developed using a captured Uighur scribe and in 
the Uighur script a set of written laws and judgments was developed by Temuchin’s adopted brother, a 
captured Tartar, placed in charge of the task by Temuchin.  Temuchin also had the scribes teach the 
Mongol princes to read the Uighur script.207  A final similarity between Shaka and Genghis Khan is that 
the new societies they created were fueled by military expansion to ‘pay’ their troops.  Aggressive 
military expansion was important to both and they were based initially on a voluntary amalgamation of 
tribes and military innovation.  Amalgamated Security Communities do not need to be European, 
democratic, or peaceful.  They do however; need to have a voluntary merger of groups, and some 
integration of military forces and the capacity to create military capabilities.   
2-3 (a).  History of the creation of the German Empire 
  
 The unification of Germany provides a clear example of military integration leading to an 
Amalgamated Security Community, and highlights the process in a well known historical example.  In 
addition, it also provides examples of various levels of military integration that applied to the constituent 
states of the empire which gives a foreshadowing of the following chapters.  This case is focused on the 
process of the creation of the German Empire from about 1862 until 1871 although some prior events 
must be mentioned.   There is a great deal of literature on the particulars of conflicts and battles that 
shaped the creation of the German Empire as well as the diplomatic maneuvers that were used by 
Bismarck during this time, but these are not the focus of attention in this case.  Rather, the focus is on 
particular outcomes that fostered military integration in the North German Confederation and military 
integration / cooperation between Prussia and the South German States.   These and the level of military 
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integration and production of military capabilities are the focus of this case.   The underlying question of 
why the decision to integrate the production of military capabilities and forces is also not the focus of the 
case.  The unification of Germany is often portrayed as the result of pan-German nationalism or as the 
result of power politics as carried out by Bismarck.  There may be another factor.  Bruce Cronin, in 
Community Under Anarchy notes that:  
“neither the romantic nationalist nor the power-and-interests explanations are sufficient. While 
German nationalism did help to cultivate a transnational German identity among the political 
actors in Prussia and the German principalities, the creation of Germany was ultimately a political 
process involving competing definitions of the German nation. It required a prior construction of 
an amalgamated security community in central Europe, an arrangement that equated the security 
of the principalities with that of the German nation.”208 
The construction of this particular amalgamated security community is the focus of this case. 
The concept of a German state is a modern construct.  There was no clear delimitation of what 
territory would constitute Germany.  The Holy Roman Empire included German as well as numerous 
non-German populations.  Furthermore, the Protestant Reformation had both deeply divided the German 
speaking peoples as well as led to the devastation of large parts of what would become Germany by the 
Thirty Years War.  As a result there was no concept of pan-German nationalism until the late 1840’s. 
The beginning of the history of German unification is the creation of a loose Confederation of the German 
states by the Congress of Vienna.  The German Confederation’s chief political body was the Federal Diet 
(Bundestag) that met from 1816 to 1866; it was not a parliament of elected representatives but an 
assembly of ambassadors representing the member states.209 The second step was the creation in 1834 of 
the Zollverein, which was a customs union created under Prussian leadership including all of the German 
states except Austria.  It had the effect of creating a single market among the Zollverein participants.210  
Bismarck’s failed attempt to create and use a Zollverein Parliament to foster political unification through 
economic integration will be examined in another chapter.    
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 After the failed revolution of 1848-1849, liberal democratic social and political pressures became 
part of domestic German considerations along with an embryonic desire for a unified German state since 
such a state might allow social, economic, and political reforms.  There was not any agreement on how to 
form such a state.  There were competing visions of what should constitute a German state. One view was 
that of a kleindeutsch (little Germany), which would be a state that would include all parts of the old 
German confederation except for Austria and therefore be dominated by Prussia.  The supporters of the 
kleindeutsch version believed the Austrian Empire was a multinational and multiethnic entity that should 
not be part of a “German” state.  The other view was of a grossdeutsch (big Germany) supported by the 
majority Catholic southern German states that would include the German territories of Austria.  In late 
1847 through early 1848, following a severe European economic downturn, popular uprisings led to the 
convening of a ‘vorparlament’ or pre-parliament in Frankfurt in March 1848.211  It demanded that a 
National Assembly be elected. Elections were held in April, and a Parliament was seated by May 1848.  
The two major items on its agenda were creation of a central government and a national constitution.  The 
constitution was adopted in December 1848.  The government it created had no civil service and no army.  
The result was an impotent and toothless entity that failed to create a unified Germany through the writing 
of a constitution.212  Failing to include the German speaking portions of the Austrian Empire in the new 
German State, the National Assembly offered the title of Emperor of Germany to King Frederick William 
IV of Prussia, who rejected it and the constitution for three reasons. First, he did not want to subsume 
Prussia into ‘Germany’. Second, he did not accept that a parliament of commoners had the right to offer 
the office to him (only Princes of the German states could make such an offer legitimate).  Finally, he still 
believed that such a state it should include Austria.213  The end came once the moderates walked out and 
the remaining left leaning parliament was disbanded by troops from Wurttemberg.   
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In 1850 Austrian and Barvarian troops intervened in Hesse where Prussian troops almost came 
into conflict with them but backed down when Russia sided with Austria.  The result was the Treaty of 
Olmütz that the Prussians viewed as a diplomatic humiliation by Austria, but it did restore the German 
Confederation under Austrian leadership.  By 1851 all of the reforms enacted by the revolutionary 
government were repealed.214  
 The German Confederation, Zollverein, and the failed revolution of 1848-1849 set the 
preliminary overall historical context for German unification.  Despite a common market and a grassroots 
desire for reform and a united German state, the rulers of the various German principalities had reasserted 
their rule and prerogatives.  At this point there was no reason to believe that a unified German State was 
possible.  It is necessary to turn to Prussian domestic politics as the next step in examining German 
unification.  This does not in any way to imply however, that this paper subscribes to a Borussian (Latin 
for Prussia) view of German history.  German historians such as Heinrich von Treitschke advocated the 
Borussian version of German unification arguing that; “it was the emergence of Prussia as a powerful 
modern state with its historical mission as the power destined to unify a pre-existing German nation that 
gave this nation its political expression so that it could fulfill its historical and cultural vocation as a Great 
Power on the world stage.”215  After World War II this positive view of a Prussian centric German history 
was discredited and inverted to a view of German history in which authoritarianism and militarism, also 
caused by Prussia, led to the disaster of two World Wars.  A more balanced view of German history was 
put forward in 1981 when James Sheehan argued that German history is continuing struggle between 
centripetal and centrifugal forces of political unification and fragmentation.216  So it is not Borussianism, 
instead, this paper must examine Prussia because it established the Amalgamated Security Community 
that became Germany.   
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 Politically Prussia had three main contending visions.  First there were the Hohenzollern Kings 
(Frederick William IV, and his brother William) who were willing to subordinate Prussian ambitions to 
Austrian dominance because they valued their relations with the Hapsburgs and their communal history 
within the Holy Roman Empire.217  This was until the treaty of Olmutz which King William viewed as a 
humiliation.218   Although King William thought it would be beneficial to integrate some small German 
principalities into his realm by giving the princes a privileged place in governmental assemblies and by 
having them serve in the Hohenzollern army and bureaucracy, William’s view for the rest of Germany 
was that Prussia would exert moral leadership over them, not that they should combine with Prussia into a 
larger German State.219 
The second vision was that of the Junkers (agrarian nobility) who were not only conservative but 
tended to be parochial as well.  In 1854 Frederick William IV replaced first chamber of the National 
Assembly with a House of Lords dominated by the Junkers who were then effectively able to veto any 
legislation and forced a partial return of their pre-1848 privileges.220  The Junkers were opposed to a 
national German state.  Their interests were based on their position within Prussia and they considered 
themselves Prussians, not Germans.  The Junkers dominated the Prussian civil service and army because 
‘second sons’ and those who had lost estates tended to favor a military or bureaucratic career because 
they had a higher social status. Bismarck was a Junker who as a student did not agree with idea of a 
German nation. In his early political career he fought for Junkers class privileges, and as Minister 
President in 1862 was opposed to having Prussia absorbed into a German national state.221  Bismarck’s 
(like the rest of the Junkers) loyalty was focused on Prussian patriotism and did not encompass any desire 
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for a German national state.222  Although not a German nationalist, Bismarck was willing to use German 
nationalism to advance the interests of Prussia when it was convenient to do so. 
 Finally, there was the vision of the nationalist and liberal movements that had failed in the 
revolution of 1848-49. They remained a force in domestic politics and in the National Assembly.  Their 
desire for a German national state resurfaced after the Italian war of unification and resulted in the 
formation of the Nationalverein (National Union) which advocated a kleindeutsch German state.223 
 The reform of the Prussian Army provides the start point for the eventual creation of an 
Amalgamated Security Community that became Germany.  From 1814 until 1859 the Prussian Army was 
supposed to be organized according to the “Law on the Obligation to Perform Military Service.”  
According to this law every Prussian male was obliged to perform military service from age twenty until 
age fifty.  If conscripted he served three years in the regular army and two years in the regular army 
reserves.  Afterward he became a member of the militia (Landwehr) until age forty when he then passed 
into the home guard (Landstrum) to finish his obligation at age fifty.  In practice, conscription was by 
lottery based on birth month (men born in December rarely served).  From 1816 to 1850 the percentage of 
men in the army shrank from 1.25 percent to 0.79 percent of the Prussian population.224  In 1858 Prince 
William replaced his ill brother King Frederick William IV as King of Prussia.  King William was a 
professional soldier who recognized the weak state of the Prussian Army.  King William also believed 
that “Prussia could maintain her place among the European powers only through a strong army and that 
her strength and effectiveness depended on the preservation of the exclusive royal control of the army and 
the state executive.”225  Albrecht von Roon was a career soldier and General who had served under Prince 
William.    He thought reliance on the Landwehr (citizen-soldiers) was a handicap since they required the 
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government to have to consider popular opinion in deciding policy matters.226  In 1858 von Roon 
proposed to King William a method to reform the Prussian Army. He advocated abolishing the civilian 
administration of the Landwehr and making it organizationally closer to the regular army.  To do this he 
proposed area commands staffed by regular army officers who would train the Landwehr units to make 
them a more effective and ready reserve for the regular army.  The Landwehr units would also be divided 
so that the oldest eleven age groups would be assigned to garrisons, rear areas, and forts, while the 
youngest five age groups could be used with the field army.  The most controversial proposal was that 
men should serve seven years with the regular army (three active and four reserve). This would 
immediately increase the numbers in the regular army by making men available for longer periods of 
service.  In addition von Roon proposed increasing the professionalism of officers and NCOs by closer 
initial screening, education, and training.  King William agreed with these proposals and appointed von 
Roon head of a commission to prepare legislation to enact these reforms.227   
 This is the point where liberal domestic political views in the National Assembly clashed with the 
Monarchy.  The original Landwehr system was popular with the liberals and affluent middle-class who 
made up a large part of the Landwehr’s separately appointed junior officer corps.228  It was also seen in 
the National Assembly as a political balance against the power of the King.  Liberals viewed universal 
conscription as an obligation that gave citizens a part in public affairs in exchange for service, while von 
Roon and the King viewed military service as a required tribute owed to the Monarch. General Edwin von 
Manteuffel, head of the personnel division of the War Ministry, proposed an organizational reform that 
greatly reinforced the king’s position as commander of the army with no parliamentary oversight.  Since 
the War Ministry was required to report to the National Assembly, von Manteuffel suggested the King 
form a royal war cabinet through which he could command the army outside the War Ministry and 
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parliamentary oversight.  King William created it in 1859 with von Manteuffel as chief and removed all 
authority over appointments from the War Ministry.  This allowed him direct command over the army.229   
 The next act by King William ensured a fight with the National Assembly, which also supported 
a stronger military, but one based on more liberal principals with some parliamentary oversight.  The 
King replaced the liberal War Minister with von Roon.230 Replacement of a liberal with a reactionary 
monarchist guaranteed a fight in the National Assembly which began over the Army bill of 1860.  This 
bill was designed to implement von Roon’s reform measures.  It called for a doubling of infantry 
regiments, large increases in artillery and cavalry, expansion of the officer and NCO corps, and the 
conscription of sixty thousand recruits per year versus forty thousand as had been the quota under the old 
system.  It called for a three year initial service in the regular army followed by a four year regular reserve 
obligation.  The National Assembly was willing to fund a large increase and go along with most of the 
proposals except the third year of regular army service.  Although not considered essential by most of the 
Prussian Generals, the King was absolutely committed to the third year of service.  The King, von Roon, 
and von Manteuffel were so disinclined to have any parliamentary involvement or oversight of army 
command and organization that they refused to compromise and withdrew the bill.  Instead, they asked 
for a provisional appropriation of money to cover military expenditures into 1861 which the National 
Assembly approved.231  In fact von Roon had already begun to implement his reforms in 1859 and 
continued to do so in complete disregard of the parliament.  The conflict became a constitutional crisis in 
September 1862 when the National Assembly refused all further money for the army.  At this point, 
facing a complete political defeat, King William considered abdication.  He was persuaded by von Roon 
to instead summon Otto von Bismark to become Minister-President.232   
Bismarck was made head of the Prussian government to resolve the constitutional crisis, not to 
unify Germany or increase Prussian power.  His first move was to assert that the king had the obligation 
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to take all necessary actions to maintain the well-being of the state based on article 109 of the 1850 
constitution. This was used to justify the government collecting taxes without authorization by 
parliament.  Also, War Minister von Roon had arranged for alternative sources of funding for the army so 
that by 1865 the government had enough money to mobilize and pay for a whole campaign. It got the 
money principally from an arrangement with the Cologne-Minden Railway.233 Bismarck simply ignored 
the parliament and governed without it, supported by the army and the Prussian civil-service.   
 Bismarck as a conservative Prussian Junker was motivated by a desire for internal stability and 
monarchical domination in Prussia and the desire for greater Prussian power in Europe.234   An indicator 
of what he intended to do in foreign policy was his “Iron and Blood” speech in the budget commission of 
the parliament in which he stated:  
“Germany does not look at Prussia’s liberalism but at her power. Prussia must keep her power 
together for the auspicious moment, which has already been missed a few times; the Prussian 
boundaries are not favorable for the formation of a healthy state.  The great questions of the age 
are not settled by speeches and majority votes-this was the error of 1848-1849 - but by iron and 
blood.”235 
Bismarck soon had an “auspicious moment” to increase Prussia’s external power and internal stability.  
The duchies of Schleswig-Holstein were majority German, Holstein had been a member of the German 
Confederation since 1815, and they had separate succession laws from the Danish crown.  The issue of 
limited local administrative jurisdiction and succession was supposed to be settled by the London Treaty 
of 1852.236  The provisions of the treaty were not kept and in November 1863 the Danish parliament 
passed a new constitution incorporating Schleswig into Denmark. Austria and Prussia demanded that the 
Danish constitution be revoked. When Denmark refused they both sent troops and were joined by several 
of the smaller German states.  The peace treaty of Vienna in October 1864 separated Schleswig-Holstein 
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from Denmark and gave them to Prussia and Austria to administer jointly.237   Removing Danish claims to 
the majority German Schleswig-Holstein had been a liberal and nationalist cause in 1848-49.  Therefore, 
internal to Prussia the war with Denmark strengthened the government and weakened the liberal 
opposition.   
 In the middle of the conflict with Denmark, Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke, who had 
become Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1858, was appointed as Chief of Staff to Prince Frederick 
Charles who had assumed command in the field.   The Prussians finished the conflict with von Moltke’s 
assistance directly planning the remainder of the campaign.238  As von Roon had been instrumental in the 
reforming the personnel, recruiting, and organization of the army, von Moltke was instrumental in 
reforming war fighting methods including the technological, logistic, communications, transportation, and 
command and control of the Prussian army.  One item that preceded von Moltke’s tenure as Chief of the 
Prussian General Staff was the Dreyse rifle (needle gun) that was the first bolt action breech loading rifle, 
which could be fired five times faster than any muzzle loading rifle that equipped other European armies.  
Although it had a shorter effective range than other rifles, it was adopted beginning in 1848 and was 
eventually distributed to the entire army by 1864.239  General von Moltke was recognized as a genius 
whose ideas were far ahead of his contemporaries regarding the employment of new technology.  Moltke 
understood that to be effective the new technology required intensive individual and unit training as well 
as aggressive unit leadership.  He revised the War planning cycle to an annual basis that could incorporate 
the information from the latest war-games and maneuvers.  The Prussian army had a command and 
control system that used standard orders and gave great leeway to subordinates to use their initiative 
(mission orders – Auftrag), as well as a good officer and NCO education organization that ensured the 
system was understood.  What von Moltke added was two things, a concept of risk management and time.   
His method was to plan worst case scenarios with tight time horizons which resulted most often with the 
Prussian army arriving before the enemy and with more troops and resources. This allowed the army to 
                                                 
237 Ibid., 172. 
238 Arden Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 97. 
239 Ibid., 24. 
 87
compensate for other mistakes or the ‘fog of war.’   He sent General Staff Officers to subordinate 
headquarters who completely understood his intent and were able to amplify and interpret mission orders 
and assist the commanders.240   Von Moltke as head of the General Staff created a community of officers 
who had a great impact on the army since most senior commanders had passed through it at some point 
and were able to put the new ideas of war fighting into practice.   
Von Moltke is best known for the military use of railroads.  Moltke understood that railways 
helped Prussia strategically since troops could be moved to meet geographically dispersed threats.  To 
von Moltke the development of railroads was more important than border fortifications.  In addition von 
Moltke introduced field telegraph units to keep up with the new mobile army.241   He saw the railroads as 
complex systems in which a problem with one train could have a cascading and large impact throughout 
the whole network.  Planning and scheduling had to be very exact.  He understood that there had to be 
great coordination among the General Staff, War Ministry, Commerce, and Interior Ministries in order to 
exploit the potential of the railroads.  Von Moltke pushed for double rail lines that could accommodate 
two way traffic; especially in the direction of France.  A critical event was the mobilization of 1859 in 
which civilian railway traffic had priority which lead to a complete fiasco.  Shortly thereafter, von Moltke 
convened a conference of Prussian military and civilian railroad officials to establish a Central Railroad 
Commission in Berlin, along with each rail line having a subordinate commission with representatives at 
each loading station.  It was agreed that in time of war military traffic would have priority. He organized a 
mobilization division within the General Staff, and within it there was a separate railroad management 
section.   Von Moltke then decreed that mobilization orders were to be sent by telegraph reducing 
notification time from five days to one.  He implemented time phased mobilization plans.  Trains were 
organized to carry a complete single unit and scheduled to transport them according to its place in the 
war-plan (order of battle). 242   In 1866 “field railroad troops” consisting of a mix of civilian and military 
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personnel were created.243  Between 1864 and 1866, as mobilization strength grew to over 600,000 
because of von Roon’s reforms, mobilization times were reduced from almost fifty days to little over 
twenty days.  It was this reform of transportation, communication, and supply using railroads and 
telegraph that gave the Prussian army its operational and strategic superiority over its adversaries.   
 After the defeat of Denmark, the issue of the future of Schleswig-Holstein remained a matter of 
contention between Prussia and Austria. The compromise that was agreed on let Prussia administer 
Schleswig which would enter the Zollverein and Austria would administer Holstein with Prussian 
administration of Kiel which was to become a German Confederation naval base as well as construction 
of a canal and railroad.244  This agreement only postponed the conflict although the King and Crown 
Prince did not want a war with Austria.245  Bismarck wanted to eliminate Austria from Northern German 
affairs to establish Prussian dominance in the Confederation and partly to repay them for the humiliation 
at Omültz.  Bismarck intended to provoke a war with Austria but not because of a desire to create a 
German national state.  In the end the conflict with Austria occurred despite the qualms of the Prussian 
monarchy partly because Austria attempted to isolate and humiliate Prussia in the German Confederation.  
Bismarck made a secret limited three month alliance with Italy in April 1866 for a joint war with 
Austria.246  By the third week of April Italian troop movements forced a partial Austrian mobilization 
which moved Prussia to mobilize.247  Austria called for non-Prussian members in the Confederation Diet 
to mobilize against Prussia. The most powerful states in the German Confederation after Prussia and 
Austria; the southern German states of Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg along with Saxony and 
Hanover, sided with Austria. Prussia responded by announcing that the German Confederation was 
dissolved while presenting a plan for a new confederation (what was to become the North German 
Confederation) which was rejected.  Prussia then demanded Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse join the new 
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confederation, and invaded when they refused.  Austria responded by declaring that they would assist 
these states under Prussian attack and this led to an overall outbreak of hostilities.248  The combination of 
Bismarck forcing a two front war on Austria which tied down a large part of their forces in Italy, and 
Prussian superiority in mobilization, transportation, communications, command and control as well as a 
superior rifle, resulted in a defeat for Austria and the German states that had allied with Austria.  The 
outcome of this conflict established the Amalgamated Security Community that became the German 
Empire.     
 Bismarck pursued a moderate peace because he believed that humiliation of Austria would not be 
anything but trouble in the future and he did not want to fight France or Russia while simultaneously 
fighting Austria and her German allies.249  There was a “Preliminaries of Peace” signed on July 26 at 
Nikolsburg, which was ratified later in a Treaty of Peace, signed at Prague on August 23rd, 1866.  The 
peace agreement allowed Prussia to annex Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, electoral Hesse, Nassau, and 
Frankfurt which produced a contiguous state linking the previously separate parts of Prussian territory. 
Austria agreed to the dissolution of the German Confederation and to recognize the formation of a North 
German Confederation north of the river Main in which Austria would not participate, and a South 
German Union (blocked later by Prussia).  Also included was a provision for separate treaties to be 
concluded between Prussia and the kingdoms of Bavaria, Württemberg, and the duchies of Baden and 
Hesse-Darmstadt.250   
The treaties between Prussia and Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria (who were not included in the 
North German Confederation) are very interesting.   They were all required to pay indemnities; the 
Zollverein Treaties were renewed between them and the North German States; they recognized the 
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conditions of the Nikolsburg “Preliminaries of Peace”, and most interestingly they agreed to the 
appointment of a commission to regulate railway traffic as well as establishment of new railway 
communications:  
“ART. VIII. Appointment of a Commission to regulate Railway Traffic. The High Contracting 
Powers, as soon as Peace is restored in Germany, will cause the meeting of a Commission for the 
purpose of establishing the passenger and goods Traffic of the Railways on a proper basis; 
especially to regulate the state of competition in a proper manner; and to oppose such efforts of 
separate Boards as are injurious to the general interests of traffic. Establishment of New Railway 
Communications. Inasmuch as the High Contracting Powers are agreed that the establishment of 
all New Railway communications conducive to the general interest is to be allowed and as far as 
possible promoted; they will cause the above-named Commission to lay down principles most 
advantageous to the general interests of traffic in this respect.”251 
Although on the surface it appears as an item designed to promote commerce, what this did was give 
Prussia effective control over railroads and telegraph communications that were essential to the new 
Prussian way of waging war. Concurrent with these separate peace treaties Prussia pushed each of these 
states to sign “A Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance with Prussia”.   These treaties guaranteed 
each other’s territorial integrity and committed themselves to pool their entire military strength in time of 
war under the command of the King of Prussia.252   This is the beginning of a movement toward military 
integration between the North German Confederation and the South German States.   
 The North German Confederation was established by a treaty between Prussia and the North 
German States that had allied with Prussia in August 1866.  By April 1867 a constitution was adopted for 
the North German Confederation.253  Key provisions allowed the North German Confederation to be 
dominated by Prussia with the Prussian King acting as President and most importantly as Commander in 
Chief of the Confederation Army.  The constitution established a federal system, with the Confederation 
focused mostly on foreign and military affairs along with commercial activities not covered by the 
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Zollverein.254  There is a debate over whether Bismarck intended to create a “German” state government 
or just a façade for Prussian hegemony. Although quite willing to use German nationalism as a tool, his 
main motivations previously were to increase Prussian power and ensure domestic stability and there is 
no reason to believe this had changed.255   On the other hand, Bismarck became Federal Chancellor of the 
North German Confederation, and considering that “where you sit determines where you stand” it is only 
natural that Bismarck would begin to promote the collective interests of the Confederation.  On 
examination it is clear that his policies were designed to promote an “ever closer union” especially in 
regard to bringing the southern German states into the confederation. The army of the North German 
Confederation was integrated and the armies of Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria were integrated to 
differing levels as will be discussed below.  The point is that the North German Confederation formed a 
strong Amalgamated Security Community, while Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria illustrate the process 
of military cooperation moving towards integration that indicates the existence of a weak or partially 
integrated Amalgamated Security Community.  
 “Since 1866 Bismarck had insisted that the south must be won, not conquered.”256  On the other 
hand, Prussia was viewed with even greater suspicion and disapproval in the southern German states 
following the war with Austria; especially in Bavaria and Wurttemberg.  The political movements 
favoring union with the north were weak and unorganized.257  Prussia also suffered from a stereotype 
among the southern Germans as being a militaristic society, a “large barracks’ that maintained its 
domestic order by force. A joke in Wurttemberg was that the Constitution of the North German 
Confederation had ‘only three articles; 1. pay, 2. be a soldier, 3.  keep your mouth shut.”258  In Bavaria 
elections in 1869 resulted in a significant victory for conservatives who condemned the government as 
traitors because of the military alliance with Prussia which only served “to transform Bavaria into a spike-
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helmeted province of a German Union that was only Prussia written large.”259   Interestingly enough these 
objections not only had a basis in reality, they can be seen as a backhanded indication of the integrative 
nature of the measures adopted to bring the Wurttemberg and Bavarian armies up to Prussian standards 
which will be discussed below.  The key point is that any program to win over the southern German states 
to unify with the North German Confederation faced serious political difficulties.   
 The war generated a wave of patriotism that changed the makeup of the Prussian National 
Assembly even prior to the end of the war; in the election of July 1866 the conservatives won a 
significant majority.  With the army reforms nearly every family had someone in the army and with the 
victory over Austria public opinion strongly favored the King and Bismarck.  The liberals were therefore 
very amenable to working out a compromise.260  The constitutional crisis ended in September 1866 when 
the National Assembly made a retroactive allocation of money spent while it was dissolved.  Bismarck 
was supported by the Free Conservative Party joined by moderate liberals to create a solid base of support 
in the National Assembly for Bismarck and his policies.261  In any case the Prussian Assembly lost power 
as the North German Confederation came into being: 
“After 1866 the attitude of the Prussian Chamber toward the royal prerogative was not of decisive 
importance. The principal arena in which the relationship of the army to the state was to be 
discussed henceforth was, from 1867 to 1871, the parliament of the newly created North German 
Confederation and, after 1871, the Reichstag of the German Empire.”262    
This is a clear illustration of military integration creating an Amalgamated Security Community and that 
same military integration changing the domestic power structure.  That this occurred despite the King, 
Bismarck, and the Junkers, having all been opposed to the creation of a German state, demonstrates the 
power of the process of military integration. The other issue of Von Roon’s reform of the Prussian Army 
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that created the constitutional crisis in the first place was resolved when the National Assembly finally 
approved the reforms.263   
The army of the North German Confederation will be discussed below, but it was, for all intents 
and purposes, a greatly expanded Prussian Army.  By homogenizing the various forces of annexed 
territories and members of the Confederation to Prussian methods, equipment, and standards it also acted 
as an institution of national integration.264   This extended to at least partial integration of the southern 
states as well.    
“During the years 1866-1870 the most tangible progress toward the integration of Germany under 
Prussian leadership came in the area of military affairs.  By providing for the supreme command 
of the King of Prussia, the military alliances had made possible the assimilation by the southern 
states of the Prussian military system at a time of great popular and governmental resistance to 
Berlin’s political control.  Their own miserable record in the fighting of 1866 and the remarkable 
efficiency of the Prussian military machine had had a considerable impact upon southern officers 
and statesmen.  Naturally German nationalists were now eager to accept the Prussian system, but 
many particularists were similarly inclined.  If but to reinforce their own independence, it 
behooved the southern states to copy the seeming virtues of Prussian militarism.”265 
The final stage of the creation of the German state was the result of the Franco-Prussian war.  The 
spark that started the conflict was the question of succession to the throne of Spain because the French 
objected to the possibility of Hohenzollern there as King.  When the French Ambassador met King 
William at Ems on 13 July he presented the French demands and was rebuffed.  The foreign office 
official with the King sent a dispatch to Bismarck describing the encounter.  Bismarck was having supper 
with Von Moltke and Von Roon when he got the dispatch.  With army assurances that they were prepared 
for a war with France, Bismarck then edited what was to become know as the Ems Dispatch to ensure it 
would provoke a war and released it to the newspapers.266   
 The years following the integration of the armed forces of the North German Confederation prior 
to the war with France had had an effect:  
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“The North German Confederation began to change the outlook of the smaller and medium-size 
German states; by participating in the security community, their leaders began to think and act 
like Germans. Reflecting and assisting this transformation was the replacement of the Prussian 
flag with a new German banner.”267 
The reaction in the North German Confederation to the news of a war with France was a wave of national 
patriotism fanned by the press.  In the South there was less enthusiasm initially and in some areas 
opposition as well as questions in the press over the wisdom of engaging as an ally in another great power 
war.268  The Ems Dispatch and the French preparations for war soon made those concerns moot, and the 
southern German states mobilized along with the North German Confederation honoring their defensive 
alliance commitments.  For the moment parochialism and distrust of Prussia dissipated in a widespread 
feeling of pan-German patriotism in response to what was perceived as French arrogance.  Southern 
German reserves reported to their units enthusiastically.269   
The French were as much to blame for their disaster as much as the Prussians were able to claim 
success.  In September 1870 the Emperor Napoleon was captured along with an entire French army at 
Sedan, effectively ending the Second Empire and causing the formation of the Third French Republic.  
Although the Germans reached the outskirts of Paris and even shelled it, the limits of the Prussian 
military system were reached when the defeated main French forces were replaced by new conscript 
armies that fought a type of guerrilla war that impeded the German supply lines. The victories over the 
French army continued to fan nationalist sentiment and many Germans viewed them as revenge for the 
actions of Louis IVX and both Napoleons.  Bismarck encouraged nationalist demands that the historically 
German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine be annexed to Germany.  This annexation of Alsace and 
Lorraine became a clause demanded by the southern states as justification of the German national cause 
as well as a buffer against future French attacks.     
  Prior to the end of the conflict the North German Confederation became the German Empire.  
Although Baden was pro-unification, the rulers of the other states were not. In Bavaria the King along 
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with the Prime minister and powerful rural and Catholic factions were against unification; in 
Württemberg the King and Queen saw unification as a sharp reduction of their sovereignty but they had 
little popular support; the Duke of Hesse (who had attempted to ally himself with France prior to the war) 
was very resentful of unification but had to bow to popular support for unification.270  None of the 
politicians in southern Germany thought that there was any alternative to merger with the North German 
Confederation after the victory over France.271  With the success of the army Bismarck wanted to use the 
nationalistic German sentiment created by the war with France to enlarge the North German 
Confederation to encompass the south German states.272 Baden had already tried to join previously but 
had been rebuffed by Bismarck because he thought it would preclude all of the southern states from 
joining. Wurttemberg and Bavaria were essentially reduced to negotiating terms.  An additional item of 
leverage was that the customs union would have to be renewed by 1876 and therefore the threat of 
economic isolation also existed for any state that did not join the new state.  The treaties were negotiated 
with Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt and signed on November 15, Bavaria on November 23, and 
Wurttemberg on 25 November.  Although the Bavarian Diet did not want to ratify the treaty seeing it as a 
surrender to Prussia, and the Bavarian King was also against it, public opinion was too strong to ignore 
and it was approved. 273   
  There was one final step.  The German nationalists had desired to create a German Reich with 
an Emperor (Kaiser).  To get around the King’s objection to accepting the title of “Emperor” from 
parliament, Bismarck paid off the Bavarian King to write a letter to William asking him to become 
Emperor.  This offer from the German Princes convinced King William of Prussia to become the first 
German Emperor.  On 18 January 1871 the Prussian King William I, was declared German Emperor in 
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the hall of mirrors of the Palace of Versailles, which was being used as Royal and Army Headquarters for 
the German forces besieging Paris.274     
“With the massed regimental colors of German troops as a backdrop, surrounded by princes and 
general, William I received the acclaim of a large gathering of officers representing all the units 
of the German army around Paris.  Exercitus facit imperatorem, the army creates the emperor, the 
Romans used to say, and the martial show of this day, thereafter annually celebrated in Germany 
as the birthday of the new Reich, could almost appear as a reenactment of ancient events.”275 
Although it was not literally the case that the army selected the emperor, it is clear that the army was the 
underlying cause for unification.  It was not nationalism, revolutionary reform, nor economic integration 
that set the stage for German unification.  It was not by conquest of the southern German states that the 
German Empire came into being.  The army was the basis for the state because of its activity as an 
institution of integration and identity construction.  It is this aspect of integration and identity formation, 
which is based on military integration that characterizes Amalgamated Security Communities.  The 
German Army continued in this role in the consolidation of the Empire, both in the active forces as well 
as among veterans.276   Finally, it is on examination of the level of integration between the army of the 
North German Confederation and those of Baden, Wurttemberg, and Bavaria that another factor becomes 
clear.  The less militarily integrated states were able to negotiate for privileges and exemptions as 
conditions for their entry into the German state.  Especially in the case of Bavaria where there remain 
privileges and exemptions to this day based on those negotiations.    
2-3 (b).  The Government 
 The common Government in this case is the one established by the constitution of the North 
German Confederation which, with a few modifications, became the constitution of the German Empire.  
It is also important to examine the offensive / defensive treaties that were signed between Baden, 
Württemberg, Bavaria, and Prussia because of the effect that they had on integration.   
 The various German constitutions are all Federal.  One explanation is that the constituent states of 
Germany, especially the mid-sized and powerful states possessed sufficient governing capacity to make a 
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negotiated merger more attractive than one in which the dominant power (Prussia) annexed the states and 
would have had to expend resources conquering them and then rebuilding governing capacity.  In addition 
it may have been advantageous in the view of Bismarck and conservative Prussia to preserve existing 
monarchies and power structures to offset the creation of a representative parliament.277   Another view is 
that the structure of the government was essentially path dependent given the history of the Holy Roman 
Empire and its constituent states, the German Confederation, the constitution developed by the 
revolutionary parliament in 1848, as well as the concept of sovereignty and legitimacy residing in the 
monarch that guided the Prussian Kings and conservative monarchists in their policy preferences during 
the entire process.  Given either or both of these explanations as valid, the product was the formation of a 
government (except for the directly annexed territories) that was created through a process of negotiation 
resulting in a federal state voluntarily agreed to by the constituent states.  It is the voluntary aspect of this 
state formation that places it into the category of being an Amalgamated Security Community.    
 The North German Confederation came into being almost immediately following the defeat of 
Austria. By 18 August 1866 a treaty had been signed with a majority of the states that were to form the 
North German Confederation. Delegates from the constituent states had a draft constitution by early 
February which was adopted by the Diet in April 1867.  It was based on several previous documents 
including the constitution passed by the revolutionary government in 1848.278   The provisions for what 
comes under the jurisdiction of the Confederation are listed in Article IV and include; citizenship and 
passports, customs and tariffs, commercial legislation, taxes for federal purposes, weights and measures, 
money and banking, patents and intellectual property, foreign affairs and consular representation, river 
navigation, postal service and telegraph, contract law, penal law and commercial law, railways and roads 
and water-communications for the defense of the country and for general circulation, and finally the 
military affairs of the confederation and the navy.279  Significant areas were reserved to the constituent 
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states such as regulation of education, religion, health services, police, civil law and civil liberties, along 
with the right to collect direct taxes.280   The bicameral legislature consisted of a representative assembly 
(the Diet), and a Federal Council (Bundesrat) that represented the rulers of the constituent states, each 
having equal legislative power.  The votes in the Federal Council however, were such that Prussia could 
block any legislation contrary to its interests.  The Presidency of the Confederation belonged to the 
Prussian King, who acted as Head of State and Commander in Chief of the armed forces with the 
authority to declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties.  He also had the power to appoint and 
remove all federal officials since they were responsible to him, not the legislature.281     
 It is interesting to note the treatment of the telegraph and railways in the constitution.  Art. 
XLVIII. calls for the Telegraph Service to be “administered for the whole territory of the North German 
Confederation as single institution,” and that it is under the direct supervision of the Presidency.   The 
constitution is very explicit regarding the critical nature of railroads for defense and the primacy of the 
federal government in their regulation.282 Integration of communication and rail transportation were so 
vital to the Prussian way of waging war, that they were included in the basic law establishing the 
Amalgamated Security Community of the North German Confederation.  
The Constitution also outlines the integrated military of the Amalgamated Security Community.  
The centrality of the integrated armed forces to the North German Confederation can be seen in the 
funding of the confederation which in 1868 military expenses consumed 99.5% of the confederations 
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entire budget.283   Art. LIII defines the new Confederation Naval component as being “an undivided one 
under the Commander-in-Chief of Prussia” whose organization and composition are determined by him 
and that “the Ports of Kiel and the Jahde are federal military ports.” The Navy owes its allegiance to the 
“King of Prussia, who appoints its Officers and Functionaries, and into whose Service they are to be 
sworn, as well as the crews.”   Funding for the Navy was centralized as well; “The expenditure required 
for the formation and maintenance of the Fleet and of the establishments connected therewith is provided 
from the Federal Treasury.”  In order to build this new force, the constitution also exempts everyone in 
the “Maritime Population of the Confederation” from service in the army.  Section XI of the Constitution 
of the North German Confederation deals with the “Military Affairs of the Confederation” which was the 
establishment of the Army.  As with the Navy the “Land Forces of the Confederation form one single 
Army, which in war and in peace is under the command of His Majesty the King of Prussia, as Federal 
Commander-in-Chief,” in addition “all the federal troops (including officers) are bound to render 
unconditional obedience to the orders of the Federal Commander-in-Chief.  This obligation is to be 
undertaken in the Banner-oath.”   He had the authority to appoint all commanders of contingents and 
fortresses, as well as to select from any contingent officers to fill those positions of responsibility.  The 
Federal Commander-in-Chief was given the right of erecting fortresses within the territory of the 
confederation, and could declare any part of the federal territory in a state of war if public security was 
threatened.   He was also given control over determining the strength, formation and organization of all 
contingents (there were some units that came from a single member state) as well as the organization of 
the Landwehr, and was to determine the strength and location of various garrison units.  He had the 
authority to order any part of the federal army to be mobilized for war.   As the Federal Commander-in-
Chief it was his duty to ensure that all troops were properly equipped, trained, and led by qualified 
officers.  In order to do this he could establish training standards, institutions and conduct inspections.  
When he deemed necessary he could then remove any “defects” he found from any contingent.  This gave 
the King of Prussia effective quality control over all the forces to ensure integration at a level in which all 
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the various forces could operate as a single army.  The size of the Federal Army in peace time was set at 
one per cent of the population.  The reforms of von Roon were incorporated in the constitution so that all 
males were subject to military service. Funding for the army was to be “borne equally by all the Federal 
States” to be paid to the federal treasury by the separate states of the confederation.  The base line amount 
for the army and its institutions was also fixed in the constitution at “225 thalers (currency unit) per 
soldier” which was to be allocated annually to the Federal Commander-in-Chief (this “iron budget” of 
automatic appropriations for the army ensured that there would be no repeat of the legislature cutting off 
funds for the military).  The most direct aspect of integration was contained in ART. LXI which mandates 
that the whole Army of the North German Confederation would adopt the Prussian Army system in all 
respects.  
“After the publication of this Constitution the Prussian Military Legislation is to be immediately 
introduced into the whole Federal Territory, both the laws themselves and the regulations, 
instructions, and receipts issued for their execution, explanation, or completion; especially, 
therefore, the Military Penal Code of 3rd April, 1845, the Military Criminal Court Regulation of 
3rd April, 1845, the Ordinance on Courts of Honor of 20th July, 1843, the directions respecting 
Recruiting, Time of Service, matters of Service and Maintenance, Quartering, Compensation for 
Damages to Fields, Mobilization, &c., for Peace and War.”284 
In addition, any future adaptations or modifications instituted by the Prussian Army were to be adopted 
by all other federal contingents through the Committee for the Army and the Fortresses. There was no 
Minister for War in the constitution so the effective control of the armed forces fell to the Prussian 
General Staff as the highest military planning authority.285   
 Besides the Constitution of the North German Confederation, there were treaties signed between 
Prussia and Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria that provided the basis for a partially integrated 
Amalgamated Security Community.  As noted previously the peace treaties between Baden, 
Württemberg, Bavaria and Prussia included the establishment of Railroad Commissions and railway 
communications which had both civil and military implications that effectively integrated those systems.  
There were also signed at the same time (August of 1866) secret offensive and defensive alliance treaties 
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between Prussia and each of the Southern German states.  These treaties guaranteed the territorial 
integrity of signatories, and included the provision that in time of war they would place all their military 
forces under the command of the King of Prussia.  These treaties were made public in March 1867, and 
caused concern not only in Paris and Vienna but also discontent in the anti-Prussian elements of the South 
German States.286   This was not the total extent or limit of military integration between the Army of the 
North German Confederation and the forces of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria as will be outlined in 
the next section.  However, the levels of integration were in that order, with Baden being the most 
integrated and Bavaria the least.    
 Besides the likely intervention of outside powers had Prussia tried to unify all of Germany 
following the war with Austria, there were other considerations that prevented unification with the 
Southern German states including religious, cultural, and the very real probability that inclusion of the 
Southern states would have forced concessions in the constitution that would have made it more liberal 
and less centralized than Prussia was willing to accept.287  Without the Southern States Prussia could 
dominate the North German confederation and consolidate its gains.  Given the anti-Prussian feeling in 
the Southern states Bismarck saw that it was preferable to wait until either the Zollparliament had 
succeeded in bringing the states closer or until the Southern states themselves freely wished union with 
the North.288   It was the opportune moment of national patriotic feeling as all allied “German” Armies 
fought against the French that provided the basis for a negotiated constitutional union.  The constitution 
of the German Empire was for most parts simply the constitution of the North German Confederation 
with exceptions and exemptions made for the South German states; particularly Württemberg, and 
Bavaria.  All the southern states were exempted from taxes on beer and spirits which was a financial 
advantage to sweeten the deal.  The terms negotiated for entry into and creation of the German Empire 
gave Württemberg and Bavaria several privileges.  They were allowed to manage railway, postal, and 
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telegraph systems in their territory (subject to laws governing national defense).  Despite becoming part 
of the German Army Württemberg was allowed to appoint most of the officers and administer the affairs 
of its contingent including uniforms and insignia. In peacetime Württemberg’s troops could not be forced 
to be stationed outside of Württemberg and no soldiers other than those from Württemberg would be 
stationed there.  Military budget surpluses were kept rather than returned to the Imperial treasury.  
Bavaria got even more concessions, it maintained its own War Ministry and General Staff as well as 
command of its forces in peacetime; however these forces were closely supervised by the Prussian 
General Staff.  The King of Bavaria was Commander-in-Chief of his contingent and retained the right to 
appoint all officers.  Bavaria was to adopt common Imperial standards in mobilization, training, and 
organization, it reserved the right to arm, equip, and fund its own force as well as determine uniforms and 
insignia.  Bavaria was given a permanent seat on the Bundesrat committee on military affairs. Bavaria 
also retained rights of diplomatic representation, and negotiated the creation of a foreign policy 
committee in the Bundesrat with a Bavarian president and permanent Württemberg and Saxon 
representation (which was ignored by Bismarck).  If a German envoy was incapacitated a Bavarian envoy 
could be appointed as a substitute. Bavaria also retained the right to be represented at peace 
negotiations.289   
These concessions gave two of the Southern states unequal standing in the constitution of the 
German Empire; the same two states that were the least militarily integrated.  One Bavarian politician 
noted however, that it would have been better to negotiate terms that gave Bavaria more influence over 
federal policy rather than retain state privileges.290  This would seem to have been more reasonable, but 
only if Bavaria was committed to unification rather than possible future independence.  It is interesting to 
note the emphasis that these states placed on trying to maintain as much “independence” of their military 
forces as possible.  It is clear that they saw this as critical to maintaining some semblance of sovereignty.  
When the opposition to unification by the rulers of these states is remembered, it is clear that maintaining 
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control of military forces and the capacity to create military force had the potential to provide options for 
future independence.  In addition to trying to maintain a nominally “independent” military, Bavaria also 
focused on maintaining diplomatic and foreign policy privileges.  Therefore, the most logical reason for 
what was negotiated was a desire for eventual freedom from the Prussian yoke, and the only way to have 
any chance of that occurring was to have the ability to create military forces.  This potential for 
dissolution is a hazard for partially integrated Amalgamated Security Communities that will be examined 
in the next chapter. 
2-3 (c).  Defense Integration and Cooperation 
 It was the integrated army of the North German Confederation that made it a strong 
Amalgamated Security Community.  Therefore the integration of that army and its contingents must be 
examined.  Also significant are the armies of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria in the period from 1866 
to 1870 during which they were pledged to fall under the wartime command of the King of Prussia (by 
the conditions of the defensive and offensive alliances – Schutz und Trutzbundnisse) prior to their 
negotiated entry into and creation of the German Empire. The different levels of military cooperation and 
integration had an effect on those negotiations and the domestic political character of Germany.   
 1. The army of the North German Confederation was in effect an expanded Prussian Army.  
The history of the creation of that army is primarily the narrative of how the Prussian army incorporated 
the forces of the other states in the confederation.  A critical issue was unit leadership.  First, there was 
the question of incorporating the officers of the other states.  The Prussian Army did not have nearly 
enough officers to lead all the new units that would comprise the Army of the North German 
Confederation, so it pressed the rulers of constituent states and annexed territories to absolve their officers 
from previous oaths. All of these officers were required to swear loyalty to the King of Prussia directly. 
Eventually three hundred thirty six officers from the various constituent states took the “Banner-oath” of 
allegiance to the Prussian King while only forty one refused, and fifty eight were retired.291   The 
professionalism of the Prussian Officer Corps also had a positive effect on the integration of officers from 
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other states.  Officers from smaller states who did not have the opportunity to develop their abilities or 
have much opportunity for promotion were challenged to enhance their skills and work to develop new 
units in the army of a major power.  In addition the demographics of the officers from the other states 
changed the Prussian officer corps.  The number of aristocrats declined as officers from families with 
backgrounds in business, bureaucracy, and academic professions were integrated.  Even the Prussian 
regiments were changed as young Lieutenants from the other states were assigned to assist in their 
acculturation to the new army.292   The formation of new officers through the Prussian officer cadet corps 
in Berlin also helped to integrate the force since cadets from the annexed territories and other member 
states were given preference in attendance.  Saxony however, maintained its own cadet corps. There were 
other officer schools that helped to integrate the army of the North German Confederation.  The schools 
were open to officers from across the confederation. There was a military academy in Berlin and after 
three years of studies the most promising went on to serve on the General Staff.  There were artillery and 
engineer schools for lieutenants who studied together for a year in their specialty schools. There was a 
college for army veterinary officers, and for army surgeons and medical officers as well as a school for 
gymnastics (physical training).  There was a riding institute for Cavalry and Artillery.  There was a school 
for rifle instruction for both officers and non-commissioned officers.293   The officer education system 
integrated men from different states into a single organization where they learned not only the subject 
matter but also how to work with each other.   
 The Prussian Army placed great emphasis on its non-commissioned officer (NCO or sergeant) 
corps.  The pay and benefits were better than the civilian jobs open to most of them.  They received 
housing, clothing, and food allowances as well as medical care, and could retire at half pay after 12 years 
of service (young enough to start a second career) at a time when pensions for the most part did not exist 
in Germany.  In addition, the NCO corps was one of the earliest merit based organizations in Prussian 
society where ability could lead to social mobility and advancement.  These incentives created very loyal 
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troops who desired to achieve success.  This was facilitated by a NCO school system that gave them 
access to general education as well as military specific knowledge.  The system had three levels and high 
educational standards. The first level was school for military skills such as riding schools, engineer 
schools, and supply schools.  The next level was non-commissioned officer schools for advancement 
within the NCO Corps.  Finally there were schools for promotion to officer rank.294  The North German 
Confederation also had orphanages for the children of soldiers (who had died) which included a free 
education, as well as providing free education to the children of officers, NCOs, soldiers, and military 
employees at the various garrisons.  Soldiers were also educated in regimental schools, where they were 
taught by officers and NCOs to read and write.  Finally, there was an instructional infantry battalion 
which was formed each year of soldiers, NCOs and officers from all of the constituent members of the 
confederation.  The purpose of this unit was to maintain uniformity throughout the entire Army of the 
North German Confederation, and would disperse all of its members back to their parent units in war 
time.295   The integration of the Army of the North German Confederation and its adoption of common 
standards and procedures, as well as the socialization and acculturation fostered in the various schools, 
was greatly facilitated through the military education system.   
The expansion of the Prussian Army and formation of the Army of the North German 
Confederation provided opportunities for ambitious soldiers from the disbanded armies that had opposed 
Prussia.  The possibility of accelerated promotion, benefits, pay and pension, and the possibility for civil 
service appointment after twelve years of service were very tempting for the NCOs from the other 
German armies.  The integration of these NCOs greatly assisted in ensuring that soldiers who were 
conscripted into the Army of the North German Confederation had someone from their own state in 
positions of authority in their unit which helped to legitimize it as more than just the Prussian Army.296   
 Besides the integration of the administrative functions of the army, the organization of the combat 
units should be reviewed briefly.  The Saxon contingent formed a separate Army Corps (the XII Corps) of 
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the Army of the North German Confederation, and the contingent from Hesse was organized as an 
independent division.  However, both were restructured according to Prussian regulation with one or two 
minor exceptions such as an extra Jaeger or rifle battalion.  The Prussian Army increased in size by three 
Army Corps, one in Hanover, one in Schleswig-Holstein, and one made of the lesser annexed states.   
Importantly, units from Prussian allies such as Oldenberg, Mecklenburg, and Braunschweig were 
incorporated into those Corps as were Prussian units to ensure there were not too many “new” units from 
former opponents in one area.  In addition, as the Prussian Army demobilized in 1866, each battalion 
formed a new fifth company that was consolidated with other companies to form new regiments which 
were in turn assigned to the new provinces.  The states that were defeated in 1866 had demobilized their 
armies but their professional cadres were incorporated into these new units.297  The infantry regiments of 
the Army of the North German Confederation were numbered consecutively from 1 to 108 except for the 
Prussian Guards and Hessian troops, for a total of 118 infantry regiments.  The Jaeger battalions were also 
numbered consecutively from 1 to 16 except for the 2 Hessian battalions for a total of 18 battalions from 
Prussia, Saxony, and Mecklenburg.298  Consecutive numbering of units is a method to demonstrate that 
the units belong to a larger organization and are an integral part of it.  The 76 regiments of cavalry of the 
Army of the North German Confederation were also numbered consecutively.  The consecutive 
numbering was not 1 to 76 but rather by type of cavalry such as Cuirassiers, Dragoons, Hussars, and 
Ulhans.299   The Field-Artillery was organized differently with the regiment taking the number of the 
Army Corps it was assigned to.  The Saxons and Hessians had their own Artillery, but the artillery of 
Mecklenburg, Brunswick, and Oldenburg were incorporated into Prussian regiments.  Siege-Artillery was 
all Prussian except for one Saxon unit.300 The Army of the North German Confederation was made up of 
Army Corps.  Prussia provided 12 Corps including a Guards Corps and the other 11 Corps came from the 
constituent states of the confederation and normally most of the troops in those came from the local area.  
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The Guards Corps however, was different in that it recruited from the whole confederation and had no 
territorial district as well as being directly under the supervision of the King.301  It was a truly “national” 
unit.   The other arms of the Army of the North German Confederation such as engineers, supply, and 
transportation were all assigned to each Army Corps to provide it support.   
 Upon examination it is plain that although there were contingents provided by various members 
of the confederation, most notably Saxony and Hesse, it was by virtue of organization of its 
administrative and combat forces a single organization and performed as such against France under the 
direction of the General Staff.  The allied armies that became part of the German Empire prior to the end 
of the conflict must be examined next.   
 2.  The Army of Baden.  Baden found itself in a precarious position after the Prussian defeat of 
its ally Austria and subsequent exclusion of Austria from Germany.  Without an Austrian protector Baden 
was suspicious of Bavaria and being close to France was afraid of French encroachment in the 
Rhineland.302  In addition to the alliance with Prussia, Baden tried to join the North German 
Confederation in 1867 but was denied by Bismarck who (feared a reaction by France) wanted all of the 
South German states to join together.303  Following the defeat of Austria the government in Baden was 
replaced with a pro-Prussian regime led by Minister of State Karl Mathy and Foreign Minister Rudolf von 
Freydorf who favored union with the North German Confederation as did Grand Duke Friedrich I.304   
Having been denied official entry into the confederation, the Government in Karlsruhe focused instead on 
implementing Prussian military reforms, equipment, organization, regulations and everything necessary 
for military integration.  The Grand Duke negotiated additional treaties with Prussia in 1867 and 1868 
that permitted cadets, officers, and administrators to be trained in Prussia and for Prussian officers to 
assume senior military positions in the Army of Baden.  In 1867 a Prussian Major was named head of 
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Baden’s General Staff and in 1868 a Prussian Major General was appointed as War Minister.305   The 
cadets, officers, and administrators on returning from service or school in Prussia then assisted in training 
and reforming the Army of Baden to match Prussian standards.  The most difficult part of the adopting of 
Prussian reforms was the introduction of universal conscription.306  The opposition was overcome by the 
promise of liberal domestic reforms. The Baden Lantag (parliament) commission that proposed the 1868 
Army Bill called for “a re-united Germany” and said that passage of the bill was “one of the most 
important organic laws” for Baden to join the North German Confederation. Baden matched the formula 
for recruitment in the North German Confederation by setting the strength of the army at one percent of 
the population in 1868.  Baden adopted Prussia’s administrative system, military justice system, drill 
regulations, weapons and equipment.307  “This military coordination prepared Baden not only 
psychologically, but simultaneously also institutionally, for joining the North.”308  
 Baden organized its army according to Prussian tables of organization and equipped its infantry 
with 16,000 Prussian M1862 needle guns purchased in 1867 and the Baden M1867 needle gun it 
produced itself.  The Baden infantry uniform was nearly identical to the Prussian infantry except for the 
cockade and plate on the spiked helmet and shoulder piping in the respective regimental colors.  
Similarly, the Artillery was organized on Prussian lines and equipped with Krupp cannons that the Baden 
Army repainted from olive to mid-blue to match Prussian gun carriages. The Artillery uniform was the 
same as Prussia except for the cockade and plate on the helmet.  The Engineers and Medical Service were 
organized and uniformed like the Prussians except for the cockade and plate on their helmet.  Only the 
Cavalry had different equipment because they were a lower priority and were still equipped with 
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percussion carbines and Austrian hussar sabers.  After the war with France they were upgraded.309  “By 
the end of 1869, Baden’s armed forces were, in effect, a separate army corps within the Prussian army, 
with corresponding insignia and service grades.” 310  In 1870 Baden sent 45,000 troops, designated as the 
XIV Army Corps by the Army of the North German Confederation, under the command of Prussian 
General August von Werder to fight against France and distinguished itself during the fighting.  On 25 
November 1870 a military convention was signed between Baden and Prussia.  Baden’s War Ministry 
was dissolved and all of the administrative functions, organization, conscription and mobilization, officer 
promotion and appointments, military justice and discipline, housing of troops, and retirement all came 
under the jurisdiction of the King of Prussia.  In July 1871 Baden’s army officially became the XIV Corps 
of the Army of the German Empire.311   
“The union of Baden’s troops with those of Prussia represented the culmination of what had most 
likely been the most important aspect to the prelude to German Unification, the extension of 
Prussian military institutions and practices to other parts of Germany, and the absorption of non-
Prussian military forces into the Prussian army” 312 
Adoption of the Prussian military system certainly assisted the integration of Baden into the German 
Empire, but it is also clear that because of its known desire to join the North German Confederation 
unconditionally that Baden had no ability to negotiate terms (as did Wurttemberg and Bavaria) to join the 
German Empire.    
 3. The Army of Württemberg.  King Karl and particularly Queen Olga were against 
Württemberg participating in any type of German unification and wanted to retain Württemberg’s 
independence and their sovereignty.313   The Foreign Minister Freidrich von Varnbueler was enough of a 
realist to recognize that economically Württemberg had to cooperate with Prussia but worked to maintain 
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Württemberg’s independence and sovereignty both politically and militarily.314  In a speech to parliament 
in December 1867, von Varnbueler stated “Württemberg wants to remain Württemberg so long as it has 
the power.”315  Domestic popular opinion was decidedly anti-Prussian in Württemberg.   There was strong 
parliamentary support for the war against Prussia in 1866 to the point that rather than accept defeat “some 
newspapers called for popular resistance on the model of Spain against Napoleon”, and this anti-Prussian 
opinion continued after the peace treaty.316   The King, however, was stunned by his army’s poor 
performance in the war against Prussia and decided that it had to be reformed.  He fired his War Minister 
and then found in the new War Minister’s adjutant, Major Albert von Suckow, a competent military 
advisor who he promoted to be Chief of Staff of the Army.  Suckow was from Mecklenburg, a longtime 
ally of Prussia, and he admired the Prussian military and its system.  He began his reform by adopting the 
Prussian needle gun, and organizing the army along the lines of a Prussian division.  He adopted Prussian 
drill regulations but was careful to import drill instructors from Baden rather than Prussia to minimize any 
potential fallout from having Prussians instructing the troops.  Under the context of the defensive treaty of 
alliance he sent officers as students to Prussian military schools in Berlin in order for the Armies to be 
able to work together better in wartime.317  The parliamentary opposition to Prussian reforms was led by 
the democratic German Peoples Party that pushed for a system based on the Swiss militia model as being 
more desirable than the Prussian system.318  When Suckow tried to pass conscription laws he was forced 
to compromise so that the term of service was limited to two years, and one year volunteers could apply 
for government support if their family could not pay their expenses.  This did not placate the Peoples 
Party which collected the signatures of three quarters of the number of voters who normally voted in state 
elections opposing the new conscription laws, demonstrating just how unpopular the military reforms 
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associated with Prussia were.319  The organization of the Landwehr in Württemberg was not reformed, 
and Württemberg kept its own uniforms.320  The infantry, both Jaeger and line regiments were equipped 
with the M1867 Prussian needle rifle. The Cavalry regiments were equipped with both the Prussian 
M1857 needle carbine for one third of the force, while the remainder had percussion pistols and sabers.  
The Artillery was equipped with Krupp cannons, but painted in their own brownish green-grey colors.321    
What is seen in Württemberg is much less military cooperation and integration than occurred in the North 
German Confederation or in Baden.  What reforms occurred were done against significant political and 
public opposition.  Wurttemberg was politically so anti-Prussian that the Foreign Minister, von 
Varnbueler, did not want the secret defensive – offensive alliance treaties to be made public and requested 
a declaration from Berlin that the treaty was only defensive.322   This was refused and anti-Prussian 
sentiment intensified.  The partial military reforms were the only venue of cooperation moving toward 
integration in Württemberg.        
“But with the exception of these military reforms, which, at least in the eyes of the king, had a 
very ambiguous political meaning, no progress toward German unification was made between 
1866 and 1870.”323 
The Army of Württemberg was put under Prussian command at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian war 
and was integrated into the Army of the German Empire at its conclusion.  In contrast to Baden which 
openly desired unification, Württemberg wanted to maintain its independence.  It adopted the equipment, 
organization and tactical reforms of the Prussian Army but it kept its distinction as a separate force.  That 
distinction however, was primarily superficial in terms of uniform and limited considering its officers had 
attended Prussian schools and its troops had adopted Prussian drill and regulation.  Most importantly with 
the publication of the terms of alliance with Prussia they knew that in war they would be fighting along 
side the Army of the North German Confederation.  Given that military cooperation and limited military 
integration were the only successful moves toward unification in the face of significant political 
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opposition, it must be seen that even limited military integration has a powerful effect.  Finally, although 
its nominal military separateness gave it some bargaining leverage when negotiating its entry into the 
Empire, it was less leverage than Bavaria which had a larger and more independent force.    
 4. The Army of Bavaria.  Bavaria saw itself as equal to the Prussians politically and had no 
desire to join the protestant Prussian dominated North German Confederation.    In late 1866 Bavarian 
King Ludwig II appointed Prince von Hohenlohe as Prime Minister.  He had advocated Bavarian 
cooperation with Prussia before the war and thought that German unification was inevitable.324  On the 
other hand, domestic political opinion in Bavaria was decidedly anti-Prussian so that when a 
“Constitutional Alliance” was put forward in 1867 by Bismarck that Württemberg found acceptable, 
Hohenlohe could only dismiss it.325  Hohenlohe also had to reject the Zollparliament at first, and Bavaria 
only agreed to join after winning concessions that limited its jurisdiction and increased their influence.  
Even then the upper house of the Bavarian parliament sought to block the deal until Hohenlohe took the 
speaker to Berlin to meet with Bismarck, and pressure from business interests forced them to accept.326  
Anti-Prussian Bavarians simply moved to send delegates to the Zollparliament that would preserve 
Bavarian interests and block Prussia.  This opposition was centered on the Patriot Party.  It was composed 
of peasants, clergy, aristocracy, and democratic left who were against “dancing to Bismarck’s fiddle”.327  
Bavaria’s opposition to Prussia was more than a political desire for independence, but rather there were 
strong issues of cultural identity that worked to drive Bavarian policy.328    This cultural identity was 
recognized by Bismarck, and was one of the chief reasons he was not in a hurry to absorb the south 
German states.  The 1869 election gave the Patriot Party a significant victory and they attacked the 
government for the military alliance with Prussia, characterizing it as an “underhanded means to 
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transform Bavaria into a spike-helmeted province of a German union that was only Prussia writ large.”329  
Prince Hohenlohe was not able to resist the push of anti-Prussian political sentiment and he resigned in 
February of 1870.  His replacement as Prime Minister, Count Otto Bray-Steinberg, supported greater 
cooperation with Austria and absolutely supported Bavarian independence.330  In addition he pronounced 
the alliance with Prussia to be strictly defensive, not offensive.331  The potential for union with the North 
German Confederation was very slim prior to the war with France. 
 Immediately after the debacle of the unexpected defeat in 1866, the Bavarian army realized the 
need for reform.  King Ludwig II appointed General Sigmund von Pranckh Minister of War in August 
1866.  By the end of 1866 he proposed the adoption of most of Roon’s Prussian Army reforms: 
introduction of universal conscription and one year special volunteers, abolishing paid substitutions and 
exemptions, divided Bavaria into military districts, and reorganized the Landwehr according to the 
Prussian system.  These reforms were opposed in the parliament; particularly by the Patriot Party.  They 
objected that Bavaria could not afford the reforms and suggested that the Swiss system would be a better 
model for reform which would have the added benefit of impeding Prussian-Bavarian military 
cooperation and reducing the chance of becoming involved in a conflict as an active participant with 
Prussia.332      
“They felt that Bavaria could not bear such a heavy financial burden – particularly for a system 
that they forsaw would only diminish Bavarian independence and reduce their army to a mere cog 
in the Prussian military machine.”333 
In the end however, Pranckh’s reforms were passed into law, but those were just the initial reforms.  
Pranckh had the Bavarian War Ministry develop a comprehensive mobilization plan with emphasis on 
coordination with the railroads.  He implemented large scale field maneuvers by 1867 to train large units.  
Also in 1867 Pranckh established a War Academy patterned after the Prussian school, and instituted an 
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inspectorate to manage the military school system and enforce adherence to standards and regulations.  
Standards for the recruiting of officers were raised.  Prussian regulations for drill, and the functioning of 
the various combat and support arms were adopted.   Military cooperation did exist between the armies 
based on the offensive-defensive alliance.  Prussia and Bavaria exchanged military representatives; they 
cooperated on combined mobilization and concentration plans as well as operational plans for a possible 
war with France.334   
Cooperation for Bavaria had significant limits. As part of the military reforms Bavaria rearmed 
but in contrast to the other south German states Bavaria did not adopt the Prussian Dreyse needle rifle.  
Bavaria equipped its troops with Bavarian weapons.  The majority of Bavarian infantry were equipped 
with a Bavarian muzzle loading rifle converted to a percussion firing breech-loader; the M1867 Podewils 
rifle. Because of its low rate of fire it was being phased out and replaced with the Bavarian M1869 
Werder rifle.  This rifle was the best available in Europe, using metal cartridges with a base primer (i.e. 
modern cartridges) unlike the paper cartridges for the needle gun.335  The Werder was superior to the 
French Chassepotte in its ballistics as well.336  The only negative factor was that it had only been 
produced in limited numbers and by the time of the war with France only four Jaeger battalions had been 
issued the rifle and during the war two line infantry regiments were able to trade their Podewils for 
Werders.  Bavaria entered the war with both the best and probably worst standard infantry weapons on the 
German side; but most importantly they were Bavarian designed and produced.  The Cavalry were 
equipped with Bavarian M1843 percussion pistols, Bavarian straight swords or sabers, and a few received 
M1869 Werder pistols and M1869 Werder carbines.  The Artillery was equipped with the Bavarian Zoller 
system.  The other major difference that set the Bavarian Army apart was its uniforms which were of a 
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completely different design and color than the other German troops.  The General Officers, Jaegers, Line 
infantry, and Cuirassiers were dressed in light blue, the Artillery, Engineers, Trains, and Medical troops 
wore dark blue, and the rest of the Cavalry wore dark green uniforms.  The rank insignia were completely 
different; the Prussians wore their rank on their shoulders while the Bavarians wore theirs on their collars. 
The Bavarians also wore a distinctive crested helmet (the Raupenhelm - catapillar helmet) with differing 
plumes depending on the unit that set them apart form the other “spike helmeted” (Pickelhaube) German 
armies.337    
 The reformed Army of Bavaria performed in an outstanding manner in the war with France.  
Bavaria was the largest, most powerful, and culturally distinct of the south German states.  It also had 
done the least in terms of military integration.  The least militarily integrated and most politically opposed 
to union got the most concessions for its entry into the Empire, but it still entered the Empire.  In addition, 
although part of the customs union, Bavaria had used the Zollparliament to block efforts to bolster any 
further political union based on economic cooperation, so it was military cooperation and limited military 
integration based on the offensive and defensive alliance that was the only tangible movement toward 
German unification in Bavaria prior to 1870.  It is also interesting that the opponents of unification with 
the north saw military cooperation and integration as a threat that would diminish Bavarian independence.  
Given the overwhelming political anti-Prussian sentiment and issues of cultural identity that strongly 
opposed union with the north; the integrative effect of even limited military cooperation moving toward 
integration must be seen as extremely powerful.             
2-3 (d). Measuring the Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities 
and the capacity to produce military capability 
 
This paper argues that once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, especially the 
integration of the capacity to produce military capability, an Amalgamated Security Community (a state 
or state like entity) will form as a result, and that this process is the mirror image of state dissolution.  
This proposition leads to a dichotomous dependent variable: state formation / state dissolution.  For 
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Amalgamated Security Community formation the key act is security integration which is a tipping point 
while for state dissolution the key act is security disintegration as sub-state elements establish 
independent military generation capability.  The independent variable is the degree of integration of 
military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability.  The independent variable will be 
measured by category in the case of the creation of the German Empire based on the evidence that has 
been presented.  This will be done for the North German Confederation, Baden, Württemberg, and 
Bavaria.   
Category 1 - Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces. 
The Army of the North German Confederation almost completely merged its administrative 
functions under the supervision of the Prussian Army and general staff to include military schools, pay, 
promotion, reserve system, mobilization, retirement and recruitment.  The only divergence was the Saxon 
cadet academy, and the ability of state contingent commanders to appoint officers although these could be 
removed by the Prussian King if found to be unfit.  The Operational forces were completely integrated 
even though the Saxon and Hesse contingents kept their own unit designations they were an integral part 
of the Army of the North German Confederation.   The integration in this case comes very close to being 
complete and therefore should be scored close to a four so it will be scored as a 3.9, in recognition that the 
integration was almost complete.   
 The Army of Baden had additional treaties with Prussia that permitted cadets, officers, and 
administrators to be trained in Prussia and for Prussian officers to assume senior military positions in the 
Army of Baden such as Chief of Staff and Minister of War.  Baden adopted all of the Prussian regulations 
in every aspect to include uniforms of its troops.  The Grand Duke however still appointed his own 
officers and Baden still had its own War ministry.  Operational forces were led into combat against the 
French by Prussian General Werder and were designated as the XIV Army Corps of the Army of the 
North German Confederation and then Empire.  Therefore based on having integrated combat forces and 
some administrative functions this indicates a medium level of integration and will be scored as a 3. 
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 The Army of Württemberg adopted Prussian unit organization, drill regulations, and equipped its 
force with Prussian weapons but its drill instructors were from Baden not Prussia.  It only partially 
adopted the conscription reforms and kept its own uniforms and paint on its equipment.  It maintained its 
own War Ministry with total control of its administrative functions for appointments, promotions, 
retirements, etc…   It did however send officers as students to the Prussian military schools and 
cooperated on operational war planning.  It functioned as a Prussian style division and was placed under 
Prussian command during the war with France.  Operational forces can be said to have been partly 
integrated in terms of organization, tactics, and equipment but this was limited with no integration in 
terms of administration.  Therefore with some combat force integration this measure is very low and will 
be scored as a 1.  
 The Army of Bavaria did adopt most of the Prussian reforms regarding conscription and 
reorganization of the Landwehr.  It also adopted Prussian regulations for drill, and the functioning of the 
various combat and support arms.  However, it maintained its own War Ministry and military school 
system.  It equipped its own forces and uniformed them with Bavarian manufactured items.  It entered the 
war with France as a distinct Army Corps allied with the North German forces but under the operational 
control of the Prussian King.   There was no administrative integration.  The key aspect of integration of 
combat forces was in terms of organization and use of Prussian regulations for the functioning of the 
various combat and support arms which did make the Bavarian forces interoperable operationally with 
their North German allies.  With a minimum of combat force integration this measure is not zero but is 
very low and will be scored as a 1. 
Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production. 
 The Army of the North German Confederation was equipped primarily with Prussian weapons 
and will be scored as a 4. 
 The Army of Baden was likewise equipped with Prussian equipment and Baden produced 
Prussian equipment (Baden M1867 needle gun).  Despite some cavalry units not having been upgraded 
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prior to the War with France (they were upgraded after) this example still exhibits a complete sharing in 
production which must be scored as a 4. 
 The Army of Württemberg also adopted Prussian equipment.  Also, though some cavalry units 
were not upgraded it was due to time and money not sharing of technology or production.  Therefore this 
example must also be scored as a 4.   
 The Army of Bavaria completely designed and equipped its army with its own manufactured 
weapons and equipment. Therefore this example must be scored as a zero.  
Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces. 
 The army of the North German Confederation, The Army of Baden and the Army of 
Württemberg all used Prussian equipment and therefore must all be scored as a 4.  The Army of Bavaria 
used non-compatible equipment both in the obsolescent Podewils rifle and the advanced Werder rifle.  
Bavaria’s artillery was also not organized or equipped with compatible weapons and therefore this 
example must also be scored as a zero. 
Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers. (DTLOMS) 
 The Army of the North German Confederation completely adopted Prussian doctrine and had a 
mechanism for updating any changes throughout the army. It also shared the same military school system 
and training standards.  Although Leaders could be appointed by state contingents they were subject to 
removal by the King of Prussia and they all had to attend the same schools (except for Saxon cadets).  
Prussian organization, regulations and equipment were standard.  Soldiers were conscripted, promoted, 
placed in the reserves, and retired by the same law as well as the overall strength of the army being the 
same across all states of the confederation.  This category is very close to being completely integrated 
(despite minor exceptions) so that it must be scored as a 3.9   
 The Army of Baden likewise adopted all Prussian measures in terms of doctrine, training 
standards and sending its officers to school.  It used the same organization and equipment. It also adopted 
the Prussian conscription law and formula for the size of the army.  The only thing lacking was the formal 
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administration of these aspects of Baden’s military by Prussia.  Baden administered its own army through 
its War Ministry for recruitment, promotions, retirements etc…  On the other hand Prussian officers were 
placed in charge of Baden’s War Ministry and army.  This impacts the score which otherwise would have 
been at a medium level, but this level of integration is very close to complete and must be scored as a 3.9 
as well.    
 The Army of Württemberg also adopted Prussian reforms in terms of doctrine, training standards, 
and sending its officers to Prussian schools.  Although Württemberg used officers from Baden as 
instructors it was still effectively adopting Prussian drill, regulations, and methods.  Suckow organized 
the Army of Württemberg along the lines of a Prussian division so organizationally it matched Prussian 
forces.  Materiel was purchased from Prussia.  Leader development was primarily an issue internal to 
Württemberg except the schooling received in Prussia.  In terms of Soldiers (personnel issues), 
Württemberg only partially adopted the conscription reforms and only half heartedly enforced those, and 
did not reform the reserve system.  Promotions, assignments, pay, retirement and all other personnel 
issues were internal to Württemberg.   Integration was not complete but included critical areas which is a 
medium level of integration and will be scored as a 3. 
 The Army of Bavaria adopted Prussian regulations for drill, and the functioning of the various 
combat and support arms.  It established its own military school system but it was patterned after the 
Prussian schools.  So in terms of Doctrine and Training it adopted the Prussian system.  Leader 
development was accomplished internal to Bavaria with no indication of any systematic sending of 
officers to Prussian schools, only the exchange of high level military representatives.  Organization was 
along Prussian lines but not completely; the Artillery particularly was not compatible.  Materiel was 
completely Bavarian.  Bavaria however did adopt of most of Roon’s Prussian Army personnel reforms of 
universal conscription and reform of the Landwehr according to the Prussian system.  For the Army of 
Bavaria there was some integration in basic areas which equals a low level of integration and will be 
scored as a 2.   
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Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) Communications, 
Logistics.   
 It is in this area that the terms of the Peace treaty that mandated joint railway commissions and 
railway telegraph communications along with the terms of the offensive-defensive alliance treaties 
placing the south German states militaries under the command of the King of Prussia comes into play.  
The Army of the North German Confederation, the Army of Baden, the Army of Württemberg, and the 
Army of Bavaria were under the operational command of the King of Prussia which meant under the 
effective command and control of the Prussian General Staff.  It was in conjunction with this command 
relationship that joint planning was conducted for mobilization, deployment concentration, and 
operational maneuver in the event of a war with France.  The telegraph and railroad systems that were 
critical to the Prussian way of war under Moltke were controlled by the Prussian General Staff so that the 
operational Command and Control, Communications, and Logistics for all of the armies was basically a 
single system controlled by a single organization.  This is a high level of integration and will be scored as 
a 4 for each army. 
Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing. 
 The Army of the North German Confederation had a combined budget.  This was the “iron 
budget” levy of 225 thalers (currency unit) per soldier automatically paid by each state in the 
confederation annually based on the number of soldiers from their state serving in the army.  This is 
complete integration and is scored as a 4. 
 The Army of Baden presents a challenge in this category.  Baden’s cadets, officers, and 
administrators were trained in Prussia and Prussian officers assumed senior military positions in the Army 
of Baden.  This is not just a personnel issue but a budget issue as well.   Either Baden paid for their 
students and the Prussian officers or Prussia paid or there was a joint method.  An assumption can be 
made regarding the purchase by Baden for all equipment and uniforms for its forces, but that is not clear 
with this exchange that was rather extensive and included civilian administrators.  For this reason there 
was some minimal joint budget arrangement and therefore this example will be scored as a 1.   
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 There is no evidence that he Army of Württemberg or the Army of Bavaria participated in any 
joint budget with Prussia; there were too many political obstacles to any type of arrangement in this area.  
Both of these examples must be scored as a zero.  
Overall scores for each of the armies when all of the scores of the categories of the independent 
variable are taken together are as follows:  
The Army of the North German Confederation (Category 1=3.9, Category 2=4, Category 3=4, 
Category 4=3.9, Category 5=4, Category 6=4) the result is an average score of  3.96 which is a high level 
of integration. 
The Army of Baden. (Category 1=3, Category 2=4, Category 3=4, Category 4=3.9, Category 5=4, 
Category 6=1) the result is an average score of  3.3 which indicates a medium to high level of integration 
overall in this example.   
The Army of Württemberg (Category 1=1, Category 2=4, Category 3=4, Category 4=3, Category 
5=4, Category 6=0) the result is an average score of  2.6 which indicates a low to medium level of 
integration overall in this example. 
The Army of Bavaria (Category 1=1, Category 2=0, Category 3=0, Category 4=2, Category 5=4, 
Category 6=0) the result is an average score of  1.1 which indicates a low level of integration overall in 
this example. 
 It is interesting that the effect of military integration overcame tremendous obstacles to 
unification in the case of Germany.  It is true that the federal character of the government of the German 
Empire allowed dissimilar political units to maintain varying degrees of local jurisdiction, power, and 
ability to raise revenue that mitigated the pain of lost sovereignty.  It is also true that the economic 
benefits of union helped preserve the Empire once created, but economic benefit could not overcome 
desires to retain political independence.  The integrative effect of the military continued to build an 
overarching “German” identity after the end of the Franco-Prussian war.  
“Yet the army of the Second Reich did not use its status as a means of expanding its spectrum of 
domestic influence directly. Instead, after 1871, it sought to enhance its position by concentrating 
even more closely on keeping abreast or ahead of the rapidly changing techniques of making war.  
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Military modernization facilitated the army’s role as an instrument of social integration, and 
increased its power relative to other institutions, but was not undertaken primarily for either 
purpose.”338 
2-4. (a).  History of the Dutch Republic – Dutch Revolt to Independence  
 
The case of the creation of the Dutch Republic is significant for several reasons.  The previous cases were 
in the context of the warrior culture of the Zulus and the Prussian state; often seen as the archetype of a 
militarized society.  The previous cases also occurred in a relatively short time frame.  This case is 
focused on a non-militarized entity that took a long time to coalesce.  It also includes the factor of 
mercenary troops.  It is a case of the creation of one of the first republican states in Europe.  The history 
of the United Provinces provides a clear example of heterogeneous sovereign entities, fiercely protective 
of their rights as well as fiercely competitive with each other, that evolved into a single entity when for a 
great majority of the time the only strong bond between them was a common military and a common foe.  
As such this case highlights the construction of identity through military integration. This case is focused 
on the process of the creation of the Dutch Republic from the Dutch Revolt of 1567 to 1648 and the treaty 
of Munster that formally recognized it; a period known as the Eighty Years War.  Traditional histories 
portray the Dutch Revolt as a conflict with three components; a struggle against Catholic religious 
oppression by the Northern Protestant provinces, a struggle to protect the privileges and local rule of the 
provinces, as well as a struggle against oppressive taxation and to protect free trade.  Later historians 
pointed out that conflict resulted in a Protestant North and a Catholic South but the provinces were not 
arranged that way in the beginning. They also showed that a considerable part of the conflict was by its 
nature a civil war among the seventeen provinces rather than a fight against a foreign power.  In addition 
a large part of the population was not made up of religious extremists but rather moderates who sought to 
reconcile Protestants and Catholics; chief among these was William of Orange the acknowledged leader 
and embodiment of the early revolt.  Finally, modern historians have also pointed to the impact of 
international developments and weakness of Spanish finances as being the underlying factors for the 
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eventual success of the Dutch Revolt.339  It is quite clear that the initial efforts against the Spanish 
benefited from the inability of the Spanish to focus their might against the Dutch.  If the Spanish had not 
been preoccupied with fighting other major powers such as the English they might well have made short 
work of the Dutch rebellion with what at the time was the best army in Europe.  The Spanish dissipated 
not only their military force but their economic resources as well, so that when a sustained campaign 
might have crushed the Dutch, they were unable to do so because their own army revolted over lack of 
pay and began looting the territory they were trying to restore to Spanish control.  Politically, the Spanish 
might have been able to maintain control or co-opt the rebels if they were not constrained by Philip II's 
policies that were driven by religious considerations (i.e. obsessively consumed by a desire to oppose the 
Reformation), that prevented a negotiated settlement.  On the other hand the Dutch over time developed 
an efficient and effective defensive military capability.  This happened after Philip II and William of 
Orange had left the scene and Maurice of Nassau developed the army to defend Dutch independence.  
This long process created an Amalgamated Security Community and eventually a state and Dutch 
identity. 
 The seventeen provinces that comprised the Hapsburg (or Spanish) Netherlands were not united 
until the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V issued “the Pragmatic Sanction of 1549.  Prior to this they had 
no common history and had belonged to different masters, some were Burgundian provinces, Utrecht had 
been a bishopric, others owed allegiance to the Holy Roman Emperor. In 1559 governing the Netherlands 
was left to Margret of Parma, assisted by Archbishop Granvelle whose highhanded rule caused a backlash 
by the Netherlands nobility; chief among them was Prince William of Orange.  Although the nobles 
persuaded Philip II to get rid of Granvelle, Philip demanded the strict application of heresy laws and 
ecclesiastical reforms from the Council of Trent and by 1565 intended to establish the Spanish Inquisition 
in the Netherlands.  Calvinists ‘Beggars’ asked him to reconsider but the small army of Beggars was 
defeated in 1567.  Philip was not satisfied and sent the Duke of Alva with an army to punish all those 
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involved in rebellion and heresy as well as setting up the “Council of the Troubles” that executed so many 
for heresy and rebellion it was known as the “Council of Blood.”  The Duke of Alva greatly increased 
taxes to pay for his army.  The repression and large tax demands pushed many of the Netherlands 
population into opposition to the Duke of Alva as well as Philip II.   In April of 1572 the Sea Beggars 
captured the city of Briel in Zealand. William of Orange then moved into the Netherlands with twenty 
thousand troops.  In the provinces of Friesland and Zealand citizens of numerous cities and towns angered 
by taxes and the Council of Troubles opened the gates to the Beggars and supporters of William of 
Orange.  A meeting of the Estates (provincial assembly) of Holland was convened and proclaimed 
William of Orange stadholder in Holland, Zealand, West Friesland, and Utrecht.  It also began to provide 
funds to William for military forces which he had financed personally until then.340 This can be seen as 
the beginning of the process of military integration and amalgamation. The stadholder was the name for 
the governor representing the sovereign who commanded the area’s forces, as well as a representative of 
the province to the king. The stadholder had considerable influence over local politics by having the right 
to select local office holders from prepared lists.341  The Estates of Holland proclaimed that William of 
Orange was the true representative of the King, so they could claim to be loyal subjects fighting only 
against the tyrannical and excessive rule of the Duke of Alva.  They were not seeking independence but a 
return to local rule with its privileges and trade advantages.342      
The nature of terrain greatly influenced the conduct of the conflict.  The Southern provinces 
suffered the most because they were difficult to defend while the Northern provinces of Holland and 
Zealand possessed significant water obstacles for any attacker.  The Duke of Alva complained “there is 
no place great or small, not even the most wretched village, that has not a water-filled ditch that requires 
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bridging for its passage.” 343  The army of the Duke of Alva was composed of four tercios (the basic 
Spanish infantry formation of the time which was a combination of pikemen and arbusques) from 
Lombardy, Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples.  Other troops were Walloons, Burgundians, and Germans.  These 
were supplemented by Spaniards, but the mixture of troops caused the army to suffer from the defects of a 
mercenary force.344   Without pay it became more of a danger to its officers and the local population than 
to the enemy.  
 Between 1573 and 1576 fighting spread across the Netherlands and to the sea.  Although some 
cities fell to the Spanish it happened after long sieges (Haarlem), others were saved by opening the dykes 
and flooding the surrounding countryside (Alkmaar, Leyden) demonstrating the possibility of a successful 
defense against the Spanish Army. Victories at sea (Zuider Zee, Eastern Scheldt) ensured sea trade routes 
remained open. Meanwhile the Spanish Army mutinied multiple times for lack of pay; plundering whole 
districts and greatly increasing hatred of the Spanish.345  The Spanish army in the Netherlands was owed 
six million crowns (currency unit) in back pay. Phillip II’s revenues amounted to about ten million 
crowns while expenses just for the Spanish Army and Navy were eight and a half million. The interest on 
Spain’s national debt consumed about a third of all revenue.  Phillip II declared state bankruptcy in 
September 1575 by suspending all payments to creditors ending Spain’s ability to borrow money to pay 
for operations in the Netherlands.346   This set in motion a chain of events leading to an almost total 
collapse of Spanish government.  Antwerp was plundered extensively and large parts destroyed (the so 
called ‘Spanish Fury’) while the mutinous troops almost completely left Holland, Zealand, Gelderland, 
and Utrecht.  The mutinous plundering Spanish army had alienated the provinces in the southern 
Netherlanders to the point that William of Orange was able to persuade all the provinces to join Holland 
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and Zealand.  At Ghent in November 1576 all of the provinces signed the “Pacification of Ghent” which 
repealed all of the Duke of Alva’s laws and the ‘Council of the Troubles’ sentences and demanded the 
departure of all Spanish troops .  The nobles of the southern Netherlands would not follow William of 
Orange, and the Catholic provinces did not allow Protestants to return and openly worship nor did the 
northern Calvinists allow Catholics to do the same. Therefore, the union of all of the provinces against 
Spain was short lived.  On 6 January 1579 the Southern Catholic provinces in reaction against the 
Calvinists and religious unrest signed the Union of Arras reconciling those provinces with the Spanish 
king.  The Northern provinces signed the Union of Utrecht on 23 January 1579.  With the Union of 
Utrecht and the Union of Arras, the Netherlands was permanently split by an enduring north-south 
divide.347  
 The Union of Utrecht is often seen as the founding document of the United Provinces.  At the 
time however, it was viewed more as a temporary alliance.   
“The provinces that adhered to the Union of Utrecht, did not constitute any obvious natural unit.  
The frontier between rebel and Spanish-occupied territory did not correspond originally to any 
national, religious, social, historical, or linguistic division. In and era when men thought that 
religious unity and political unity went hand in hand, the northern provinces contained at least as 
many Catholics as Protestants.  The Union itself was a military alliance of seven very different 
provinces with different interests and strongly separatist instincts.  It was essentially a defensive 
reaction against Spanish oppression, not the outcome of a positive Dutch national feeling which 
already existed.” 348   
The unifying principle of the Union of Utrecht was a negative one of common defense against foreign 
attack.  There was no other common bond as the provinces often directly competed against each other 
commercially. The provinces of the Northern Netherlands approved the Act of Abjuration formally 
renouncing Phillip II as Sovereign Lord of the Netherlands on 22 July 1581.  It did not create an 
independent state or create a republic.349  Rather they went shopping for a new Sovereign offering the 
post to a variety of people (Duke of Anjou, King of France, Queen Elizabeth) but none of them took the 
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job. In 1580 Phillip II put a price on the head of William of Orange and on 10 July 1584 William of 
Orange was assassinated in his home in Delft.350     
The Dutch Revolt continued because the governing capacity in the States General, provinces, and 
municipal governments prevented political chaos, and they could afford to continue the fight. Unlike the 
Spanish, they were financially sound. Although not the richest or most populated, the Northern Provinces 
benefited from the plundering troops and sieges that devastated the Southern Netherlands by securing the 
majority of trade while the refugees from the South were trades people and professionals who boosted 
economic activity.  Sea victories allowed escalation of the seafaring tradition and lucrative sea trade and 
the shipbuilding industry.  A choice location at the mouth of major rivers allowed access to the interior as 
well as access to England, Scandinavia, and the Baltic.  In about 1590 they designed the ‘Fluyt” type of 
cargo ship that had a greater capacity and was cheaper to build than ships of competing naval powers with 
innovative standardized construction methods and use of wind powered sawmills and heavy cranes. Trade 
was expanded to the Mediterranean (including to the Ottoman Empire by 1612) after the Dutch defeated 
the Spanish fleet.  Trade expanded world wide with Dutch trading colonies in the Caribbean, North 
America, the East Indies, and Indian Ocean. In 1602 the Dutch East Indies Company was established.  By 
1670 Dutch sailors accounted for almost one in ten of the adult male population.351  “As of 1670, the 
Dutch owned three times the tonnage of the English, and more than the tonnage of England, France, 
Portugal, Spain, and the Germanies combined.  The percentage of Dutch-built ships was even larger.”352  
Sea trade provided a basis for Dutch wealth and allowed urban population growth (the geography of 
marsh and low lying land precluded the creation of large estates with tenant farmers).  Urban population 
centers diversified the Dutch economy.  Amsterdam was an international financial center and a center for 
the arms and ammunition industry. Other cities were industrial centers for brewing, textiles, ceramics, 
sugar refining, smelting, tobacco cutting, distilling, silk throwing, glass making, paper making and 
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printing and dairy products. With a robust and advanced economy the United Provinces were able to fund 
their armed forces despite rising costs.353   Holland paid 960 thousand florins (currency unit) for military 
forces in 1579, in 1599 it paid 5.5 million florins, and in the early 1600’s it was paying 10 million florins 
annually. To raise these sums the United Provinces borrowed money as did all the other powers, but they 
created an advantage by promptly paying the interest on their debt so that they could borrow at much 
reduced rates, especially once Amsterdam became a financial center.  The combination of an advanced 
diversified economy with its predominant position in trade and finance along with sound credit allowed 
the United Provinces to continually fund their armed forces and outlast their financially weak foe.354   
 When William of Orange died John van Oldenbarnevelt, the pensionary of Rotterdam pushed for 
Maurice of Nassau (William’s second son) to be a member on the Council of State created by the States 
General.  Since Maurice of Nassau was only sixteen his command of the army came several years later.355  
In 1585 Oldenbarnevelt pushed for Maurice of Nassau to be named stadtholder of Holland and Zealand 
even though he was very young to prevent the Earl of Leicester from obtaining the office. English 
assistance to the Dutch revolt was not successful and even resented; the English army (lacking pay) 
became a danger with defecting officers handing over towns and forts to the Spanish. The Estates of 
Holland then gave Maurice of Nassau the title of prince, gave permission for cities to hire mercenaries 
and put the province under Maurice’s direct control. The English left the Netherlands in late 1587 but 
Dutch forces did prevent a linkup of the Spanish Armada with the Duke of Parma’s land forces.356    
 Maurice of Nassau was named stadholder of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel by 1589.  
Maurice completely reorganized the army of the United Provinces and in the process became one of the 
most famous military leaders of his time.  One of the key reforms was to have an army that was paid 
regularly even if it was smaller than previously; this was done to improve discipline and prevent mutinies 
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and plundering.  A smaller force was not a great disadvantage when the canals and rivers allowed troops 
to be moved quickly to any point in need of reinforcement.  Soldiers were made to learn marching and to 
conduct close order drill.  This was further developed into having the soldiers learn to fire by volleys 
which produced a great increase in firepower.  He also improved the artillery force and focused on siege 
warfare including the building of fieldworks and trenching.  His disciplined, reformed army came to be 
seen as the best in Europe and he hosted one of the first military schools where officers from around 
Europe came to learn Maurice’s methods.   With this army Maurice of Nassau began to reconquer 
territory lost over the past several years.357  Almost all of his military activity involved sieges; he only 
fought one field battle (the Battle of Nieuwpoort) which he won.     
 The United Provinces were included in an alliance with England and France against Spain from 
1596-1598 and is significant in that the United Provinces were considered a de facto sovereign power. 
When Philip II died in 1598 he transferred sovereignty over the Netherlands to his daughter Isabella and 
her husband Albert the Archduke of Austria.358   While Maurice of Nassau concentrated on military 
affairs, the leading politician of the United Provinces John van Oldenbarnevelt, was able to make the 
complicated multilevel governance in the United Provinces work and continually provide support for the 
armed forces and defense of the provinces.  He could do this because he was the chief official of the 
dominant province of Holland which provided more than half the budget.  His job was not easy and in 
1607 he described the problem with the United Provinces:   
“The United Provinces are not a republic, but seven individual provinces, each of which has its 
own form of government, and they have nothing in common but that they are by contract bound 
to aid one another in mutual defense. Therefore, when there is no danger of an attack from 
without, this government will fall into absolute anarchy and disorder through mutual jealousy and 
general indifference, and herein lies one of our weakest points, where the enemy may attack us. If 
we have not a government with sufficient authority to rule the country, to keep together the 
provinces and towns in perfect unity; if we have not a government which has authority to force 
those who resist to fulfill their obligations without having to wait for the consent of provinces and 
towns, we must be destroyed.”359 
                                                 
357  Vlekke, Evolution of the Dutch Nation, 154-155. 
358  Ibid., 161 
359  J. Ellis Barker, The Rise and Decline of the Netherlands, (London: Smith Elder & Co., 1906), 162–163. 
(underline by this author) 
 130
On the other hand he was one of the very same politicians who attempted to protect the interests of their 
province at every opportunity and resisted attempts to centralize power.  In 1602 Oldenbarnevelt stopped 
an attempt to make Maurice of Nassau sovereign, and though Maurice did not object it indicated where 
their relationship was headed.360  Oldenbarnevelt helped negotiate the Twelve Year Truce with the 
Austrian Archduke in 1609 after the Spanish army’s lack of money, mutinies, and poor administration 
stopped operations.361   The Truce not only gave the United Provinces a break from the fighting but it 
provided implied recognition as an independent state as well, since the Archduke agreed to negotiations 
with the United Provinces as if they were a free and independent state.362     
 After the truce took effect a theological dispute among Calvinists spilled over into politics with 
the Estates of Holland and Oldenbarnevelt supporting one side, and the States General and Maurice of 
Nassau the other.  In 1616 the other provinces with Maurice’s backing sent Holland a demand to restore 
the peace and agree to a synod to resolve the dispute.  The conflict was not about theology at this point 
but rather between the forces of unity led by Maurice, and the forces of provincial supremacy directed by 
Oldenbarnevelt.  In 1617 the Estates of Holland led by Oldenbarnevelt passed the so called ‘Sharp 
Resolution’ that effectively stated the province was sovereign in regards to matters of religion.  Most 
importantly it included a provision for the cities of Holland to raise troops who would take an oath of 
allegiance only to the States of Holland, not to the Captain-General of the United Provinces.  In addition 
any troops garrisoned there were to accept orders only from local authorities.  In the Netherlands each 
town usually had sheriffs ‘schouts’ who functioned as police, and local guards / militia called 
‘schutterijen’ that dealt with riots and insurrections, both of whom normally owed allegiance to local 
authorities.  However, when the cities in Holland began raising troops they were called ‘waardgelders’ a 
term that meant mercenaries placed on standby (professional soldiers hired by towns rather than the 
United Provinces), who swore loyalty to the Estates of Holland.  Maurice of Nassau was not only 
stadtholder of five provinces (including Holland) but held the post of Captain-General of the Army (as 
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well as titular head of the Navy).  As Captain-General of the Army the troops of the United Provinces 
swore loyalty to him.  The waardgelders being raised by Holland and not being under his command was 
an affront to Maurice.  The worst part was the insistence that they not obey orders from any source than 
the local authorities which meant that the States General and Maurice would have no control over them. 
In Utrecht the allies of Oldenbarnevelt also began to raise waardgelders, also without informing the States 
General or Captain-General, moving Maurice to make a formal complaint to the States General.  This 
highlights that the center of the crisis that forced Maurice to act was the issue of the chain-of-command of 
the soldiers in the United Provinces and whether a province had the authority to raise troops outside the 
authority of the States General and the Captain-General of the Army.  Maurice had the backing of the 
States General, most of the Provinces, and the regular army.  He used his powers as stadtholder to begin 
replacing allies of Oldenbarnevelt in other provinces.  In July 1618 the States General demanded the 
waardgelders be dismissed in Holland and Utrecht as Maurice in his capacity as Captain-General picked 
off Oldenbarnevelt’s allies town by town.  In August 1618 the States General gave Maurice extraordinary 
powers and he placed Oldenbarnevelt under arrest along with several supporters including Hugo Grotius.   
Oldenbarnevelt was tried for treason in conspiring to breakup the United Provinces and beheaded in 
1619.363  Grotius had argued that each of the provinces was sovereign under the Union of Utrecht and that 
the Union was simply an alliance in which the States General simply handled the conduct of the war.364  
What Grotius did not see was that by centralizing the handling of the war the States General developed a 
superior argument for centralized authority; a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.   
 This internal conflict was extremely significant for the consolidation of the Dutch Amalgamated 
Security Community.  This established the absolute right of the States General to levy professional troops.  
This issue was revisited in 1649-1650 when the Province of Holland decided to reduce its financial 
obligations with a ‘Peace Dividend’ by defunding foreign troops. William II, stadtholder at the time 
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opposed the move as did the other provinces who accused Holland of violating the Union of Utrecht.  
When Holland issued orders to disband troops in November 1649, William II used his position as 
Captain-General to reverse those orders.  Eventually, William II was forced to take Amsterdam by force 
in 1650 at which time Holland accepted that one province alone could not decide to reduce the number of 
troops in the army.365   This event also centered on the nature of provincial power vice the States General 
regarding military forces.  The difference between them was that this event revolved around the issue of 
financial burden-sharing not the issue of command and control.  After the events involving 
Oldenbarnevelt and the waardgelders, there was no question of anything other than a single military for 
the United Provinces.     
 Once the ‘Twelve Year Truce’ expired, the conflict with the Archduke and Spain resumed in 
1621.  At this point the conflict had expanded into the Thirty Years War and the United Provinces became 
involved in a world wide conflict, but those actions are not central to the narrative.  Maurice of Nassau 
died in 1625 and was succeeded by his younger brother Frederick Henry.  Although the Spanish had a 
few initial successes such as the capture of the city of Breda, Frederick Henry took all of the remaining 
towns of the Eastern provinces, recaptured Breda, and took Maastricht which cut the Spanish off from 
their Austrian allies.   Protracted peace negotiations began in the mid 1640’s and when Frederick Henry 
died in 1647, Holland took the opportunity to push the other provinces to agree to an end of hostilities.  In 
1648 Spain formally recognized the independence of the United Provinces in the peace Treaty of 
Muenster.366   By the time the Treaty of Munster was signed a clearly Dutch national identity existed.367 
2-4. (b). The Government 
This case provides an interesting example of a minimal form of common government.  The 
United Provinces achieved this minimal government with the Union of Utrecht which, significantly for 
this study, is almost completely focused on creating a formal bond of common defense among the seven 
provinces.  First and foremost in this case, local governments were the center of gravity for the system 
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that functioned in the United Provinces.  It is not really possible to describe the government in the United 
Provinces as having been established or even as having been developed because the component parts 
already existed and functioned prior to the Dutch Revolt.  The local governments were already established 
at the town, city, and province level; the office of Stadtholder existed in each province; and the States 
General for the Netherlands already existed.  Although the United Provinces became a republic it was not 
for lack of trying to remain a monarchy, and while there were elections for various offices it was not a 
democracy but rather a type of oligarchy of rich merchants and nobles.368  
Each province was sovereign within its territory and ruled itself.  Each had its own assembly that 
varied in membership with different methods of selecting members. The Estates of Holland was formed 
by delegations from eighteen towns; each having one vote regardless of size, and the nobility had one 
vote as a group also. Changes in size of communities did not change which communities received 
representation.  There was an additional important aspect which was that a majority in the provincial 
assembly almost never would override the considerations of a key minority.  There was a long tradition of 
consensus, perhaps because the provinces lacked the ability to coerce a city; especially a large one.  
Throughout the Netherlands there also existed the office of Pensionary; the cities had one as did each 
province.  The Pensionary was a paid legal advisor and secretary (responsible for things such as official 
correspondence and preparing resolutions as well as seeing them carried out), and often gained great 
influence by holding office over a long time while the representatives in the assemblies changed.  The 
Pensionary was often part of the provincial delegation to the States General.  As the chief official from 
the largest province the Pensionary of Holland often became the leading official in the United Provinces 
as well (such as Oldenbarnevelt and de Witt).369  
The States General was the central body for the United Provinces but it was not designed as a 
legislative assembly, rather it was a council designed to coordinate a unanimous position of all seven 
provinces.       
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“The Union of Utrecht of 1579 had been in effect a temporary defensive alliance among the 
provinces to meet the immediate demands of the struggle against Spain; those concerned in it had 
not attempted to frame a constitution with unified central institutions and a common executive.  
The prosecution and financing of the war was the primary concern, and the States General existed 
for this purpose, to discuss consequent problems of foreign relations and to perform certain 
functions such as the granting of charters to the East and West India Companies; but it did not, at 
least after Leicester’s departure, legislate on domestic matters.”370 
If it could be compared to any contemporary body it would likely be the European Council of the 
European Union.  The need to reach a unanimous position meant that there was a great deal of travel (and 
therefore time delay) involved as the delegations had to report to the provincial assemblies the progress of 
negotiations and then receive instructions regarding the position of the province and then return to the 
States General for further negotiations until an agreement was reached.  There were also some territories 
that the States General was responsible for directly; the so called Generality lands which had been 
conquered but were outside the boundaries of the seven provinces.  The other ‘national’ governing body 
was also for a time a Council of State but it withered after the time of Maurice of Nassau, and was 
reduced to being an administrative arm of the States General.371  The United Provinces also did not have a 
central legal system; rather it was up to the provinces to administer justice.372  The case of the Dutch 
Revolt is a seeming anomaly in the paradigm of state formation through a centralizing administrative 
bureaucracy since it is estimated that by the end of the Eighty Years War the central government of the 
United Provinces only employed about 300 people.373 
The office of Stadtholder was peculiar.  Each province could have one and they were not 
supposed to be hereditary.  However, the various Princes of Orange and the House of Nassau tended to 
dominate as stadtholders.  Although they were often the stadtholder in multiple provinces the office was 
not ‘national’ but provincial.  However, like the Pensionary of Holland they exercised immense influence.  
The stadtholder exercised considerable influence over the composition of the town councils (from which 
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political power originated) due to the prerogative of being able to select town council members from a 
list; this gave him at least some patronage and leverage.  The posts that were ‘national’ were the positions 
of Captain-General of the Army and Admiral-General of the Navy.  The more political and powerful post 
was the Captain-General of the Army, which Maurice used to take on Oldenbarnevelt and William II took 
on the Estates of Holland and city of Amsterdam.   These ‘national’ offices were military ones because 
the heart of the United Provinces was the defensive alliance created by the Union of Utrecht, which 
became by default the founding document of the United Provinces.   
The Union of Utrecht pledged the seven provinces to unite, bind, and confederate with each other 
“in all ways and manners as if they were one Province alone” without being able at any time to separate 
or dissolve the union (Article I).  Article II requires the provinces to “aid one another with life, goods and 
blood” against all attacks from Spanish Forces regardless of whether the attack is against one province, 
city, territory, or against them all.  Article III extends this requirement to attacks from any other foreign 
power.  These articles form the security guarantee which is the basis for the formation of the union.  
Articles IV-VII deal with the building and repairing of fortifications, as well as the garrisoning of towns 
and the finances for these activities.   Article IX forbids any treaty, starting of a war, or levying taxes at 
the union level on all the provinces unless there is unanimous consent of all provinces, and Article X 
prohibits any province or city from making any agreements with foreign powers.  These two articles 
therefore effectively reserve all issues of foreign affairs to the States General.  The door was open for 
other cities and provinces to join the confederation (Article XI) and the standards regarding the issue of 
currency (minting) were to be jointly established (Article XII).  Articles XIII-XV dealt with matters of 
religion in accordance with the Pacification of Ghent as well as the return of ecclesiastical property.  
Article XVI requires that disputes between provinces be resolved in conjunction with the other provinces 
or if the issue involves all the provinces by the stadtholders.  Article XVII requires the provinces to treat 
foreigners justly so as to not provoke or give justification for foreign powers to attack.  Article XVIII 
likewise requires the provinces to treat the citizens of the other provinces as they do their own and to not 
levy tolls or duties at a higher rate than they do for their citizens, which amounts to a weak form of an 
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interstate commerce clause.  Article XIX is the origin for the States General to meet on an almost 
continuous basis as a deliberative body which is different than prior to the Dutch Revolt when the 
convening of the States General was an exceptional occasion.  Articles XXI and XXII resolve that any 
issues or discrepancies that may arise regarding the intent of the treaty will be interpreted by a unanimous 
agreement of the provinces as would be any amendments.   Article XXIII is an enforcement clause calling 
for the arrest of those who contravene the provisions of the treaty.  The remaining articles call for various 
officials of provinces and cities; stadtholders, magistrates, commanders etc… to swear oaths to uphold the 
provisions of the treaty.  Two Articles contained very important provisions but were not (or extremely 
rarely) used.  Article V contained a provision for a national level tax the proceeds of which could only be 
used for defense.  Article VIII permits conscription of those between eighteen and thirty years old.374   
The Union of Utrecht clearly establishes a voluntary association of political entities that retain much of 
their local sovereignty but do concede some powers to a common government.  On the other hand that 
government is supposed to be constrained in policy formation by the need for approval of all the 
provinces.  That the United Provinces were clearly an Amalgamated Security Community is directly 
reflected in its origins under this treaty which was decidedly focused on issues of common defense.    
This complicated system and a lack of central bureaucracy has often been criticized as being 
cumbersome and inefficient by most historians.  However, as noted by Jan Glete it would seem to be 
counter-intuitive that an inefficient, cumbersome, and politically divided entity could have had the 
phenomenal success enjoyed by the United Provinces.  It should be even more unlikely that such a small 
population could hold its own militarily against the great powers of its day that were many times its size 
that had supposedly more efficient centralized bureaucratic state administrations, much less beat them and 
establish itself as a great world power. The success of the United Provinces was commonly referred to as 
a miracle.  Glete argues that the system itself rather than being inefficient was extremely efficient because 
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of the decision making process that required negotiation and unanimity.  This enabled the United 
Provinces to have relatively high taxes but not suffer from tax revolts, provincial rebellions, or civil wars 
experienced by other centrally administered states, since the social and political elites had agreed on 
policy matters before they themselves implemented that policy in their locality.  This eliminated local 
barriers to resource mobilization that tended to hamper centralized bureaucratic states that used coercion 
as the method to extract resources.  In addition the business minded elites understood that each side in the 
negotiation needed some sort of benefit from policy decisions which reduced zero sum conflicts.375    
It was the efficient aggregation of political interests that provided the strength that was the 
underpinning of the Dutch successes.  The business of the Dutch may have been business; however, that 
business needed protection.  It needed freedom of navigation and a secure homeland to function.  The 
basic common interests therefore found their expression in the creation of an Amalgamated Security 
Community under the Union of Utrecht.   
 There were two methods to fund the military that was the primary focus and expense of the 
Generality (the States General acting for the whole of the Union). The army (and parts of defensive 
fortifications), were funded by quotas from the provinces based on a negotiated system that reflected each 
province’s size and wealth; not through a centralized tax system.   Holland’s share for example was about 
58 percent and Amsterdam paid about half of that.  The provinces had different methods of raising their 
share of the revenue so that taxes varied among the provinces although the taxes were usually based on 
consumption.  Often regiments were allocated to provinces for pay purposes.  There was no way to force 
a province to pay its share and there was no central review of a province’s finances.376  The naval forces 
on the other hand were funded through the five Admiralties.  The administration of the Admiralties 
collected convoy and license fees (customs duties), along with fees for authorization of privateering and 
licenses for merchants trading with the enemy.  In addition to their port area each Admiralty was allotted 
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an inland territory to raise funds.  With this the Admiralties (the naval administration) became the only 
national level fiscal authority encompassing the United Provinces.377     
Although the United Provinces’ common government was minimal, it was sufficient to meet the 
requirements for the formation of an Amalgamated Security Community.   The United Provinces as an 
ASC was not only based on trust between the provinces but on trust between the elites as well as the 
commoners in the society who suffered, fought and died together in an eighty year long conflict.  It was 
that common bond that forged a common identity among seven previously autonomous provinces. 
2-4. (c). Defense Cooperation 
 The beginning of the Dutch Revolt was marked by military cooperation among the provinces and 
William of Orange acting as stadtholder of Holland, Zealand, West Friesland, and Utrecht.  In the early 
stages of the conflict there was involvement by elements of all seventeen provinces not just the seven 
Northern provinces that united under the Union of Utrecht.  Naval forces in the early stages of the conflict 
were primarily privateers operating under Letters of Marque issued by William of Orange in his capacity 
as a sovereign prince.  There was only limited control or even coordination between the land forces and 
naval forces of the revolt.  The Sea Beggars primarily attacked shipping and towns with few or no 
defenses.  Their primary contribution was to keep the local sea lanes open in the vicinity of Holland and 
Zealand.  In the early part of the conflict the mercenary armies of William of Orange were no match for 
the Spanish army in field engagements.  On the other hand the local inhabitants of the towns could and 
did provide significant military capability when defending their towns.  It was the combination of the 
strong defenses of the towns and the inability of the Spanish to cut of the sea lanes that allowed the forces 
of the revolt to survive the onslaught by the Duke of Alva.   
 Mercenaries certainly provided a significant part of the rebel forces.  This was a necessity partly 
because of the size of the population which was most likely only a million and a half at the time.378  It is a 
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mistake to view the defensive forces of the rebels as being all mercenaries.  The defenses of Northern 
Holland in 1572 - 1573 provide an example.   
 “Of the 4,960 soldiers whose origin is known, 1,440 (roughly three in ten) came from North 
Holland north of the river Ij, compared with only 250 from the Southern Quarter and Zeeland. 
Most of the soldiers came from the northern provinces, with a remarkable number of Friesians 
(850) Apart from 700 Germans there were few foreigners.”379   
The commander of Northern Holland, Sonoy, had a few mercenary companies but had to rely on local 
forces for a large portion of his defense.  The peasants not only had to quarter troops but also had to stand 
watch and build fortifications and ditches.  In the winter of 1572-1573, Sonoy mobilized the peasants to 
cut a forty two foot channel the entire length of the frozen waterways that were the main defensive barrier 
for North Holland to prevent the Spanish from simply walking over the ice.  This involved all the men of 
villages for several days and was a significant effort.  According to old medieval traditions the peasants 
could be armed and made to provide military service; this was called the lantwere composed of all men 
able to bear arms.  Sonoy used this to mobilize a watch force along all the dykes and rivers bordering the 
entire area.  All peasants were to arm themselves with either a firearm, or pike (pitchfork if very poor) 
and either a sword or ax and provide security for three day intervals.380    The point is that while the local 
inhabitants were not professional soldiers they engaged in important defensive tasks.  These shared tasks 
and hardships aided the rebels in creating a sense of unity and solidarity with other rebels that would not 
happen if all military related activities were carried out by foreign mercenaries.      
 A significant effort was expended by local inhabitants in building fortifications. The larger cities 
had defensive elements that had been adopted according to the style of the trace italienne which was a 
“circuit of low thick walls punctuated by quadrilateral bastions.”381  This type of ‘star fort’ was developed 
in response to medieval bombards that quickly destroyed large masonry walls.   The trace italienne 
system gave such protection against attacking forces that usually a town could only be “encircled and 
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starved into surrender” when besieged.382  In addition defensive earthen works called sconces were 
constructed at strategic locations.  These consisted of breastworks enclosed on all four sides and 
surrounded by a moat with a drawbridge and shelters for the garrison.383  It was the local inhabitants who 
provided the labor to construct these temporary forts. These fortifications combined with natural and man 
made water barriers made the Northern provinces of Holland and Zealand almost impossible for the 
Spanish army to take, and it was these provinces that were the basis for the survival of the revolt.   
 The fluid situation that marked the military and political situation during the years of the Dutch 
Revolt prior to the Union of Utrecht can be seen as having fostered military cooperation among the 
provinces of the Netherlands.  The provinces of Holland, Zealand, and at a minimum probably Friesland 
and Utrecht as well had formed a pluralistic security community under William of Orange as their 
common stadtholder.   Further cooperation among and with the other provinces was based on negotiation 
and their level of occupation by Spanish forces.  Their cooperation and common funding of military 
capabilities did not approach the level required for military integration.  In the early stages of the Dutch 
Revolt the provinces assisted each other as allies against a common foe.  Military integration began with 
the Union of Utrecht (decision to integrate), and only became integrated in practice when Maurice of 
Nassau transformed the Dutch forces with a military revolution that made his army the best in Europe.   
2-4. (d). Integration 
The Union of Utrecht while limited did create a formal Amalgamated Security Community.  One 
of the key items of integration was the requirement for the provinces to provide common funding of 
military forces for their collective defense (Article V, and VII), and even though a confederation wide tax 
was not used it was provided for.   A specific item that received special attention in the Union of Utrecht 
was common funding of fortifications; most likely because of the great significance that trace italienne 
fortifications played in the conduct of the conflict as well as their cost.   Article IV provides for the 
Generality (States General acting for the whole of the United Provinces) to provide half of the funding for 
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upkeep and repair of city fortifications and that for new fortifications the cost would be “borne by all the 
said Provinces in common.”  Although the United Provinces did not use conscription, the principal that 
all citizens were required to provide military service (Article VIII) was included; likely as a reaffirmation 
of the tradition of the lantwere in which all able bodied males could be required to provide service.    
 Naval forces were integrated under control of the United Provinces in 1597 when the States 
General established five Admiralties (Rotterdam, Amsterdam, North Holland, Zealand, and Friesland).   
“These admiralties were federal (not provincial) organizations, representatives for the States 
General were members of their boards, and they were required to co-operate with each other 
under the leadership of the States General and the Admiral General (the stadtholder).  Operational 
fleets were normally composed of warships from several or all admiralties, which shared the 
federal responsibility for sending armed forces to sea.” 384  
The other aspect of the admiralties as federal institutions is the already mentioned fact that the admiralties 
were the only national level fiscal authority encompassing the United Provinces.  An objection might be 
raised that having five different admiralties demonstrates a certain amount of disunity and acquiescence to 
local desires to have their own organization.  The flaw with this argument is that having the five different 
admiralties was actually more efficient than having only one center of naval administration in an era when 
coordination was best done face to face.  The naval forces of the United Provinces focused on protection 
of commercial trade; usually done by convoy.  The commercial trade fleet was dispersed among multiple 
ports, and in an era with limited communications it was more efficient to have a flattened organization 
that responded directly to the needs of the local commercial fleet to coordinate convoys.  Therefore 
having regionally based centers of naval administration was more efficient at protecting the sea lanes with 
minimal hindrance when larger taskforces needed to be created for purely military tasks.  Having five 
admiralties did hamper naval standardization which had a negative impact on the Dutch Navy in the first 
Anglo-Dutch war (1652). There is no question however, that it was a federal force and it was the States 
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General (led by De Witt) that appointed De Ruyter as Lieutenant-Admiral of the Navy that standardized 
and rebuilt the fleet.385        
A significant body of work has as its focus the military reforms implemented by Maurice of 
Nassau that have been called a “military revolution.”  This military revolution was first described by the 
historian Michael Roberts in 1955.  Roberts proposed that the changes in tactics from 1560 -1660 led to 
revolutionary changes in logistics and organization to the point of creating a standing army; and the first 
person to enact these reforms was Maurice of Nassau.386   The first reform was fiscal and that was to 
reduce the overall size of the army to a level that could be adequately paid year round.  A smaller number 
of well paid troops were less of a danger to the country as well as more effective militarily.   According to 
M.D. Feld this led to a professional disciplined force that reflected the ‘middle-class” society that created 
it.  This shifted the foundation of war from an enterprise that supposedly would pay for itself by plunder 
and ransom, to one in which a defensive army could be employed to protect the United Provinces with out 
danger to the economy or inhabitants they were protecting.  This fundamentally changed the nature of 
discipline and loyalty in the army because they were providing work for pay, not the possibility of glory 
or booty as gentlemen adventurers.  “Regular pay destroyed the aristocratic ethos.  A salaried worker was 
not a gentleman.”387   Discipline could be enforced uniformly over an extended period of time because 
unlike mercenaries hired for a campaign, permanent salaried soldiers were always accountable to their 
employer.  This led to the ability to enact other reforms since the intervals between battles could be used 
to improve skills and adapt organizations.388  One of the key reforms that this enabled was that soldiers 
were made accustomed to use of spades to dig trenches and field fortifications in siege operations, 
something ‘beneath’ mercenary soldiers which then required peasants to be found to do the work.  
Maurice had soldiers construct assault trenches so they would be able to approach the walls of a town for 
an attack without taking casualties.  It was with the spade that Maurice of Nassau gained fame as an 
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expert in siege warfare.389  He even helped compose books on siege warfare and had a position created at 
the University of Leiden for surveying and fortification to help Dutch defenses.390  Maurice made artillery 
a primary arm and focused on siege guns and heavy mortars which were key tools in siege warfare.391 
Maurice and his cousin William-Louis of Nassau, stadtholder of Friesland, had been students at 
the University of Leiden where they had been exposed to the writing of classical authors by Professor 
Justus Lipsius.   Maurice of Nassau had become interested in the ideas of unit formations, close order 
marching, and fighting in the manner of the ancient Roman army.  From his study of Roman authors 
William-Louis of Nassau developed the concept of a ‘countermarch’ to greatly increase the firepower of 
his units.  The countermarch is where the front line of a formation fires and then marches to the rear to 
reload while the next line advances, fires, and marches to the rear in a rotation so that the countermarch 
produces an almost continuous fire on an enemy force.392  This continuous volley fire required intense 
training and discipline to master (since a soldier marching to the rear might be inclined to continue in that 
direction) and so Maurice instituted standardized drill that became the ‘occupation’ of the soldiers when 
not in battle.   Furthermore, weapons handling required intensive training.  To facilitate that training 
Count Johan of Nassau (younger brother of William-Louis) commissioned a drill book to be used as an 
instruction manual for the army.  This was one of the earliest illustrated drill books and was called the 
“Wapenhandelinghe van roers, musquetten ende spiessen (Arms drill with arquebus, musket and pike) 
(Amsterdam, 1607).”393  It is a systematic representation of the steps necessary to use the pike, arquebus, 
and musket.  More importantly it portrays each step in a numbered logical sequence with an associated 
verbal command that forms a complete cycle of loading, aiming, firing, back to reloading.  Soldiers 
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trained in these techniques became parts in an overall system that improved unit command and control.394   
With the increased control provided by verbal drill commands, Maurice reduced company formations to 
about 135 men, thirteen officers and NCO’s, 45 pikemen, 44 arquebus, and 30 muskets which gave the 
Dutch an significant firepower advantage.395   The combination of close order marching drill, weapons 
handling drill, and the countermarch transformed the army of Maurice of Nassau.  It vastly increased the 
firepower of the army and was proven to be successful in the battle of Nieuwpoort.396  The permanence of 
the force was demonstrated when, during the Twelve Years Truce, the officers, NCOs, and half the 
soldiers in each company were retained so as to quickly rebuild the army with the perishable expertise 
that was maintained.397 
The effect of the reforms also reduced the cost of infantry units since infantry could be trained 
quickly and uniformly.  Creating an effective force of archers and pikemen was a long term process, but 
teaching the use of a firearm only took a few weeks and with the Wapenhandelinghe there was a method 
for quality control.  “The number of military variables was reduced to the availability of manpower and 
the availability of weapons” rather than the long period needed to create an effective Spanish tercio. 398  
Maurice of Nassau also standardized the weapons manufactured for the Dutch army.   
 “Maurice took steps to standardize the weapons used by the entire Dutch army. After extensive 
testing, he determined upon a single ‘model’ for muskets and another for harquebuses, and 
distributed five examples of each to arms producers in Holland, with orders that all the weapons 
they produced in the future must be made to the same design and must fire a bullet of standard 
caliber.  To implement this program, the Dutch Republic spent far more on weapons in 1599 than 
in any other year between 1586 and 1621.”399 
This illustrates the integration of the Dutch arms market and its responsiveness to the demands of the 
Dutch military.  The Dutch could quickly generate military capability because of the large arms industry 
in the United Provinces.  
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The reforms of Maurice of Nassau made him and his army famous.  It made the Dutch army a 
school for a generation of European leaders.  Young leaders came to the Dutch army to learn from around 
Europe.  “Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick William of Prussia were directly or indirectly 
educated in the Dutch Army,” while serving in the Dutch army became a part of the education of the 
European gentry.400  Count Johan of Nassau established a military academy in 1616 to teach the Dutch 
army system; the instruction took six months.  The Dutch army also dispatched drill instructors to other 
countries and the arms industry did a brisk business equipping foreign armies.401 
The reforms implemented in the Dutch army also had an impact on society.  In other armies 
command was often difficult because of considerations of an officers’ social status.  The Dutch officer’s 
role on the other hand depended less on social standing than on what he knew; he was a technocrat and 
this facilitated a rational command structure.  “It was the first national army without a corresponding 
social base”402  Officer commissions were available to commoners as well as to the nobility and were not 
for sale, but rather depended on knowledge and competence.  Feld argues that it was the first modern 
instance of a military culture and furthermore, the earliest industrial revolution.403  Maurice of Nassau 
replaced command based on social relationships to one based on a system of standardized rules and 
universal discipline that applied to all soldiers which determined their place within the army.  The idea of 
universal law applicable to all individuals regardless of social standing eventually provided the basis for 
modern society.   
Recruitment of soldiers during this era tended to be done through military entrepreneurs; colonels 
who “owned” and administered their regiment and hired it out to the highest bidder. The United provinces 
on the other hand made the officers of the army servants of the state.  This was done because the 
provinces had the right to nominate the company commander for the units it paid for; although the 
Captain-General usually made the final choice.  This made the commanders beholding to the chain of 
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command and not able to “switch” employer.  Although the Company Commanders were given a fixed 
amount of money to pay for the costs of the company, they were not mercenary units but rather 
contracted, and these were often long serving units after the reforms of Maurice which necessitated a 
professional force.404   Although there was no large bureaucracy to administer the army, almost all 
administrative functions; recruitment, pay, discipline, housing, transportation, and medical care occurred 
at the company and regimental level.405 
There is still an issue regarding mercenaries in this case.  An army of mercenaries that did all of 
the fighting for the people would not seem to fit the proposed model in which military integration in an 
Amalgamated Security Community leads to formation of an identity based on shared struggle as ‘brothers 
in arms’.   It is true that mercenary armies fought for William of Orange in 1568 and 1572; however, it 
was the militia forces and peasants that had to defend their towns from the Spanish Army after those 
mercenaries failed and were disbanded.  The various defenses of towns against sieges in which the town’s 
people suffered greatly must be included as part of the common military struggle even though the local 
militia was not part of the national army.   There is a further twist on mercenaries in the context of the 
United Provinces.    
“Parts of its infantry were recruited from Germany, England, Scotland, and France as regiments 
organized by military entrepreneurs, and with their native languages as command languages.  
These foreign regiments became long-serving, and a permanent part of the Dutch army under the 
command of officers who often became closely related to the republic by career opportunities and 
marriage.  When the republic went to war with England-Scotland in 1665, the English and 
Scottish regiments were transformed into national units.  Many of their soldiers were actually 
already Dutch or German.  The French regiments became national units after the French attack on 
the Dutch Republic in 1672.”  “However, a large and soon dominant part of the army was 
organized and recruited in the Netherlands in companies administered by the provinces and the 
States General and commanded by native Dutch or at least Dutch-speaking officers.  The national 
identity of the soldiers is little known, but traditional assumptions that most of them were foreign 
mercenaries are doubtful.  The Netherlands was a part of Europe that attracted large number of 
immigrants to its labor market, and the armed forces were an important part of this market.   
Foreigners recruited for long term service in the Dutch army may often have settled in the 
country.  This makes them different in character from normal mercenary forces, which were 
formed by officers and men who were ready to serve any ruler.”406 
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Mercenaries in the Dutch case come in two varieties.  There were short term soldiers for hire who owed 
no loyalty other than pay to their employers.  These were the unreliable elements that the reforms of 
Maurice aimed to get rid of first by ensuring regular pay and second by keeping troops in the army for 
extended careers.  The other type of mercenary was a foreigner who became a soldier employed by the 
United Provinces who then made the Dutch army his career and home.   
“…the Dutch armies did in fact contain a considerable proportion of Walloons, Frenchmen, 
Germans, English, and Scots - the ‘Macs’ who made a permanent career in the Dutch service, and 
the names of whose successors, we are told, are still to be found in Dutch telephone 
directories.”407 
These second type of soldiers do not impact the proposed model of this study.  In fact there are many 
armies today (including the U.S. Army) that employ foreign soldiers who regularly become citizens 
during their term of service.   
 One final issue must be noted. Although the Princes of Orange and other family members of the 
House of Nassau were stadtholders, Captain-General of the Army or Admiral-General of the navy, they 
were not the ultimate military authority.   The ultimate military authority was the States General.  Maurice 
undertook the campaign that led to the battle of Nieuwpoort under the guidance of the States General.408  
None of the Princes of Orange or other stadtholders claimed sovereignty; they acted as agents of the 
United Provinces.  In this regard the Dutch Revolt provides an early example of civilian control of the 
military.  Furthermore, this control manifested itself in a policy that emphasized defense not expansion 
beyond the territory of the Netherlands.  This policy had a direct impact on campaigns and arguably on 
the development of a professional army.  
 The case of the United Provinces also helps to clearly illustrate what makes a strong 
Amalgamated Security.  The importance of the outcome of the dispute between Maurice of Nassau and 
his former mentor Oldenbarnevelt goes beyond the provinces having to yield to the central authority of 
the States General and Captain General thus establishing the principle that only the central authorities 
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were able to raise troops and create military capabilities.  It established the United Provinces, often seen 
as having a disunited decentralized political system, as a strong Amalgamated Security Community.   A 
strong Amalgamated Security Community is one where the central government has the capacity and 
authority to generate military capability; almost to the complete exclusion of any sub-state element being 
able to create military capabilities or possessing the capacity to create military capabilities.    
2-4. (e). Measuring Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities and 
the capacity to produce military capability 
 
The independent variable in this study is the degree of integration of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability.  Below is the measurement of the independent variable by 
category in the case of the Dutch Revolt based on the evidence that has been presented.   
Category 1 - Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces. 
 The military forces of the United Provinces were integrated although it took some time to achieve 
functional integration under Maurice of Nassau and the creation of the Admiralties for the naval forces.  
The issue of integration was firmly settled in 1618 with the demise of Oldenbarnevelt.  Administration in 
this case is a bit trickier since it was handled by the company or regiment but those functions were done 
with funds paid to the unit.   Therefore, what was integrated was funding for the military.  Funding for the 
navy was completely federal.  Funding for fortifications was either in part (for cities) or in whole (for new 
forts) paid for by the States General.  On the other hand provinces paid for various units which would 
seem to indicate a lack of integration.  The integration in this regard was that the provinces paid for units 
that it had agreed to in negotiation with the other provinces in the States General.  It was not a voluntary 
raising of troops but simply a method to disburse the funds that the States General had decided to allocate 
for the army.   In this category there were integrated combat forces and some integrated administrative 
functions such as finance.  This equals a medium level of integration and is scored as a 3. 
Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production. 
The Dutch were innovators in shipbuilding and led in ship production.  They built fleets for other states 
and even rented their own navy on occasion.  Although the different admiralties created non standard 
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fleets prior to the first Anglo-Dutch war they were reorganized and standardized by the second conflict.  
The Dutch arms industry likewise was open and sold weapons to many foreign states.   There was no 
withholding of technology, the armament industry was integrated and showed itself to be so when 
Maurice standardized the weapons for his reformed army.  Complete sharing in production in this case is 
a high level of integration and will be scored as a 4. 
Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces. 
The military reforms of Maurice of Nassau, including the standardization of weapons, means that 
integration in this category is high and is scored as a 4.   
Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers. (DTLOMS) 
Again the reforms of Maurice of Nassau weigh heavily on this category.  Considering that he created a 
new doctrine emphasizing drill, firepower, siege-craft, and a long term professional army, the integration 
of doctrine must be viewed as complete.  Training, especially the extensive use of repetitive drill along 
with the Wapenhandelinghe was clearly integrated.  Moreover, the establishment of a military academy, 
along with educating much of the Western European gentry meant that leader development was taken 
seriously and was also highly integrated.   In fact the seconding of drill instructors to other armies and the 
training of foreign officers was so extensive that to an extent a number of foreign armies were 
“integrated” with the Dutch army in terms of doctrine, training, and leader development as well as 
organization.  Maurice reorganized the infantry company and made artillery and engineers critical 
branches of his army as well, so that the category of organization is also integrated.  Materiel integration 
in the army occurred with Maurice’s reforms.  Naval forces were materially standardized later.    It is in 
the area of soldiers that there was not much integration.  Methods of recruitment, pay, medical care, and 
discipline were usually handled by the unit.  The only integration in this area is integration in terms of 
discipline (the standard rules for military justice established by Maurice) which places this at a very low 
integration level.  The average score of the different factors equals 3.5 which is a high level of integration.       
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Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) Communications, 
Logistics. 
After 1618 and the demise of Oldenbarnevelt there was no question of the central command and control 
of the forces of the United Provinces.  The various Princes of Orange acting as stadtholder and Captain-
General, or the general appointed by the States General was the undisputed head of the army.  This was 
likewise for the office of Admiral-General of the naval forces.  The supreme role of the States General 
was continually reinforced by issuing guidance to the military commanders.  Communications were 
rudimentary and command was often face to face on the battlefield.  Coordination of campaigns on the 
other hand often included many meetings conducted by delegations of the States General to provide input 
to the military commanders as well as written correspondence.  So although limited, communications 
were integrated.  Logistics, on the other hand was only minimally integrated.  Water transportation was 
arranged at a central level, but commanders usually would purchase their expendable supplies (e.g. food) 
locally.  The admiralties also used the local market to purchase their supplies.  Logistics must be 
considered to be at a very low level of integration if at all.  The rating for this category can only be rated 
as being at a medium level and scored as a 3.   
Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing. 
It is in this category that the negotiated consensus system of funding for the military under the Dutch 
system stands out.  As previously noted the highly efficient nature of resource mobilization through 
negotiation rather than coercion that characterized the Dutch system means that this category is 
completely integrated.  The Estates General agreed on what was to be funded and who was to provide 
what amount of funding and to what units those funds were to be spent on.  This category is therefore 
scored as a 4.     
When all of the scores of the categories of the independent variable are taken together (Category 
1=3, Category 2=4, Category 3=4, Category 4=3.5, Category 5=3, Category 6=4) the result is an average 
score of  3.6 which indicates a high level of military integration overall in this case of the founding of the 
Dutch Republic.   
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3-1. Introduction. 
A weak or partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community is one in which the central 
government does not have the preponderance of capacity and authority to generate military capability.  
The authority of the central government does not exclude any sub-state element from being able to create 
military capabilities or possessing the capacity to create military capabilities. Having more than one 
authority with jurisdiction over the creation of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military 
capability within an Amalgamated Security Community is what defines it as partially integrated.  A weak 
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or partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community will be at a fairly low level of military 
integration.   
In Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Deutsch found that Amalgamated Security 
Communities were significantly more prone to disintegration or failure than Pluralistic Security 
Communities, and that disintegration tended to be quite violent in a number of cases.  He also found 
Pluralistic Security Communities to be easier to attain and easier to preserve than Amalgamated Security 
Communities.409 Partially integrated Amalgamated Security Communities demonstrate the instability that 
Deutsch found to be inherent in Amalgamated Security Communities.  This paper posits that such 
instability is the product of imperfectly integrated military forces and in particular the result of multiple 
jurisdictions having the capacity to create military capabilities.  Partial integration preserves partial 
sovereignty as well as providing a subordinate military identity for sub-state political entities.  This 
provides multiple definitions for what constitutes a “brother-in-arms” and directly impacts the formation 
of an “us vs. other” identity.  This in turn allows a policy choice for sub-state political entities that have 
access to the means of organized coercion to choose “a continuation of politics by other means” (i.e. 
armed conflict) to achieve their objectives.  The opposite side of this argument provides an explanation 
for the difficulty to attain or create an Amalgamated Security Community.  An Amalgamated Security 
Community requires a much closer bond be established than in a Pluralistic Security Community.  This is 
because even for a partially integrated ASC the sub-state political entities must give up some sovereignty 
as well as agree to the creation of at least some type of super-ordinate national military force that creates 
and carries an aspect of national identity and gives new choices and meaning to what it means to be a 
“brother-in-arms.”  In order to progress to being a strong ASC almost the entire meaning of what it means 
to be a “brother in arms” must be transferred to the super-ordinate national military force as the sub-state 
jurisdiction over the creation of military capabilities is eliminated.  This process is difficult and in many 
cases marred by civil war.  The cases below illustrate a progression from Pluralistic Security Community, 
to weak partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community, and then to a strong Amalgamated 
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Security Community.  This is done by examining the U.S. as three distinct cases over time; American 
Revolution to Ratification of the Articles of Confederation (1775-1781), Articles of Confederation (1781-
1789), Constitution to Civil War (1789- 1861), and then an examination of the process of military 
integration from the Civil War to 1916 and impact of that on issues of identity.  Two additional examples 
are provided to highlight that the U.S. is not a singular instance of this process.    
3-2 a.  Selected History of American Revolution to Ratification of the Articles of Confederation 
(1775-1781). 
 
 The American Revolution began long before the Declaration of Independence in 1776.  The First 
Continental Congress, in September - October 1774 created a “non-importation, non-consumption, and 
non-exportation agreement” (called the Continental Association) against Britain.410  The Association as it 
was known created an enforcement mechanism whereby a citizen’s “committee be chosen in every 
county, city, and town” to enforce the boycott as well as the committees of correspondences being 
responsible to inspect the various customs houses.411  Because of the unrest in the American colonies the 
importation of arms and ammunition from England was banned, but Congress made note of the fact that 
there were enough gun makers in the colonies to make an estimated one hundred thousand guns as well as 
several gun powder manufacturers (mostly in New York).412  There was a considerable colonial military 
tradition, mostly independent of that in Britain, of producing combat forces their own defense that was the 
basis for armed resistance to the British.  After the Boston Massacre local leaders in Massachusetts 
advocated “serious militia reforms to create a force capable of offering opposition to the British Army if it 
returned in strength” while other colonists organized voluntary military companies for extra training.  
Following the Coercive Acts, as British troops returned to Boston, the colonists stepped up their military 
preparations, removing militia officers loyal to Britain, and increasing the pace of militia training. 
Massachusetts’ Provincial Congress reorganized one-quarter of the colony's militia into "minute 
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companies", (i.e. minutemen) who conducted extra training to be ready quickly in an emergency.  While 
the First Continental Congress was meeting, various leaders already were proposing forming a combined 
colonial army that could be used if hostilities erupted, but the proposal was rejected.413  Within each 
colony, however, war materials were gathered and the militia was put on a high level of readiness.  
“Imports of arms and powder grew by October 1774 to such a degree that British officials became 
alarmed.  Individual colonial governments began to move existing supplies beyond the reach of British 
seizure and to encourage domestic manufacturers.  Massachusetts took the lead in collecting munitions, as 
it did in reforming the militia.”414  It was to capture or destroy some of these military supplies that 
prompted the British to move on Concord on 19 April, 1775, sparking open hostilities.   
 Following Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts formed an army out of the thousands of men 
surrounding Boston. They adopted a plan for a New England army of 30,000 men; (13,600 from 
Massachusetts) under the command of Major General Artemas Ward.  By June 1775 the Provincial 
Congress approved a Massachusetts army of twenty-three infantry regiments and one artillery regiment.415   
On 20 May the New Hampshire Provincial Congress authorized a 2,000 man force for the New England 
army and with Nathaniel Folsom as commanding general.  On 25 April the Rhode Island Assembly 
authorized a 1,500 man force organized as a brigade with its own company of artillery under Brig. Gen. 
Nathanael Greene.  On 27 April the Connecticut Assembly authorized a 6,000 man force of eight 
regiments with David Wooster as commanding general.416  By June 1775 these three additional distinct 
armies from adjoining colonies joined the Massachusetts army at Boston to form a New England Army. It 
was this regional amalgamated force that prepared the way for the creation of the Continental Army.  It 
was this force that fought the British at the battle of Bunker (Breed’s) Hill. Although a “rage militaire” or 
passion for all things military gripped the colonies enabling the mobilization of manpower to start the 
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revolution, this patriotic “spirit of ‘76” quickly faded and recruiting became a challenge for the remainder 
of the war.417   
 On 10 May, New Hampshire “Green Mountain Boys” led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold 
captured Ft. Ticonderoga, New York, which controlled a key North / South waterway preventing British 
movement out of Canada as well as providing siege cannon for the forces surrounding Boston.418  On 15 
May the Continental Congress appointed a committee to develop the means to procure arms, ammunition 
and military supplies for the colonies.419  The critical act came on 14 June when Congress decided to 
create the Continental Army by recruiting ten companies of riflemen and accepting responsibility for the 
New England Army at Boston as well as the forces planned for the defense New York.420  On 15 June 
1775 Congress selected George Washington as the Commander and he assumed command on 3 July. 
Congress next authorized a preemptive invasion of Canada but after capturing Montreal the invasion 
forces were defeated at Quebec on 31 December with the remaining troops retreating back to 
Ticonderoga.421  In October of 1775 Congress established a Marine Committee in charge of naval affairs 
and authorized the fitting out of armed vessels.422   In November Congress authorized a Marine Corps of 
two battalions, as well as authorizing the capture and confiscation of all British “ships of war, frigates, 
sloops, cutters, and armed vessels” along with any ship transporting supplies for British forces.423 By the 
fall and winter of 1775 fighting spread to the southern colonies as patriot forces clashed with loyalist 
forces.  The Prohibitory Act in December of 1775 was in effect a declaration of war by the Parliament on 
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the colonies.424  The Cannon from Ft. Ticonderoga on Dorchester Heights overlooking Boston forced a 
British evacuation on 17 March giving Washington and the Continental Army an important victory, and 
in the South the British failed to take Charleston in June 1776.   
The detail to this point is to highlight that numerous engagements (including an invasion of 
Canada), significant military preparations (creation of combat capability and capacity to produce military 
capability) by the states, and political actions took place prior to the Declaration of Independence on 4 
July 1776.  The course of the war is well known so it is only necessary from here to highlight the most 
significant events up to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation.    
The most important victory was the defeat of British General John Burgoyne’s army that invaded 
from Canada through the Lake Champlain valley 1777.  It was the victory at the Battles of Saratoga 
fought on 19 September and 7 October which persuaded the French that the British could be defeated and 
to openly support the American Colonies as an ally (along with Spain a year later).425  On 6 February, 
1778, the French and United States signed both a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and a Treaty of 
Alliance.426  The French and Spanish had been supplying clandestine aid to the American Colonies but by 
July 1778, France was openly at war with Britain.  Foreign material support was critical in sustaining the 
conflict.427 With the intervention of France and then Spain in 1779 (and eventually the Dutch) the conflict 
became global in scope with naval conflicts in the Caribbean and Mediterranean which prevented the 
British from applying all of their available military power against the United States.428  Cornwallis was 
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trapped by a combined American and French army led by Washington and Rochambeau as well as French 
navy led by Admiral De Grasse and forced to surrender 19 October 1781. Prior to this the Articles of 
Confederation were finally ratified in March 1781. It was under the Articles of Confederation that the 
United States signed the Treaty of Paris ending the war in September 1783 formally recognizing the 
thirteen colonies as independent states.  
3-2 b. The Government 
During the American Revolution until the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, 
there was no central government to speak of but rather an assembly of representatives of independent 
states that worked to coordinate their efforts against a common enemy.   The status of what might 
commonly be viewed as a government is crystal clear in the text of the Declaration of Independence in 
which the representatives of those states assembled together declare in the plural that they should be free 
and independent states, not a newly independent unified state or singular entity.429 
The Continental Congress was a coordination body not a government. Structurally it had no power to 
make policy except by consensus or compel any colony to do anything.   
“Congress's administrative structure reflected the fact that it was an assembly of ambassadors 
representing the interests and attitudes of their separate states. Given the ambassadorial role of the 
members of Congress, it is not surprising that the delegates tended to hold final decision-making 
authority on the floor, where each state cast a single vote.”430 
Congress however, did appear to take the role of a national government.  It adopted the New England 
army as the Continental army, appointed generals including George Washington as commander-in-chief 
and took measures to acquire weapons and gunpowder.431  All of these measures were taken prior to the 
Declaration of Independence and more importantly involved the obligation for expenditures by Congress.  
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Congress took these financial obligations however, without having any independent source of revenue.  
The states had agreed to “voluntarily” contribute funds to Congress for the war.  This arrangement set up 
a structural free-rider problem in which the states would benefit from the public good of protection from 
the British but had no incentive to contribute unless the British army was close at hand.432  From 1775 
through 1777 the states did not make any financial contributions to Congress.433  There was no dominant 
state as in the Dutch case to provide an administrative and financial base for the American states as a 
whole; rather there were multiple strong states which added to the collective action problem.  Considering 
that part of the cause for the hostilities was due to taxes the states were not about to give Congress that 
authority nor was there any administrative capacity to collect any tax.  Without tax revenue, loans from 
commercial sources were not possible either (as the Dutch had been able to finance their conflicts).  The 
only option was to print paper money.434  Congress began printing money in June 1775 but each state 
printed money also.435  The value of the dollar issued by Congress declined over 70 per cent in 1777.  
Congress stopped issuing paper money in 1779 but tried other methods to generate revenue such as 
issuing interest bearing loan certificates.  The problem was that the certificates were used in addition to 
the paper money, and since they were being cashed in the Congress was actually losing money paying 
interest which it had to halt in 1782.436  Congress passed resolutions asking the states to stop issuing their 
own paper money and recall what had been issued. It was in effect an attempt to create a national 
monetary union but that failed also. Congress had no power to stop counterfeiting of the Continental 
dollar and had to ask the states to prosecute counterfeiters.437  In late November 1777 Congress decided to 
raise revenue by authorizing the confiscation and sale of the property belonging to people who remained 
loyal to Britain; but this was to be carried out by the states.  In December it authorized the confiscation of 
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private property by the Continental army to keep it from disintegrating (this was the winter of Valley 
Forge 1777–1778).  This was a resort to the age old form of war paying for itself through looting; 
although the Continental army was to issue certificates of indebtedness to be redeemed later.  In 
November 1777 Congress tried to implement a voluntary tax arrangement with the states by 
requisitioning revenue proportional with the value of land taxed by each state.  Congress tried to reduce 
the free rider problem by publicly making known what each state owed.  After the British victories in the 
south, Congress made two additional requisitions in August and November of 1780 to be paid in real 
goods and coined money but there is no record that these were ever paid.438  The only real revenue source 
was in the form of grants and loans from France and Spain that dramatically increased once France and 
Spain openly went to war against Britain as American Allies.  It was money from the Spanish and French 
that to a large extent funded the revolution, not the efforts of Congress. 
 Congress also completely failed in its management of the war effort itself.  In June 1776 
Congress established a Board of War and Ordnance.  It was supposed to be the executive agent of 
Congress for military affairs and consisted of five members of Congress as well as a secretary and clerks.  
Its duties included the supervision of raising and equipping units, accounting for arms and ammunition, 
maintaining personnel records and storage of equipment, disbursing funds, and dispatching 
correspondence as directed by Congress.  Board was incapable of functioning.  The members had other 
duties and none had any military background.  Congress created a new War Board in late 1777 who were 
not members of Congress.  Its duties were expanded to include medicine, clothing, and provisions.  It was 
also supposed to develop estimates of required equipment and supervise the building and maintenance of 
arsenals, barracks, and other facilities needed for the military. The War Board was made up of people 
who were antagonistic to General Washington so it failed to be of much use. This was replaced in 1781 
by a War Department.439  A further problem existed in the administrative staff set up by Congress under 
the War Board.  The problem was that the contracting officers were paid based on commission which 
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meant that the more they spent the more they were paid.  This raised prices, added to the devaluation of 
currency, and in the long run to the supply breakdown of the Continental Army.440  It was the states that 
provided (grudgingly and inadequately) for their own contingents in the Continental Army.441  Three main 
sources existed for obtaining ammunition; captured enemy munitions at sea, the exchange of imported 
ammunition for exemption from the embargo (Association), and local production.442  Ammunition 
procured by Congress was not a primary source.  
 The attempt by Congress to manage naval affairs was no less abysmal.  In October 1779 
Congress established a Board of Admiralty whose members included two Congressmen and three 
commissioners with the powers and duties almost the same as the Marine Committee which it replaced.  
The Board of Admiralty was never able to find a third commissioner and rarely was able to form a 
quorum.443  It was discontinued in July 1781.  The Navy boards faired no better. In August 1781 Congress 
created the Agent of Marine to “direct, fit out, equip, and employ, the ships and vessels of war belonging 
to the United States” but had to assign the duties to the Superintendent of Finance by September because 
no one had taken the post.444   The Continental Navy had virtually disappeared by 1780 possessing only 
five ships, and played almost no useful role. Not a single U.S. vessel was with the French fleet at 
Yorktown.  The U.S. relied on the French Navy, privateers, and state navies.  In John Adams view; 
“recollecting the whole history of the rise and progress of our navy, it is difficult to avoid tears.”445 
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 Congress did not function as a government during the American Revolution prior to the 
ratification of the Articles of Confederation.  It did not have any administrative capacity, coercive 
capacity, or legislative ability.  Although it appeared to accept the responsibility for “national” financial 
obligations, Congress could not tax, raise revenue from commercial sources, or set monetary policy to 
finance the war effort. It was kept afloat by loans from foreign governments.  Congress failed to manage 
the war effort which was the core reason for its very existence. The Continental Congress was simply an 
assembly of ambassadors.446  The result was that the war effort in many respects was carried on by 
George Washington himself and by the various states cooperating when it was in their interest; i.e. when 
the British army was close by.  In fact the French by 1781 had become wise to the inability and 
inefficiency of Congress so that they stipulated that only George Washington was allowed to spend 
money they donated.447  The point is that there was no “government” during this period.  
3-2 c. Military Cooperation 
3-2 c. (1) The militia system as the basis for generating combat capabilities. The British 
colonies in America had a long history of generating military capabilities and the capacity to produce 
military capability.  The early English settlements were under threat not only from native tribes but also 
from other European powers and so all of them hired professional soldiers as military advisers to help 
with local defense.  The colonists had to adapt the militia system to their local circumstances.  
Massachusetts was the first English colony to create permanent regiments in 1636 (created in the British 
army in 1640’s). Experience in frontier fighting demonstrated the weakness of the matchlock musket so 
that by 1675 almost all of the colonies militias required its troops be equipped with flintlocks completing 
the transition to this weapon twenty five years before most European armies. Since most colonists hunted 
there were a large number of rifles made in the colonies (particularly in Pennsylvania) which resulted in 
an emphasis on rifle marksmanship. Militia training in the American colonies stressed individual 
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marksmanship rather than massed firing also to fight frontier battles with native tribes.  Leadership in the 
militia was controlled by local elites whether the colony elected or appointed its officers.  Recruitment 
was not an issue since in the colonies few free adult males were exempt from belong to the militia 
because of the early settlers need for local defense.  As the colonies became more settled the economic 
impact of taking all males out of a town or region for any length of time was too severe.  The solution was 
that temporary detachments were formed out of regular militia companies for long term operations.  The 
militia system of universal service became a replacement pool, local training center, and a local military 
supply center.  Starting in the late 1600s a series of conflicts involving expeditions against Spanish and 
French colonies exceeded the capacity of the militia system. The solution was that the colonial governors 
and legislatures formed regiments outside the local militia structure.  These temporary regiments were 
called Provincials and were raised for the current conflict and then disbanded.  The units had a period of 
one year service so new regiments were formed each year if necessary. The colonial government 
appointed the officers who had a status greater than that of militia officers.  A famous example of a 
Provincial unit was Rogers Rangers during the French and Indian War.448  George Washington was a 
Provincial officer. The experience fighting numerous frontier conflicts against native tribes and creating 
Provincial regiments for colonial conflicts, along with the militia system that provided the infrastructure 
for creating military capability, gave the various English colonies a significant capacity to produce 
military capability.   
3-2 c. (2) The parallel conflicts fought at the state and local level.    There were two additional 
aspects to the American Revolution that were fought primarily at the local level by local and state forces.  
The first is the conflict between Patriot and loyalist/Tory forces that, especially in the Southern states, 
took on the flavor of a civil war.  The second aspect was the conflict with native tribes allied with the 
British including four tribes of the Iroquois, Cherokees, Choctaws, Creeks and Chickasaws; tribes located 
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from Canada to Florida.449  The fighting with the Indians during the revolution was significant and 
geographically extensive conducted primarily by local forces except for a punitive expedition against the 
Iroquois in 1779 by part of the Continental army. The fighting reverted to a localized conflict after the 
Continental troops withdrew.450  The conflicts between the loyalists / Tories and Patriots, and with the 
Indian tribes along the various state frontiers was a parallel conflict managed almost exclusively at the 
state and local level.   
3-2 c. (3) Naval military activities   The Congress’ poor performance of managing the 
Continental Navy has been noted.  The force itself only had one successful operation; a raid on Nassau in 
the Bahamas. Congress authorized the construction of thirteen frigates in December of 1775; of these only 
one sank in battle, the British captured seven, burned two, and the Americans had to burn the other three 
to keep them from capture.  This doesn’t mean that the conflict at sea was unsuccessful; rather it was 
other naval forces that produced the most significant results.   
The first successful American naval force was established by George Washington during the 
siege of Boston in 1775.  By January 1776 it consisted of seven schooners and a brigantine that captured 
thirty five British ships. When Washington left Boston for New York the Marine Committee of Congress 
ordered its agent in Boston to dismiss the fleet.  Washington however, repeated the process in New York 
forming a small fleet to help defend the city and captured a number of British ships off of Long Island.451 
Washington’s fleets were his own creation and materially added to the war effort by obtaining arms, 
ammunition and supplies, as well as stopping some British reinforcements.  The point is that it was not a 
national fleet but a fleet in the service of the Army commander.452   
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Another successful American naval force was the fleet of privateers; privately owned armed 
vessels authorized to attack enemy shipping by a letter of marque, i.e. legalized piracy.  These military 
entrepreneurs saw this as a way to get rich quick so there were a large number of privateers (over 2000 
were authorized). They severely damaged British trade and were the most effective American naval 
effort.  British losses were significant; shipping insurance costs rose dramatically and forced the British to 
use convoys to protect their merchant ships which reduced the number of warships available for other 
duties.  The privateers also disrupted communications between England and the British forces in North 
America.453  The key point is that the most effective American naval force was not based on military 
cooperation, but on private military entrepreneurs.        
 The last category of American naval force is the navies of the various states.  Except for 
Delaware and New Jersey, all of the states produced some sort of state naval force.  Although no one state 
had a naval force larger than the Continental navy all of the state navies combined had a much larger total 
number of ships.  The states’ navies were designed to protect their ports, costal waters and local trade 
ships.  These tended to act as a waterborne militia that was used to ward off British raids or keep 
loyalists/Tories from being supplied or supporting the British.  Massachusetts was the one state where 
deep sea vessels outnumbered costal defense vessels; the largest being a frigate of 28 guns.  The naval 
administration in the states varied; some states had separate state naval boards and war boards while 
others had a combined board.454  States also commissioned privateers, with Massachusetts being the first 
to do so with an act passed in November 1775 setting up a prize court and granting letters of marque and 
reprisal.455 The state navies were not insignificant and participated in several engagements including the 
defense of Philadelphia and the Penobscot expedition; the greatest naval disaster prior to Pearl Harbor.456   
Although a disaster, the number of state navy vessels participating was far greater than the Continental 
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Navy.  The important point is that the states had the capacity to create and use naval military capabilities 
as well as land forces.  
3-2 c. (4) Production of land military capabilities457   The critical point is that the states 
produced the vast majority of all of the land forces; even the units of the Continental Army came from the 
states because they were the entities who possessed the capacity to produce military capability. Congress 
never had the capacity to generate significant military capability.  It produced limited naval forces, some 
technical services that were auxiliaries to the army, and two regiments recruited in Canada.  Washington 
directly recruited “additional” units but they proved difficult to fill. Congress requested forces from the 
states, authorized the recruiting of regiments in the states for the Continental Army, accepted units 
generated by the states or adopted units generated by the states but in only very limited circumstances did 
Congress generate military capability.  One contentious issue was who appointed the officers of the 
Continental units because the states wanted to control the appointments (a patronage opportunity).  
Although it nominally won the right to name officers, in practice Congress compromised by agreeing to 
select from a list of state nominees for each unit.  Congress had more success in controlling promotions, 
especially those based on merit, since the middle and southern colonies knew that if promotions were 
based on seniority New England would completely dominate the force.458 
 The first force that Congress adopted was the New England army (that became the Continental 
Army) which was a combined army consisting of the Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut state armies; raised, trained, equipped, and supplied by each state, and led by state officers.   
The second force was the group of units that had been requested by Congress including New York troops 
and the 4th Connecticut Regiment to garrison Ft. Ticonderoga and later invade Canada.  The next force 
was very significant; the ten companies of riflemen that were the first units created directly as Continental 
soldiers.  Congress allocated the companies to Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia which were 
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expected to create the units.459 These first purely Continental units were provided by the states.  Another 
issue for Washington was that each colony had a different regimental organization which made tactical 
coordination difficult.  Since almost all of the Continental soldier’s enlistments ended on 31 December 
1775, Washington took the opportunity to attempt a complete reorganization to a standardized regiment 
for the entire army.  Washington also wanted to distribute good officers throughout the army regardless of 
which colony they came from, but he had to abandon this attempt to mix officers from different colonies 
in the regiments because it was extremely unpopular.460  The lack of reenlistments pushed Washington to 
ask the New England governments to use a draft to fill their regiments (since they were responsible for 
manning them), and to request any available weapons because the states were responsible for equipping 
the units.  Washington was forced to accept state militia units to fill out the army around Boston for the 
remainder of the siege during the first several months of 1776.  
 In October 1775 Congress authorized General Schuyler to organize a Continental regiment out of 
the Canadians who wanted to join his army.  Moses Hazen (a Captain in Rogers' Rangers) was authorized 
by Congress to raise a second Canadian regiment.  It was made up primarily of French veterans of the 
French and Indian War who remained in Canada and was organized like a French regiment from that war.  
Hazen personally financed the regiment; Congress did not reimburse him. So of the two regiments not 
provided by a state that were part of the Continental army, one was created and maintained by an 
individual and had a completely different organization. 
With enlistments ending at the end of 1775 new regiments for the Northern Department had to be 
created.  There were the regiments of Canadians, two regiments from reenlisting soldiers, and regiments 
from New York, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  General Schuyler also 
                                                 
459 “Responsibility for recruiting the companies was given to the three colonies' delegates, who in turn relied on the 
county committees of those areas noted for skilled marksmen. The response in Pennsylvania's western and northern 
frontier counties was so great that on 22 June the colony's quota was increased from six to eight companies, 
organized as a regiment. On 25 June the Pennsylvania delegates, with authority from the Pennsylvania Assembly, 
appointed field officers for the regiment.” Wright, The Continental Army, 25-26. 
460 Ibid., 51. 
 167
wanted to mix officers and units from different colonies; however, the consensus was that it was 
impractical.461   
“Both Washington and Schuyler hoped to emphasize national identification by mingling 
personnel from several colonies in each regiment. Opposition from officers and men alike ended 
that concept.”462 
Washington wrote to the state governments of Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts to 
change the short term militia regiments they were sending him into Continental regiments for the 
Northern Department.463  Horatio Gates, commander of the field forces under General Schuyler, created a 
four brigade structure for his army by grouping regiments from the same or adjacent colonies to 
“minimize friction”.464  Gates had run into the same problem regarding cooperation between the units 
from different colonies who did not want to serve together. During the Battles of Saratoga “over two-
thirds of the Northern Department's soldiers, (including artillery and cavalry troops) were militiamen 
from New England and New York.”465   
Limited military cooperation was not only true of the armies of the northern states, but was also 
the norm in the middle and southern states. Virginia created eight state regiments with a different 
organization from the reorganized Continental Army.466  Virginia offered the units to Congress but did 
not change their organization to Continental standards nor alter the terms of enlistment.467 North Carolina 
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regiments also did not match Continental standards.468 South Carolina decided to reinforce its militia with 
regular state troops rather than asking Congress for authorization to create Continental troops. When 
Congress asked South Carolina to raise three regiments matching the Continental army’s organization, 
South Carolina “did not immediately transfer its units to the Continental Army but tried to delegate 
operational control over them.”469  Congress eventually accepted the South Carolina units as Continentals 
with a compromise in which “it promised not to send more than one-third of the troops outside South 
Carolina without prior notice.”470 In effect South Carolina kept a hold on its “Continental Army” troops. 
Georgia raised an infantry regiment for the Continental Army but the state continually asserted “a right to 
retain an interest in the regiment's affairs”.471  Military cooperation in the South was much less consistent 
than in the North,472 with local leaders preferring to support the local militia rather than the Continental 
Army.473  
Military cooperation was better in the middle states.  Delaware formed a Continental regiment but 
it lacked weapons until joining Washington’s army. New Jersey created sixteen companies according to 
militia strength in its various counties while a third Continental regiment was raised on a colony-wide 
basis.  Pennsylvania had a large Quaker population so it did not have a compulsory militia.  Instead it 
relied on volunteers called associators. A regiment was recruited matching the organization of 
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Washington’s regiments.  Congress asked for four more regiments.  This time companies were recruited 
by counties and formed into units on a geographic basis, but they were battalions not regiments, and 
differed from other units by having a company of riflemen. Pennsylvania wanted its units to be formed 
into a unified brigade so it could retain some control over the use of its army and train its junior officers.  
Because of the defeats in Canada this did not happen as Pennsylvania units were sent to various 
locations.474 Maryland formed one regiment of nine companies different from the Continental 
organization by including a light infantry company and additional officers.  It also created 7 separate 
infantry companies and 2 artillery companies.  When asked to form two Continental units in August 1776, 
Maryland transferred the regiment and the independent companies to the Continental Army but did not 
provide a second regimental staff.475  
 The middle states provided a few combined units. One was a “German Battalion” authorized by 
Congress in May 1776, of immigrant Germans recruited in Maryland and Pennsylvania for three-year 
terms.  Another was the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment created in June 1776, whose cadre was 
from the original Continental rifle companies recruited in 1775.476   These combined units functioned 
because they had an identity other than the geographic state; one was composed of German immigrants, 
the other of frontiersmen who had more in common with each other than with the people of the settled 
regions of each state.  This is in comparison to Washington’s and Schuyler’s attempts to “emphasize 
national identification by mingling personnel from several colonies in each regiment” that failed (an 
example of identity at work in the creation of military forces). Washington did create a provisional 
“artificer” regiment (construction engineers) with carpenters, blacksmiths, and a company of boat builders 
for his army by selecting skilled individuals from the entire army.477   
What Congress did control was the operational and strategic level organization of the conflict.  As 
the conflict spread to areas outside of New England Congress created geographic departments.  It first 
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created a Northern Department (upstate New York) and then a Canadian Department.  This was followed 
by a Middle Department and a Southern Department.  Washington was overall Commander-in-Chief and 
in command of the "Military District" of New England.  Each Department had a Major General in 
command with two brigadier generals and a staff to support him.478 The shift of Washington’s army to 
New York City put him in command of the Middle Department.  A Western Department encompassing 
Western Pennsylvania, North-Western Virginia, and the Ohio River valley was also created.  With 
Washington’s move to New York City, New England became the Eastern Department but it needed 
additional forces.  Congress adopted two Rhode Island state units, Massachusetts gave operational control 
of three existing state regiments to the Eastern Department (with the caveat that they could not be sent out 
of the state), and Connecticut created two regiments of state troops.  These state troops significantly 
augmented the defenses of the Eastern Department.479   The transfer of operational control of Continental 
forces between Departments was a Congressional function that was shared with Washington as 
Commander-in-Chief.  At the strategic and operation level there clearly was military cooperation guided 
by Congress. 
 Facing the threat of attack against both the Northern Department from Canada and against 
Washington’s main army in New York City, Congress estimated that the Northern Department needed 
20,000 men and Washington's Main Army needed 25,000 troops.  To reach these numbers Congress 
asked the states to provide 30,000 militia.480   
“Congress' decision to turn to the militia rather than attempt to recruit more Continental 
regiments was based on practical and ideological reasons. Militia could take to the field quicker. 
Many delegates also believed that America faced a crisis which demanded the full participation of 
society for the Revolution to succeed. They felt that the militia, rather than the regular army, was 
the military institution which represented the people.”481 
This view of the militia as the primary fighting force vs. a standing regular army was the critical debate in 
terms of how combat capabilities should be generated and will be examined in detail later.  In 
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Washington’s army “fifty-seven percent of the total strength came from 36 regiments of militia and 4 
regiments of state troops.”482    
 The constant need for reorganization and recruitment due to the short one year enlistments (based 
of the previous experience of creating Provincial units) was a serious problem. Congress tried to adopt a 
permanent organization called the “eighty-eight battalion resolve” that called for eighty-eight regiments 
matching the organization in Washington’s army.  Regiments were allocated to the states based on the 
population of each state.  A state's “line” consisted of its Continental infantry regiments allocated under 
this plan.  
“Congress continued to commission all officers while allowing individual states to actually name 
the officers up to and including colonels. The states were expected to provide the arms, clothing, 
and other equipment for their respective regiments; they could withhold part of the men's pay to 
cover the cost of uniforms.”483 
Washington asked for more infantry, more artillery, and a force of cavalry.  Congress gave him authority 
to create 16 additional infantry units, three artillery regiments, and a force of three thousand light cavalry.  
These units were unique in that they would be organized under Continental Army authority rather than by 
the state governments.  Washington had serious difficulty recruiting the units. In Connecticut the effort by 
one of Washington’s aids to create a unit there was more successful “once he received support from the 
state government.”484   
“Because of serious recruiting problems, Washington attempted to raise only 15 of the 16 
approved regiments, and 2 of those were stillborn when their colonels declined the commands. 
Although some of the additional regiments were quite successful, none could compete equally 
with the regiments organized under the September 1776 state quotas.” 485  
The attempt to create units directly under the authority of the Continental army was a failure.  In 1778 
Congress cut the regiments recruited by Washington.      
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“They generally were weaker to begin with and lacked the political support of the state lines. 
Congress normally consolidated units from the same or adjacent areas, retired the excess officers, 
and transferred the consolidated unit to a state line if possible”486   
During the winter at Valley Forge (1777-1778) the army had only about a third of its authorized strength.  
By May 1778 Congress reduced the number and size of the infantry regiments by thirty percent.487 
Although this reorganization reflected the impossibility of recruiting a large, long-term army that 
Washington wanted, it also reflected some Congressional factions unwavering suspicion of a standing 
army.   After creating a large army with the “eighty eight battalion resolve”, that army was expected to 
win.  It had not done so, but a smashing victory had been won at Saratoga with the assistance of large 
militia forces.  The opponents of a large army compared Gates' victory at Saratoga with Washington's loss 
of Philadelphia.488 
 The surrender of Charleston SC. in May 1780 wiped out the entire Continental army of the 
Southern Department.489 Another defeat at Camden SC decimated three Maryland “line” regiments, the 
Delaware “line” regiment, and a regiment of artillery.490   The result of these losses combined with 
recruiting problems and financial difficulties led to a final reorganization plan in October of 1780.  The 
result was a major reduction in the number of units.   
“All other units had to disband and transfer their enlisted men to the line regiments. Congress 
allotted every regiment, except Hazen's and the two partisan corps, to a single state to simplify 
subsistence and troop replacement.”491 
This last reorganization implicitly acknowledged that only the states were capable of providing and 
sustaining the primary military combat capabilities of the army.   This was the last major effort at creating 
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military capabilities during the conflict and it was this force that entered the final campaign of 1781 that 
led to Victory at Yorktown.     
Special Units 
Artillery. The states were the main creators of artillery forces.492  Additional forces were created 
from reenlisting veterans and recruiting in the states.493  Chief of Artillery, Henry Knox, did however take 
care of the special logistical needs of the artillery.494  The he expansion of the artillery units was made 
possible primarily by imported French guns.  There was some domestic production of iron guns but these 
cannon were too heavy for the field army and were limited to fixed fortifications.  There was limited 
production of bronze cannon at the foundry in Philadelphia.495  In November 1777 Congress approved the 
addition of two more artillery artificer companies. Knox grouped the four companies into a regiment and 
by February 1778 Congress consolidated responsibility for ordnance, munitions, military equipment, and 
repair of weapons under the Carlisle depot commander who became colonel of the Artillery Artificer 
Regiment.496 
 Cavalry was also provided by the states.  The first unit was a regiment composed of six troops of 
light horse created by Virginia as state troops that were transferred to Washington.  The second regiment 
was formed around Connecticut militia troopers who were converted into Continentals.  The third 
regiment came from Virginia and the fourth from Pennsylvania.  Virginia and Connecticut helped to 
overcome problems in obtaining horses and equipment, specialized cavalry weapons, and training the 
horses for combat.  Assistance from “the two states noted for raising horses in the eighteenth century, 
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indicated the importance of supply factors in creating the regiments.”497  Shortages of men and horses 
forced the 2d and 4th Continental Light Dragoon regiments to be equipped as infantry in 1779.  The other 
two Light Dragoon regiments were transferred to the Southern Department for the rest of the war.498   
 Engineers. The French Minister of War loaned four military engineers to the Continental Army 
in 1777.  The leader of the French engineers, Duportail, was made a Brigadier General and put in 
command of all engineers in the Army.  They first developed bridging capabilities for the army, and a 
large portion of the engineers helped to construct the fortifications at West Point, NY.  Duportail next 
proposed to create companies of sappers and miners.  Washington liked the plan to train the sapper and 
miner company officers as apprentice engineers because it would create a method to train native-born 
engineers. In March 1779 Congress made the Corps of Engineers the status of a branch of the Continental 
Army on par with the Artillery.  Washington also appointed a topographical staff of a geographer and 
surveyor with six survey teams to produce maps.499  In the summer of 1778 Washington organized 
companies of skilled workmen serving the Quartermaster General using them as construction parties.  
These artificer companies helped build West Point, maintained wheeled vehicles, and mended roads as 
pioneers (construction engineers) during marches.  Congress directed the nine companies be grouped into 
a Quartermaster Artificer Regiment in November 1779. 
Other light units included “partisan corps” or “legion” based on a European type unit designed 
to conduct raids on enemy rear areas.  In December 1776 Congress created the first of these units 
recruited primarily from the German-American community but with foreign volunteer officers.   The 
second unit was an independent legion Commanded by General Pulaski composed of 200 light infantry 
and a troop of cavalry. A third unit was created in April 1778 composed of light dragoons (cavalry) and 
dismounted troops.  Congress also created a mounted military police unit (the Marechaussee Corps) in 
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1778.  Congress created a Corps of Invalids in 1777 of men not fit for field duty to garrison fortifications 
such as West Point and it served there for the rest of the war.500     
Training, Standardization, and Administration 
  In 1777, once French supplies began to be abundant, the 1763-model French Army musket 
became the standard infantry weapon of the Continental Army.501 State troops and militia however had a 
mix of weapons.  A Commissary General of Prisoners was created in 1777 and Washington also used that 
office to coordinate intelligence activities.  The logistic structure included a Commissary General and a 
Quartermaster General's Department organized into specialized groups to handle transportation, quarters, 
forage, and baking.  A hospital service was organized to provide support to the territorial departments and 
service the soldiers.  At Washington's request Congress created a Clothier General's Department to 
furnish uniforms in late 1776.  Under the Clothier there was a Commissary of Hides to produce leather 
goods.502  
One foreign volunteer, Frederick Wilhelm von Steuben, was the most important trainer and 
creator of an administrative staff for the Continental Army. Steuben created a new training system mixing 
Prussian, English, and American practices.  Steuben emphasized bayonet training to add to the existing 
marksmanship skill of the Continental soldiers.  Steuben personally trained a provisional "model 
company" at Valley Forge to use his system.  After they were trained the members of the model company 
instructed all other units at Valley Forge and then the rest of the army.  Steuben also created a simple and 
effective system for maneuvering units on the battlefield.  Steuben’s system covered all aspects of 
infantry drill and maneuver.  In March 1779 Congress approved publication of Steuben's Regulations for 
the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Part I. Almost every officer received a copy 
of what became know as "The Blue Book". Steuben’s drill book covered many additional topics.  The 
Blue Book specified routine of daily life and emphasized health and morale, it improved the efficiency of 
the trains, it covered the importance of regimental administration, it clearly explained the functions of 
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every individual in a regiment, and it specified training for senior noncommissioned officers.  In was 
different from other army regulations of its day because it emphasized that an officer was “to gain the 
love of his men, by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, enquiring into their 
complaints, and when well founded, seeing them redressed. He should know every man of his company 
by name and character."  Steuben made the Continental Army the most progressive military organization 
of its day.503  Steuben then became the Inspector General from 1778 through 1780 becoming 
Washington's de facto chief of staff and a Major General.  Steuben had assistants at division level along 
with a major in each brigade whose first task was implementing Steuben's drill system.  The main duty of 
these Inspector Generals was to ensure that units followed official Army doctrine.  The Army Adjutant 
General worked with Steuben to standardize the Army's paperwork developing printed forms for most of 
the routine regimental and brigade bookkeeping chores.  Steuben developed policies while the Adjutant 
General performed routine administration.   The Inspector General gradually absorbed the mustering 
department as well covering all the territorial departments.  Inspectors were authorized for all combat 
arms and technical branches.  Steuben became the Continental Army's supreme administrator since his 
department had parallel positions under all territorial, division, and brigade commanders in the Army.504 
3-2 d. Measuring Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability 
 
The independent variable in this study is the degree of integration of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability.  The independent variable will be measured by category based on 
the evidence that has been presented. 
Category 1 - Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces. 
Operational forces during this period chiefly consisted of state sponsored units acting as part of a joint 
force; integrated only at the senior command levels.  The integrated forces were minor and consisted of 
the Continental Navy, the special units and a few of the additional regiments recruited by Washington 
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under the authority of the Continental Army (which had limited success and were soon eliminated).  Most 
attempts to create integrated regiments (mixed units with soldiers from multiple states) were opposed by 
the officers and men unless they had a preexisting identity such as the German-American units.  It was 
found that only the states had the capacity to generate and sustain the major combat forces of the 
Continental Army.  The States also fought a parallel conflict using their own state forces. Non-integrated 
and non-standardized militia and state troops played a major role in the conflict.   The administrative 
staffs established by Congress, the War Board and the Navy Board / Admiralty were an abysmal failure.  
The Continental Army’s internal administrative staff improved once Steuben became the Inspector 
General; however it was limited to the internal workings of the army. Military forces therefore in this case 
can not bee seen as integrated except in a very minimalist way and can only generously be scored as a 0.5.   
Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production. 
The source for most weapons used during the conflict was foreign imports; British or French / 
Spanish.  The domestic production of weapons was limited to rifles and some cannon, both located 
primarily in Pennsylvania.  Domestic Gunpowder production was primarily in New York.  Therefore, in 
this category there was some sharing of low tech production which is a very low level of integration and 
will be scored as a 1 
Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces. 
 The initial combat forces relied on a wide variety of equipment depending on what was available 
in each state or could be captured from the British.  Not until large numbers of French muskets became 
available was there any standard weapon.  There were numerous Artillery pieces in different units.  Basic 
equipment like shoes and uniforms were in short supply.  Rifles were an important part of many units but 
they were almost always a hand crafted weapon.  The militia and state troops had a variety of weapons.  
On the other hand almost all of them were muzzle loading flintlocks at the same level of technological 
development.  For this reason it can be viewed that they all had common basic equipment which is a low 
level of integration and is scored as a 2. 
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Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers. (DTLOMS) 
 Not until Steuben created the unique system outlined in the “Blue Book” was there anything 
approaching a standard doctrine.  The states produced combat power using the militia system as the basis 
to do that and those units conformed to local needs.  Although training across the states tended to 
emphasize marksmanship over the bayonet, there was a difference in how units trained and organized for 
frontier duty vs. those trained to defend against the British. Leaders were also for the most part selected 
by the states; sometimes for political reasons rather than military competency.  Congress only exercised 
complete control over general officer appointments.  The states produced units with different 
organizations depending on local circumstances and often they did not follow the guidelines established 
by Washington for the organization of units in the Continental Army.  Material was non-standardized 
among the various forces and only the importation of French muskets gave the Continental Army a 
standard weapon, the rest were non-standardized.   Recruitment for the most part depended on the states 
and the militia system as it basis.  Recruitment on an annual basis for the first several years of the war 
also forced reorganizations of the army each year for several years.  Soldiers pay, food, clothing, and 
medical care were mostly born by the states mainly because of the lack of administrative capacity 
demonstrated by Congress.  As the war dragged on recruitment became a major issue and forced several 
reorganizations of the army.  Congress did eventually support a severance pay and limited retirement but 
that is covered in the next section.  The only integration in this area was achieved by Steuben as Inspector 
General and that was very minimal.  The special units were small and tended to have narrow functions 
and fluctuating organizations but can be said to have been integrated.  This category can not be seen as 
integrated except in a limited way and can only be scored as a one. 
Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) Communications, 
Logistics.   
The logistic sustainment of the force was not integrated.  Congress failed to support the force as a 
whole.  It was foreign support, state support to its own regiments, and the army capturing British supplies 
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and confiscating property to feed itself that sustained it.  It is to be recalled that the French stipulated that 
only Washington could spend the largest grant that they made because they became wise to the inability 
of Congress to properly manage funds.  The logistic system did not function during the war. 
Communications were established between each state and between the various military departments so 
that it can be said that there was an integrated communications system that had its basis in the committees 
of correspondence even prior to the conflict.  Command and control is the primary area where integration 
can be said to have occurred.  Washington did act as Commander-in-Chief.  Congress did establish 
territorial departments, selected their commanders, provided a staff, and moved units between territorial 
departments as needed.  The Continental Army did exercise operational control of the units under it, and 
those units responded to the unified command structure of the territorial departments and the officers in 
command of each department.   This category is between a low to medium level of integration and will be 
scored as a 2.5 
Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing. 
Because the American colonies had no equivalent to the Union of Utrecht as in the Dutch case 
that created a defensive alliance and outlined the responsibilities of the constituent states for the 
prosecution and financing of the war, burdensharing was abysmal.  The voluntary arrangement of state 
support immediately created a structural free rider problem that was kept at bay only through the initial 
printing of money and then by injections of foreign capital.  This category must be scored as a zero.    
When all of the scores of the categories of the independent variable are taken together (Category 
1=0.5, Category 2=1, Category 3=2, Category 4=1, Category 5=2.5, Category 6=0) the result is an 
average score of 1.16 which indicates a very low level of military integration overall in the case of the 
American Revolution to Ratification of the Articles of Confederation (1775-1781).  The military 
integration in this case was based on military necessity as Washington (and to a small extent Congress) 
tried to field a more effective force to fight the British.  This military integration was not based on a 
decision by the constituent states to integrate their military forces or their capacities to produce military 
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capabilities.  Because it was not based on a political decision to integrate it could only have a limited 
effect and did not cause a tipping point to occur to form an ASC. 
Furthermore, Congress did not act as a government during this period but acted as an assembly of 
state representatives.  A close analogy for Congress during this period would be NATO’s North Atlantic 
Council (NAC).  The NAC meets as a multinational representative political body requiring unanimity for 
its decisions but also is tasked to fund and coordinate military activities up to and including combat.  With 
no government and a very low level of integration this does not meet the requirements to be an 
Amalgamated Security Community in this paper.505  During the American Revolution to the Ratification 
of the Articles of Confederation (1775-1781), what existed was a Pluralistic Security Community.  The 
evolution of the security community of the American Colonies began long before 1775 and follows the 
phases outlined by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett.506  A “nascent community” could be said to 
have been created out of the French and Indian War in which Provincial units were used to augment the 
British regular army and help adjacent states, and the response to the imposition of the Currency, Revenue 
(Sugar) Acts and Stamp Act that led to the Stamp Act Congress in 1765.  An “ascendant” pluralistic 
security community can be seen developing from the Townshend Acts and Boston Massacre in 1770, 
through the Tea Act of 1773 and the response by all the colonies to prevent the tea ships from docking, to 
the Coercive Acts and the First Continental Congress’ boycott (the Continental Association) of 1774, and 
the forming of the Committees of Correspondence as an enforcement mechanism.  It was also in 1774 that 
the Congress noted domestic arms manufactures and the various colonies began collecting arms and 
ammunition and organizing their forces for a fight.  The entity that fought the British during the American 
Revolution to Ratification of the Articles of Confederation (1775-1781) was a “mature” pluralistic 
security community.  By the end of this period it was moving from a loosely coupled pluralistic security 
community toward becoming a tightly coupled security community. Although there was evidence of 
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cooperative and collective security, policy coordination against “internal” threats, free movements of 
populations, and a high level of military cooperation, there was no internationalization of authority 
(authority vested in Congress) nor was there a “Multiperspectival” polity (rule shared at the national, 
transnational, and supranational levels) and that prevents this paper from describing it as a tightly coupled 
security community. That happened with the ratification of the Articles of Confederation.    
3-3 a.  Selected History of Events under the Articles of Confederation (1781- 1789) 
 Although Congress approved the Articles of Confederation in November 1777, it was not until 1 
March of 1781 that they were finally ratified.  The holdout was Maryland that insisted that those states 
with claims to lands in the Northwest that had been ungranted “Crown land” should cede them to be 
administered by Congress.  When Virginia finally ceded the land it was with the stipulation that the land 
should be formed into “republican states” with the same rights of sovereignty and independence as the 
other states.507  Following Yorktown, during the last two years of the Revolution prior to the peace treaty, 
the Continental Army did not engage in any major battles.508   
Congress was under considerable financial pressure and began cutting costs in early 1782.  By 
April it had begun to reduce the number of authorized officers as well as eliminating the Army's support 
structure.  It also began the process of disbanding the navy starting with the first American built ship of 
the line just as it was completed.  On 24 March 1783 Congress ordered the recall of all armed ships 
sailing under American authorization, and on 11 April declared a cessation of hostilities on sea as well as 
on land.  By August 1785 the last armed American vessel was sold, thereby eliminating the naval forces 
of America.509 1783 was a crucial year.  The first critical event was the Newburgh Mutiny in March; 
significant because it was proposed as a mutiny of the entire army.  As Congress tried to cut costs, some 
wanted to dismantle the Continental Army. A portion of the army encamped in Newburg NY., feared that 
they would be dismissed without receiving pay or pensions due them and sent a message to Congress 
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noting the lack of pay.510  One of General Gates' aides wrote an anonymous address (which Gates 
approved) to the Continental Army that became public.  This first Newburgh Address was mutinous in 
tone and highlighted the ingratitude of the nation towards the soldiers and called on the army to take 
action. The second Newburgh Address implied Washington supported taking action against Congress.  At 
a meeting on 15 March Washington was able to diffuse the crisis.511  On 11 April 1783, a cessation of 
hostilities on land and sea was announced by Congress which effectively ended the conflict although 
British troops remained in New York City until November.  There was increased pressure to completely 
disband the Continental Army but it was decided enlistments would not expire until a final peace treaty 
was signed, but the Commander-in-Chief could furlough the troops at his discretion.  If there was a 
problem with the peace negotiations they could rapidly recall the army.  The furloughs began in June 
1783.  Washington kept 5 artillery companies, six infantry regiments, and a provisional light regiment on 
active duty; the remainder of the Continental Army went home. Washington resigned his commission as 
Commander-in-Chief on 23 December.512 
Another significant event that soured civil-military relations occurred on 21 June of 1783 when 
mutinous troops from Pennsylvania’s third regiment along with Philadelphia militia troops surrounded the 
building where Congress was meeting and demanded that their complaints be addressed immediately.  
This forced Congress to leave Philadelphia and reconvene in Princeton where they thought they would be 
protected.   At this time General Henry Knox, suggested the creation of a veterans fraternal order called 
“The Society of the Cincinnati” to be headed by General Washington.  The idea would be to create a fund 
for soldiers’ widows and orphans, provide a venue to maintain the friendships forged during the war, and 
to promote a closer union among the states.  Membership was limited to Continental officers and on their 
death their oldest son or collateral descendents if no sons survived. Opposition to what was seen as an 
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attempt to create a hereditary aristocracy was swift and significant.  Most state legislatures condemned it 
and Benjamin Franklin even called it an attempt to create hereditary knights.  In the face of overwhelming 
criticism the society quickly changed its rules.513    Doubts about its intentions and more importantly the 
antipathy towards keeping a standing army was increased by the confluence of the three events; the 
Newburg Address, the Philadelphia mutiny and flight of Congress, and the Society of the Cincinnati.  
 On 3 September 1783 the Treaty of Paris was signed.  Article I recognizes the United States in 
the plural as independent and sovereign states.514 Article VII is also written to indicate a peace between 
Brittan and a plurality of states; “There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between his Britannic Majesty 
and the said states….”  Despite the almost universal claim that the Treaty of Paris recognizes the United 
States as a sovereign and independent state the language is clear that it does not do so but rater treats the 
various states as the entities that are recognized as sovereign.  This is seen particularly in the language of 
Article V which clearly indicates that there is no central government or singular sovereign entity called 
the United States but rather that Congress will recommend certain legislative actions to the various states.  
Congress is not seen as having standing to change any law or to take any action under the treaty.515 What 
Congress was able to do as the agent of the states was to approve the final treaty on 14 January 1784 
(once it was able to obtain a quorum) officially ending the war.   
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Congress shall also earnestly recommend to the several states that the estates, rights, and properties, of such last 
mentioned persons shall be restored to them,...” Ibid. (underline by this author) 
 184
 Border disputes began to arise between the states.  Article 6 of the Articles of Confederation 
forbids any two or more States entering into any treaty without the prior consent of “the United States in 
Congress assembled” that specifies the purpose and duration of the treaty. There were several instances of 
Article 6 being ignored and the states acting as sovereigns to create separate agreements (treaties) 
between them.  The most famous was between Virginia and Maryland dealing with jurisdictions over the 
Potomac River to make the river navigable.  An agreement called the Mount Vernon Compact with added 
provisions regarding the Chesapeake Bay was approved by the two states and Delaware and Pennsylvania 
were asked to join in adopting the treaty.  Congress was concerned about what some viewed as an invalid 
treaty.  This led to Virginia and Maryland calling for another meeting at Annapolis in 1786 to discuss 
developing a system for the regulation of commerce beneficial to all states.516  Without representatives 
from a majority of the states the delegates were only able to send a report to Congress and the various 
state legislatures calling for a future Convention to regulate trade and adjust the Federal System.517  By 
September 1787 this convention submitted the final draft of a Constitution to Congress.  Another critical 
event was Shays' Rebellion; an armed revolt of farmers in western Massachusetts. Following attacks on 
courthouses in numerous locations, the Secretary of War, Henry Knox, could not acquire funding to use 
the small force of remaining Continental troops to fight the revolt; neither could the state of 
Massachusetts afford to raise troops.  General Lincoln the state militia commander called on the wealthy 
to provide money to fund a state force and was able to call out four thousand militia.  In defending the 
Springfield Arsenal it dispersed Shays group of regulators with cannon ending Shays' Rebellion on 25 
January 1787.  Shays' Rebellion spread beyond Massachusetts and fueled a wave of backcountry 
resistance to tax and debt collection from New England through the middle states down to South 
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Carolina.  This in turn influenced the Convention in Philadelphia where delegates realized they needed a 
national military force, or at a minimum for Congress to have the authority and means to raise an army.518    
  The final critical event in 1787 was the passage of the Northwest Ordinance by Congress in July.  
The Northwest Ordinance is the greatest achievement of the Congress under the Articles of 
Confederation.  It was a revision of ordinances passed in 1784, and 1785 designed to provide government 
to the Northwest Territory (territory north and west of the Ohio River) acquired in the Treaty of Paris and 
also outlined the procedure for new states to be admitted into the Confederation.  The territory and then 
state could not however, interfere with land sales conducted by Congress.519  It was these land sales that 
allowed Congress to pay off its foreign and domestic debts incurred during the revolution since it had no 
other way to raise revenue.520   
The new Constitution was ratified by the ninth state on 21 June, 1788 making it binding 
according to Article VII. The new Congress under the Constitution began in March 1789 ending the 
period of the Confederation.  
3-3 b. The Government 
 Congress was the only “national” level governmental organ under the Articles of Confederation.  
It could not however, act as sovereign because sovereignty under the Articles of Confederation resided in 
each of the various states.  This was specified in Article II “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, 
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly 
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”  This wording, expressly delegated to it, was 
specifically meant to prevent sovereignty from being transferred to Congress from the states.521  The 
Articles of Confederation created a government wherein the state governments retained sovereign power 
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and the central government was their creature.522 It has already been demonstrated that the Treaty of Paris 
recognized the sovereignty of the states since Congress had no legal standing to enact the provisions of 
the treaty and that peace was concluded with a plurality of named states, not a singular United States. 
Various provisions of the Articles of Confederation were ignored by the states with impunity, particularly 
the prohibition on making treaties without the consent of Congress.   
What the Articles of Confederation did accomplish was to create a formal defensive alliance 
among the states in Article III:  “The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship 
with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general 
welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, 
or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.”  Since the 
Articles of Confederation set up a defensive alliance one of the powers expressly given to Congress 
(Article IX) was “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war”.  Article VI 
then goes on to prohibit states from entering into any war without the consent of Congress (except to 
defend against invasion) in order to limit the liability of the other states to actions by one state to drag 
them all into a war.  This limit applied to treaties/alliances/embassies with foreign powers for the same 
reason.  Nor could a state impose customs duties that would interfere with established treaties.  States 
could only keep a few ships during times of peace unless it was “infested by pirates” and only enough 
land forces to “garrison the forts necessary for the defense” of each state.  The purpose of these 
limitations was to preserve the defensive nature of the alliance and ensure that any war was endorsed by 
the majority of the Confederation and undertaken in accordance with the directions of Congress.  The 
states however, were required to have “a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and 
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accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field 
pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.”  This force would be 
the means to conduct a defensive war; as was happening in the ongoing Revolutionary War.  In addition 
to determining peace and war, the Articles of Confederation expressly gave the United States in Congress 
assembled, the power to conduct foreign affairs, i.e. send and receive ambassadors and enter into treaties 
and alliances. Congress could not prohibit the imposition of customs duties by the states equal to those on 
its own citizens; nor could Congress impose any embargoes.  This made any attempt to regulate trade 
almost impossible since Congress had no ability to harmonize conflicting state customs duties.523  In 
addition to the freedom to travel and engage in commerce throughout all of the states, Article IV included 
reciprocal recognition of all legal proceedings between the states as well as the guarantee of extradition of 
criminals who fled across state lines.  This can be seen as providing a legal basis for eventual common 
citizenship and an eventual common market under the Constitution. One of the most critical sections of 
the Articles of Confederation was Article VIII that took on the debt from the war.524 Under severe 
financial and political pressure Congress tried to move towards a coercive national tax but could not 
because it did not have the authority to do so on its own.525  In February 1781 Congress approved a 
proposal for a national tax (an impost) on imported goods. Rhode Island refused to approve it and the 
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initiative died. In April 1783 Congress again passed a national impost (customs duties) proposal but New 
York rejected it.526 
 Congress’s inept handling of the war has already been noted.  There were however, on occasion, 
functions that were entrusted to an individual heading an administrative department that worked.  The 
notable ones included Treasury under Robert Morris after 1781, Benjamin Lincoln and Henry Knox as 
Secretary of War, Robert Livingston and John Jay as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the Post office.527 
The creation of these administrative organs was bolstered by a small bureaucracy developed to handle 
land sales and administer the Northwest Ordinance.  These administrative organs were carried over and 
continued to function under the new Constitution.  The administration of land under the Northwest 
Ordinance and land ceded by the states to congress created a “national domain” similar to the “Generality 
Lands” in the Dutch case and was a significant achievement under the Articles.  These administrative 
organs, although limited in size and scope, provided a skeleton to build a new government.  This 
continuation of administration and staffs developed under the Articles allowed the new national 
government to begin functioning relatively quickly.528  Although the new constitution was not a revision 
of the Articles but replaced them, there was an administrative and historical continuity between the 
Articles of Confederation and the new federal government.529   
3-3 c. Defense Cooperation 
 3-3 c. (1) Demobilization / Dismissal of the Continental Army and its replacement.  The 
period from 1781 to 1789 under the Articles of Confederation saw a reduction in what limited military 
integration had been achieved during the Revolutionary War.   The financial pressures on Congress 
pushed it to economize and the beginning of the end for the Continental Army came in 1782 when 
Congress moved to reduce the size of staff agencies, transferring functions to army officers as part time 
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additional duties, as well as eliminating numerous positions providing direct support to the various field 
armies.  Washington acquiesced to the reality that recruiting had fallen to the point where the states could 
not fill their units, by agreeing that all states would reduce their “line” units to complete regiments.530   In 
1783 a congressional committee was created to explore the idea of a peacetime army.  Washington 
suggested a small Regular Army of four infantry regiments and one of artillery (a little over 2,500 troops) 
"to awe the Indians, protect our Trade, prevent the encroachment of our Neighbors of Canada and the 
Floridas, and guard us at least from surprises; also for security of our magazines."531  Washington 
understood that financially a larger peacetime army was not possible and that the militia would have to 
provide the bulk of the manpower for a peacetime military structure. However, there were defects with 
the militia system that required attention.532 Fixing these defects would be included in language calling 
for a “well regulated militia” and for uniform regulations and training in the constitution.533 After 
hostilities ended on 11 April 1783 Washington furloughed large portions of the army.  A further reduction 
was approved in October by Congress that reduced the force on active duty to one artillery company and 
one provisional regiment at West Point before the end of the year.534  With the war won, the public mood 
turned anti-military.  In Congress serious debates reflected the view of many people that even a small 
force for the protection of the settlers and western frontier areas could pose a threat to American 
liberty.535  This antagonism stemmed from hatred of the regular British Army and was bolstered by the 
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various mutinies (especially the one in Philadelphia), the Newberg affair, and the Society of Cincinnati.  
By spring of 1784 the issue of a peacetime army was caught up in the disputes between various states’ 
claims to western lands.536  This dispute ended the attempt to retain part of the Continental Army as a 
peacetime army.  On 2 June 1784 Congress dismissed all of the remaining troops from the Continental 
Army except for fifty-five caretakers at West Point and twenty-five at Fort Pitt.537  At this point there was 
no integrated military force whatsoever; all of the administration and field forces that had been 
constructed for the Continental Army during the war were gone. 
   The dismissal of the troops was a particularly dismal point in American history.538   
There were no celebrations, groups of men found their way home to communities in dire economic straits 
where they were either objects of jealousy or treated with indifference, ignored and forgotten.  The half 
pay pensions promised by Congress were turned into certificates for five years pay but most were sold to 
speculators for a fraction of their value before Congress had the money to begin payments.  Despite the 
severe hardships suffered by the Continental Army, it was not praised or honored in the aftermath of the 
war.  This was primarily because the public believed that it was a people’s war of armed citizenry that 
won the conflict, not the Continental Army.539  It was long after the war that the Continental Army 
veterans got some of the respect and compensation due them.540 More importantly the belief in a war won 
by citizen-soldiers (militia) would have a profound effect on military policy and the evolution of the US 
as an Amalgamated Security Community as the debate between militia and a standing force demonstrates.  
In the final analysis however, the Continental Army was primarily the field army of an alliance that 
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exercised operational control of units and could redeploy them between territorial departments but had 
various constraints placed on it by the states.541 
On 3 June, 1784, the day after the dismissal of the last Continental regiment, Congress agreed to 
create a single regiment of 700 men enlisted for one year, made up of eight infantry companies and two 
artillery companies.  The First American Regiment was composed of troops from four states: 
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey.  Since Pennsylvania provided the most troops it 
was nominated the commanding officer, while Connecticut and New York were allowed to nominate a 
major each.  Recruitment was done by enlisting volunteers from their militias.542  The First American 
regiment was divided, with the New Jersey contingent occupying a fort in upstate New York to watch the 
Iroquois, while the rest of the unit was sent to Fort MacIntosh to provide security against the Indians of 
the Ohio valley.543  All other military requirements were left up to the states and their militias.  The state 
militias were expected to maintain a sufficient level of readiness and were bolstered by the return of many 
Continental Army veterans.544  When the enlistments expired in 1785 Congress continued the regiment 
but made the enlistments for three years and repeated the procedure in 1788 when those enlistments 
expired.545  Secretary of War, Henry Knox was concerned by Shays rebellion because no national troops 
were anywhere near the Arsenal at Springfield to defend it.  Eventually two artillery companies were used 
to garrison the Arsenal at Springfield and West Point.546  Congress placed the military supply system 
under civilian control.  The Secretary of War was responsible for storage, transportation, and distribution 
of military supplies while the Treasury Board was responsible for purchasing all military stores, including 
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food and clothing.547  The small collective military force under the Articles of Confederation created to 
replace the Continental Army was at best a garrison force to provide an initial defense against Indian 
tribes in Ohio and New York, and to guard key installations like West Point and the Springfield Arsenal.  
In no way could this force be considered an integrated force or one that could conduct any military 
operation without significant augmentation from the forces of one or more state militias. 
 3-3 c. (2) The great argument: Standing Army vs. Militia.  This was the critical debate and had 
far reaching consequences for the evolution of the United States as an Amalgamated Security 
Community.  This debate involved not only the question of how to produce military capability or where 
the capacity to produce military capability would be located, but it also included the question of 
jurisdiction over military forces and who could control those forces.  This issue then was also directly tied 
to the concept of state sovereignty, and the question of the right of secession that will be covered later.  
 This argument regarding a standing army vs. militia was, according to Samuel Huntington, 
“essentially the extension into the military realm of different political beliefs;” i.e. a federalist 
conservatism that supported an aristocratic officer class and lower class enlisted soldiers and a liberal 
republicanism that believed in defense provided by citizen soldiers whose officers were chosen from the 
citizenry which reduced the social cleavage between officer and enlisted. The preference for the militia 
was wide spread and politically powerful. The militia was seen as the primary defense force for the 
republic and the inclusion of provision for even a temporary standing army in the constitution was 
strongly opposed.548       
 Today the history of the Revolutionary War often gives place of primacy to the Continental Army 
and refers to the militia using Washington’s often quoted phrase “To place any dependence upon Militia, 
is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff.”549  In Washington’s view “Short enlistments, and a mistaken 
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dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our 
debt.”550  This has become the predominant view of the militia during the Revolution.551  Most Americans 
during and immediately following the war believed it was the militia, conducting a peoples’ war that had 
beaten the British, not the Continental Army.552  The concept of the revolution was as a people’s war in 
which the sacrifice and suffering of “the people” (mothers, fathers, and sisters) who endured the hardships 
of the struggle for independence along with young men who were “citizen soldiers” were the ones who 
defeated the British in an uprising of the “virtuous citizenry”.553   This support for the militia is 
understandable for a practical reason, all free males were subject to the militia, and it existed in all 
communities, while providing the combined functions of a draft board, basic training unit, and reserve 
combat unit.  Militia forces fought in the vast majority of the engagements throughout the war against 
loyalist/Tory forces, Indians, and British raiding/foraging parties as well as supporting the Continental 
Army in major battles.554  The debate in Congress began during the war, especially following the victory 
at Saratoga, where Gates defeated the British with a force made up of two thirds militia troops.555  This 
caused an enduring policy debate in the financially challenged Congress regarding the virtues of the 
militia over a standing army.556   For many Americans the militia was the only defense establishment 
required following the Revolution.557  
In contrast to the support for the militia, there was a clear animosity against professional armies.  
“Detestation of the word army was not alone an inherited prejudice, but a vital fundamental principle in 
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the political faith of the day.”558   The Newberg affair, the Society of Cincinnati and various mutinies in 
the Continental Army worked to reinforce this perception.559  Animosity against the Continental Army 
also came from resorting to confiscation of private property during the war.560   Washington noted “our 
countrymen and fellow citizens dread our halting among them, even for a night, and are happy when they 
get rid of us.”561        
“When Jefferson began his presidency, Revolutionary veterans enjoyed an honored, but not 
privileged, place in society.  Their status reflected the popular perception of the Revolution as a 
people’s war, and of soldiers as a band of the people. The Continental Army was not included in 
that concept, however.  The army was perceived as a necessary evil, its ranks filled with rabble 
and men ambitious for power and preferment.  Exceptional leaders had kept the army in check.  
This prevailing view of the war supported the republican creed that regular armies, including the 
Continental Army, threatened liberty.” 562  
The animosity against maintaining a standing army was one of the main points of contention during the 
process of creation as well as ratification of the Constitution.   The primary problem facing the convention 
was the issue of power; how it was distributed and who controlled it.  This meant the issue of control over 
military forces, militia, navy, and especially a standing army, were at the center of the debate on creating 
a stronger central government; at least as much as financial authority/taxation and regulation of 
commerce.  The opposition to a strong central government and animosity towards a standing army 
became intertwined.563  The Anti-federalist’s made several arguments against the Constitution based on 
opposition to a standing army.  One argued that “the president general will be a king to all intents and 
purposes, and one of the most dangerous kind too--a king elected to command a standing army.”  Others 
argued that standing armies were dangerous to liberty not only because rulers use them to impose their 
will and keep themselves in power but also from the danger of military coup d’état.  The power given 
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Congress to raise armies and to fund themselves with taxes led others to argue that Congress could 
threaten any opposition under the excuse of “suppressing insurrections”, or if the President so chooses to 
send the militia of any state to force compliance to central government demands, or that “a standing army, 
composed of the purgings of the jails of Great Britain, Ireland and Germany, shall be employed in 
collecting the revenues of this our king and government”.564  Their argument was grounded in suspicion 
and distrust of standing armies that were believed to be inherently disposed to being a threat to the people 
and to liberty.565  To counter these objections Hamilton devoted a significant part of his arguments in the 
Federalist Papers, to explaining the need for a Navy (Federalist No. 11 & 24); why state military forces 
would be more dangerous (Federalist No. 8 & 16); why the militia should be controlled by Congress 
(Federalist No. 29), and why there should be a standing army answerable to Congress that would not be a 
danger to the republic (Federalist No. 23 through 28).  Madison also reviewed the arguments in favor of 
federal military power in Federalist No. 41 & 46.566        
When the Constitution was adopted it allowed Congress to raise and support navies and armies 
and establish rules for regulating them.  Congress also could “call forth the militia” and provide 
regulations for “organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia” when it was in national service.  This 
would seem to indicate that those favoring a standing army and national control over the militia won the 
argument.  That was not the case.  The general antipathy towards a standing army did not dissipate, and 
placed a significant political constraint on the central government that precluded the establishment of any 
strong standing army for over a century.  The “standing army” did not have an automatic fiscal allocation 
but required constant Congressional approval since money cannot be appropriated for more than two 
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566 The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Penguin Group Inc., 2003) 
 196
years to support any army.  The result of this condition was that the army was seen to be a temporary 
force created to deal with an emergency.567  More importantly, although states could not maintain a navy, 
they kept their militias. The attempt to have a nationalized militia failed.  The Constitution gives the states 
the right to appoint militia officers and to train the militia and specifically notes the need for a well 
regulated militia.  The result was that multiple land forces were institutionalized by the Constitution; the 
state militias and the federal army.568  Furthermore, the capacity to produce military capability was 
retained in multiple locations subject to multiple jurisdictions and had profound consequences for the 
development of the U.S. as an Amalgamated Security Community. 
3-3 d. Measuring Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability 
During the period of the Articles of Confederation, there was a movement from the low level of 
military integration achieved during the Revolutionary War to support the Continental Army, to almost no 
integration at all as Congress dismissed the Continental Army. It is a relatively simple task to measure the 
independent variable by category in the case of the Articles of Confederation (1781- 1789). 
Category 1 - Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces. 
The administrative and operational forces during this period were disbanded and replaced with what can 
only be described as a force of security guards and minor garrison units unable to conduct operations 
without significant augmentation by state militias. Military forces therefore in this case can not bee seen 
as integrated and are scored as a 0.   
Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production. 
The source for weapons during this period was the leftovers from the Revolution stored in various 
locations.  Production was not needed except for gunpowder.  There was no integration and this category 
is scored as a 0. 
                                                 
567 “Our main reliance was to be on the militia and on such armies as could be improvised when war breaks out” 
Greene, The Revolutionary War and the Military Policy of the United States, 295-296. 
568  U.S. Constitution.  See Also; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United 
States of America, 93. 
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Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces. 
 The large numbers of French muskets still provided a standard weapon.  The artillery pieces by 
this point were also standardized from the imports during the war.  All the rifles and muskets were muzzle 
loading flintlocks at the same level of technological development.  For this reason it can be viewed that 
the small First American regiment and the state militias all had common basic equipment which is a low 
level of integration and is scored as a 2. 
Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers. (DTLOMS) 
 The “Blue Book” was all that remained of anything like a standard doctrine.  The states continued 
to produce combat power using the militia system.  However, the numerous Continental Army veterans 
that rejoined local militias that helped to insure that the Blue Book remained the standard during this 
period.  On the other hand there was no need for the large unit maneuvers that were a significant portion 
of the Blue Book.  There was still a difference in how units trained and organized for frontier duty against 
the Indians.  Leaders for the First American regiment that replaced the Continental Army were selected 
by the states.  Material had become more standardized by using French arms.  Recruitment depended on 
the states with the militia system as its basis.  The states produced the units for First American regiment 
by recruiting from their militia as well as the additional companies recruited as garrison forces.  Soldier’s 
food, clothing, and medical care were now dependent on local purchases by contract since the 
administrative support functions were disbanded.  Soldier pay in the First American regiment was 
dependent on Congress (other than their chain-of-command, this was what made them a “national” force).   
The integration achieved by Steuben as Inspector General was eliminated as the army disbanded.  This 
category can not be seen as integrated except in an extremely limited way and can only be scored as a 0.5. 
Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) Communications, 
Logistics.   
The logistic sustainment of the force was not integrated and reverted to a local contract method 
for the First American Regiment. Communications between territorial departments vanished with the 
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disbanding of the army. Command and control likewise reverted to state control over their militias with 
the dismissal of the army.  The only integrated Operational Control that was exercised was over the First 
American regiment by Henry Knox but that unit’s location in the wilderness necessitated the recruitment 
of two additional garrison companies. Therefore this category can be seen as being at a very low level of 
integration and will be scored as a 0.5. 
Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing. 
There was no burdensharing and this category must be scored as a zero.    
When all of the scores of the categories of the independent variable are taken together (Category 
1=0, Category 2=0, Category 3=2, Category 4=0.5, Category 5=0.5, Category 6=0) the result is an 
average score of 0.5 which indicates an almost non-existent level of military integration overall in the 
period under the Articles of Confederation. 
This is less than half the score of 1.16 for a very low level of military integration determined in 
the previous period (1776-1781).  With no government and an almost non-existent level of military 
integration this case does not meet the requirements to be an Amalgamated Security Community in this 
paper.569  Under Articles of Confederation what existed was a Pluralistic Security Community.  Moreover, 
this Security Community that had evolved in the previous case from a “nascent community” through an 
“ascendant” to a “mature” pluralistic security community, evolved further from a loosely coupled 
pluralistic security into a tightly coupled pluralistic security community under the Articles of 
Confederation.  Before the Articles of Confederation there was a movement towards the United States 
becoming a tightly coupled security community. There was evidence of cooperative and collective 
security, policy coordination against “internal” threats, free movements of populations, and a high level of 
military cooperation.  The Articles of Confederation that provided the formal declaration of an alliance, 
the reservation to Congress of various authorities (to declare war and peace, to negotiate treaties etc…) 
                                                 
569 The operational definition in this paper for an Amalgamated Security Community is: Amalgamated Security 
Communities are states (de facto or de jure) composed of two or more previously independent political entities that 
have integrated a portion of their respective militaries and that have voluntarily and formally merged so that they 
are subject to some form of common government. 
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and the sharing of various authorities, shows there was an internationalization of authority (authority 
vested in Congress) so that there was a “Multiperspectival” polity (rule shared at the national, 
transnational, and supranational levels) which allows it to be described as a tightly coupled security 
community meeting the requirements noted by Adler and Barnett.570   
This case also illustrates the point regarding the need to substitute military cooperation in lieu of 
military integration in the description of tightly coupled security communities to make the definition more 
precise and correspond better with multiple actors in a pluralistic security community.  What is seen in the 
case of the Articles of Confederation that supports this argument is the decrease in military integration to 
an almost non-existent level in no way impacts the continued military cooperation required by the formal 
defensive alliance established under the Articles of Confederation.  This lack of military integration does 
not prevent the United States under the Articles of Confederation from continuing to evolve into a tightly 
coupled pluralistic security community.  There was a continued high level of military cooperation (e.g. 
the states provided the officers and units for the First American regiment) while military integration 
disappeared after the war.  It was the establishment of a government under the constitution with the ability 
to tax and raise armies/navies that moved the United States from a tightly coupled pluralistic security 
community to a partially integrated ASC.  
3-4 a.  Selected History of the United States as a Partially Integrated Amalgamated Security 
Community under the Constitution; 1789 to the Civil War 1861.  
 Throughout this period the capacity to produce military capability was retained in multiple 
locations subject to multiple jurisdictions.  Having more than one authority with jurisdiction over the 
creation of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability within an Amalgamated 
Security Community is what defines it as “partially integrated”.  The Constitution enshrined the multiple 
jurisdictions with the capacity to create military capabilities by providing for both a congressionally 
supported regular army and the state militias. The key points in this section focus on the issues directly 
relating to these multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to create military capabilities. 
                                                 
570 Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, 50-57. 
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   To combat the Indian threat in the Northwest Territory, Washington called for an increase in the 
regular army in his first address to Congress then ordered the army to attack the Indians.  After several 
failed expeditions Congress doubled the size of the army which then defeated the Indians at the battle of 
Fallen Timbers.  The Indians signed a treaty in August 1795 ceding the lands in the Ohio River valley to 
the U.S. 571 This campaign demonstrated the utility of maintaining at least some regular troops, and 
ensured that a small regular army would become permanent.   
 The next important event was the passage of the Militia Act by Congress in 1792.  It authorized 
the President to “call forth the militia” to “execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and 
repel Invasions” as called for in Section 8 of the Constitution including using militia from a number of 
states to suppress an insurrection in a state that did not have the ability to do so on its own.  The first use 
of this power was by George Washington to call out a force of almost 15,000 militiamen suppress the 
Whiskey Rebellion in 1794.  There was no fighting as the rebellion melted away.572  The Militia Act did 
have two very important limitations, militiamen could only be called out for three months in any year and 
they could not be sent outside the borders of the U.S.  
 Multiple threats to shipping from belligerents in wars of the French Revolution and North African 
pirates pushed Congress to create a Navy in 1794.  Congress also addressed harbor defenses, added some 
artillery and engineers, and provided arsenals and magazines (Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers 
Ferry, Virginia).573 The artillery and engineers provided small garrisons for harbor defenses to be 
supplemented by militia and reflected a political compromise that took into account the need for 
professional military technicians maintained by the national government.574  The regular Army had about 
three thousand troops scattered from West Point to the Canadian Border into the Ohio valley and down to 
the Southwest frontier and at a few seaports fortified after 1794.  This force was meant to protect the 
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border against raids from Indian tribes and to provide a warning of an invasion but it was not large 
enough or positioned to conduct a defense of the country. In 1798 continued attacks on American 
shipping and the XYZ Affair pushed Congress to create a Navy Department, and the U.S. Marine Corps.  
It also authorized a Provisional Army (a temporary emergency force requested by President Adams) but 
no increase in the regular army.  Congress did authorize the President to accept privately armed and 
equipped volunteer units for short-term service. Although not used by Adams this concept saw much use 
later in the Mexican and Civil wars.575   
Significant opposition to the regular army was led by the Jeffersonian faction that feared a 
“standing army” might be used against domestic opposition and objected to every expansion arguing that 
the militia was adequate to protect the country.576  President Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury 
summed up their view when he stated “The distribution of our little army to distant garrisons where 
hardly any other inhabitant is to be found is the most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary evil 
that can be contrived.”577  The Federalist Party continued advocating a larger navy, and a larger regular 
army to ensure the protection of American commerce, frontier settlers, and ports. Despite the 
Jeffersonian’s push for cuts in the regular military, events precluded it.578     
 By 1812 Congress approved a declaration of war with the hopes of kicking the British out of 
Canada. The U.S. Navy had tremendous success which prompted Congress to increase the Navy.579  The 
land campaigns were generally a disaster. One key problem was the provision in the Militia Act of 1792 
limiting militia to being used within the borders of the U.S.  When a force led by a New York militia 
general attempted to invade Canada using a mixed force (a majority of militia supported by regular army 
troops) a large majority of the militia refused to leave U.S. soil because of the Militia Act. This resulted in 
the defeat and surrender of a force that had crossed the river and successfully attacked the British near 
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Queenston.  Another move toward Canada from Albany New York failed when the New York and 
Vermont militia also refused to cross the border. On the other hand the defense of New Orleans was a 
clear success. A majority of General Jackson’s force was composed of militia and volunteers. This battle 
served to reaffirm the reliance on citizen soldiers and the military abilities of militia and volunteers, 
although this was far out of context to the circumstances (fighting from prepared defenses supported by 
artillery).  The real success in the war was due to naval victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, as 
well as American artillery and fortifications.580       
 There was one very important political event during the War of 1812 relating to state sovereignty 
and control over militia; the Hartford Convention of 1814.  The states of New England opposed the war 
not only because of economic devastation to its trade with England but for political reasons as well.  The 
Federalist Party dominated the New England states and consistently opposed the war as being a partisan 
project designed to suppress domestic opposition and intent on conquest not defense.   
  The Federalists used their position in the state governments to hamper the war effort by 
restricting recruiting, quarantining privateers, and most importantly refusing to place state militia units or 
state troops under federal control.  In 1812 the ranking regular officer in New England requested militia to 
replace regular soldiers who were being sent to the north and west.  The problem was that the militia units 
were to fill garrisons where regular army officers would be in command rather than their own state militia 
officers.  The Governors of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts refused to mobilize the 
requested militia.  The Governors argued that under the Constitution the militia could only be called out if 
the country was under threat of invasion. Furthermore, the states had the constitutional duty to appoint 
militia officers and therefore could not serve under regular army officers.  This reasoning was supported 
by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.  There was a belief that if the militia were placed under federal 
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control it could be ordered to participate in the invasion of Canada which they opposed so these states 
decided that they would retain control over their means of defense to protect themselves as well as an act 
of protest against the war.581   
“President Madison condemned this decision, claiming it was based on “a novel and unfortunate 
exposition” of the Constitution and that it challenged the very basis of the Union.  If the United 
States could not call up militia in time of war, he said, “they are not one nation for the purpose 
most of all requiring it.”582 
The New England states did provide units to protect harbors but ensured that the militia officer in charge 
outranked the federal officer to ensure state control even though the troops were being provided for by the 
federal government.  Other command arrangements were worked out between state militia and federal 
officers for the defense of Maine, Boston, Connecticut and Rhode Island, but in almost every case the 
state retained control and funded a large portion of the militia.  When a Federalist governor was elected in 
Vermont he ordered the Vermont militia serving in New York to return home claiming they were needed 
for local defense and should not be serving under regular army officers.  New Hampshire also had an 
event in which the Governor called out the militia to protect the city of Portsmouth but refused to place 
them under regular army officers.  The Federal officials responded by withholding supplies and the 
governor responded by dismissing the militia.  The other issue was money.  The Federal Government was 
so short of funds it could not pay for the militia that was in federal service so any mobilization done by 
the states for local defense had to be paid for by the states themselves.  The Federalists in New England 
claimed that the Federal government had thrown away its resources in Canada while it left the New 
Englanders defenseless.583   
This begged the question of responsibility for the defense of New England especially in 1814 
when the British attempted to attack from Canada with a large force (battle of Plattsburgh), burned 
Washington, and tightened the blockade against New England ports.  In response to these events and 
fearing invasion, the Massachusetts Legislature called for a convention of New England states.  
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Representatives from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont met 
secretly in Hartford Connecticut from 15 December, 1814 to 5 January, 1815.584  The most important 
points of the convention report regarded defense, and the first section advocated state nullification of 
federal acts.585  The second section of the Hartford Convention Report claimed the states should be in 
charge of their own defense and should be allowed to withhold the federal taxes collected in their state to 
fund the state’s defenses.586 The third section can be seen as a call to recreate the New England army of 
the Revolution by forming a regional force rather than depending on the United States federal military for 
the defense of New England.587 The last section of the report was a veiled threat of secession if the 
complaints of the Convention went unanswered and “defense of these States should be neglected.” The 
report and demands of the Hartford Convention made no difference to the war because it was over; it did 
however eliminate the Federalist Party as a viable political movement.   
What is important is that this document provided the argument for nullification, for state control 
of the defense of its territory, and for the creation of a regional defense force outside the control of the 
Federal Government’s regular army.  Finally, the actions of the New England states to successfully refuse 
to place their militia under federal control set an important and destabilizing precedent.  This argument 
for state control of its defense and for the creation of a separate regional defense force illustrates the 
limited integration and tenuous nature of the United States as a weak ASC at this time.  
 The Nullification Crisis of 1832-1833 is of interest to this case because of the military 
preparations taken by both sides.  Nullification involved interpretation of the Constitution in regard to 
what powers were apportioned to the states vice the Federal Government.  Those who supported 
nullification looked to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798.588  Economic impacts of the Tariff 
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of 1828 and the Tariff of 1832 resulted in political pressure in South Carolina to “nullify” the Federal 
Law.  A “Nullification Convention” was authorized by the South Carolina Legislature at the request of 
the Governor and in November of 1832 that body announced that the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were 
unconstitutional and therefore “null and void” in the state.  That body went even further and proclaimed 
that any attempt to use force by the Federal Government would result in South Carolina leaving the 
Union.589  What gave the Nullification Convention the authority and audacity to challenge the power of 
the Federal Government; in effect daring it to use force?  It was because South Carolina had the capacity 
to generate military capability through the state militia.  The South Carolina Legislature authorized 
Governor Hayne to call out the state militia, draft any male between the ages of eighteen and forty five, 
and to accept volunteers.  The legislature allocated $200,000 for weapons purchases and gave the 
Governor access to an additional $200,000 for military preparations. Governor Hayne called for 
volunteers and by January a volunteer army of 25,000 men was being equipped and trained. Hayne 
established a cannon ball factory, purchased over $100,000 worth of weapons in the north, and also 
recruited 2000 cavalry.  A compromise was reached in Congress in 1833 that diffused the crisis and 
prevented bloodshed.590  The relevance of this issue to Amalgamated Security Community formation is 
that although South Carolina was undeniably part of the United States which at this point met the criteria 
to be an ASC, South Carolina felt it retained sufficient sovereignty and military capacity to challenge 
federal authority and dissolve the political union between it and the United States by force if necessary.   
Although the official policy of the United States was to rely on the militia for its defense the 
reality was by this time the majority of militia was untrained, lacked weapons and was of little use as 
combat units. Given the lack of action by the Federal Government there was a move by various states to 
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reform the militia.  In the 1830’s some states rescind their militia laws completely or drastically reduced 
any fines.  Various states then decided to use a provision in the Militia Act that allowed for volunteer 
militia companies that were to receive extra training to reform their militia into a small number of active 
militia volunteer companies while the vast majority of the militia would be considered a reserve force.591  
Of course since this was done on a state by state basis it was not uniformly carried out, but it did signal a 
shift away from regular militia who could only be used for three months towards reliance on better trained 
volunteer militia units that could be used for much longer periods.  The regular militia then tended to 
function more as a selective service and recruiting database than as an actual fighting force.         
President Polk asked Congress for a declaration of war against Mexico which passed on 13 May 
1846. Congress raised the strength of the regular army to over 16,000 and authorized the regular army to 
add a regiment of mounted riflemen and a company of engineers (sappers, miners, and bridge builders). 
Congress also authorized the President to call for 50,000 volunteers for a term of one year or the duration 
of the war.592  Most volunteers chose one year enlistments.  Volunteers were supposed to receive pay at 
the same rate as regular troops but had to furnish their own uniforms and horses. Volunteer officers were 
appointed according to the militia law of the state the unit was from, but Generals and staffs were 
federally appointed.  On 15 May 1846 the Secretary of War issued requisitions to various states for 
volunteer units.593  Polk desired a quick victory and wanted General Winfield Scott, Chief of Staff of the 
Army, to lead the initial 20,000 man volunteer force into Mexico to force a peace settlement.   
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“That such a plan was impossible to execute did not occur to the President, despite Scott’s efforts 
to introduce reality.  Polk was imbued with one of the great fallacies of nineteenth-century 
American political life: the militia myth, which held that in times of peril hordes of gallant young 
Americans would spring to the colors and decisively whip any army arrogant enough to confront 
them. That an untrained soldier, no matter what his nationality, was no match for a trained one 
was a lesson that the United States steadfastly refused to learn”594   
A more reasonable plan was worked out that achieved Polk’s war objectives of seizing all Mexican 
territory north of the Rio Grande and the Gila River westward to the Pacific Ocean including New 
Mexico and California. During the Mexican War the regular army grew to about 42,500 officers and men, 
and over 73, 500 volunteers and short term militia were on active duty at some point.595  The regular army 
performed well, but the short term militia had proved to be worse than useless, while the volunteer units 
had performed well in some cases after sufficient training.  President Polk however, consistently 
advocated the state generated volunteer units as being superior.596  Given the continuing political support 
of militia forces (volunteer units) and opposition to the regular army, at the end of the war not only were 
the volunteer units disbanded but by December 1848 the regular army was reduced to a peacetime force 
of less than 10,000 officers and men (fewer than authorized in 1815).  Between wars the regular army 
engaged in exploration and garrisoning western territories.  By June 1860 the regular army had a strength 
of 1,080 officers and 14,926 enlisted men.  Most of the regular army was in the far west scattered into 
small garrisons and could not form an effective fighting force. The Department of the East consisted of all 
states east of the Mississippi river and only had 929 regular army troops.597    
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 The Civil War in the United States is such a well known topic that for the purposes of this paper it 
should only be necessary to highlight the significant parts related to state sovereignty and the creation of 
military capability and the capacity to produce military capability.  The election of Lincoln in November 
1860 moved several states to begin military preparations long before the start of the war.  Seven states 
formed the Confederacy on 18 February, 1861. They took control of all federal property inside their 
states, including military property (except for Fort Pickens and Fort Sumter).  A Confederate War 
Department was created on 21 February.  By 27 February President Jefferson Davis was able to get the 
Confederate Congress to authorize a provisional army of 100,000 volunteers with enlistments for twelve 
months.598   On 14 April, Lincoln declared the seven southern states as being in a state of  insurrection 
and asked the loyal states to provide 75,000 militiamen for three months; meeting the requirements under 
the Militia Act.599  This prompted eight other states to leave the union.600  These states joined the 
Confederacy because they were not prepared to use force against other states to enforce the laws of the 
United States. This clearly demonstrates the weakness of the system of multiple jurisdictions with the 
capacity to produce military capabilities inherent under the Militia Act.  Lincoln on his own initiative 
called for 40 regiments of volunteers to serve three years and increased the Regular Army by 22,714 men, 
and the Navy by 18,000 sailors.601  The generation of military capabilities on both sides was similar. 
Prewar volunteer militia units provided a core of partially trained and equipped units.  Both sides used 
newly created volunteer armies not the regular army.  The states, not the national governments, controlled 
mobilization and did a much better job than the understaffed War Departments to generate military 
capabilities.  It was state officials who enlisted the soldiers and formed the units.  The regular militia was 
also used.  States used their militia for internal security, as garrisons for forts, prison camp guards, border 
patrol, and during invasions mobilized them to fight. The militia’s primary role however was to “serve as 
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the nursery from which the old regiments and batteries of volunteers were to be recruited and new ones 
organized.”602   The result was two armies with units of varying abilities; some were very good 
preexisting volunteer units, others were completely raw.  The key point is that the militia system provided 
the capacity for each state to generate military capabilities, and the time that had elapsed between 
Lincoln’s election and the first real battles in the summer of 1861 allowed both sides to create large new 
armies while the disposition of the regular army on the frontier prevented the federal government from 
moving quickly to stop the southern states from arming themselves.    
The South Carolina Declaration makes several points regarding what was seen as the historical 
sovereignty of the State of South Carolina. It references the Declaration of Independence that asserts the 
colonies were free and independent states (plural) with the full power to do all acts and things which 
independent States may of right do, and that following the Declaration of Independence each of the 
thirteen States exercised its separate sovereignty creating governments and constitutions. Under the 
Articles of Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom and independence. It quotes from 
the1783 Treaty of Paris that recognizes each of the colonies as separate free, sovereign and independent 
states (plural). If a state had not ratified the Constitution it would have remained a separate, sovereign 
state.603  Therefore, the South Carolina Declaration declares the Constitution is a compact between 
sovereign states, and when one of the contracting parties fails to perform part of the agreement it entirely 
releases the obligation of the other party to the compact.604  According to this rationale South Carolina 
was free to resume its status in the world as a “separate and independent State.”605  The states of the 
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Confederacy believed the same logic outlined in the South Carolina Declaration that they were latent 
sovereign states that could reassert their right to full sovereignty.606 
The secession of states from the Union and formation of the Confederate States was based on this 
belief that the states retained their sovereignty.  Although the Nullification Crisis is the obvious 
precedent, this belief was not confined to the southern states. The examples of the Hartford Convention 
and Ex-President John Quincy Adams’ threat of northern secession if Texas was admitted as a slave state 
are sufficient reminders that the idea of the states being sovereign was fairly wide spread.   What gave this 
concept legs to stand was two political-military facts.  First, the federal government was never allowed to 
keep a large standing army precisely because of the fear that it would be used to suppress domestic 
political dissent. Consequently it was looked down upon as a necessary evil manned by the dregs of 
society and exiled to the frontier regions where it could not be expected to (and did not) act against any 
state.  Second, the states were mandated by the Constitution to maintain their militias, and those militias 
were considered to be the primary means of defense in time of war.  The militia (later the volunteers) 
were therefore extolled as the primary example of the republican virtue of the citizen-soldier able to 
defend his local community.  The result was that the states had the capacity to generate military 
capabilities and if joined by other states had the potential to challenge the claim of the federal government 
to the monopoly on the use of force.  This ability of each state to generate military capability gave it the 
means to back up its claim to sovereignty. Russell F. Weigley in History of the United States Army makes 
the critical point:  
"The mobilization of the war armies...was an impressive achievement, especially for a nation with 
so limited a permanent military force. In no small measure, the achievement derived from the 
historic citizens' militia, whose organized companies became the nucleus of the war armies. In no 
small measure, too, however, the citizens' militia made possible the great war itself, by 
giving the states sufficient military strength, and thus a sufficient residue of sovereignty, to 
wage war against each other. Some perception of the relationship between the military 
institutions of the states and the very existence of the war probably underlay the War 
Department’s eventual efforts toward direct federal recruiting.  Initially nourished by the 
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organized militia companies, the Civil War was also the great war of the volunteer armies… But 
it proved to be the last major war both of state-affiliated and of volunteer armies"607 
 
This is the danger of weak or partially integrated Amalgamated Security Communities where more than 
one authority has jurisdiction over the creation of military capabilities and the capacity to produce 
military capability.  They are structurally susceptible to fracture and civil war since having the tool to 
forcibly break apart the community also provides part of the justification for the act in terms of perceived 
sovereignty.  This may be the reason that Deutsch described Amalgamated Security Communities as 
being less stable than Pluralistic Security Communities  
3-4 b. The Government: 1789 to the Civil War 1861 
 It is quite clear that the U.S. Constitution instituted a government and that it corrected the major 
flaws inherent in the Articles of Confederation.  The Constitution grants the Federal government powers 
to collect tax revenue, enforce federal laws, regulate commerce, declare war, raise and support armies, 
provide and maintain a navy, and call forth the militia.   This voluntarily and formally agreed to 
government meets the requirements for the U.S. to be considered an Amalgamated Security Community 
so this section does not need to review government structure or capabilities.  Instead the legislation and 
policies that made it a weak or partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community are the focus.  
 The Constitution itself codified the dual jurisdiction over the creation of military capabilities and 
the capacity to produce military capability.  In Article 1, Section 8 the Constitution says Congress has the 
power: “To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of 
them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the 
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed 
by Congress.”  Article 2 Section 2 states that the “President shall be Commander in chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of 
the United States."  Also the Second Amendment states that: “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”  
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Congress was limited however, when raising an army in that “no appropriation of money to that use shall 
be for a longer term than two years.”  This limitation can be seen as implying that there would be no 
standing army but only armies created in response to emergencies. It was practical necessity that made the 
regular army permanent not the language of the Constitution.   The vague language of the Constitution 
left Congress to develop the methods to implement the powers granted it under the Constitution's militia 
clauses.  Washington, Knox, and Hamilton tried to get Congress to pass legislation that would provide for 
a “well regulated militia” (in today’s language a militia organized and equipped to be interoperable) as 
called for in the Constitution but they had all failed.608  What they got instead was the Militia Act of 1792 
which was really two acts passed on 2 May and 8 May.  The first act dealt with the power of Congress 
under the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8): “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws 
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”.  In the service of the Federal government 
militia would be paid at the same rate as regular army soldiers and were subject to the same regulations.  
Militia could not be forced to serve more than three months in any one year.  The second act dealt with 
the power of Congress under the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8); “To provide for organizing, arming, 
and disciplining, the Militia”. The only discipline prescribed by Congress was the use of Steuben’s “Blue 
Book”.  The militia was composed of “every free able-bodied white male citizen” in each state between 
the ages of eighteen and forty-five years old.  Arming the militia was the duty of each individual to 
provide their own musket with ammunition (twenty four cartridges to fit his weapon) and accoutrements 
(bayonet, belt, spare flints, knapsack, ammo pouch) or rifle with shot-pouch, and powder-horn and 
accoutrements.  It was at the discretion of each state legislature to organize their militia into “divisions, 
brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies” and although the act went on to describe the size and 
organization of each unit, that portion was prefaced with the phrase “if convenient.” That of course made 
the outlined organization irrelevant and up to the discretion of the state to organize their militia. There 
was to be a company of artillery and troop of cavalry in each division who were to be volunteers that 
provided themselves with horses and uniforms at their own expense.  It was this portion of the act that 
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later led most state militias to reorganize into units of active volunteers and a reserve militia that was 
mostly a manpower pool.  The adjutant general in each state was in charge of implementing the act and 
was required to prepare an annual report regarding “the militia under their command, reporting the actual 
situation of their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition” and to send it to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
state, and a copy to the President of the United States.609   
The Militia Act helped establish the authority of the federal government with the use of 
federalized militia during the Whiskey Rebellion.  The issue of Federal authority to call forth the Militia 
was resolved by the Supreme Court; which established that a state could not refuse to place its militia 
under federal control.  Massachusetts and Connecticut had refused to call out the militia during the War of 
1812 and were supported by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in their contention that the state had the 
right to determine if the requirements of the Militia Act had been met.  It was the U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings in Houston v. Moore (1820) that a militiaman who refused to respond to a federal call-up violated 
national law, and a unanimous decision in Martin v. Mott (1827) that upheld the constitutionality of all 
portions of the Calling Forth Act of 1795.610  Samuel Huntington notes the militia clauses created an 
“empire within an empire” in that the militia clauses sanction a semi-military force that cannot be 
completely subject to military discipline nor removed from political “entanglements”.  More importantly 
“they give constitutional sanction to a division of control over the militia between state and national 
governments which necessarily involves the militia in the conflicting interests of the federal system.”  
Specifically it resulted in state control of the militia during peace and contested dual state-federal control 
in time of war.611 
The Militia Act left the states completely in charge of the militia in peacetime and 
institutionalized separate centers with the capacity to create military capabilities within the country.  
Furthermore, it ensured that state militia forces would be organizationally incompatible and equipped 
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differently.612  The Militia Act in fact encouraged the creation of as many different armies as there were 
states.  Numerous administrations pushed Congress to revise the Militia Act, but there no basic changes to 
the act that remained in force for 111 years until it was superseded the Dick Act of 1903.613  
 Congress did move to help establish domestic arms manufacturers as well as to arm the state 
militias.  The Act for Arming the Militia passed on 23 April 1808 provided an annual appropriation of 
$200,000 to provide “arms and military equipment for the whole body of the militia of the United States, 
either by purchase or manufacture.”614  The amount of money was inadequate, but by making it an 
ongoing annual appropriation long term contracts could be given to domestic arms manufactures helping 
them to become established.      
The Constitution, Militia Act, and the Act for Arming the Militia formed the legal structure that 
made the U.S. during this period a partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community.  In addition 
there was the component of politics both national and at the state level.  State militias were an integral 
part of state politics and patronage. All attempts to reform them by requiring officers to have 
demonstrated military proficiency faced stiff opposition from powerful families whose members received 
commissions for who they were, rather than their military competence.615  States jealously guarded their 
prerogative to name officers in part because of this issue of patronage but also because the power to 
control officer appointment provided political control over the militia.  At the national level the various 
attempts at militia reform foundered because politically the militia was seen as the counterbalance to the 
power of the federal government and the regular army.616  This balance was predicated on the sovereignty 
retained by the state, and it was the militia that was the symbol and substance of state sovereignty.617  No 
reform of the militia was possible until that balance shifted in favor of the federal government first with 
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the Dick Act in 1903 and then completely in 1916 with the Passage of the National Defense Act as the 
nation faced the prospect of war with either Mexico or Europe.618  
On the other hand the system did function.  The U.S. government was able to successfully wage 
war both inside the territory of the U.S. and overseas.  The militia formed a significant part of almost 
every field army.  The federalized militia enhanced the power of the central government, but the militia 
also enabled the local elites in the southern states to oppose federal authority. The militia in the U.S. was 
a double edged sword and research into militia in China illuminates the issue.  The Chinese turned to 
creating local defense forces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to civil war, 
rebellion, and social disorder.  Although created by local elites they almost always involved some type of 
state supervision. The Chinese militia were never just the tool of either local elites or state officials but 
were involved in shared efforts by both.  The militia provided an intermediary organization between the 
state and society that was an arena for competition between various interests and factions that, depending 
on circumstance, could result in greater power for local elites or increased state control.619   
“Militia organization in modern China was, in the end, a contested domain in which both state 
and society, as well as different elements of the state and society, met to pursue their mutual 
interests or negotiate their differences. We should not be surprised to find that in different 
periods, or even in different places in the same period, militia mobilization could lead either to an 
increase of local autonomy or to the expansion of state control.”620 
3-4 c. Defense Cooperation: 1789 to the Civil War 1861 
 The structure of the small army and the administrative section under the Secretary of War did not 
change and neither did the policies as the government changed from Confederation to the new Federal 
government.  There was no navy so any naval matters were addressed by the same department until the 
Naval Department was created in 1798.  The prohibition in the Articles of Confederation against states 
maintaining a naval force in peacetime carried over under the constitution with Congress having the 
power to maintain a Navy.  The Navy (except for the Confederate force during the Civil War) was a 
                                                 
618 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 321, 348-349 
619 Edward A. McCord, “Local Militia and State Power in Nationalist China,” Modern China 25, no. 2 (1999): 115-
141. 
620  Ibid. 
 216
completely federal affair and therefore an integrated force. This was also true for costal fortifications.  
Since it was the land forces that had a direct bearing on the issue of state sovereignty that will be the 
focus of this section; not naval forces.  The Navy and costal fortifications will be included however, in the 
final calculation of the degree of military integration.  One last caveat to this section is that the relative 
combat effectiveness of the land forces, the militia and regular army, is not the focus of this paper.  The 
arguments made by General Emory Upton and others against the use of untrained militia and for a larger 
and/or expansible regular army are not the subject of this paper. Therefore, the militia and regular army 
will not be compared in terms of combat abilities.  What will be examined is; military cooperation, levels 
of integration, and the dispersal of the capacity to produce military capabilities.  
 3-4 c. (1) Administration.  The regular army as a creation of Congress was clearly dependent on 
the federal government for its administration.  The militia when in federal service was likewise dependent 
on the federal government for its administration which was clearly stated in the Constitution and Militia 
Act.  This section primarily deals with that federal administration of land forces.   
Most of the time the military supply system was managed by civilians using a contract system 
from the end of the Revolution until the end of the war of 1812.621  The procurement, storage, and 
distribution of all supplies (other than food) for the Army was centralized in Philadelphia.622 Medical 
service after the Revolution was left up to unit surgeons.  Although medical supplies were available, 
purchasing and transportation of supplies to the troops was problematic.623  In 1812 Congress reinstated 
the office of Commissary General of Purchases and Ordnance Department (responsible for cannon balls, 
shells, shot, powder, and construction of gun carriages etc...) under the Secretary of War.  In 1813 
Congress expanded the Army staff and added a topographical section to make maps. It also recreated the 
positions of Adjutant General, Inspector General, and Surgeon General and added them to the Pay 
Department, Hospital Department, the Judge Advocate, and the Chaplain.  This provided the Secretary of 
War a staff to manage the Army.  This did not resolve the problems of transportation over great distances 
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through the wilderness that caused the breakdown of logistic support to the field armies.  Commanders 
had to provide food by purchasing it from local sources, and troops in the field often lacked blankets and 
shelter even in winter.  Despite several reforms, the issues of transportation and reliance on inefficient 
contractors were not resolved.624   
John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War did much to make the regular army more professional. 
Calhoun was able to get legislation passed in 1818 that provided for the organization of a Subsistence, 
Quartermaster, and Medical Department on a permanent basis.625  Calhoun was also able to establish the 
post of Commanding General of the Army to provide coordination between the field armies and the War 
Department. Calhoun assisted in reforming the Military Academy, greatly improved costal fortifications, 
and instituted recruiting depots for the regular army in major cities.626 He was able to get Congress to 
require contractors to provide bulk supplies to depots which provided for closer supervision by the 
military.  The depots functioned well but transportation issues and lack of maps caused continued logistic 
failures.  In response the Secretary of War recreated the corps of artificers to repair wagons and boats.  
The army abandoned contracted boats for owning steamboats which proved to be cheaper and more 
reliable.627  Although the militia in federal service were supposed to depend on federal resources they 
often received supplementary supplies and pay from state and local sources when the federal system 
failed, even through the Spanish American War.628 
In the Jefferson administration the country was divided into three military departments with a 
contracting agent and assistants that were responsible for the movement of supplies and troops within that 
department.629  Just prior to the Civil War there were seven geographic Military Departments; six were 
west of the Mississippi River.  Each was commanded by a senior colonel or general officer and had about 
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2000 regular troops.  They were also responsible for training militia and volunteer forces called into 
federal service.  These geographic departments received administrative support from the Secretary of War 
but were under the orders of the President or Commanding General of the Army for combat operations.630    
 Weapons were also purchased using a contract system for most of this period.  Although weapons 
could be purchased for less in Europe, Hamilton and Knox urged the development of a domestic arms 
industry as essential for national independence.  The Act of 1808 to Arm the Militia gave the federal 
government the means to develop one.  In addition Congress expanded the number of U.S. arsenals and 
magazines used for the storage of weapons and also established national armories (Springfield, 
Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia) to produce weapons under the control of the federal 
government.631  Some states also created armories but the only permanent one following the Revolution 
was created in Richmond Virginia. From the 1820’s through the 1840’s domestic manufacture of military 
arms was based on two the national armories and six private manufacturers who received long term 
contracts on a regular basis.632   No government run or managed national foundry similar to the national 
armories was created.  Although military craftsmen (artificers) could make the gun carriages and all other 
equipment needed, only the private foundries were capable of casting cannon. Prior to the war of 1812 
Congress noted the existence of over 500 furnaces and foundries and stated that the production of cannon 
was adequate so heavy ordnance production remained entirely in the hands of private industry.633  A new 
artillery system adopted in 1839 gave the U.S. forces a substantial advantage in the Mexican War.634  
Although new rifled artillery became available prior to the Civil War, the mainstay of both armies 
remained the smoothbore cannon.   
 To resolve the lack of American educated engineers and technical specialists Congress created a 
Corps of Engineers as a separate branch in the army with 10 cadets and 7 officers creating the U.S. 
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Military Academy in 1802.635  The Artillery School created in 1824 at Fort Monroe was the first specialist 
school and helped to introduce the first official U.S. artillery system for all categories of artillery that had 
been created in 1818.  General Scott prepared a new manual of infantry tactics for Regulars and militia 
and prepared the Army regulations of 1821 which was the primary manual through the Mexican War.  
Besides West Point a number of other military schools had been created prior to the Civil War (e.g. 
Norwich, VMI, the Citadel etc...) that provided officers for both armies in the North and South.636   
The raising of state troops for federal service was an important administrative function performed 
by the states.637 Recruiting for the regular army was difficult.  During the War of 1812 recruiting for the 
regular force was so difficult that the actual strength was one half to one quarter of what was 
authorized.638 Recruiting depots set up in major cities in 1822 to enlist soldiers for the regular army rather 
than by regiment had some success but it did not fix the shortage of regular soldiers.639  The problem was 
the perception of the regular army by the society.  This perception came directly from the historical 
distaste for a standing army.  As Samuel Huntington outlines in The Soldier and the State, the dominant 
and constant ideology in America has been liberalism.  American liberalism has tended to identify both 
domestic and foreign enemies as being related to the professional military. The military has been a 
“universal target” as each liberal group identifies either the old order or its enemies with the professional 
military through American history.  “Liberalism is divided in its views on war but it is united in its 
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hostility to the military profession.”640 The critiques of Federalist attempts to create a regular army in the 
early years of this period included a widespread and deep animosity toward the soldiers themselves.641   
The military necessity of having a regular force on the frontier led to the survival of the regular army 
despite the inherent opposition, and although Americans recognized the need for a regular army they still 
loathed it.642  Officers were often called ‘idle vagabonds’ that drained the public treasury, while the 
enlisted men were called ‘the scum of society’, ‘hirelings,’ and ‘good candidates for the state prison’.  
One contributing factor was hostility towards foreigners since a large portion of the troops were foreign 
born immigrants; one estimate was that two thirds of the soldiers in the 1830 were immigrants.643   
William Sumner, the Adjutant General of Massachusetts, in his 1826 response to the Barbour 
Commission wrote “The militia is what is left after society is purified by army enlistments,” and that 
while there was no need for regular soldiers to be intelligent the militia required intelligent recruits.644  
Given the deep seated and wide spread societal animosity toward the regular army, the vast majority of 
Americans preferred to serve in either the militia or in volunteer regiments recruited by the states.   
3-4 c. (2) Forces The Regular Army throughout this period, regardless of the various increases 
and subsequent cutbacks during each crisis, was an integrated force recruited, supplied and administered 
by the federal government.  The level of competence of that administration progressed during the period 
and made the army more effective as well as less reliant on local support when in the field.  On the other 
hand, it was despised by powerful political factions and by society so it was kept on the frontier for the 
majority of the time. The pattern for its use in war was for the regular troops to function as a core of 
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competent troops augmented by militia.  Besides improving fortifications the regular army engineers and 
explorers contributed materially to building the country.645   
“The frontier shaped the force composition, military organization, tactics, and weapons of the 
Army.  The expansion and development of the country also provide the Army with a wide range 
of nonmilitary functions.  The War Department regulated trade with the Indians: Army generals 
negotiated treaties with them: Army explorers surveyed and mapped land and chose the sites for 
forts and the settlements which were to follow: Army engineers built roads and developed 
waterways.”646 
Important as its contributions were, when the primary crisis came in 1861, the Regular Army could not 
and did not participate.  It is the militia and volunteer units that must be considered as having the greatest 
impact on the U.S. as a partially integrated ASC. Militia forces in the various states included all three 
categories of combat units of the period; infantry, cavalry, and artillery.647  In 1849, South Carolina 
reported that its militia consisted of 49,487 soldiers in infantry units, 2,955 in cavalry units, and l,067 
artillery troops.648   Artillery units could be found in almost every state and were significant in several 
actions including the defense of New Orleans, the Mexican War, and the shelling of Fort Sumter that 
began the Civil War.649  Militia cavalry had a significant impact in several conflicts including mounted 
militia at the battle of Fallen Timbers, mounted militia riflemen at Tippecanoe, Kentucky cavalry 
regiments at the battle of the Thames, and the First Mississippi mounted rifle regiment at Buena Vista.  
The largest component of any force during this period however, was the infantry.  During the Revolution, 
it was common for the militia to bring their own weapons and for state owned weapons to be used only by 
the poor. Due to a shortage of weapons states began to confiscate privately owned weapons of militiamen 
                                                 
645 Note: The tasks assigned to the regular army on the frontier bear a close resemblance to the "Petersberg tasks" of 
humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking, that form the basis for the EU’s Security and Defense Policy. 
646  Samuel P. Huntington, “Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in American Military Policy,” Political Science 
Quarterly 76, no. 4 (1961): 490. 
647 Note: There were variations within these categories such as light infantry, or rifle equipped troops for skirmishing 
that were different from line infantry equipped with musket and bayonet or heavy infantry such as grenadiers.  The 
Cavalry and artillery also had different types of units equipped with different weapons, for different tasks; however 
the three main categories of combat units during the period were infantry, cavalry, and artillery.  Other types of 
troops such as engineers greatly assisted the army but were not the main combat units. 
648 Lee W. Eysturlid, “An Opportunity to Show Their Epaulets and Feathers: The South Carolina Militia During the 
First Secession Crisis, 1848-1851,”  Armed Forces & Society 20, no. 2 (Winter 1994) 
649 An example are three batteries of Pennsylvania militia that served in Mexico; Washington artillery, Wyoming 
Artillery, Stockton Artillery. See: Randy Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War with Mexico (Shippensburg, PA.: 
White Mane Publishing Company Inc., 1992), 106, 170, 285. 
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as they were about to return home. Eventually, militia men would bring their personal weapons to musters 
(mandatory drill day) to escape the militia fine for not having a weapon, but would leave their personal 
firearms at home when mobilized.  Over time the militia would be armed with state provided weapons.  
There was a benefit to the state militia to do this because it standardized the weapons being used within a 
unit and reduced the number of different calibers of weapons that had to be provided for.  Complaints 
regarding insufficient weapons to arm the militia were based on a lack of standardized military weapons 
not that there were no weapons at all.  Those states that counted both state provided and personally owned 
firearms in their militia reports to the Secretary of War (as required in the Militia Act) had a very high 
percentage of the total militia as being armed.650  At the point of crisis in 1861, when state militias were 
mobilized to assert state sovereignty and oppose federal authority, there was a fairly large supply of small 
arms that had accumulated in part due to the Act of 1808 to arm the militia.  Early in the conflict weapons 
varied so much that as late as 1862 a federal officer’s request for ammunition included eleven different 
types of ammunition for small arms.651   
Despite the flaws inherent in the militia system created by the Militia Act, the states could create 
sufficient military capabilities at a minimum to conduct a defense, especially if the militia were in 
prepared positions.  This is important because to defy Federal authority it was not necessary to march on 
Washington or invade another state.  All a state needed to assert its sovereignty was sufficient military 
capability to defend itself against Federal government attempts to impose its authority on the state.652  The 
concept of state control over its militia extended to Border States such as Kentucky during the Civil War 
which declared it was neutral and refused to call out its militia when requested by the President.  
                                                 
650 Robert H. Churchill, “Gun Ownership in Early America: A Survey of Manuscript Militia Returns,” The William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 60, no. 3 (2003): 615-642 
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652 “South Carolina's leadership husbanded this strength and took its control very seriously. To the state's elite, the 
militia represented a force that could guard not only against internal domestic turmoil and violence, but also one that 
could resist the central authority of the federal government. To weed out Unionist sentiment and secure the officer 
corps as loyal state's righters, the Militia Test Oath had been created in South Carolina after the Nullification Crisis 
of 1832-1833.” Lee W. Eysturlid, “An Opportunity to Show Their Epaulets and Feathers: The South Carolina 
Militia During the First Secession Crisis, 1848-1851,”  Armed Forces & Society 20, no. 2 (Winter 1994) 
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The various state militia organizations, because of the flaws of the Militia Act, were left to do 
whatever they thought was appropriate.  The commander of the militia was in all cases the state governor. 
The legislatures had power to mobilize the militia and to create regular state units.  The states then had a 
multitude of different limitations regarding control of the militia.653 The methods to select officers also 
varied greatly.654 This variety in command and control was mirrored by the variety in organization as well 
as in training.  Responses by state adjutant generals to the Barbour Commission in 1826 showed a 
significant variation between the state militias.655  To add to the variety between states the volunteer units 
within the states differed greatly from one another.  The Barbour Commission reported that militia 
musters had lost their military training value by the 1820s and had become primarily social events.  In 
addition many states simply refused to respond to the Commission, indicating their lack of performance 
while other state’s responses confirmed the steep decline in the readiness of their militia.656  This lack of 
military usefulness and opposition to the militia fine and incarceration for debt led some states to abandon 
the fine or to abandon the militia law altogether or restructure their force into volunteer units (or 
uniformed militia) that drilled regularly and a reserve militia composed of everyone else. This trend 
started following the War of 1812 and by the time of the Mexican War volunteer “Uniformed Militia” 
units were widespread and used extensively in that conflict.657  Some states allowed the volunteer militia 
                                                 
653 “Each state maintained control of its own militia, making the militias essentially state armies.  Each governor 
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to establish their own by-laws rather than function according to state regulation. Another part of the 
problem was that these volunteer companies were not “uniform” in the very essence of the word.658 
General Emory Upton, who led a Union volunteer regiment in the Civil War, criticized the 
military legislation of 1861 that created the initial Union Army composed of volunteer militia.  “Congress 
had sanctioned all of the extravagance of the military system under the confederation, by permitting each 
State to send, subsist, clothe, supply, arm, equip, and transport its troops.” This occurred because the law 
“was based on the theory of confederation: the troops were to be State, not national.”659 The militia and 
volunteer units that belonged to the states were not integrated in organization, equipment, training or 
discipline. “Washington’s recommendations for a “well regulated militia” having uniform discipline, 
formations, and the same type of “arms, accoutrements and military apparatus” were never carried out 
until the Dick of 1903.   Prior to that reform; “each succeeding war has found us at the outset with 
different systems of formation and discipline, and different kinds of arms, accoutrements and military 
apparatus in the militia of the various states.”660   
This non-integrated force was in theory the main defense force for the United States.  The non-
integration of the militia was a political choice.  The nationalists had won the argument for the existence 
of the Regular Army but the anti-federalists won the argument for keeping the militia under the control of 
the states as a counter balance to the power of the federal government.  It was the ideology of the early 
republic that so feared standing armies and the possible tyranny of a powerful central government that 
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resulted in the continued control of the state over their militia.661  This ideology resulted in multiple 
jurisdictions having the capacity to generate military capabilities guaranteeing that the United States 
would during this period be a weak partially integrated ASC.  Furthermore, this ideology that was 
manifested in continued state control over its own militia, inherently maintained that state control over the 
militia was essential in order to be able to oppose the central government.  The provision and 
maintenance of a tool whose purpose was justified politically as necessary to fight against the federal 
government became a self fulfilling prophecy.  This is the danger of weak partially integrated 
Amalgamated Security Communities; being only partially integrated the components of the community 
do not trust each other enough to become fully integrated and they have the means to engage in civil war 
should the various components of the community enter into a vicious cycle of increased distrust.   
3-4 d. Measuring Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability 
 Based on the evidence presented the degree of integration by category can be measured.  It is 
important in this case to point out the capacity to produce military capability was deliberately non-
integrated by the Constitution, and the various acts of Congress as well as actions of the states.  The 
integrated and standardized regular army was only one of the military forces of the United States during 
this period and is considered as a separate force that had to work with the forces generated by the states.  
Category 1 - Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces. 
The administrative machinery developed during the period from being not very integrated to being 
integrated given the efforts of various Secretaries of War especially the efforts of Calhoun.  The 
development of a permanent staff in Washington composed of multiple departments and the creation of 
the position of Command General of the Army provided the basis for continued improvement and 
integration.  The effectiveness of the administrative staffs was often in question but the process of 
providing more and more integrated administration of the military is clear.  On the other hand the 
administration of the militia was under state control.  The operational forces were split in almost every 
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campaign into groups of Regular Army troops and militia or volunteers.  The Regular soldiers formed 
part of an integrated force within itself.  American Armies usually consisted of a core of regular soldiers 
augmented by militia or volunteers from several states.  Almost by definition then the operational forces 
could not be considered integrated when structured in such a combination.  This led to frequent battlefield 
problems (even disasters) when commanders tried to use these combined forces in the field.  They were 
much more successful when defending a prepared position.  Given the reliance on militia or volunteers 
when the great crisis of the Civil War came (even with the integrated Regular Army establishment) this 
category can only be seen at best as being at a very low level of integration and will be scored as a 1.     
Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production. 
Arms production was a critical concern for the U.S. during this period.  Initially dependent for large 
quantities of arms on foreign sources the U.S. actively developed arms production capability.  Importantly 
it was government and private manufacture of arms that resulted in a dispersed capacity including some 
states producing small arms.  Cannon production was even more widely distributed and was completely 
dependant on private manufacture.  There was a sharing of low level technology but the competition 
between private contractors ensured a variety of designs.  Therefore, this category must be considered at a 
low level of integration and will be scored as a 1 
Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces. 
The various militia forces and regulars shared some common basic equipment however; different units 
often had different caliber weapons, and later in the period prior to the Civil War there were some units 
equipped with flintlocks while others had percussion cap weapons.  The different weapons used by each 
side during the Civil War indicates that integration in this category was low and is scored as a 2. 
Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers. (DTLOMS) 
In this category integration almost completely breaks down.  Although the Regular Army was integrated 
across all elements (DTLOMS) the state militias had almost no commonality.  Doctrine in some states 
was based on U.S. Army regulations but many simply did not have access to the material.  Training 
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varied based on state militia law requirements and later on volunteer unit by-laws or state regulations.  It 
was noted that some volunteer units reported for duty highly trained while others were raw recruits, and 
some had to ‘unlearn’ what they had trained to do in order to work with the Regular Army.  The Regular 
Army had the Military Academy and some specialized schools for leader development and training.  
Various state sponsored military schools existed as well.  However, during this period numerous officer 
appointments at both the state and federal level (particularly in wartime) were based on politics.  In 
addition some states allowed elections for officers.  Organization was standard in the regular army but 
varied greatly between the state militias.  Material was either supplied by the individual, community or 
state in the case of the militia.  The Regular Army’s equipment was usually standardized and supplied by 
the federal government.  Recruitment of soldiers for the Regular Army was either through the regiment or 
later through centralized recruiting stations.  Militia and volunteers were recruited in a variety of ways.  
Some militia units were long standing and recruited in their community, others were formed during a 
crisis by state officials, or by individuals seeking to command the unit.  Soldiers pay depended on 
whether the Federal government agreed to take the unit into federal service as opposed to the state 
maintaining the troops.  Even then the federal government sometimes had to have states maintain the 
troops when money became tight.  Militia soldiers and volunteers maintained the right to go home when 
their service time ended, as happened in the campaign against Mexico City, regardless of the strategic 
consequences. This category cannot be considered as integrated and is scored as a 0.   
Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) Communications, 
Logistics.  Command and Control was one of the critical issues regarding the militia and volunteers.  The 
states maintained their control of officer appointments as well as refusing in some cases to place their 
militia under federal control.  There were, on the other had, occasions where Regular units were placed 
under the command of Governors (Harrison) or militia generals (Jackson) to provide a core of disciplined 
soldiers.  There were some militia units that refused the orders of Regular Army commanders or were 
such discipline problems as to be a detriment to operations.  Communications and transportation tend to 
be part of the same problem in this period so that over the wide expanse of the North American 
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wilderness local commanders often had to operate with limited guidance or information.  Logistics was 
one of the key failures during this period. Dependence on contractors often resulted in low quality for a 
high price that was delivered late.  In the War of 1812 field armies often went without critical supplies or 
relied on local populations to provide for the army.  Both Seminole Wars demonstrated logistic problems.  
The Mexican War showed some improvements but Winfield Scott had to abandon his supply lines in 
order to attack Mexico City.  By the time of the Civil War however, logistic support for the Union Army 
was very robust.  Militia forces that augmented Regular Army forces in federal service used the same 
logistic support and in that sense were integrated.  However, state units that remained under state control 
were supported by the state.   In this category there was some commonality in basic areas that can bee 
seen because the U.S. did manage to conduct successful operations with combined regular and militia 
forces.  This equals a low level of integration and is scored as a 2.    
Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing.   
This category is interesting in that is the most integrated area.  The regular Army was supported by the 
federal government by federal tax revenue.  The militia in federal service was funded in the same manner 
and militia or volunteer soldiers in federal service received the same pay as did the regular soldiers. 
Furthermore, the Act of 1808 to arm the militia of all the states was an annual federal allocation of funds 
that provided weapons to all of the states in addition to what they purchased themselves.  In this category 
there was clearly funding of key functions from single source which equals a medium level of integration 
and is scored as a 3.  
When all of the scores of the categories of the independent variable are taken together (Category 
1=1, Category 2=1, Category 3=2, Category 4=0, Category 5=2, Category 6=3) the result is an average 
score of 1.5 which indicates a low level of military integration overall in the period under the 
Constitution; 1789 to the Civil War 1861.  This does not negate the fact that the U.S. was an 
Amalgamated Security Community by the operational definition of this paper.662  There is no question 
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that the Constitution produced a common government out of a voluntary merger of two or more 
previously independent political entities.  Despite the low level of military integration overall, the naval 
force, coastal defense works, and the Regular Army were very much integrated and were supported by the 
central government for the benefit of all the component states. The key in this case is the part of the 
operational definition that ASCs have integrated a portion of their respective militaries.  It is the multiple 
jurisdictions with the capacity to create military capabilities that make the U.S. a Partially Integrated 
Amalgamated Security Community during this period.       
3-5.  American Military Integration, 1862 to the National Defense Act of 1916;   effects of the 
process and identity issues. 
 This section seeks to illustrate the process through which the U.S. became a strongly integrated 
Amalgamated Security Community but is not scored as a separate case.  Rather there is an overview of 
the actions that involve military integration from the Civil War to the National Defense Act of 1916 and 
the impact that had on issues of identity.  This section will not score the level of integration because it 
deals with the reduction of the multiple jurisdictions that could create military capability and the merging 
of these into the already integrated Regular U.S. Army.  The issue of identity is important because it is 
tied to the trust necessary for various previously partially integrated communities to become fully 
integrated as well as an illustration of how the process of military integration and the elimination of 
multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to produce military capability impacts identity.     
3-5. a.  Military Integration. 
 The volunteers or uniformed militia that enabled the Civil War to begin could not provide the 
manpower necessary for the entire war.  In April 1862, Confederates resorted to conscription, and the 
Union took a small step in that direction with a Militia Act of 1862 permitting the President to draft 
militia for three years if a state did not meet its quotas for volunteers.  The Enrollment Act of March 1863 
bypassed the militia clause, basing its authority directly on Congress’ power to raise and support armies.  
It imposed a military obligation on all able-bodied male citizens between twenty and forty five years old.  
                                                                                                                                                             
have integrated a portion of their respective militaries and that have voluntarily and formally merged so that they 
are subject to some form of common government. 
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Although this was the first legislation to impose universal federal conscription and set an important 
precedent, it contained numerous loopholes.  It permitted substitution (a hired replacement) and it allowed 
commutation (paying $300 to avoid military service).  The result was not true conscription but it did 
generate an increase in volunteering since districts could avoid the draft if they met their quotas.663      
 Following the Civil War the large army of volunteers was disbanded. Congress kept a little over 
50,000 regular troops in 1867, but by 1876 Congress cut the Regular Army to slightly more than 27,000 
and it remained at that level until the Spanish American War.  Although the Regular Army was busy with 
frontier duty and conflicts with Native American tribes, there were no conventional military operations 
between the Civil War and the Spanish American War.664 
It was the formation of the National Guard movement in 1879 as an association of officers of the 
various state volunteer militia units that led to significant change.  The first victory for the National Guard 
Association was the doubling of the annual allocation of funds for the militia in 1887.  The next was that 
by 1892 every state changed its laws in order to support an organized militia, almost universally called the 
“National Guard.”   Another victory was the defeat of attempts to create a Federal Army Reserve, as well 
as attempts to increase the size of the Regular Army to fight the war with Spain, but it could not gain 
enough support to pass legislation to revise the Militia Act of 1792.665  The Regular Army and National 
Guard opposed each other during this period in heated terms. The National Guard was able to use its 
political support to fend off attempts to bypass it as a viable force and the Regular Army eventually got a 
useful reserve force.   
 The Spanish American War shows a transition in the generation of military capabilities.  
Although the National Guard Association pushed for the call up of National Guard units, they had to be 
sworn in as individuals because they were destined for overseas service which circumvented the legal 
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prohibition of militia only being used within the U.S.  The call up of the National Guard suffered from 
variations in state preparations; some units were trained and equipped functioning units while others were 
raw recruits.  While the Regular Army provided the majority of the force in Cuba, 75 percent of the forces 
in the Philippines were National Guard units until 1899.   Another important element was Congressional 
authorization for the recruitment of 3,000 federal volunteers “with special skills” from the nation as a 
whole.  The most famous of these was the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry; the “Rough Riders.”666  After the 
end of the Spanish American War the National Guard units and volunteers returned home.  The ongoing 
conflict in the Philippines and the Army Act of 1899 kept the Regular Army at its war time strength. Most 
importantly it called for the recruitment of 25 new federal volunteer regiments (35,000 men) through July 
1901.667  Using the precedent set by units like the Rough Riders, and unlike previous volunteer regiments, 
these soldiers did not come from the state organizations but were directly recruited, trained and organized 
by the federal government.  The importance of these regiments was that; “if state volunteers were the 
lineal descendants of the neighborhood companies that made up the Civil War armies, then the U.S. 
Volunteers looked forward to the national citizen soldier armies of the twentieth century.”668 
 The next major reform was the Dick Act of 1903.  The Regular Army wanted a federal reserve 
and did not want to include the National Guard.  This was impossible given the political power of the 
National Guard so the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, worked with Guard officers who advocated the 
repeal of the Militia Act.  The Dick Act divided the militia into the Reserve Militia, (all able bodied males 
between 18 and 45) and the Organized Militia that would receive federal support, i.e. the National Guard.  
The National Guard was to be given equipment and modernized at federal expense and federal funds 
would pay for summer training camps.  National Guard officers were to attend Regular Army schools at 
federal expense.  There would be joint Regular Army and National Guard maneuvers and training camps 
paid for by the federal government including the National Guard soldier’s pay. Regular Army officers 
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were to be sent out to National Guard units to be instructors and inspectors.  There was a price for the 
federal support.  The National Guard was required to follow Regular Army standards for training, 
equipping, and organizing its units.  If Guard units failed to meet the training standards or administrative 
regulations they would loose their federal funding.  The most important part of the Dick Act was that it 
gave the President the power to call the National Guard directly into federal service for up to nine months. 
The Dick Act was amended in 1908 eliminating the nine month limit giving the President the authority to 
determine the length of federal service. The 1908 amendment also stated that the National Guard could be 
called up for federal service outside the territory of the U.S. but the Attorney General pronounced this to 
be unconstitutional in 1912 maintaining the ban on foreign service.669  Congress increased appropriations 
for the National Guard to the extent that in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century three times as 
much money was spent on the National Guard than had been spent on the militia during the entire 
previous century.670  This was still not enough to make the National Guard uniformly effective as a 
national reserve.  State funding remained the determinant of how effective the various units were.  By 
1915 as the Regular Army was planning for the possibility of involvement in WWI the dispute between 
the National Guard and the Regular Army came to a point of decision.  The Regular Army believed that 
in light of the determination that the National Guard could not constitutionally serve overseas that it could 
not be an effective reserve force.  The problems with Mexico in 1916 that led to the Punitive Expedition 
pressed Congress to pass the National Defense Act of 1916.  The Regular Army was increased and 
reorganized, and a permanent federal army reserve was created.    Part of the act reaffirmed the obligation 
of universal military service but it outlined the requirement for service as an obligation to the nation.  The 
impact on the National Guard was tremendous.  First, the National Guard was to expand to over 400,000 
troops and the federal government would pay for most of the National Guard expenses.  Next, the War 
Department would determine the number and types of a state’s National Guard's units.  The War 
Department also was to impose uniform enlistment contracts and set standards for officer’s commissions 
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as well as increased training requirements.  On entering the National Guard soldiers were required to take 
both state and federal oaths and could be drafted into federal service.671  The National Defense Act made 
the National Guard a partly federal and partly state force in peacetime but completely federal in time of 
war.  This federalization of the National Guard makes it an extension of the Regular Army subject to 
being used by the federal government how and wherever it wants.672 This allowed the U.S. to use the 
National Guard in both World Wars even though the vast majority of soldiers in both conflicts were 
draftees.  The National Defense Act of 1916 put an end to multiple jurisdictions having the capacity to 
produce military capability in the United States.   The use of mass conscription completely moved the 
generation of military capabilities into the federal government’s control.  This created a strong 
Amalgamated Security Community in the United States which now follows the principle that the Active 
Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve are components of a single army.  Military integration 
deepened after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 mandated Joint integration of all services Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marines for war-fighting.      
 3-5. b.  Identity issues 
There is another aspect to the military integration process described above. The process that 
resulted in the National Defense Act of 1916 greatly increased funding and ensured that the National 
Guard would be the primary reserve force for the U.S.  In exchange, however, the supporters of the 
National Guard made a Faustian bargain that stripped the National Guard of most all of its autonomy as 
well as its local identity.  The militia originated as a local defense force and it remained a local force until 
the Dick Act.  The militia served more functions than just being a part-time military force.   
                                                 
671 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 344-350. See Also; Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, “The 
Origins of the ROTC,” Military Affairs 23, no. 1 (1959): 1-12. 
672 “In effect, the act provided that the National Guard could be called into federal service, at which point guardsmen 
would be part of the army, and not the state militia. This change in characterization had tremendous implications.  
… the militia clause of the Constitution limits the uses of the militia by the federal government. The use of the army, 
under the army clause, is not so limited. Thus, when federalized, the National Guard is no longer subject to the 
restrictions of the militia clause and may be used in the same way as the standing army.” John F. Romano, “State 
Militias and the United States: Changed Responsibilities for a New Era,” The Air Force Law Review 56, (January, 
2005): 243. 
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“As more than an occasional military force, the militia established community identities and 
social structures, participated in politics, kept the public peace, and encouraged economic 
activity.”673   
In an era where there was no opportunity to support a local amateur or professional sports team and faith 
usually had a number of expressions, the militia performed important aspects of social influence and the 
creation of community identities during a period in which there was no other universal institution that 
could unite a community.  There were few diversions from the task of survival that could command the 
attendance of a community other than that of universal compulsory militia service.  Militia musters were 
the largest social gathering of community residents in which "men would gather in small groups to play at 
politics, swap horses, engage in rough and tumble, debate the leading questions of the day, or simply 
exchange news."674  In an era prior to wide spread annual county fairs, militia musters and reviews filled 
that social function and drew enthusiastic civilian crowds.675  The militia muster and review was also a 
significant social institution for young boys who eagerly anticipated the chance to participate.  “Much of 
the social life of the community centered around the military organizations, and these were quite willing 
to assume this civic role.”676  In addition to providing entertainment, the militia events directly fostered 
the formation of community identity. 
“In addition to encouraging national and regional affiliations, the militia promoted an awareness 
of locality, a sense of community, and a bond of neighborliness. Muster days, often more a 
bacchanalian fete or martial burlesque than opportunities for serious military training, were 
indeed anticipated community events throughout the United States. Individuals from every corner 
of the community lined the streets to watch the militia perform. Crowds gathered to watch the 
military procession, partake ‘of an excellent Barbecue,’ and enjoy the traditional toasts. With 
citizen-soldiers leading the crowds, all were united by the day's experiences, if not a shared 
table.”677    
                                                 
673 Harry S. Laver, “Rethinking the Social Role of the Militia: Community-Building in Antebellum Kentucky,” The 
Journal of Southern History 68, no. 4 (2002): 779. 
674  Ibid., 778. 
675  “In the more isolated areas muster and review was a time of refreshing in a secular vein… There was trading, 
gambling, and courting. There were games of sport, such as footraces, kicking the hat, throwing the rail, and gander 
pulling.  There were salesmen for the cities to press on the rustics their ‘slow’ merchandise.  At the first opportunity, 
and ambitious politician would harangue the crowd on the issues of the day and shout reasons why he should be 
elected to office.  It was the event of the season, or year! And no person, isolated and with few such opportunities, 
would miss it if possible.” John Hope Franklin, The Militant South, 1800-1861, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1956, page citations are to the 2002 reprint edition), 182 
676  Ibid. p. 184 
677  Laver, “Rethinking the Social Role of the Militia: Community-Building in Antebellum Kentucky,” 786. 
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Besides the opportunity for the entire community to socialize, Militia musters also incorporated rituals, 
ceremonies and extensive symbolism designed not only to create, but also to affirm, a communal identity.  
In terms of collective identity, rituals serve both an integrative function as well as to delineate 
distinctions.  Rituals do not however, have to be separate from common group practice on special 
occasions; they can function to affirm group identity when common practice is ritualized.678     
“The significance of such gatherings, however, was of greater import than the relief they gave 
from sun and plow and the opportunity they provided to turn out in military splendor. First, 
militia events encouraged the cultivation of a national identity, a personal association with the 
United States that took root in the Revolutionary era. Second, the militia advanced a regional 
identity by promoting an affinity for Kentucky and the western reaches of the country. Third, 
gatherings of citizen-soldiers strengthened the ties that bound disparate individuals into a local 
community of neighbors. Lastly, the militia's public appearances reinforced the social hierarchies 
of race, class, and gender, while maintaining the cross-class hegemony of white males. In short, 
citizen-soldiers, beyond being the nation's first line of defense, gave substance and form to the 
complex and still inchoate sensibility of shared identities on the frontier”679   
The militia participated in more than just regular musters.  There were special events and competitions as 
well as participation as honor guards, escorts and parades to include significant funeral corteges.680  The 
militia musters and special events were closely tied to local politics and allocation of power in the 
community and state. The chief method of political persuasion of the time was public oration and the only 
opportunity to speak to all of the voters at once, especially in rural areas, was during militia gatherings.681  
Also, serving as a senior officer in the militia could be used as a platform for political advancement.682  
As the number of ‘volunteer’ units from the 1820’s through the 1850’s grew, these units frequently would 
engage in regular competitions with units in other towns (or within a city if it had more than one unit), 
often traveling considerable distances.  The official hosts would be the volunteer unit but the entire 
                                                 
678 Joseph C. Hermanowicz and Harriet P. Morgan, “Ritualizing the Routine: Collective Identity Affirmation,” 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 197-214 
679  Laver, “Rethinking the Social Role of the Militia: Community-Building in Antebellum Kentucky,” 780 
680 “Just as fetes joined people in an expression of pride, comity, and happiness, public funerals provided an 
opportunity for mourners to gather in a mutual expression of grief and loss. The militia again provided the model for 
order and deference, and the hierarchical ladder, with its complex ordering of class, gender, and race, made its way 
from church service to graveside.” Ibid., 793 
681 “Militia events underscored the elevated status and influence of both militia and civilian leaders by providing 
them a platform to address the larger community. As significant as the words spoken and meanings conveyed was 
the selection of the particular men who spoke; access to the stage equaled access to power.” Ibid., 789 
682 Eysturlid, “An Opportunity to Show Their Epaulets and Feathers: The South Carolina Militia During the First 
Secession Crisis, 1848-1851.”  
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community would assist in entertaining the guests.  The event would turn into a holiday and be the 
occasion for parties and dinners in honor of the guests.683  All of the militia events provided an 
opportunity to demonstrate local pride in ‘their’ militia as well as a town’s hospitality.684  Volunteer 
militia units organized themselves, provided their own uniforms and named themselves with a multitude 
of names designed to indicate their distinctiveness.  Some unit names were based on their town and 
function (e.g. Kingston Dragoons, Greensboro Artillery, Philadelphia Rangers) others on their town and 
uniform (e.g. Nashville Greys, Brownsville Independent Blues) and others on famous leaders (e.g. 
Monroe Guards, Jefferson Guards, Washington Artillery) others on their ethnic heritage (e.g. Independent 
Irish Greens, American Highlanders) while some embraced simplicity such as the Fayette County 
Volunteers.685   The names given by the local volunteers to set themselves apart from other militia units at 
the same time functioned to provide local communities a symbolic moniker to focus communal identity 
around “their” unit, much as high school mascots do in contemporary culture.      
 A very interesting history of one such unique volunteer unit examines the process of the 
dissolution of community ties and linkages to community identity as the unit transitioned from being a 
militia unit to becoming part of the National Guard.  It highlights the transformation of the generation of 
military capabilities in the U.S. away from the direct involvement of communities and local elites to being 
completely under the jurisdiction of the federal government.  The “Richardson Light Guard” (RLG) of 
South Reading (later Wakefield), Massachusetts, was formed in 1851 as part of the Massachusetts 
Volunteer Militia (MVM) that was created when the old militia system was revised and divided into an 
active militia and reserve inactive militia.  The term “Light Guard” reflected the function of the unit as 
light infantry while "Richardson" referred to a prominent local businessman.  The unit belonged to its 
                                                 
683  Franklin, The Militant South, 1800-1861, 183-184. 
684  “Each of these militia occasions presented participants with a menu of toasts and speeches that drew upon a 
common set of symbols and ideologies to promote nationalism, regionalism, and localism simultaneously.” Laver, 
“Rethinking the Social Role of the Militia: Community-Building in Antebellum Kentucky,”  783. 
685 Every company in the two regiments from Pennsylvania that were entered into federal service for the Mexican 
War were independent volunteer companies with distinct names. Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War with Mexico,   
5-8. See Also; McAfee, “The Twentieth Regiment, New York State Militia, 1861 "Ulster Guard." 23-26. See Also; 
Franklin, The Militant South, 1800-1861, 174-176. 
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soldiers and to the community.686 The unit fought in the Civil War and “returned as a unit to a glorious 
homecoming in its hometown.”  Between the Civil War and the Spanish American War the unit was not 
called for any state or federal service but conducted its regular drills, parades and events along with social 
functions. In 1891 the town (now Wakefield Massachusetts) purchased land and constructed a new rifle 
range and facilities using mostly town funds a little bit of state funding but no federal money. In addition 
to providing one of the finest ranges in the state the town funded the construction of a new armory in 
1895.  The “Richardson Light Guard” fought in the conquest of Puerto Rico during the Spanish American 
War as Company A, Sixth Massachusetts Infantry Regiment MVM.  The town continued to support “its 
unit” during the war and even raised money for the men in the RLG to supplement the sometimes-delayed 
federal pay, and the Citizens' War Relief Committee of Wakefield, sent $250 to the RLG for the men to 
buy extra food on the trip home.  On its return the unit was greeted by a massive celebration by the entire 
town including special attention by Civil War veterans of the unit. “Not lost on observers was the 
symbolism: the old veterans of the town militia from the Civil War welcoming back into the community 
the latest incarnation of the town militia from newer distant battles.” “The company and the town 
celebrated the exploits of their company, not the regiment to which it belonged.”687   This was both the 
highpoint for the RLG as a town militia and its swansong as a “town” militia. The 1903 Dick Act changed 
the relationships between the federal, state, and local institutions involved with the militia.  “National 
Guard” became the official term for the organized militia and the RLG had to conform to Regular Army 
organization, equipment, and discipline. Massachusetts used the unit for strike duty in 1912, built a new 
state-owned and controlled armory in 1913 and instituted state drill pay in 1914 that effectively made the 
                                                 
686 “Prominent local men were welcomed as "honorary members," meaning that they could pay membership fees 
and claim association with the company, but not wear the uniform or train. Nor were they expected to serve during 
times of strife. Honorary members not only were a source of cash for the company, but also tied the company to the 
vested interests and leaders of the town. Honorary membership also provided a way for new residents to become 
involved in the community. The list of honorary members included most of the wealthy men of South Reading, who 
repeatedly appeared on boards of directors, committees, and philanthropic endeavors within the town. The largest 
financial donation came from Dr. Richardson, a prominent local physician and businessman. In gratitude for his 
generous gift, and to link the new institution with one of the most respected names in South Reading, the naming 
committee proposed calling the militia company the "Richardson Light Guard." Barry Stentiford,  “The Meaning of 
a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia,” The Journal of Military History 72, no 3 
(2008): 727. 
687  Ibid. 
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RLG a National Guard unit primarily supported by the state rather than the town.   The real separation 
came when the National Defense Act of 1916 created a dual status with dual oaths (to the state and 
federal governments) that allowed units such as the RLG to be ordered directly into federal service. 
Increased federal funding of the National Guard made town contributions to the unit redundant.  The 
Navy and Marines took the town provided rifle range in WWI and then the state took it over.  The RLG 
like most National Guard units during the World Wars did not serve as a unit but was broken up with its 
men filling other army units.  There was no unit celebration when they returned from combat.  The U.S. 
Army assigned the RLG’s designation following WWI as Company E of the 182nd Regiment Twenty-
sixth Division.  Between 1920 and 1941 only half of the unit’s drilling soldiers came from the town of 
Wakefield.  At the end of WWII none of the soldiers in Company E 182nd Regiment returning from 
combat in the Pacific came from the town of Wakefield.  The use of mass conscription had diluted and 
eliminated the linkage to the town.  The post-war National Guard unit in Wakefield kept the same 
designation and although some residents referred to it as the "Richardson Light Guard," it never was 
recognized as such nor were most of the drilling Guardsmen from the town.   The residents of Wakefield 
tended to serve in units in other towns since the specialization of units precluded purely town based 
organizations and so the town paid little attention to the National Guard unit.  Even the centennial of the 
RLG in 1951 received little recognition from the town or National Guard despite its history and combat 
accomplishments. In a 1975 reorganization of the Massachusetts Army National Guard the town lost its 
armory and the company.688   
“Increased state and later federal control broke a critical bond between town and company. The 
RLG was as much an institution of the town of Wakefield as were the schools, library, and fire 
departments. It was created by a town, maintained by that town, later with the assistance of the 
commonwealth, and served as an institution of the town in war and peace. As the local National 
Guard company, which bore the heritage of the Richardson Light Guard, became an institution 
more of the commonwealth and later the federal government, the bond with the town was broken, 
and the Richardson Light Guard ceased to exist.”689 
                                                 
688 Ibid.  
689 Ibid. 
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The unstated consequence to the loss of local or town linkage to the militia as it became a legal extension 
of the Regular Army after 1916 is that the identity functions of the local militia ceased.  The process that 
transitioned local militia into a legal extension of the Regular Army did not eliminate state loyalty since 
there is a dual status, but it did focus military ceremony, symbolism and ritual more on national identity. 
For example, although the unit that had been the Richardson Light Guard was not recognized as a unit 
following the World Wars, the soldiers were recognized; but they were recognized for service in federal 
military organizations (Army, Navy, Marines) not state or local military organizations.  The symbolism 
and ritual of national military sacrifice became dominant after 1916; the Tomb of the Unknowns in 
Arlington for example to commemorate the fallen in WWI was dedicated on 11 November 1921, 
Armistice Day.  The focus and genesis of Armistice Day (now Veterans Day) was on the national 
military. That is different from the origins of Memorial Day at the local level designed to commemorate 
regional and state military sacrifice that only later evolved to a national focus after WWI; roughly 
paralleling the process of increased military integration that made the U.S. a strong Amalgamated 
Security Community.   
Objections regarding causality should be noted. First, this process was not creating a national 
identity; that already existed.  What this process did was to transform a partially integrated Amalgamated 
Security Community into a strong Amalgamated Security Community.  The claim here is that the process 
of military integration eliminated the local identity of military forces, significantly reduced the state 
identity of military forces and dramatically increased the national identity of American military forces 
which in turn reinforced the overall conception national identity eventually making it superior to other 
identities.  This point is critical and tied to the constructivist literature guiding this study.  Shared 
perceptions of identities and interests construct meaning or purpose as well as shape the behavior of 
actors.  Their behavior either reinforces existing ideas about their identities and interests or gives new 
meaning to them.  This intersubjective knowledge is the basis for a structure constraining and shaping 
behavior through social interaction and this process allows actors to ‘co-constitute and co-determine’ each 
other within this structure.  So though the structure shapes the actors, the structure itself is also 
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constructed and altered by the interaction of its constituent actors.690  The structure in this instance is the 
one created by the states as actors in the Constitution and by Congress as an actor in the Militia Act that 
formally structured the relationships between the states and the federal government regarding the 
jurisdiction for the capacity to create military capabilities.  The process of military integration 
fundamentally altered that structure and not only had tangible military consequences but also resulted in 
an identity shift as the structure reshaped the actors and their relationship in the critical basic area of 
generating military forces.    
 This change can be observed at the individual level as well.  Individuals have multiple identities 
based on differing relationships so while one shared identity was that of being a citizen of the United 
States another simultaneously valid (and in cases stronger) identity was being a citizen of a particular 
state.  Early Americans were primarily focused on their local community not only because of 
transportation and communication difficulties but also because they believed that their local and state 
militia had won their freedom in the Revolution; not the national Continental Army.  It is this perception 
of who is categorized as a “brother-in-arms” that is crucial to the construction of an “us” vs. “others” 
identity.  It is this shared idea (i.e. what constitutes us and other) that gives meaning to material objects 
and forces such as local militia vs. national army.  On the other hand the national identity cannot fully 
develop without the assurance that the members of “the United States” are not only not a threat but are in 
fact fighting to defend “the United States” together rather than each constituent state separately.  The 
critical change in the process of military integration was the elimination of multiple jurisdictions having 
the capacity to create military capabilities.  A prime example is the story of Robert E. Lee who had a long 
career as an officer in the Regular Army of the United States.  Lee graduated from the U. S. military 
academy at West Point, served with distinction in Mexico receiving numerous commendations from 
General Scott, was Commandant of the military academy at West Point, commanded a Regular Army 
                                                 
690  Refer to: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 
23 (1998). 
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Cavalry Regiment and was Winfield Scott’s choice to lead the Union Army.  Despite all of this Lee 
resigned from the Army writing his sister:   
“With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I 
have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my 
home. I have therefore resigned my commission in the army, and, save in defense of my native 
state--with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed--I hope I may never be 
called upon to draw my sword."691 
As soon as he arrived in Richmond he was made commander of that state’s forces.  It is clear that Lee had 
multiple identies, but his identity as an American citizen was not as strong as his identity as a Virginian, 
although other Virginians, including Winfield Scott, remained with the Union.  Lee made a choice of 
identity; specifically a choice to the local / state military over the national military although he served for 
a long time as a U.S. soldier in senior positions and with distinction.  The process of military integration 
that resulted in the National Defense Act of 1916 eliminated that type of identity choice.  This has a direct 
link to recent scholarship regarding Social identity and self-categorization theories examining the salience 
of race categories and American national identity. In terms of policy, when a sub-group identity is salient, 
e.g., an individual state, the focus will be on the consequences of a policy for that state, whereas if a 
superordinate identity is salient, e.g., the nation, then the focus will be on the consequences of a policy for 
the nation.692  The relationship of this research to the process of military integration is that military 
integration eliminates the sub-group identity of local and state military forces leaving only the 
superordinate identity of national military forces.  How the military is created and the structure of 
jurisdictions for the capacity to create military capabilities has a direct impact on the identity of that force 
and the nation.  The process of military integration in the U.S. eliminated the local and state military as 
components of U.S. identity leaving only the national military force as the institution through which we 
define soldiering and what it means to be a soldier.   
                                                 
691 John William Jones, Personal reminiscences, anecdotes, and letters of Gen. Robert E. Lee. (New York: D. 
Appelton and Company, 1875), 139. 
692 John E. Transue, “Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American National 
Identity as a Uniting Force,”  American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 78-91. 
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A second objection to causality of military integration increasing American national identity 
affiliation over state affiliation would be that an increase in technology or media that produced greater 
opportunities for social interaction or development of social networks used by elites that reinforced 
national identity became more prevalent during this time.  This is contradicted by the evidence of strong 
local support for local military units in 1898 and then by the dissolution of those bonds during the First 
World War.  The twenty years between 1898 and 1918 did not demonstrate a great breakthrough in 
technology that produced greater opportunities for social interaction or development of social networks.  
The railroads, telegraphs and newspapers of 1918 were not markedly superior to those of 1898. The 
Hearst papers of 1898 were certainly capable of leading national opinion.  The movie industry during 
those twenty years was not ubiquitous as it later became and the greatest work from the period focused on 
regionalism and bigotry not on unifying national symbolism (i.e. Birth of a Nation).   The period was also 
marked by domestic anti-imperialism especially opposition to the war in the Philippines.  On the other 
hand that conflict involved national volunteers as well as regular soldiers which place that conflict 
squarely in the integration process.        
The U.S. is an imagined political community, but the conception of that community and what 
constitutes its identity changed over time; and the process of military integration played a significant part 
in that transformation. The legal structure of multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to create military 
capability reflected political realities that precluded, at that time (1789), further integration.  The 
development of an Amalgamated Security Community in this case involved the retention of sovereignty 
and identity at the state level.  The basis for the retention of state sovereignty was the state militia which 
also allowed a strong identity to be retained at the state level as well. The process of military integration 
eliminated the local and state military forces as actors as well as sub-ordinate institutions leaving only the 
superordinate national military as a force for boosting national identity in a strong ASC.  
4-6. Examples of other partially integrated Amalgamated Security Communities. 
 The following examples serve to illustrate that the conditions of partially integrated Amalgamated 
Security Communities exist in other cases. Although these are not case studies the similarities to include 
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the danger of civil war enabled by the existence of multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to produce 
military capability will be evident. One instance of a military integration process leading to a strong 
Amalgamated Security Community is included, while the other example has yet to be resolved.     
3-6. (a.)  Switzerland – was a partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community until it 
adopted its constitution of 1848 following a civil war.  It is particularly relevant to the U.S. case since 
numerous founding fathers thought the Swiss example was worthy of emulation.  George Washington, 
when he submitted his recommendations for a peacetime military establishment (Sentiments on a Peace 
Establishment, May 1783) pointed to the Swiss as an example for the militia and wrote; 
“…we might see, with admiration, the Freedom and Independence of Switzerland supported for 
Centuries, in the midst of powerful and jealous neighbors, by means of a hardy and well 
organized Militia.”693   
3-6. (a.) 1. Brief History of Switzerland related to militia and 1847 civil war  
The Swiss Confederation traces its origin to the oath (actually a written treaty) of mutual support sworn 
between the three cantons of Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden in 1291 to preserve their local autonomy.  
The decisive defeat of the Austrians at the Battle of Morgarten in 1315 prompted a revision of the terms 
of confederation that remained in effect until 1798 and made the Swiss Confederation an alliance against 
the Hapsburgs.  The Swiss Confederation gradually expanded, defeating the Austrians several times 
establishing the Swiss reputation as fierce fighters.  The Swiss became much sough after mercenaries 
serving in a variety of armies. By 1513 there were thirteen independent states in the Swiss 
Confederation.694   When the Swiss lost decisively at the Battle of Marignano in 1515 it began a tradition 
of partial neutrality in which the Swiss decided that they would not undertake any offensive military 
actions.  On the other hand the 13 Cantons agreed that to add to their income they would still fight as 
mercenaries in other people’s wars.695  Switzerland’s cantons include several ethnic groups and languages 
                                                 
693 Wright and MacGregor,  Soldier-Statesmen of the Constitution,  196. 
694 Bonjour, Offler, and Potter, A Short History of Switzerland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 69-140. See 
Also; Georg Thurer, Free and Swiss (Coral Gables, FL.: University of Miami Press, 1971), 23-44.  See Also; 
William Denison McCrackan, The Rise of the Swiss Republic: A History (Boston, Mass.: Arena Publishing 
Company, 1892), 69-243.   
695 “The militia was then, as it has generally remained, cantonal in character. The cantons did the selling of soldiers.” 
John McPhee, La Place de la Concorde Suisse, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1984), 53. 
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and are also divided between Protestant and Roman Catholic.  There were internal clashes associated with 
the Reformation.  The peace treaty following the second Kappel War was significant in that all of the 
cantons agreed to respect the religious choice of the others and in some cases cantons became bi-
confessional.  Switzerland did benefit from the Treaty of Westphalia since all the European powers 
recognized Swiss independence.696  In 1798 the French Revolutionary Army invaded the Swiss 
Confederation and created a client buffer state out of the Swiss Confederation called the Helvetic 
Republic.697  After the defeat of Napoleon Switzerland received guarantee for its territorial integrity and 
was recognized by the Congress of Vienna as a permanently neutral state.  A new Federal Pact was signed 
in August 1815 in which the cantons recovered their most of their sovereignty. A key provision was that 
the Federal Pact prohibited internal alliances between the cantons which might be harmful to the 
Confederation.  The period between 1815 and 1830 involved the restoration not only of the autonomy of 
the cantons, but also of the privileges of the aristocracy, guilds, and the conservative authorities from the 
old confederation. Liberals in Switzerland responded by focusing on fostering a Swiss identity through 
numerous societies like the patriotic student association, singing societies, and the annual Federal 
Shooting Match (Schutzenfesf) and Schweizerischer Schützenverein (SSV, or Swiss Shooting Federation) 
begun in 1824.698  In 1830 many Swiss cantons adopted liberal constitutions, ended censorship, and 
established representative governments.  The regeneration as it is called also included rural towns 
redressing the inequalities in which the cities dominated the cantons.  Five conservative cantons who 
wished to preserve the old order withdrew their representatives from the Federal Diet and formed the 
                                                 
696 Bonjour, Offler, and Potter,  A Short History of Switzerland, 141-184. See Also; Thurer, Free and Swiss, 46-66. 
See Also; McCrackan, The Rise of the Swiss Republic: A History, 251-281. 
697 Bonjour, Offler, and Potter,  A Short History of Switzerland, 213-240. See Also; Thurer, Free and Swiss, 77-95. 
See Also; McCrackan, The Rise of the Swiss Republic: A History, 295-313. 
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military unity- it was also linked to Swiss mythology – William Tell. Article I of the Swiss Shooting Federation is 
focused on Swiss identity. “To draw another bond around the hearts of our citizens, to increase the strength of the 
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Civilian Firearms Ownership and Regulation, May 2, 2003, at the Tower of London. Available from 
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League of Sarnen.  In 1833 when fighting between rural townspeople and the cities in two of these 
cantons became serious the Federal Diet mobilized a Federal army to suppress the unrest and sent the 
force to dissolve the League of Sarnen and force the cantons to send representatives to the Diet.699 
 The Civil War was spawned by the forces of conservatism in opposition to liberal reform but it 
also had a strong element of religious opposition in which the conservative forces tended to be Catholic as 
well.  The Cantons of Aargau and Vallais were the scenes of political violence prior to the Civil War.  In 
Aargau two Catholic monasteries were implicated in purchasing arms and agitating for secession which 
led to a short but violent confrontation that was suppressed by the canton’s forces. The government of 
Aargau was under the control of the Radical Party and its associated group the ‘Young Swiss’ (la jeune 
Suisse) which was the most liberal party. They responded by abolishing all monasteries and nunneries in 
the canton.  Lucerne brought the matter before the Diet which agreed that Aargau had violated the Federal 
Pact.  In the canton of Vallais a liberal government was elected and the Bishop in the canton then 
excommunicated all members of the society of 'Young Switzerland' and their relatives while the catholic 
forces in Upper Vallais formed a militia. In May 1844 after organizing and training the force it marched 
on the canton government and removed it from power.  No Federal intervention occurred because 
Lucerne had supported the military preparations of the Upper Vallais and had been able to delay action by 
the Diet since it was the Vororte or host canton for the Diet for 1843-1844.  This increased the tension 
between the Protestant and Catholic cantons. At this point Lucerne invited the Jesuits to take over the 
schools in their canton.   Even though it was legal the Jesuits were seen as the opposite of everything the 
liberal forces were working for especially the separation of church and state as well as secular education.  
Radical armed partisans (Freischarler) conducted two attacks to overthrow the government of Lucerne; 
an inconsequential one in December 1844 and a large one in March 1845, but both failed.700  In response 
to these attacks the seven catholic cantons (the former ‘Borromean League’) met in Lucerne in December 
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1845 and secretly formed the Sonderbund (separate league), pledging that in the event of an “attack on 
one or any other number of them they will, to maintain their sovereign and cantonal rights, engage in a 
joint defense with every means at their disposal.”701   The Sonderbund then appointed a Council of War, 
making it an alliance with a central military authority. Since the Sonderbund Council of War was 
composed of the heads of Government of the seven cantons it also functioned as the group’s lead political 
body.  In the Diet the legality of the Sonderbund was quickly disputed based on the provision in the 
Federal Pact that prohibited internal alliances between the cantons.  The situation was a stalemate until 
Geneva elected a liberal Radical government in October 1846, and then the canton of St. Gall also elected 
a liberal Radical government in May 1847.  At the same time the Vororte or host canton for the Diet 
changed to Bern.  The head of the Bernese government was Ulrich Ochsenbein who had led the second 
failed Radical armed partisan (Freischarler) attack on Lucerne in March 1845. By the rules of the Federal 
Pact he was the presiding officer of the Diet and Federal President.  His assumption of power was seen by 
the Sonderbund as a declaration of war.  Citing the creation of a War Council and separate military 
organization of the Sonderbund the Diet ordered it dissolved on 20 July.  On 16 October the Sonderbund 
War Council ordered the mobilization of its military forces.  After efforts to negotiate a settlement failed 
the Diet ordered the mobilization of 50,000 Federal troops on 24 October.  On 3 November Sonderbund 
troops attacked the canton of Ticino to take control of the St. Gotthard Pass.  The attack caused the Diet 
on 4 November to issue a ‘Decree of Implementation’ which authorized the use of force to carry out the 
orders of the Diet.  To lead the Federal Army the Diet chose Guillaume Henri Dufour, Chief of the 
General Staff of the Swiss Federal Army.  General Dufour viewed his mandate to dissolve the 
Sonderbund as limited to actions that would preserve the union not convert or punish the Catholic 
cantons.  To win the conflict he decided to use the superior force of the Federal Army to outmaneuver his 
opponent and win as humanely and with the least bloodshed possible in order to moderate any post 
conflict political distress.  General Dufour’s plan was to concentrate his army and overwhelmed the three 
major Sonderbund cantons Fribourg, Lucerne, and Valais in succession rather than attack all of the 
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Sonderbund cantons at once. The plan worked well and quickly at the cost of fewer than 150 killed and 
less than 450 wounded on both sides. The entire conflict was over in less than a month, which precluded 
outside intervention.  The Federal troops for the most part acted with compassion and charity and 
refrained from looting or destruction which greatly helped in the reconciliation of the two sides.  From 
March through April 1848 a constitutional Diet created a new constitution which was approved in 
September 1848; with amendments it remains the Swiss constitution.702     
3-6. (a.) 2. The Government 
There are two important governments to examine: the Federal Pact or (Bundes-Vertrag) of August 1815 
in which the cantons recovered their most of their sovereignty not restored in the Act of Mediation; and 
the constitution of 1848.  Under the Federal Pact of 1815 the Federal government consisted of the Federal 
Diet (Tagsatzung) composed of representatives from each of the 22 cantons; each canton had one vote in 
the Diet.  The representatives voted based on instructions from their canton. The Diet was the supreme 
military authority, was responsible for foreign affairs, and could decide matters of war and peace by a 
three fourths majority.  The Diet met in one of three representative cantons (Vororte) Zurich, Berne, and 
Lucerne on a two year rotating basis.  The only federal officials were the chancellor and secretary. A 
Federal board of arbitration was created to settle internal disagreements.  To defend Swiss neutrality the 
Federal government could call up an army of about 33,000 based on contributions from the cantons equal 
to 2 per cent of their population (and did so to dissolve the League of Sarnen).  A war fund was 
established at the federal level to pay for federal military operations with money derived from customs 
duties on imports.  The cantons retained the right to make trade agreements and military capitulations 
(mercenary lease agreements) with other countries, as well as control over the police and all economic 
issues.703  Although the cantons were quite powerful, the Federal government created in 1815 was a 
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voluntary and formal merger of the cantons so that they were subject to a form of common government 
and is sufficient to meet the requirements for an Amalgamated Security Community.      
 The constitution of 1848 in amended form continues to serve as the basic law of Switzerland.  It 
established Bern as the permanent national capitol, and set up a bicameral legislature consisting of a 
National Council to represent the people and a Council of the States to represent the cantons.  Both 
cambers meeting in joint session as the Federal Assembly chose the members of the Federal Tribunal, 
Federal Council, and Federal General (Commander in Chief in times of war). The Federal Council is a 
permanent executive independent of the Federal Assembly composed of seven members heading one of 
seven administrative districts chosen for four year terms but can serve multiple terms.  The Federal 
government was given complete control of foreign affairs.  The constitution forbids all military 
capitulations (leasing of mercenaries by the cantons) and foreign pensions and titles.  The Federal 
government was given control over the postal service, weights and measures, creation of a common 
currency (Swiss Franc 1850), and all tariffs and customs duties providing the Federal government with its 
own revenue.  Internal tariffs and customs were abolished. Direct taxation was reserved to the cantons.  
Federal law was made supreme and canton constitutions and law had to conform to Federal regulation but 
the cantons reserved all powers not delegated to the Federal government. A citizen of any canton residing 
in another canton had the same rights as a native of that canton; which created a universal Swiss 
Citizenship.  Education and police functions were primarily the responsibilities of the cantons.  The 
cantons were prohibited from making any political treaties or alliances between them. They were also 
expressly prohibited from “violence and from arming themselves” in cases of disputes with other states; 
rather they would submit to arbitration by the Federal government.704  The military provisions of the 
treaty greatly increased the Federal government’s control over the creation of military capabilities but did 
not eliminate the canton’s involvement.  Article 13 of the Swiss Constitution prohibits the Federal 
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government from maintaining a standing army but it also forbids any canton from maintaining a force of 
more than 300 men (except police).  All Swiss were required to perform military service but units were to 
be constructed whenever possible from troops within the same canton, and the canton could appoint the 
junior officers of these units. The Federal government, however, was responsible for the organization, 
training standards, appointment of senior officers, and arming of the military.  This changed the canton 
militia from being separate entities that provided troops to the Federal Army into Federal militia 
organized and equipped by the Federal Army staff even though it was recruited primarily by canton; it 
became analogous to the U.S. National Guard. The Federal government was also given exclusive 
jurisdiction over the manufacture and sale of gunpowder (Article 41).705  The larger impact of the 1848 
Swiss Constitution was reconciliation of the opposing sides of the Civil War.  Within a year after its 
passage the people of the defeated cantons proclaimed that they were ready to join the Federal army and 
fight any foreign enemy of Switzerland.706      
3-6. (a.) 3. Defense Cooperation and Integration 
The Swiss military was always based on universal service.  The canton was the entity that had the 
jurisdiction over the creation of military capability. This in turn led to the practice of the cantons 
contracting out the military services of their militia which continued for centuries.  The militia basis of 
military forces in each canton allowed for clashes between cantons and between cities and rural areas.  
The early militia expected each man to provide his own arms and to train himself.  Shooting societies 
sprang up with the first hand held firearms. Even after the battle of Marignano when the Swiss no longer 
collectively fought except to defend their territory, the Swiss were not neutral or peaceful and had no 
qualms about fighting for pay; mercenary contracts were economically vital to poor cantons.  This system 
also had the benefit of creating an experienced battle hardened pool of militia in each canton.  Although 
there was a defensive alliance (Defensionale of Wyl) formed in 1647 with a joint Catholic and Protestant 
military council to provide troops for the Diet it could not be called a Swiss Army but rather an alliance of 
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canton armies.  The Federal Pact of 1815 included military components that contrasted with the previous 
pre-Helvetica Republic system. Instead of allied armies of the cantons there was to be a Federal Army 
composed of units generated by the cantons but commanded by Federal officers.  This was analogous to 
the Continental Army under the Articles of Confederation with a few additional elements.  In 1817 the 
Diet adopted a system for the organization of the Federal Army called the “General Army Regulations for 
the Swiss Confederation.” This included the division of the militia into three categories, the Federal Line, 
the Federal Reserve, and the Landwehr.707  A General Staff School was established in Thun.708   This 
school provided a well trained officer corps for the Federal Army and the General Staff provided 
organizational and operational leadership and coordination.  The cantons were however, heavily involved 
as they always had been in the creation of militia capabilities.  It is also evident from the Military items of 
the Swiss cantonal archives that the cantons controlled militia administration; equipping, housing 
recruiting, training and military justice as well as supplying arms and ammunition, uniforms and 
equipment (including horses) for their militia from the 1700’s up through 1848.  The cantons collected 
military taxes to support their militia.709  
The Constitution of 1848 changed the nature of the military organization.  The contracting of 
militia by the cantons as mercenaries ended.  Article 19 states that “The Confederation exercises control 
over the army and the material of war” and that the federal army is composed of the cantonal military 
corps and all Swiss subject to military service but are not in a canton unit.  Furthermore in cases of danger 
the federal government also has exclusive and direct control of men not part of the federal army, and of 
all other military resources of the Cantons.  This establishes federal jurisdiction over all manpower and 
equipment.  Article 20 gives the federal government control over the organization of the army, military 
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instruction of every kind, and providing arms for the military.  Military law is set by federal legislation 
while the cantons are allowed to enforce the law under supervision of the Federal government.  The 
cantons are allowed to exercise control over forces in their territory in peacetime as well as furnish 
uniforms and equipment.  The cantons can appoint junior officers but are subject to standards set by the 
federal government. The Federal government also can establish federal training areas and federal military 
facilities and maintained the right to appoint senior officers.  The cumulative effect of the provisions of 
the 1848 Constitution is to make the militia a federal force subject to federal organization, standards, 
training, legal regulations and dependent on the federal government for its arms and ammunition.  One 
item in Article 18 over time transformed the Swiss militia into a nation in arms; “Each soldier shall 
receive without expense his first equipment, clothing, and arms. The weapon remains in the hands of the 
soldier.” Each man was required to attend shooting practice and keep his equipment in good order, as well 
as attend periodic training. The federal government established schools for all branches and required 
attendance for promotion. The only exemptions from service were for physical disability or essential 
government work.  This made the Swiss Army very democratic in that all classes, professions, and 
occupations worked side by side in the Army.710  Over time this had an integrative effect.   
“In the nineteenth century, the army was a leader in the process of forming a national state and 
the centralization of state functions at the federal level.”711 
3-6. (a.) 4. Swiss identity and military integration 
 To this point the differences in religious affiliation and the city vs. rural tensions were mentioned.  
Switzerland is also multi-lingual (German, French, Italian, and a very localized language; Rumantsch) 
and multi-cultural.  It also has a multiplicity of political parties.  On the other hand there is a strong Swiss 
identity.  The key common institution after 1848 was the Swiss Army.  That doesn’t mean that an identity 
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did not exist prior to 1848.  On the other and the liberals and progressives consciously worked to promote 
Swiss national identity during the restoration and regeneration period from 1815 – 1848.  They formed 
cultural societies, shooting societies, and political movements to increase the perception of a common 
identity in opposition to the reactionary forces and autonomy of the cantons.  That was not enough to 
prevent civil war.  The cantons maintained sufficient control of the jurisdiction and capacity to create 
military capabilities that they could make the choice to pursue their perceived interests by force. The 
Sonderbund did have external political support, and there is sufficient evidence that had the Federal Army 
moved slowly or had not won decisively that the Catholic portion could have split off or become a 
protectorate of France as happened during several previous periods.712  The handling of the Civil War and 
Constitution were critical for post war reconciliation and construction of a unified federal state.  In the 
end however, the obligatory universal service in the Swiss Federal Army provided a common democratic 
institution for integration and identity affirmation.  As noted by one Swiss official “Switzerland does not 
have an army. Switzerland IS an army.”713   
3-6. (b.) Kurds in Iraq 1991 to 2010 – Provides a current example of what claims to be a federal 
system but includes multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to produce military capabilities.  In this 
instance the multiple jurisdictions are the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government.  
This example includes the Kurdish forces, the Peshmerga (those who face death) because they are 
sanctioned as ‘Guards of the Region’ by the 2005 Iraqi Constitution maintained by a recognized regional 
government and are not an ‘unauthorized militia’.  This example will not explore those other unauthorized 
albeit important forces which also mainly operate outside the Kurdish region (e.g. Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM)).  
This example highlights the difficulty of military integration even within an ethnic group threatened by 
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outside forces.  It also demonstrates how critical the issue of constitutional structure regarding multiple 
jurisdictions with the capacity to produce military capabilities is for policy makers.714        
3-6. (b.) 1.  History of Kurds in Iraq 1991 to 2010 
 
 The Kurds are the largest ethnicity without a state, and are present in Syria, Turkey, Iran, and 
Iraq.  This example is focused only on Iraqi Kurds in Iraq; there are Turkish and Iranian Kurdish groups 
that use Iraqi Kurdish territory for sanctuary and as a base of operations but those issues are tangential to 
the main points of this study.  From this point reference to “the Kurds” indicates Iraqi Kurds as a 
coalition; where factions clash they are indicated by party affiliation.  It is enough to note that there is a 
long history of brutal oppression of Kurds in Iraq, the worst being the attacks by Saddam Hussein in the 
1980’s that included the use of chemical weapons against civilians.715  Following the end of Operation 
Desert Storm on 28 February 1991, the Kurdish regions rebelled but were quickly defeated.  Iraqi Army 
forces moved into the Kurdish regions and several million Kurds fled into the mountains where they had 
no food, shelter, or water in winter conditions. By 16 April the armed forces of the US, UK, and France 
began Operation Provide Comfort.  To protect the relief supplies which were being transported by air, the 
allied forces declared the area north of the 36th parallel a no-fly zone for Iraqi aircraft.  Although the 
UNHCR took responsibility for humanitarian assistance in June 1991 the no fly zone (Operation Northern 
Watch) was maintained up to Operation Iraqi Freedom providing protection to a large portion of the 
Kurdish region.  During the remainder of 1991 the Peshmerga guerrilla forces of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front 
gained control of most of the Kurdish areas except for the area of Kirkuk.  In March 1992 the two main 
Iraqi Kurdish political parties in the Kurdistan Front, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) agreed to hold elections in May 1992 for a Kurdish Regional Assembly.  The 
international humanitarian, reconstruction and relief efforts were primarily concentrated in the KDP 
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controlled area and did not extend into the province of Sulaimaniyya controlled by the PUK.716   Local 
territorial skirmishes turned into a civil war when fighting broke out between the KDP and PUK in May 
1994 resulting in 3000 dead by the time a peace agreement was arranged by the U.S. in 1998.717  The 
peace agreement resulted in a territorial division of administrative responsibility.  The KDP set up an 
administration in the city of Arbil (Erbil or Irbil) to govern the provinces of Dahuk and Arbil while the 
PUK set up a separate administration in the city of Sulaymaniyah to govern the province of As-
Sulaymaniyah and parts of Tamim (Kirkuk) Province.  The modus vivendi between the PUK and KDP 
included a consociational power sharing agreement for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 
which the decisions were hammered out between the party leadership rather than in the Kurdish 
Assembly or administrative ministries.718  13 percent of the money from the Oil-for-Food program 
(UNSCR 986) was allocated to the Kurdish region.  This helped fuel economic development and 
increased administrative abilities within the Kurdish government as the KDP and PUK began to cooperate 
and work with the UN and NGOs.  The Kurdish region also benefited from increased trade with Turkey 
and Iran. The customs duties on this trade gave the Kurdish Regional Government its own source of 
revenue as well.719  In 2003 when the Turks refused to allow U.S. forces to transit their territory, the 
Peshmerga forces of the KDP and PUK fought alongside U.S. forces airlifted into Kurdistan to defeat the 
Iraqi army in the North of Iraq.  For the Kurds the alliance with the U.S. presented opportunities to 
                                                 
716 Ronald Ofteringer and Ralf Bäcker, “A Republic of Statelessness: Three Years of Humanitarian Intervention in 
Iraqi Kurdistan,” Middle East Report, no. 187/188, (March - June, 1994): 40-45 See Also; Michael M. Gunter, “A 
de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq,” Third World Quarterly 14, no 2, 1993): 295-319. 
717 Michael M. Gunter, “The Permanent and New Realities Facing the Kurdistan Regional Government: Options and 
Prospects,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28, no. 2 (August 2008): 247. See Also; Sharon Behn. “Kurds keep 
the peace in their own 'nation'” The Washington Times, 30 November 2005. available from 
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=&rnr=77&anr=7849  Internet; accessed 20 May 2010.  See 
Also; “Barzani: Champion of Iraqi Kurdish rights.” AFP 13 December 2005, available from 
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=73&lngnr=12&smap=02010200&anr=8105 Internet; accessed 20 May 
2010.  See Also; Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Global Security, available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kdp.htm  Internet; accessed 20 May 2010. 
718 Gareth R. V. Stansfield, “Governing Kurdistan: The Strengths of Division”, in The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, 
O’Leary et al., eds., (Philadelphia, PA.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 201-203. See Also, Michael M. 
Gunter, “The Permanent and New Realities Facing the Kurdistan Regional Government: Options and Prospects,” 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28, no. 2 (August 2008): 247. 
719 Ibid., 204, 209-211.  
 255
consolidate their position in post-Saddam Iraq.720  Arabs on the Iraqi Governing Council opposed Kurdish 
autonomy within a federal Iraq.721  Fortunately for the KRG the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL - 
created by the U.S.) had a key provision in Article 61 (c); 
“The general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the 
voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject 
it.”722 
Given that the KRG controls three governorates, it gave the Kurdish parties a veto over the constitution.  
Article 53 of the TAL specifically recognizes the KRG as the official government of the territories it 
controlled on 19 March 2003 which includes not only the three governorates of Kurdistan but also 
territories in Kirkuk (Tamim), Diyala and Nineveh governorates.723  This allowed the KRG to claim that 
the Peshmerga were not a militia but an armed force of a recognized part of the Iraqi government; the 
KRG.  The KRG and the Peshmerga were too powerful for any other Iraqi party to dominate them or 
force any agreements that ran counter to their interests.  The KDP and PUK along with 15 other smaller 
Kurdish groups joined to create a single list of candidates for the Kurdish regional and Iraqi national 
elections held in January, 2005.724  A key result of was that the Iraqi National Assembly chose Jalal 
Talabani (head of the PUK) as President of Iraq while Masoud Barzani (head of the PUK) was elected 
President of the KRG by the Kurdish National Assembly.  This allocation of Presidencies went a long 
way to easing tensions between the two Kurdish factions.  KDP and PUK also saw that maintaining a 
united front was essential to leveraging political influence at the national level to achieve Kurdish 
objectives.  The next major activity was the creation of the Iraqi Constitution.  Kurds got almost 
everything they wanted in exchange for continued support of the Shia coalition in forming a new 
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government after the December 2005 national elections.725   The constitution greatly increased the 
autonomy of the KRG and the Kurdish Coalition of parties remained united in protecting the interests of 
Kurdistan.  Protected by the Peshmerga who manned the ‘green line’ (an internal border dividing the 
KRG controlled area from the rest of Iraq) the Kurdish region had become peaceful and prosperous.  No 
coalition soldier has been killed or any foreigner kidnapped in the area of Kurdistan controlled by the 
Peshmerga.  The security provided by the Peshmerga forces is the key factor that allowed Kurdistan to 
develop.726  The KRG passed a bill that recognized foreign ownership that had the effect of accelerating 
foreign investment giving generous tax and customs exemptions for the first five years of any project.727  
The difference between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq includes the extreme autonomy found in Kurdistan;  
“In the run-up to national elections in March, the Kurdish region--where nearly 20% of Iraq's 29 
million citizens live--isn't shy about parading its autonomy: Police wear Kurdish uniforms. The 
region's red, white, and green flag is ubiquitous while Iraq's is nowhere to be seen.”728 
In 2006 a decision was made to merge the separate KDP and PUK administrations into one regional 
government located in Arbil which became the KRG capitol.  This power sharing agreement included the 
creation of a Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (i.e. Ministry of Defense) and has continued to the present.  
At roughly the same time another poll taken along with the national elections indicated that 95 percent of 
the Kurds favored independence.  The KRG has been very careful not to push for this but at the same time 
has threatened to breakaway if its interests are threatened.  This has often included issues related to the 
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city of Kirkuk and its surrounding province.  The Kurds want the oil but they do have their own reserves 
in other parts of Kurdistan. The Kurds focus on Kirkuk is significantly based on its cultural value as the 
“Kurdish Jerusalem” their long sought after capitol city that they believe was wrongly taken from them by 
the policies of Saddam that expelled Kurds and replaced them with Arabs.  The Kurdistan Regional 
Constitution names Kirkuk as its capitol.  The KRG absolutely will not give up its claim to Kirkuk and 
will fight for it if necessary.729   That is not the only issue that may lead to open conflict. The issue of 
control over Kurd populated areas in the provinces of Tamim, Diyala and Nineveh in 2008 – 2009 nearly 
led to armed clashes between the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga.   The Iraqi Government ordered 
Peshmerga units to withdraw from those areas and they refused stating that they only took orders from the 
government of Kurdistan and prepared to engage the Iraqi Army. Only U.S. mediation diffused the 
immediate tensions which resulted in three party joint patrols of U.S. Army troops, Peshmerga, and Iraqi 
Army units in the disputed areas which continued in May 2010.  The relationship between the central 
government and the KRG is strained as the Arab central government tries to reassert its authority.730    
3-6. (b.) 2. The Government 
 The Iraqi Constitution adopted in October 2005 is the basis for the government, but there are also 
practices that have arisen regarding the Kurdish region that are important as well.731  The construct of the 
constitution and practices of the KRG in reality make Iraq a hybrid of a confederation and a unitary 
system.  The relationship between the central government and the provinces that are not part of the KRG 
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731 All references to the Iraqi Constitution can be found at: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; Iraqi 
Constitution. Available from http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf  Internet; accessed 22 May 
2010. 
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is not a Federal system.  It is a centralized unitary system in which the central government has complete 
sovereignty and delegate’s authority and responsibilities to subordinate provincial and local governments. 
This system is the successor to the previous regime in which the provincial and local governments were 
an extension of the central government and Ba’ath party.   
 The Iraqi Constitution contains several provisions included by the Kurds during the negotiations 
that give the KRG extreme autonomy.  First Article 117 recognizes “the region of Kurdistan, along with 
its existing authorities, as a federal region.” Article 121 grants regional governments several key powers 
(Kurdistan is only region). First, the regional governments exercise all executive, legislative and judicial 
powers in the region except those reserved to the central government and are guaranteed a proportion of 
central government revenue based on population.  Second, both Article 121 and Article 115 stipulate that 
in case of a “contradiction between regional and national legislation” in an area not exclusively a federal 
power, the regional government law is superior and application of the national law can be amended within 
the region.  Article 115 also states that “All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal 
government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region. 
With regard to other powers shared between the federal government and the regional government, priority 
shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute.”  
These articles establish the supremacy of Regional Law which is quite important given the limits of 
exclusive central government jurisdiction in regard to the region.  Third, Article 121 allows offices 
representing regions and governorates to be opened in “all embassies and diplomatic missions, in order to 
follow cultural, social, and developmental affairs.”  Hoshyar Zebari from the KDP has been the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister since 2003.  The KRG maintains a Department of Foreign Relations led by Minister 
Falah Mustafa Bakir.  “He is the chief architect of KRG foreign policy, and the Department serves as the 
conduit between the KRG and the international community.”732  Numerous foreign governments maintain 
diplomatic missions in Arbil.  The KRG has actively used not only its control of the Iraqi foreign ministry 
                                                 
732 Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir - Head of the Department of Foreign Relations. Available from 
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but its own Department of Foreign Relations to promote its interests including foreign investment as well 
as to maintain relations with neighboring countries.  Finally, Article 121 states: 
“The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the 
region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the 
region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region.”733  
This provision for “guards of the region” is what the KRG uses to provide constitutional legitimacy for 
the Peshmerga.  This sets up the structural multiple jurisdictions for the capacity to create military 
capabilities and guarantees KRG sovereignty within its territory.  Article 110 lists the powers exclusive to 
the central government which are; foreign policy, national security, fiscal /monetary policy, weights and 
measures, citizenship, broadcast and the mail, budget bill, outside water sources and census.  In reality the 
KRG has its own security force and foreign policy, establishes its own budget, and has local TV and radio 
stations that broadcast in Kurdish, which in practice leaves the central government with exclusive 
jurisdiction over weights & measures; monetary policy; and the mail.  Based on the autonomy of the 
KRG, the powers it has from the constitution and exercises in practice, along with the supremacy of 
regional law to federal law, the relationship between Kurdistan and the central government is that of near 
equals.  The best description of this is as a confederation between the KRG and the central government 
where the KRG has retained sovereignty and delegated certain limited functions to the central 
government, while the remainder of the government is a unitary system.   
 The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) did move forward with the merger of its two 
administrations beginning in 2006.  By its own admission it has yet to merge the Asayish (intelligence 
and security) and Peshmerga forces.734  A draft law for merging those forces is pending.  How then does 
this example apply to the conditions of being an Amalgamated Security Community?  First of all there is 
an Amalgamated Security Community between the territorial political administrations of the KDP and 
PUK following the decision in 2006 to merge administrations; which did include the Ministry of 
                                                 
733 Underline by this author. 
734 About the Kurdistan Regional Government: Unifying institutions. 9 November 2009. Available from 
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?anr=32349&lngnr=12&rnr=93&smap=04020000 Internet; accessed 20 May 
2010. 
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Peshmerga Affairs.  The other Amalgamated Security Community is between the KRG and the central 
government that resulted from Peshmerga participation in the ouster of Saddam and Kurdish writing of 
the constitution.  They are both voluntary agreements to have a common government.    
“We in the Kurdistan Region have decided to remain part of Iraq on the basis of a voluntary 
union, provided that Iraq is a federal, democratic and pluralistic country.”735 
They are clearly functioning governments with the capacity to generate revenue and enforce policy.  They 
also have multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to produce military capabilities and therefore fit the 
description of partially integrated Amalgamated Security Communities.  
3-6. (b.) 3. Defense Cooperation and Integration 
 There is security cooperation between the KRG and the Government of Iraq and some integration 
of Peshmerga forces with Iraqi national forces.  After the ouster of Saddam a significant number of 
Peshmerga were integrated into the Iraqi Army.  The Iraqi Army 2nd and 4th Divisions were initially more 
than eighty percent Kurdish and the 3rd Division had almost forty percent Kurdish soldiers.  The Iraqi 
government adopted a policy in 2007 of trying to ethnically balance its units so the percentages are not as 
great today, however significant portions of numerous units include forces that were Peshmerga.736  
Peshmerga units were also dispatched at the request of the central government to help stabilize areas 
outside of Kurdistan several of times in the past.  It has been noted that the Iraqi Army and Peshmerga 
nearly opened fire on each other in several incidents in 2008 and 2009 and that tensions remain strained 
with three party patrols in contested areas, and DOD recognizes the tensions in ‘ethnically mixed and 
resource rich areas.’ Part of the problem was that the 12th Iraqi Army Division Commander was accused 
of having supported Saddam’s operations against the Kurds and of being anti-Kurdish.737  The 
arrangement to ease tensions and save face for both sides is the anticipated placement of the 15th and 16th 
Peshmerga Mountain Divisions under Iraqi Army command.  The 15th Mountain Division (KDP 
                                                 
735 Speech by Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, Erbil, 30 May 2007. Available from 
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Forces (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 2009), 121-125. 
737  Ibid., 125-126.  
 261
Peshmerga) is in the Ninawa province and the 16th Mountain Division (PUK Peshmerga) is the in Kirkuk 
and Diyala provinces.  These units are already the ones conducting the joint three party patrols.  A key 
consideration for the KRG is that when the two divisions come under control of the Iraqi Army they 
would be funded by the central government providing significant fiscal relief to the KRG.  Other security 
cooperation between the KRG and central government includes KRG ‘Zerevani’ paramilitary police 
forces participating in Carbinieri training with the Iraqi Federal Police, as well as a division sized element 
of Peshmerga who guard the external border of Iraq with Iran and Turkey (Kurdistan) as part of the Iraqi 
Department of Border Enforcement (they nominally report to the Department of Border Enforcement but 
are effectively under KRG control).738   
  The Peshmerga forces respond to the KRG not the central government. 
“The KRG receives 17 percent of the Iraqi budget and maintains its own MOI and MOD and runs 
its own military, paramilitary, and police forces almost entirely independent of central 
government or Coalition supervision.  The KRG maintains police units as well as army brigades 
independent of the ISF.” 739 (Iraqi Security Forces)    
The Peshmerga force estimates vary widely because the KRG and particularly the KDP do not openly 
reveal the status of their armed forces.  Estimates are that there are possibly up to 200,000 Peshmerga.  
This includes 30,000 ‘Zerevani’ paramilitary police and 12,000 border guards.   The 15th and 16th 
Peshmerga Mountain Divisions that may transfer to Iraqi Army control have a combined troop level of 
almost 30,000 (14,750 Peshmerga each).  The remainder of the force is organized as brigades with 
possibly another 70,000 Peshmnerga.740   The PUK forces were divided into organized and semi-
organized units with the organized units being at a higher level of training and readiness.  Although the 
Peshmerga was created as an infantry guerrilla force equipped with small arms, mortars and RPG’s, it has 
evolved to become a more conventional army.  The KRG was able to capture a significant amount of 
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military equipment after the fall of Saddam and the Peshmerga forces now include substantial artillery 
forces, mechanized infantry and some armored units.  The organized PUK units included a mechanized 
brigade composed of a tank battalion and two mechanized infantry battalions; as well as three anti-tank 
battalions, three tank destroyer battalions, six artillery battalions, a machine gun battalion, engineer 
battalion, and a scout battalion that serves as the Presidential Security force.  The semi-organized 
Peshmerga provided up to sixteen infantry brigades. There were also PUK troops assigned to the Ministry 
of Peshmerga Affairs that included an additional two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, two 
military intelligence battalions as well as training academies.741  The KDP forces are considered to be 
roughly similar.  These are not insignificant forces, and are usually highly regarded.     
 The KRG has taken steps to integrate the KDP and PUK Peshmerga forces in response to both 
internal Kurdish political pressures as well as the tensions with the central government.  The provincial 
KRG election in June 2009 saw a new party (Gorran or ‘Change’ Party) make considerable gains at the 
expense of the PUK.  Partly to shore up the KDP-PUK governing alliance the central government deputy 
prime minister from the PUK (Mr. Barham Sahih) became the new KRG Prime Minister.742   The KDP 
has no interest in the fracture of the PUK and the power sharing arrangement that has brought stability to 
Kurdistan.  Therefore, facing external and internal pressures the KRG President Massoud Barzani 
announced the integration of Peshmerga forces into one unified army under the control of KRG Ministry 
of Peshmerga Affairs in November of 2009.  The concept pushed forward by the KDP leader Barzani 
includes the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs being run by an official from the PUK, an indication that this 
is meant to bind the two major factions and preserve their alliance.  It also would enable the KRG to 
better resist any moves by the central government.  The draft law that would govern this merger has two 
interesting aspects.  First, political parties and religious entities are prohibited from having any armed 
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forces, all unauthorized militia forces (not under jurisdiction of the KRG MOI or MOD) are prohibited, 
and the armed forces are to be apolitical. The second aspect is that the law references the duty of the 
Peshmerga forces and the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs’ duty to defend Kurdistan-Iraq, not Iraqi 
Kurdistan.743  There is no mention in the law of any duty to defend Iraq.  There is also a clear indication 
that despite the proposed handover of authority over the 15th and 16th Peshmerga Mountain Divisions to 
Iraqi Army control that the remainder of the Peshmerga will not integrate with the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) controlled by the central government.  The Secretary General for Peshmerga Affairs, Mahmoud al-
Sangawi (PUK), in an interview stated that:  
The Peshmerga forces will not be integrated into the Iraqi army, but the two parties’ forces – the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Masoud al-Barazani, and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani, will be unified and renamed the Kurdistan Region 
Border Guard. Division number 16, which protects the area extending from Khaneqin to Ridar, 
and division number 15, which protects everything between Ridar, Badinan and Mosul, are under 
the command of the Iraqi army and receive their military instructions from Baghdad. The rest of 
the border guard will be under the command of the regional presidency and the Kurdistan 
parliament. If the central government wants to use these troops for any purpose, it must obtain 
approval from both the parliament and the regional president.”744  
 
This provides an indication that the partial Amalgamated Security Community between the KDP and 
PUK seems to be getting stronger while the partial Amalgamated Security Community between the KRG 
and the central government in Iraq remains weak.  In this example the end result is not clear but the 
dangers of multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to generate military capabilities would seem to be 
abundantly clear.    
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Chapter 4.  Cases of Amalgamated Security Community failures;  
       failure to form and failure by disintegration.   
 
4-1. Introduction p. 264 
4-2. (a). History of the Hanseatic League. p. 266 
4-2. (b). The Government p. 273 
4-2. (c). Defense Cooperation p. 279 
4-2. (d). Review of the Hanseatic League as a potential ASC that failed to form. p. 280 
4-3. Zollverein Parliament. 283 
4-4. ASC Failure by Disintegration; review of state disintegration literature. p. 285 
4-5. Yugoslavia p. 288 
4-5. (a).  History of Yugoslavia Post World War II. p. 289 
4-5. (b). The Government p. 305 
4-5. (b). 1. The 1974 Constitution. p. 305 
4-5. (b). 2. Military as part of the political structure. p. 306 
4-5. (b). 3. Military and Economy p. 307 
4-5. (b). 4. Legitimacy and the Military. p. 308 
4-5. (b). 5. Government Structure and Ethnic Identity. p. 309 
4-5. (b). 6. Government Structure and ASC Failure. p. 312 
4-5. (c). Defense Integration & Disintegration p. 313 
4-5. (c). 1. 1945 to 1968. p. 313 
4-5. (c). 2. 1969 – 1989 Creation of a partially amalgamated ASC. p. 315 
4-5. (c). 3. 1990 -1991. Disintegration of the Yugoslav ASC. p. 326 
4-5. (d). Measuring Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities and 
the capacity to produce military capability p. 327 
4-6. Czechoslovakia: Peaceful Dissolution of an ASC p. 333 
4-6. (a). History of Czechoslovakia’s Breakup p.334 
4-6. (b). The Government p. 342 
4-6. (c). Defense and Level of Integration p. 346 
4-6. (d). The Pivotal Point. p. 352 
4-6. (e). Summary of Czechoslovakian case p. 355 
4-1. Introduction   
This chapter investigates how Amalgamated Security Communities fail.  There are two types of 
failure. First there is the failure to form; potential ASCs that do not coalesce.  It is important to investigate 
this aspect in order to isolate the independent variable (degree of military integration) from other potential 
alternative explanations for the integration of ASCs.  These include integration based on economic or 
political factors that would occur without military integration and should enable the rejection of potential 
alternative explanations such as Federalism, Functionalism, Transactionalism, and Neo-functionalism. 
These are examples where voluntary integration occurred in one area but the integration process was 
stymied by a lack of military integration.  The danger here is to prevent the argument presented in this 
paper from becoming simply a definitional argument; i.e. because Amalgamated Security Communities 
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require some degree of military integration, a lack of military integration indicates there is no ASC.   To 
preclude this, it is important to look at examples where there was the potential to form an ASC initially 
through mechanisms such as economics and politics rather than military integration and where military 
integration could have been the result rather than the cause of ASC formation.  A strong case would 
include the failure of an ASC to form even though that potential ASC may have engaged in successful 
military conflicts.   
Hansa. This is the case of the Hansiatic League which arose from the desires of merchants for 
trade advantages and was focused on economic gains; specifically trade rights.  Even though the Hansiatic 
League engaged in successful military conflicts (at one point defeating Denmark) and had a quasi-
governmental council, it lacked military integration and failed to form an Amalgamated Security 
Community based on economic or political factors.  Another example mentioned in a previous chapter 
was the attempt to use the Zollverein Parliament created by Prussia to leverage economic integration to 
advance political integration, but instead was used by factions opposed to unification to stymie efforts at 
integration.   
The second type of failure is the disintegration of Amalgamated Security Communities.  Previous 
chapters have presented cases that demonstrate how Amalgamated Security Communities are formed by 
the integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability, as well as the 
instability and danger stemming from partial integration, in which multiple jurisdictions retain the 
capacity to produce military capability.  This paper argues that this process is the mirror image of state 
dissolution.  During Amalgamated Security Community formation the key act is security integration 
which is a tipping point.  This chapter investigates state dissolution in which the key act is security 
disintegration as sub-state elements establish an independent capacity to generate military capability.  The 
examination of this problem is important because it should demonstrate the mirror image of the formation 
of ASCs as they break up through the dissolution of integrated military capabilities and the capacity to 
produce military capability.  This would demonstrate that the independent variable has validity not only in 
terms of the virtuous cycle of identity formation as an ASC coalesces but also in the vicious cycle of 
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creating divisions and differentiating between what constitutes us and other as former brothers-in-arms 
become separated from each other.  A clear and recent example is the case of the breakup of Yugoslavia.  
This case is an important test of the strength of the proposed theory for ASC disintegration due to the 
number of well established alternative explanations for the breakup of Yugoslavia. Finally, 
Czechoslovakia provides a critical case because there is no apparent connection to any military dis-
integration during the “Velvet Divorce”. If a clear connection to military dis-integration is found, 
particularly decisions made prior to the breakup, then the second half of the argument of this study should 
be seen to be quite strong and the null hypothesis completely rejected. 
4-2. (a). History of the Hanseatic League.   
The expression Hanseatic League is actually a misnomer since the hanseatic towns never actually formed 
a league (bund in German). Several scholars favor using "community," as the word that best expresses the 
loose structure and lack of clear-cut organization which characterized the Hansa.745  However, the loose 
and ill defined organization had an existence that lasted for about four hundred years with the final 
Hanseatic Diet meeting in 1669.  The word Hansa itself denotes a nonspecific crowd or community as 
well as money paid to common fund or an armed group formed to protect traders.  The development of 
the ‘Hanseatic League’ had its origins in fraternal organizations (Hense) of traveling German merchants 
that formed to reduce the risk of trade and travel, and to protect their interests in foreign ports.  Historians 
note that there was a major transition from a Hansa of individual German merchants to a Hansa of towns.  
The German city of Lübeck became the leading city of the Hanseatic League after it was declared an 
Imperial City in 1226 which left the city free to pursue its interests locally.  Initially its economic interests 
were Baltic herring fisheries but that expanded to trade with Hamburg along the 'salt road' that ran to 
Kiel.746  The Hansa’s initial rise to wealth and power was based on its control of the portage at the 
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Holstein isthmus between Lübeck and Hamburg which was the main route between the Baltic and North 
Seas in a period when ships were unwilling to sail through the treacherous Straits of Denmark.  This 
monopoly on Baltic trade was the basis for their wealth.747  The cities of Lübeck and Hamburg forged 
close ties in activities besides trade.  By 1230 these two cities established the use of a common law 
between them and in 1241 adopted an agreement for mutual protection.748   Between 1260 and 1264 there 
were decrees sent out “in support of all merchants who are governed by the law of Lübeck.” 749  These 
decrees were to be binding for a year until the cities had the opportunity to respond and the next year in 
1265 a decision was made to hold an annual meeting “to legislate about the affairs of the cities.”750  This 
indicates the ambition of the towns to take over the role of protecting German merchants and shows the 
shift towards a Hansa of towns.751   These decrees were obviously concerned with providing protection to 
merchants, but they also clearly deal with the expected behavior of the members in case of war, and that 
the community needed to establish some sort of common governing body.  While most Hansa towns were 
within the Holy Roman Empire, imperial government tended to be extremely weak in North Germany.  
This lack of government left the Hansa towns with the burden of providing for their own defense and 
charting their own foreign policy.  This meant that the member towns of the Hanseatic League functioned 
to a large extent as ‘city-states,’ exerting their influence throughout North Germany and the Baltic.752    
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As the shift towards a Hansa of towns was occurring there was an expansion of foreign Hansa 
trading posts (called Kontor).  This expansion included new towns created during the German crusades 
and towns set up in Prussia, Pomerania, and Mecklenburg, as well as establishing trading posts and 
obtaining trading concessions in outlying areas such as Russia, Poland, Norway, Sweden, Flanders, and 
England.753  The trading post community of German merchants in London called the "Hansa Almaniae" 
was an important merger of merchants from Cologne and the Rhineland, with the Baltic merchants led by 
Lübeck.  Some scholars point to the creation of a truly German Hansa in London as the point where 
Cologne recognized the leadership of Lübeck in the Hansa.754  Hansa merchants had the right to trade in 
all the markets in England without paying customary taxes and were protected by English law as special 
permanent residents (granted denizenship) with freedom from general arrest.  An official of the Hansa 
shared municipal authority as an alderman of London and also exercised judicial power between Hansa 
members, and in cases between Hansa merchants and Englishmen.755  The London Hansa (the Steelyard) 
demonstrates the considerable influence and privilege a Hansa Kontor had locally as well as the merger of 
regional associations into a larger community.  The development of a wide spread community headed by 
Lübeck can be seen in 1293 when Lübeck was named by the Novgorod Kontor as its judicial court of 
appeals.756  The Hansa had three regional groups; Lübeck leading the Wendish towns and the Saxons, the 
Rhenish with the Westphalian and Prussian towns, and finally Gotland with Livonia and Sweden.757  The 
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larger community came together as a Diet (Hansetag) in 1358 in Lübeck.  This is the formal start of the 
Hanseatic League’s rise to power and prominence in Europe.758   
 Prior to the first Hansetag in 1358, the Hanseatic towns had already achieved a number of 
military successes.759  The crucial fight however, was against King Waldemar IV of Denmark who had 
attacked Hanseatic towns and trade.  Delegates from the major Hanseatic towns (over 70 towns) met in 
Cologne in November 1367.  The assembly decided to create a Confederation (verbund) called the 
‘Confederation of Cologne’ that lasted until 1385.  The Hansetag wrote specific measures in the act that 
created the confederation such as funding the conflict through an additional customs duty in all ports 
(specified in each currency then in use), naming the required military contributions of each town and 
when they would depart as well as the rendezvous area for the attack on Denmark.  Those towns not 
providing military forces were to provide financial support.  Towns that did not support the war were to 
be expelled from the league and suffer an embargo of their ships, goods and merchants.  The Cologne 
Confederation then entered alliances with Mecklenburg, Sweden, and the Count of Holstein along with 
some Danish nobles who rebelled against King Waldemar.  The Cologne Confederation raised a military 
force larger than the one called for by the Hansetag and was prepared to attack in April 1368.  The 
conflict lasted through the summer with the Danes being defeated everywhere.  Copenhagen and its port 
were destroyed, Jutland was attacked by the Count of Holstein, and Scania was overrun by the Swedes.  
The Hanseatic forces, led by the son of Lübeck’s burgomaster, were able to sack and plunder Danish 
towns at will.  The Danish state council was forced to sue for peace and a treaty was signed in May 1370 
at Stralsund.  The Peace of Stralsund was high-water mark for the Hanseatic League in terms of its 
military power. The Hansa did not impose new trade privileges but was content with restoring the status 
quo ante bellum; except trade privileges applied to the Cologne Confederation as a whole not to 
individual towns.  Denmark had to pay compensation for 15 years and the fortresses controlling the 
Sound (Öresund), were held by the Cologne Confederation giving the Hansa control of the main 
                                                 
758 Postel, “The Hanseatic League and its Decline.”  See Also; Halliday. “The First Common Market?”, 31-37.  
759 Helen Zimmern, The Hansa Towns (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889), 50.  
 270
waterway between the Baltic and the North Sea.  Denmark had to seek approval of the Cologne 
Confederation when selecting a new King involving The Hansa directly in choosing a sovereign prince.760   
The Peace of Stralsund marked the Hanseatic League as a major power, since it had raised large fleets and 
armies, directed the operations of its armed forces, and won a military victory over an important kingdom.  
It also preserved the Hanseatic League’s monopoly on trade in the Baltic.  Despite the advantages gained 
by close cooperation, the Cologne Confederation did not last beyond the fifteen years that it controlled the 
fortresses on the Sound.  The Cologne Confederation had the potential to become a permanent 
organization.  Its members however, were not sure that they should remain so tightly bound to each other 
in a political and military alliance in the absence of an imminent threat.  The Hansa was concerned with 
trade privileges and commercial interests, not in conquest.761  In fact the Hansa tried for the most part to 
use economic measures and refrain from armed conflict as being bad for business using embargoes in 
1388 against Russia, Flanders, and England simultaneously to enforce their demands rather than resort to 
armed conflict.762  However, there were numerous occasions in which the Hanseatic League or portions of 
it did fight.   
Denmark and the Hanseatic League fought another war from 1425 to 1435 which caused division 
between different parts of the Hansa since the Prussian and Livonian towns didn’t participate.  The 
Hanseatic League regained all its privileges in Denmark and Norway in the Peace of Vordingborg.763  
Competition and tensions over commercial and trade interests were most pronounced with English and 
Netherlands merchants and the Hanseatic League fought them both. The conflict with the Netherlands 
came in 1438 after the Hollanders, who resented Hanseatic trade restrictions and had been raiding Hansa 
shipping, seized a Hanseatic salt fleet.  The Hanseatic League blockaded the Sound and stopped the grain 
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shipments to the Low Countries. The Prussian towns refused to participate militarily.  The turning point 
in the conflict was diplomatic.  The King of Denmark (who had reason to oppose the Hansa) allowed the 
Netherlands merchants equal trade rights with the Hansa in Denmark.  The Hanseatic League was forced 
to agree to the Treaty of Copenhagen in 1441 in which the Netherlands and Hanseatic League recognized 
each other’s rights to trade freely and without obstacles to navigation.  After this point the Netherlands 
merchants expanded their trade in the Baltic as the Hansa’s share of the trade slowly declined.764 
 The conflict with England occurred after decades of commercial competition, diplomatic tension, 
back and forth trade restrictions, and piracy.765  When the Danes seized an English fleet, the English 
blamed the Hanseatic League and in July 1468 all Hanseatic merchants in England were arrested and their 
goods seized.  Cologne moved to protect its interests in England and made a separate deal to preserve its 
trade and disassociated itself from the Hanseatic League in England.  Cologne instructed its merchants not 
to lend money or provide bonds for the other German merchants.  Cologne decided not to attend the 
Hansetag in 1469 and its merchants in London were to form their own council and to correspond with 
English officials as merchants from Cologne; not as the community of German merchants.  The intent 
was to obtain all the Hanseatic trade privileges for Cologne by itself.  This succeeded and Cologne 
received the Hanseatic trade privileges through 1471 despite being warned in 1470 by the Hansetag that it 
faced expulsion from the Hanseatic League if it did not abide by collective decision making.  On 1 April 
1471 Cologne was expelled from the Hanseatic League.  The Hanseatic League at the same time found 
itself at war with France over the ownership of a vessel in Danzig and various acts of piracy.  The conflict 
with England (and France) was primarily fought at sea with Hanseatic League privateers having success 
but their fleets being defeated by both England and France.  The Duke of Burgundy worked to mediate 
the conflict first with France and then with England; the result was the 1474 Treaty of Utrecht.  Under the 
Treaty of Utrecht the Hanseatic League’s trade privileges were confirmed, all buildings in London and in 
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other markets were returned to be owned freely by the Hanseatic League. The treaty guaranteed the 
operation of the Steelyard for the next hundred years until Elizabeth I closed it permanently.  The other 
outcome was the isolation and humiliation of Cologne.  Cologne was forced to beg to be readmitted to the 
Hanseatic League and to pay the penalties imposed by the Hansetag held in Bremen in 1476, as well as to 
pay damages to the Bruges Kontor and London Steelyard caused by its actions.766            
The Treaty of Utrecht was the last major success for the Hanseatic League.  By the end of the 
fifteenth century it not only faced commercial competition but opposition from newly forming states who 
resented the trading privileges of foreign Hanseatic League merchants.  Another indicator of the decline 
of the Hanseatic League was a lapse in participation.  The Hansetag in 1518 expelled thirty one towns for 
lack of participation.767  This reflects a gradual decline in Hanseatic League membership that continued 
through its end in 1669.  An attempt to restore the Hanseatic League militarily was undertaken when 
Reformation supporters made Jürgen Wullenwever the Mayor of Lübeck in 1533. He attempted to 
exclude the Netherlands and English merchants from the Baltic, tried to restrict cargoes in the Baltic to 
Hansa vessels, as well as prevent the Netherlands from obtaining shipbuilding technology developed in 
Lübeck and Danzig.  Other Hansa towns did not support Lübeck which fought the Hollanders at sea 
alone.  Jürgen Wullenwever then involved Lübeck in the Civil War in Denmark (called the Counts War) 
which had some initial success but after defeats on land and at sea Lübeck sued for peace and 
Wullenwever was captured by his enemies and executed.768   This setback for Lübeck did not end the 
Hanseatic League and it recovered a good bit of its trade during the conflict between the Low Countries 
and Spain.  There was a move to try and reverse the decline of the Hanseatic League which was done by 
attempts at reorganization and strengthening of institutions.  There were two main actions taken to 
implement stronger institutions.  The first was the appointment in 1556 of a “Syndic of the Hansa” (chief 
advocate or lawyer) which was the first Hansa official.  The duties were to set the agenda for the 
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Hansetags and to deal with issues between sessions; functions that had been handled by the Lübeck 
council.  This position remained until the end of the Hanseatic League.769  The other act was the creation 
of a constitution by the Hansetag of 1557 which was to establish a confederation to last for ten years.  The 
constitution was sealed by the four regional leading tows of the Hansa (Cologne, Lübeck, Brunswick, and 
Danzig) and accepted by sixty three towns at the diet.  It was mostly a reiteration of previously accepted 
ordinances including common military action against aggressors.  There was an attempt to set up regular 
annual financial contributions, the lack of a common treasury hampered attempts to establish regular 
finances.  The previous method of a town advancing funds hoping to be repaid continued to be 
unsuccessful and although a treasury was established in 1612 it never had the resources to function as a 
funding mechanism for the Hanseatic League.  Another measure of institutional strengthening was an 
increase in the number of Hansetags, which met almost every year from the mid-1550s to 1621.770    The 
Thirty Years War ended any chance of a renewed Hanseatic League.  With the war devastating large 
portions of Northern Europe the Hansetag authorized Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg to act for the entire 
Hansa in 1629.  These towns in pursuit of reviving the Hanseatic League at the end of the war managed to 
be included in 1648 in both the peace negotiations that resulted in the Peace of Munster between Spain 
and the Netherlands as well as in the Treaty of Westphalia.  The inclusion of the Hanseatic League in the 
Treaty of Westphalia was the first mention of it in any official document of the Holy Roman Empire.  It 
really marked the end of the league however, since no Hansetag met until 1669 because of lack of 
attendance. At that time only six towns attended, nothing was decided, and it was the last Hansetag and 
the end of the Hanseatic League.771        
4-2. (b). The Government 
 The Hanseatic League had no explicit founding charter and no formal fixed list of members.  This 
lack of organizational specificity was beneficial to the Hanseatic League given the time and area in which 
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they operated.  Although some founding members were Imperial cities in the Holy Roman Empire owing 
allegiance only to the Emperor, most other towns within the Empire had other rulers and lords to contend 
with.  The Holy Roman Empire’s capacity for governance was quite weak in Northern Germany which 
left many of these towns operating as de facto city-states and for the most part the Hanseatic League was 
ignored by the Empire.772  On the other hand, associations, confederations, leagues, conspiracies and pacts 
between cities were prohibited by the law of the Empire; The Diet of Worms 1231 and the Golden Bull of 
1356.773  This provided a good reason to be non-specific about organization and membership.  Another 
reason was that specific lists of members could be used by enemies to apply pressure against specific 
towns and divide the Hanseatic League or to hold all of them liable for the actions of a few.  A clear 
example is the accusation by England’s King Edward IV when he arrested the Hansa merchants in 1468 
that the Hansa “was a society, cooperative or corporation, originating from a joint agreement and alliance 
of several towns and villages, being able to form contracts and being liable as joint debtors for the 
offences of single members.”774 
The Lübeck syndic responded to Edward IV that:  
“The Hansa was neither a society nor a corporation, it owned no joint property, no joint till, no 
executive officials of their own; it was a tight alliance of many towns and communities to pursue 
their respective own trading interests securely and profitably. The Hansa was not ruled by 
merchants, every town having its own ruler. It also had no seal of its own, as sealing was done by 
the respective issuing town. The Hansa had no common council, but discussions were held by 
representatives of each town. There even was no obligation to take part in the Hansa meetings 
and there were no means of coercion to carry through their decisions.”775  
Therefore, the Hanseatic League could not be held corporately liable. This deliberately ambiguous 
posture was a legal defense.  In addition this lack of definition allowed the widest use possible of 
Hanseatic trade privileges by German merchants in foreign countries whose membership was difficult to 
determine.   
                                                 
772 Rotz, “The Lubeck Uprising of 1408 and the Decline of the Hanseatic League,” 2.  See Also; Johanek, “Imperial 
and Free Towns of the Holy Roman Empire,” 304.  
773 Zimmern, The Hansa Towns, 43. See Also; “The Golden Bull of the Emperor Charles IV 1356 A.D.” The 
Avalon Project, Yale Law School. Available from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/medieval/golden.asp Internet; accessed 
20 September 2010. 
774 Postel, “The Hanseatic League and its Decline.” 
775 Ibid.  See Also; Johanek, “Imperial and Free Towns of the Holy Roman Empire,” 304. 
 275
There was however, some organization to the Hanseatic League as a corporate body.  
Membership, while varying, was primarily a corporate matter with admission of a city requiring approval 
of the Hansetag and expulsion also being based on the decision of the Hansetag.  The exception was 
individual cities unilaterally leaving the Hanseatic League and a one time appointment of the city of 
Neuss as a Hansa member by imperial decree. The most widely accepted figure is that the Hanseatic 
League had slightly over seventy main ‘active’ cities and about one hundred and eighty ‘associate towns’ 
that enjoyed Hansa privileges and were represented by a nearby large member city. Citizenship became 
an issue and only citizens of Hansa towns were supposed to enjoy Hanseatic trade privileges. However, 
after foreign merchants began to move to Hansa towns to become citizens for trade purposes, citizenship 
was redefined to mean only those born in Hansa towns with merchants being given certificates to prove 
citizenship.  Also, to prevent merchants from small towns from falsely claiming Hansa privileges, the 
major cities were the only ones competent to provide certificates of Hanseatic membership.  This left the 
issue of membership of small towns up to the large cities. There was one member of the Hanseatic 
League that was not a city or town and that was the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. He was the only 
sovereign prince who was a member and he also had a number of towns under his control who were also 
members.776  The other important note about the Hanseatic League is that the member towns were ruled 
for the most part by patrician families along with the commercial interests. It was Hanseatic League 
policy to support the ruling class of town councils and it expelled towns for falling under control of 
popular governments after uprisings such as the Brunswick uprising of 1374 or when subjugated by a 
territorial prince.777   
The obvious corporate institution of the Hanseatic League was the Hansetag. From 1356 it was 
the decision making body for the Hansa.  Although there were also regional diets which met more often 
those did not consider issues for the Hanseatic League as a whole.  The Hansetag had the authority to 
decide as the supreme body all issues related to foreign affairs such as; ratifying treaties, dispatching 
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embassies and  negotiations with foreign entities, issues of war and peace, embargoes and blockades.  It 
was also the supreme body for financial and military issues; economic regulations; admission or 
expulsion of members; and acted as a mediator in disputes between towns.  Its ability to raise funds 
through imposition of additional customs duties to fund military operations demonstrated significant 
power. Only the seventy main members or cities of Hanseatic League had the ability to send 
representatives.  The representatives to the Hansetag followed instructions from their town councils based 
on what the announced agenda was supposed to be. These towns were the ones that had to provide 
military forces or financial contributions when needed.  The Hansetag also could impose fines on 
members and representatives including fines for being late, leaving early or being absent from the 
Hansetag altogether.  Attendance at the Hansetag however, was seen as a financial burden so there were 
usually much less than seventy towns represented. Hanesetags also did not have a set meeting location 
although the majority of them did take place in Lübeck.  There was also no set date or interval for the 
Hansetag. The average for the fourteenth century was little less than once a year and in the fifteenth 
century it was once every three years.  This can be attributed to the workings of the regional bodies that 
took care of local issues and so the Hansetags were only called when issues affected the Hanseatic League 
as a whole.  Absences were however, a continual problem not only due to cost but also because non-
attendance at diets was used by towns where issues were likely to go against them as a way to avoid 
unpleasant decisions.778     
The Hansetag however, did not have its own administrative element and the Hanseatic League 
did not have any official until the appointment in 1556 of a Hanseatic syndic.  How then did the Hanseatic 
League function?  It functioned because the city of Lübeck performed the functions of administration and 
executive leader of the Hanseatic League during the time between meetings of the Hansetag.  Not only 
was it the leader of the Hanseatic League from the beginning, but in 1418 Lübeck was asked to oversee 
the interests of the Hanseatic League which partly accounts for the decreased frequency of the Hansetags 
in the fifteenth century.  Lübeck almost always took the initiative in calling and setting the date for the 
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Hansetags.  Lübeck’s council would send invitations not only to member cities but to the Kontors and 
other guests including bishops, princes, and even the Emperor.779  The adoption of a constitution by the 
Hansetag of 1557 that created a confederation for ten years along with the establishment of regular 
financial contributions and a common treasury (despite being ineffective) indicate at least an attempt to 
create some minimal level of organization for the Hanseatic League.     
Regulation is an important function of government and it is clear that the Hanseatic League 
established a large volume of regulations.  Given that most of its trade was done by ship, the extensive 
scope of Hanseatic regulation can easily be seen in commercial regulation, shipbuilding standards, and 
regulation of the merchant marine.  The Hanseatic League determined the size and seaworthiness 
construction parameters for shipbuilders, required all its ships to be armed setting fixed rules for the 
military equipment and the number of sailors per ship.  As convoys became common it published 
regulations for sailing in fleets that would force them to stay together.  The Hanseatic League adopted 
detailed regulations governing the relationship and duties of sailors and captains, as well as the methods 
of execution of freight contracts by the captains including unloading times and freight claims.  The 
Hanseatic League also supported navigation aids (lighthouses and buoys) and mandated the use of pilots 
when entering and leaving harbors. It protected shipping by suspending sailing during the winter, 
mandated a clear draught line to prevent overloading, and required captains and crews assist ships in 
danger.  Other regulations covered jettison of cargo, plundering of ships by pirates, and rights of 
salvage.780   
 The problem with Hanseatic League regulation was the same problem faced by Hanseatic League 
policy; defection based on self interest (i.e. problems of collective action).  Enforcement of regulation and 
policy was up to the member towns but since towns could be fined, sanctioned, or even expelled, they 
would for the most part comply.  This fear of economic sanction not only worked to maintain policy and 
regulation within the Hanseatic League but was used through out the history of the Hanseatic League to 
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force compliance with Hanseatic demands by foreign countries.  So although there was no central 
administration there seems to have been sufficient mechanisms to overcome problems of collective action 
for the majority of issues.  The Hanseatic League was not sovereign and could not command obedience, 
but in filling the political and economic vacuum in North Germany it did perform governmental 
functions.781 
Was there a potential for the Hanseatic League to unite?  First, there were other contemporary 
groups that formed Amalgamated Security Communities such as the Swiss and the Dutch.  Although the 
leadership of the Hanseatic League has been categorized as conservative782, the Cologne Confederation 
demonstrated the potential for unity and the Confederation of 1557 confirmed the desire of significant 
elements to achieve greater unity.  There were other efforts within the Hanseatic League such as the 
‘Tohopesate’ which was a three-year defensive alliance of 38 towns against internal and external threats 
formed in 1443 in response to pressure from territorial princes and worked well enough to be renewed 
through 1451.783  The most promising missed opportunity however, was in 1418 as the Hanseatic League 
recovered from the 1408 uprising in Lübeck which effectively left the League without its leadership 
during an eight year period.  The towns decided that they wanted to come closer together and in 1417 
Lübeck formed an alliance with the other Wendish towns.  The Hansetag in 1418 was attended by a large 
number of towns from all three geographic regions as well as representatives from the Teutonic Order, the 
Emperor, Archbishop of Bremen, and the Dukes of Schleswig and Mecklenburg.  This assembly drew up 
a ‘statute’ which was a draft Hansa charter with thirty two articles which mostly restated previous 
policies.  However a type of Hanseatic League military alliance of forty towns that listed not only how 
many men at arms and crossbowmen each was to provide but also the method for their mobilization was 
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proposed.  The Teutonic Order rejected the plan.784  There was no other proposal or act that would have 
united the Hanseatic League to where it could have formed an Amalgamated Security Community.      
4-2. (c). Defense Cooperation 
The Hanseatic League (or portions of it) was involved in numerous military operations; 
particularly naval actions.  Their naval forces were usually comprised of armed merchant ships, although 
Lübeck at one point possessed the largest warship in the world (the war galleon Adler von Lübeck).785 
Militarily the Hanseatic League was a coalition of the willing.  The Hanseatic League did not require 
unanimity or a majority vote to act.  This can be seen in the numerous sub-groupings, coalitions, and 
alliances among different towns within the Hanseatic League that engaged in military actions at different 
times. Towns that decided to act consulted each other and after deciding who supported the decision and 
who would not participate they would form a coalition and execute whatever was to be done militarily.  
Those towns not participating would be exempted from the belligerents. This was the case several times 
between the Prussian and Wendish towns.  However, this did weaken the bonds between the members of 
the Hanseatic League.  There was never any Hanseatic League army or navy.  The military forces of the 
Hansa were provided by the major cities as needed for specific campaigns.  The only really joint aspect 
was the common funding mechanism of extra customs duties and financial contributions from towns that 
could not provide troops.  Cities provided ships and troops (including mercenaries) and the combined 
force might be led by a single commander.  This was the case during several campaigns such as the ones 
against King Waldemar that were led by commanders from Lübeck.  Lübeck usually did provide the 
command for operations, but there were also operations undertaken by other cities such as fleets from 
Danzig.  The Hanseatic League did undertake numerous military operations but the most that can be 
observed is close military cooperation in several conflicts and general or loose cooperation in others.  
There was no integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability between 
the members of the Hansa and there was no formation of an Amalgamated Security Community.   
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4-2. (d). Review of the Hanseatic League as a potential ASC that failed to form.   
Was the Hanseatic League a potential ASC?  First, it was definitely a community; in fact several scholars 
prefer to call it a community rather than a League.  It was a community focused on mutual commercial 
advantage.  It also absolutely was a security community that fought wars not only to advance its 
commercial interests but also in defense of the members of the community.  Second, there was at least an 
identifiable minimal common identity partly based on North German language and culture, not just on 
commercial ties, that was reinforced by over four hundred years of shared history.  This was expressed 
not only by citizenship requirements, but by common brick Gothic style of construction (step-gabled 
brick architecture) that is still extant in the old towns of former Hanseatic cities.786  Third, objections to 
the possibility that the Hanseatic League could have formed an Amalgamated Security Community 
include the lack of sovereignty of the member “city-states” who owed allegiance to multiple territorial 
princes and that the Hanseatic League was too dispersed and non-contiguous.  The answers to these 
objections is that other contemporary communities of the Dutch and Swiss, that were composed of 
entities that owed allegiance to different princes, managed to form their Amalgamated Security 
Communities, and that the Baltic and the rivers tied the Hanseatic League together in an era when 
waterways were the most rapid and efficient method of moving not only goods but moving and sustaining 
military forces as well.  The cities of the Hanseatic League would in that time have been closer together 
because of water transportation than most contemporary contiguous land based states.  Fourth, although it 
had a minimal organization it did function as a government; regulating commerce, negotiating treaties, 
imposing sanctions etc…  The Hanseatic League filled the economic and political power vacuum in 
Northern Germany.   There were attempts at several junctions to create a closer confederation; e.g. the 
constitution of 1557 and especially in 1418.  These were unsuccessful but how can the Hanseatic League 
be described?  Scholars have called it a ‘singular institution of the middle ages’, a ‘community of 
interests’, and an ‘organization that resembled a federation but lacked the legal elements of a federation’.  
                                                 
786 David Gaimster, “A Parallel History: The Archaeology of Hanseatic Urban Culture in The Baltic c.1200–1600.”  
World Archaeology 37, no. 3, (2005): 408 – 423. 
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A potential explanation is that the Hanseatic League was a Pluralistic Security Community.   Emmanuel 
Adler and Michael Barnett clearly indicate that the argument of neo-liberal intuitionalism, whereby 
international economic associations that encourage economic interchange also engenders international 
arrangements intended to produce security, is part of the development of security communities.  The 
development and leadership by ‘core states’ (in this case Lübeck. and Hamburg) of an organization to: 
facilitate trust, mutual accountability, institutionalize reciprocity, generate norms, identify common 
interests, produce charters and agendas, as well as convene meetings and provide protection to members, 
clearly indicates that the Hanseatic League was initially a “nascent pluralistic security community.”   It 
evolved over time to an “ascendant” community as networks of interaction deepened and there was a 
development of a collective identity that not only had a reasonable expectation of peaceful change but 
was ‘facilitated by the existence of common ideas of material progress and security” that could best be 
guaranteed by members of the community acting together. The Hanseatic League reached the level of a 
“mature” pluralistic security community. There was no expectation of using armed force against any 
member and clear differentiation between members and those outside the community.  There was clear 
multilateralism in which decision making procedures, conflict resolution and adjudication were based on 
consensual mechanisms.  Military planning was focused on external threats and when faced by a common 
enemy military action was undertaken jointly.  The Hanseatic League's ‘discourse and language of the 
community’ reflected community standards and the norms of the community. This included the common 
regulation of trade, shipbuilding and the merchant marine as well as negotiations and foreign policy.  The 
weakest element in the “mature” pluralistic security community of the Hanseatic League was in the 
common definition of threats.  Although they did not include each other as threats, foreign enemies were 
only agreed upon in some cases (e.g. the Danes in 1370, the Flemish and English in 1388) but in other 
conflicts, such as against the Dutch in 1441 and English in 1474, the Prussian towns did not participate 
and Cologne was expelled from the League.  Also the numerous sub-groupings and alliances such as the 
‘Tohopesate’ indicate that a common definition of a threat was a weakness.  The lack of solidarity in 
foreign policy and military affairs, and pursuit of individual rather than collective interest in terms of 
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threats and willingness to sacrifice militarily or financially within the collective security framework of the 
Hanseatic League, is recounted time and again as the chief weakness and sign of divisiveness within the 
league by numerous scholars.  There were some elements that mark a tightly coupled pluralistic security 
community in the history of the Hanseatic League.  There is obvious evidence of cooperative and 
collective security in the various conflicts it fought against external threats. There was clearly policy 
coordination against “internal” threats based on the Hanseatic League’s policy of support for patrician 
ruling councils of the towns and expulsion of towns that violated this policy and succumbed to popular 
uprisings.  The free movement of people and goods was one of the founding principles of the Hanseatic 
League.  It was in some ways a “Multiperspectival” polity in which rule was shared at the city-state 
(national), regional (transnational), and Hanseatic League (supranational) levels with certain functions 
reserved to each.  The Hanseatic League however, does not quite meet the criteria to be a tightly coupled 
pluralistic security community set forth by Adler and Barnett.787 Directly tied to the key weakness of the 
Hansa as a mature pluralistic security community to identify common threats and take common action in 
more than a few cases, is the lack of a high level of military cooperation.788  There was military 
cooperation in the Hanseatic League but it was on an intermittent basis with other clear cases of a lack of 
cooperation tied to the failure to consistently identify an external threat.  This was clearly an impediment 
to integration and did nothing to build trust or a common identity; rather it did the opposite and is noted 
as being part of the reason the Hanseatic League failed to remain united by many authors.  The Hanseatic 
League can therefore be described as being somewhere between a loosely coupled and tightly coupled 
pluralistic security community.  
To borrow a phrase, the business of the Hanseatic League was business, and despite having the 
ability to overcome many collective action problems, creating a pluralistic security community with a 
                                                 
787 Adler and Barnett eds., Security Communities, 50-57. 
788 This paper proposed that to be more precise and to create the conceptual space necessary for examining the 
process of creating Amalgamated Security Communities, it is necessary to modify this description of tightly coupled 
security communities by replacing - A high level of military integration with A high level of military cooperation in 
the criteria outlined by Adler and Barnett on pp. 56-57 of Security Communities.  Underlined word cooperation used 
by this author in place of integration in the original text. 
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common identity and culture, it failed to form as an Amalgamated Security Community primarily because 
its focus was on defending commercial interests not on defending against an external threat.  What the 
Swiss and Dutch examples have and the Hanseatic League lacked was a persistent common external 
threat that forced them to engage in at least a partial integration of military capabilities and the capacity to 
produce military capability to survive.  The Hansa lacked this impetus and remained focused on 
commercial interest which prevented the identification of a common enemy and subsequent integration.789 
At least in the case of the Hanseatic League economic integration does not lead to military integration and 
the formation of Amalgamated Security Communities. 
4-3. Zollverein Parliament.   
Another interesting example was the parliament created for the Zollverein almost concurrently 
with creation of the North German Confederation in June 1867.  This case is important because Germany 
was clearly a potential ASC that did form.  The Zollverein was a customs union of the German states that 
had been economically beneficial for the participants prior to the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and 
Zollverein Treaties were renewed immediately after the conflict.  In addition, following the Austro-
Prussian War, Berlin became a financial center. Bismarck supported the creation of a body to better 
manage the customs union.  Bismarck’s overriding goal however was German unification under the 
guidance of Prussia and he believed that a Zoll Parliament including representatives from both northern 
and southern Germany, elected by universal male suffrage, would create a community of interest that 
would remove prejudices against closer political union.  Bismarck based his calculation on the fact that 
chambers of commerce, trade associations, merchants, and industrialists all favored greater political 
                                                 
789 “Schisms and divisions were apt, above all, to take place when there was a question of beginning a war, as this 
could never be done without general approbation. Each town was inclined to throw the burden on its associates, for 
as each was solely preoccupied with its personal interests, and only entered into the League with a view to the 
profits it could thus obtain, there was always in the minds of the delegates a tacit reserve to make as few sacrifices as 
possible, and as time went on they were even ready to abandon their allies, and let the League perish if they did not 
find themselves directly benefited by any sacrifice demanded by the common weal.  What held them together at all 
was, in a word, nothing more noble or ideal than personal advantage, the fear through exclusion of losing the great 
advantages that accrued from being a member of the League.  No wonder that with an ambition so little exalted the 
Hansa was destined not to survive until our own day.” “The wonder is rather that seeing what motives animated its 
members, the defective character of the means at its disposal, such as the lack of a standing army, and the constant 
mutations in its form of government, it should have attained to such mighty results as we have roughly sketched in 
this …period of its existence.” Zimmern, The Hansa Towns, 206-208. 
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unification in Germany as being economically attractive (much the same way as standardization of 
regulations and transaction costs in the EU help foster commerce). Bismarck saw this as a way to make 
future political gains for bringing the southern states into the Prussian dominated North German 
Confederation and therefore supported the creation of a Zoll Parliament with jurisdiction over tariffs, 
commercial and navigation negotiations, and the regulation of excise taxes.   Bismarck wrote that 
“Everything depends on the direction and swiftness with which public opinion develops in southern 
Germany, and a fairly secure judgment about that will first become possible through the customs 
parliament.”790  Bismarck though it would follow the lead of the North German Confederation regarding 
citizenship and passports in addition to trade matters.  He thought it would have a natural growth that 
could over time produce a demand for closer union between the north and south.791   This hope was 
misplaced however, as the southern states harbored deep resentment of Prussia.  In the early 1868 
elections only 12 out of forty eight delegates from Bavaria and none of the delegates from Wurttemberg 
were in favor of union with the north and in Baden only a slight majority favored union.  It was a 
crushing defeat for the German nationalists.  The opposition from the southern states and resentful 
Hanover delegates along with others opposed to increased Prussian influence were able to block anything 
of significance regarding greater unification including a resolution backed by Baden and Hesse calling for 
unification of Germany and economic freedom.792  It is clear in this example that economic considerations 
and nationalist desires could not overcome political obstacles and local interests to form a German ASC.  
It was military integration that formed the German ASC, not economic integration.  
 In the process of looking for failures of potential Amalgamated Security Communities to form it 
became evident that there is a lack of empirical evidence (other cases) for any Amalgamated Security 
Community to have formed through a different mechanism that then resulted in political integration 
which caused subsequent military integration.  What history demonstrates empirically is that other forms 
                                                 
790 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871, (Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press, 1963). 395. 
791 Ibid. 
792 Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 15-20. 
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of integration without military integration fail to create ASCs.  Amalgamated Security Communities 
empirically are the result of military integration not the cause of military integration. This prevents the 
argument of this study from being simply definitional.  
4-4. ASC Failure by Disintegration; review of state disintegration literature 
 
 Before examining the failure of ASCs due to disintegration a brief review of work regarding the 
disintegration of states, especially in regard to revolution, which has a robust literature, is obligatory.  The 
1979 seminal work, “States and Social Revolutions” by Theda Skocpol, laid the foundation for further 
work on the subject by offering the state as an actor with its own interests, refuting Marx by proposing an 
autonomous state that is not simply a reflection of the power and will of the dominant social classes.  For 
Skocpol, social revolution involves social and political structural changes that occur as a result of 
different combinations of factors such as state-elite relations, military defeat, financial crisis, mobilization 
of rural and urban populations, which create political crises and the opportunity for revolution.  In her 
view a key contributing factor to the Russian revolution was the defeat and breakdown of the military 
organization in World War I that stripped the state of its monopoly on coercion and ability to suppress 
opposition and therefore lost legitimacy and popular support.  In China the creation of the ‘New Armies’ 
that were regionally based and supported by the provinces ended up being the basis of the 1911 revolt as 
well as the power base of warlords that fractured the country.  In addition the reliance of the Nationalist 
Chinese government on support from semi-autonomous former warlords was a crucial weakness.  In 
France administrative chaos and military breakdown (decentralization of the means of coercion) doomed 
the Ancien Régime.  Administrative and military breakdown is a key component of social revolution 
according to Skocpol.793  Skocpol later noted that what revolutionary regimes do best is to mobilize 
citizen support regardless of class for protracted international warfare.   
“if revolutionary leaders can find ways to link a war against foreigners to domestic power 
struggles, they may be able to tap into broad nationalist feelings as well as exploit class and 
political divisions in order to motivate supporters to fight and die on behalf of the new regime.”  
“The best evidence of this has been the enhanced ability of such revolutionized regimes to 
                                                 
793 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 
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conduct humanly costly wars with a special fusion of popular zeal, meritocratic professionalism, 
and central coordination.”794 
It is an interesting turn where military and administrative breakdown is a key component of social 
revolution but the revolutionary regimes that result are very capable militarily.  This is according to 
Skocpol because the methods and organizations developed in the revolutionary struggle are easily 
converted to mobilizing resources and people for waging war; i.e. generating military capabilities.  
Popular zeal and nationalist feelings generated by conflict with foreigners certainly includes affinity for 
fellow brothers-in-arms in the revolutionary military forces which becomes wide spread by mass military 
mobilization.  Mass military mobilization then must play a significant part in the construction of strong 
states with increased loyalty to the new regime.  Although not addressed directly it seems that this 
supports the proposed argument of this paper that military forces are key to the development of identity 
and new regimes; in this case revolutionary regimes and for the purposes of this paper Amalgamated 
Security Communities.        
Work by other scholars continued to investigate revolutions and state breakdowns and found that 
they do not come from any single source but are the result of a variety of combinations of convergent 
conditions that result in the failure of the administrative function of the state.  These converging 
conditions result in either popular uprisings or revolts by elites that cause the collapse of the state’s 
administrative capacity and replacement of one governing group by another.795  There are further concepts 
of the state as being more than just an administrative apparatus.  Mann who described four sources of 
                                                 
794 Theda Skocpol, “Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization,” World Politics 40, no. 2 (1988): 147-168. 
795 “Almost all the predominant theories of revolution are not very much concerned with how the state breaks down 
in the sense of being fragmented, and they tend to confine the issue of revolution largely to a question regarding the 
change of hands between social groups in controlling the state administrative apparatus.”  “To some extent, state 
fragmentation has been discussed in scholarly literature on secessionism or irredentism.  Relevant theories aimed at 
explaining the origins of ethnonationalist conflicts revolve around the demand for formal withdrawal from a host 
state, either by claiming independent sovereign status or by joining another existing state.” “Strictly speaking, 
theories of ethnonationalism are not theories of state breakdown. Rather, they are variants of general social 
movement theory because their analyses focus more sharply on the dynamics of movements themselves than on the 
macro structural conditions under which such collective actions occur. In this sense, secessionist/irredentist 
movements are merely part of the process of state fragmentation, not the cause of it. As a matter of fact, very few 
secessionist movements have succeeded when the central state power is highly effective.”  Jieli Li, “State 
Fragmentation: Toward a Theoretical Understanding of the Territorial Power of the State.” Sociological Theory 20, 
no. 2 (2002): 141. 
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social power (ideology, politics, economics, and military) sees the state as "crystallizations” of sources of 
power, i.e. fiscal balance, military power, bureaucratization, and extent of civilian penetration.796   Again, 
while there are additional characteristics, military power is one of the primary defining aspects.  Randall 
Collins however, gives primacy of place to the military dimension of state power as what defines a state 
as he describes the development of his Geopolitical Theory of State Power.  Citing Weber he portrays 
state legitimacy as an outgrowth of its military power.  
“Weber's treatment of the development of the state was formulated in this context; for Weber 
([1922] 1968, pp. 901-26), the dynamics of legitimacy as well as the formation of ethnic 
identification and nationalism are connected to military struggles among states and to the 
organizational mode by which varying proportions of the population are mobilized and equipped 
for fighting.”797 
While other scholars do not give primacy of place to the military dimension of state power many do see it 
as a key factor in state breakdown and revolution.  In addition to Skocpol’s other work, Goodwin and 
Skocpol note that a state that is unable to defend its territory or secure its border creates a situation where 
revolutionary forces are more likely to emerge and therefore a revolution becomes more likely.798  Collins 
and Waller also call attention to the fact that factional conflicts intensified when the Soviet military was 
weakened by over extension and military defeat, and as military control of satellite states deteriorated 
they began seceding from central control.799  The literature on state disintegration and revolution, in 
addition to other aspects, includes military disintegration as one of the factors that plays a direct role.  The 
congruence with the disintegration of ASCs into constituent parts is in cases where a state fragments 
territorially, not where there is a transfer of power within a state.  The examination of the disintegration of 
ASCs furthermore may illuminate the process of how a state breaks down territorially as multiple 
jurisdictions with the capacity to generate military capabilities emerge.  It also explains why few 
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secessionist movements succeed when central state power is militarily effective.  A direct examination of 
that process of state disintegration is beyond the scope of this paper. However, since an ASC can be a 
state or a supranational entity with a common government and at least partial military integration, yet 
remain within the definition of an ASC, there may be utility in a further examination of this process 
focused on non-ASC state disintegration in the future.  The examination of the following case does 
indicate that the process of military dis-integration is crucial for the failure of ASCs.   
4-5. Yugoslavia  
This is a key example of an Amalgamated Security Community failure because as an integrated 
ASC it devolved into a partially integrated ASC and then disintegrated in the worst bloodshed in post 
World War II Europe.  This case is instructive in several ways; there was a Yugoslav identity as well as 
other strong historic sub-ordinate identities, the YPA saw itself and was viewed as an integrative 
‘Yugoslav’ institution, the YPA was willing to use force to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia but was 
constrained by constitutional limits, the YPA recognized the danger inherent in the creation of security 
forces outside its control responsible only to the constituent republics but was unable to prevent their 
formation, and the leaders of the constituent republics clearly recognized the ramifications of the creation 
of their own security forces.  Furthermore, the Yugoslav case presents several competing theories of why 
the state disintegrated.  The popular but discounted reason is that Yugoslavia was doomed from its 
inception by the “Balkan Ghosts” of historic cycles of inevitable ethnic conflict.  A more reasonable 
explanation is that an unscrupulous politician used ethnic nationalism to consolidate his power base but 
that process led to conflict.  Another theory is that the state was so decentralized as to be ungovernable 
and that the weak structure caused the country to dissolve, and finally with the end of the Cold War and 
communism in Yugoslavia, the state was too slow to adapt to its changing environment and fell apart.  In 
examining this case an alternative explanation for the failure of the Amalgamated Security Community 
that was Yugoslavia will be examined; that military disintegration preceded the breakup and caused the 
vicious cycle resulting in the failure of Yugoslavia.  
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4-5. (a).  History of Yugoslavia Post World War II.  Toward the end of World War II the armed force 
of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) the Partizans, led by Josip Broz Tito, emerged as the 
dominant anti-fascist force in Yugoslavia.  At the Teheran Conference the Partizans were recognized as a 
significant force to be supported by the Allied powers.800  During the conflict there were a number of 
military forces both pro and anti-fascist (e.g. Ustaše and Chetniks) that opposed the Partizans, however, 
not all the military forces of the liberation movements that eventually formed the Yugoslav People’s 
Army were under the direct control of Tito: 
“The Slovene liberation movement was at least semi-detached from the Partisan movement.  The 
Liberation Front (OF) was specific to Slovenia and forged bonds with Tito’s movement; the OF 
organized a military force in Slovenia.” 801 
Also in November 1943 the Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) 
which was an umbrella organization composed of the various National Anti-Fascist Councils of the 
regions of Yugoslavia met in Jajce.802  The AVNOJ voted to reconstruct the country as a federation based 
on the “right of every people to self-determination, including the right to secession or unification with 
other peoples”, with “full equality for Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins, and 
all rights to be guaranteed for national minorities.803  The AVNOJ also named Tito as Marshal of 
Yugoslavia and Prime Minister.  Although the AVNOJ was heavily influenced by the Partizans it 
included prominent non-communists and representatives of the various ethnic groups.  Tito also met with 
Ivan Šubašić, the head of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, who received assurances that there would be 
a mixed government (communist and non-communist) after the war and in return accepted that the 
AVNOJ would be a provisional government until elections were held.  The first meeting of the Anti-
                                                 
800 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Yugoslavia a Country Study, ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington 
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fascist Assembly for the People’s Liberation of Serbia met in September 1944 and entered into an 
agreement with the other five Anti-fascist Councils to form a Democratic Federal Yugoslavia.804   This 
agreement to put into practice the declaration of the AVNOJ to create a federal Yugoslavia is the basis for 
considering Yugoslavia as an Amalgamated Security Community since the constituent councils 
voluntarily agreed to a common government with an integrated military force (a merger of the various 
liberation fronts into the YPA).       
The CPY moved quickly to consolidate power supported by the People’s Liberation Army and by 
the cadres of the State Security Service (OZNa).  The CPY eventually eliminated the remaining 
democratic parties in the People’s Front and fostered the creation of subordinate communist parties in the 
constituent republics.805  So although the form of the state was federal it was administered by a central 
party with its central apparatus making the republics administrative divisions with no autonomy. In the 
process of consolidating power and constructing the new state the CPY had an advantage in the 
supranational makeup of the Partizans which was the result of a deliberate policy.  The Partizans gained 
support from all the people’s of Yugoslavia with their slogan of “Brotherhood and Unity” and the 
possibility for equality between the various constituent ethnicities and regions within a federal 
framework.806  The CPY gained support from a strict policy of even-handedness between the nationalities 
(its leaders were from various ethnic groups) and sought out noncommunist allies.  It could therefore 
portray itself as ‘Yugoslav” rather than having its basis in one of the constituent nationalities.807         
Yugoslavia broke with Stalin and relations with the USSR became very tense.  Believing the 
USSR intended to overthrow Tito; the Federal Assembly in secret session declared a state of national 
                                                 
804 Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2001), 83-84. See Also; 
Yugoslavia a Country Study, ed. Glenn E. Curtis,  41. 
805 Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, 84-86. See Also; Yugoslavia a Country Study, ed. Glenn E. Curtis, 42-
43. 
806 Gow, Legitimacy and the Military; The Yugoslav Crisis, 22. 
807 Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History,75-76.  
 291
emergency and prepared to resist an invasion.808  The CPY purged all Stalinist influences and devised a 
different version of communism called ‘self-governing socialism’ that allowed for workers’ councils to 
exercise direct control over their own factories. The CPY changed its name to the League of Communists 
of Yugoslavia.  In 1958 the League of Communists held its Seventh Congress that emphasized the 
development of a Yugoslav identity that was not an attack on any language or culture, but that 
‘Yugoslavism’ was the proper focus of socialist nationalism of historically distinct peoples, therefore the 
old animosities were being transcended by a Yugoslav social identity.  The reality was that national 
sensitivities were resurgent in the republics.809  
The YPA was not as directly involved in politics from 1945 to 1966 as it was to become later on.  
Once Tito purged Aleksandar Ranković in 1966 and split parts of the SDB among the republics (except 
for a residual federal bureau) the political power of the YPA and its military Counter Intelligence Service 
(KOS) increased.810  The removal of hard line anti-reform elements of the security services allowed 
economic reform to progress, encouraged other cultural reformers, and led to constitutional changes.811  
 The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 resulted in a review of 
Yugoslavia’s defenses.  It was realized that facing an onslaught from the Warsaw Pact the YPA might be 
overwhelmed so a new doctrine of “Total People’s Defense” was devised.  It stated that “any citizen who 
resists an aggressor is a member of the armed forces” the result being the concept of a nation in arms 
based in large measure on the Partizan experience of World War II.  To put the concept into practice 
Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) were created in 1969. The TDF was made co-equal with the YPA.  
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Notably the TDF was funded and organized by each of the constituent republics and autonomous 
provinces. A National Defense Council was established to oversee these reforms.812   
 Constitutional amendments passed in December 1968 changed the nature of the government into 
a true federation and granted power to the governments of the republics to make decisions on economic 
and social matters while reserving foreign affairs and defense to the federal government.813  The reforms 
enacted in December 1968 had unintended consequences. The republic governments became more 
assertive and a real crisis came in 1971 in Croatia.  Although the Defense Law of 1969 put part of 
national defense in the hands of TDF units organized and funded by the republics, the federal government 
and YPA were furious that Croatian leaders allowed an article to run in the Zagreb press in June 1970 
questioning the bias in favor of the Serbs in the Yugoslav People’s Army and police and it also called for 
greater control of defense policy within the republic.  Croatian nationalists called for constitutional 
changes that would have given Croatia virtual independence.  In October 1971 Croatian leaders expressed 
their desire for more control over their economy including control over their own foreign currency 
reserves.  By this point Croatian nationalists were openly discussing topics that were clearly separatist 
such as having a UN seat and their own army. A nationalist student strike at Zagreb University was not 
tolerated by the central government and the student leaders were arrested by police and army forces.  Tito 
intervened and forced the Croatian leaders to resign and purged the Croatian party and government of 
nationalists.  Tito then purged the leadership of the other republics and began a recentralization of 
power.814  Significantly there was Army involvement in the decision making process leading to the 1971 
crackdown. 
“It was the YPA which seemed to make him decide what to do.  YPA pressure pushed Tito into 
acting against Croatia. The army did not intervene openly, but it seems to have been active behind 
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the scenes.  Tito’s statements and subsequent developments indicated that, in the absence of 
leadership from the League of Communists, the army was ‘footing the bill for the party’.”815 
In 1974 a new constitution was adopted that reiterated the equality of all constituent republics and 
autonomous regions as well as the right to self determination including the right to secession.  It kept all 
of the previous measures that devolved power to the republics and the rotating presidency, including 
checks and balances that precluded any one person or nationality from dominating the country.  The result 
was institutionalized gridlock since all Federal institutions included representatives from the constituent 
republics and autonomous provinces who were used by the leaders of those entities to protect their 
interests against any federal encroachments. The Yugoslav economy was neither a market driven system 
nor a centrally planned economy, but instead of a single economy it became an association of eight mini-
economies that tended to build redundant and inefficient capacities and even pursue protectionist policies 
towards other republics. Yugoslavia was running large deficits financed by foreign capital, partly due to 
increased oil prices but also because of borrowing by both the central government and the republics.  By 
the late 1970’s productivity slowed and inflation rose into double digits.816  Tito died in May 1980 but at 
the federal level there was sufficient discipline and cohesion in the communist party to reach decisions 
based on majority voting. The problem was in the reliance on the governments of the republics and 
autonomous provinces to carry out the policies if they were counter to the interests of a republic.  A 
source of friction was the redistributive process that greatly favored Serbia and penalized Slovenia and 
Croatia which together provided over half the federal budget.  Although Serbia contributed twenty nine 
percent of the budget it received two thirds of federal expenditures because it was the administrative 
center for Yugoslavia.  Slovenia and Croatia viewed the system as inequitable, not just based on 
contributions, but also because the expenditures did not go to develop less advanced republics but to 
Serbia.  Economic reform became an issue between the republics since reforms tended to advance the 
interests of Slovenia and Croatia while opponents tended to favor state control that benefited the 
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administrative center of Serbia.817  Attempts to address economic problems resulted in alternating cycles 
of austerity measures followed by strikes and then accommodation, including the ouster of the Prime 
Minister in 1988.818     
 The granting of autonomy and equal representation to Vojvodina and Kosovo and resulting loss 
of control over those provinces angered Serb nationalists.  Proponents of ‘Greater Serbia’ fanned the 
embers of nationalism and anti-Albanian racism in the media.  This was particularly true for those Serbs 
who wanted to regain control over Kosovo.819  In April, 1987, Milošević spoke to a crowd of Serb 
demonstrators being beaten with batons by local (ethnic Albanian) police, telling them that “No one 
should dare to beat you”.  He instantly became the Serb nationalist hero.  Milošević used Serb nationalism 
to generate political backing to remove his friend and mentor Ivan Stambolic as the Serbian President by 
December 1987.  Milošević consolidated his control of Serbia and no one in the federal government made 
any move to oppose him because they thought he could be controlled, and that what he was doing was to 
oppose Albanian secessionists.820 
Significant events were happening in Slovenia. After Tito the Communist Party of Slovenia 
allowed a liberalization of all aspects of society.  Although the most prosperous and developed republic in 
Yugoslavia, there was long term discontent with the structure of the federal state and Slovenia’s place in 
it.  Slovenian nationalism was allowed to develop and was used by the Communist Party of Slovenia to 
advance their vision of Yugoslavia with a more autonomous Slovenian republic.  A series of articles in 
the Slovene journal Nova Revija in early 1987 regarding Slovenia within the federal structure of 
Yugoslavia examined economic issues, communist party rule, and the role of the military.821   The YPA 
was not happy with the development of Slovene nationalism and the articles in Nova Revija. The Minister 
of Defense, Admiral Mamula, was concerned by what he viewed as an attempt to create a new concept of 
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defense with armies in each of the republics taking a primary role over that of the YPA.822  It was a 
reasonable concern given the Slovene view that military expenditures were excessive and that they paid 
far more than their fair share towards a military dominated by Serbs.  The Slovene Socialist Youth 
Alliance Journal Mladina became known for its harsh criticism of the Yugoslav military as well as 
support for Albanians in Kosovo; both of which created hostility in the military and in Serbia.823  In 1988 
Mladina published an article attacking Admiral Mamula as a ‘merchant of death’ for the sale of arms to 
Ethiopia as well as for personal corruption in using conscript troops to build a villa on the coast of 
Croatia.  The new Minister of Defense, General Veljko Kadijević, attacked the Slovenian leadership and 
declared that the YPA would act to defend itself in the future.  The opportunity for revenge against 
Mladina came quickly.  A Yugoslav Army NCO passed a secret document on preparations for martial law 
to Janez Janša a journalist at Mladina known for his reporting on the YPA.  Janša also obtained a copy of 
the March 1988 session of the Central Committee Party Presidium in which the Military Council had tried 
to get authorization for a purge.  Mladina published an article on 13 May that caused an uproar as it 
revealed the YPA’s plans for mass arrests in Slovenia.  Janša was arrested and turned over to the YPA 
along with the NCO and two other Mladina journalists to face a military trial for possession of state 
secrets.  The military insisted on holding the trial of the ‘Ljubljana Four’ in the military command 
language of Serbo-Croatian rather than Slovenian; a slap in the face for the Slovenes.  The public reaction 
in Slovenia to the trial was intense and overwhelmingly in favor of the defendants who were viewed as 
victims of the Serb dominated military seeking revenge.  Although found guilty the defendants had light 
sentences and they served them in a manner resembling loose house arrest staying in prison mostly at 
night.  The effect of the trial was extremely significant in that it opened a gulf between Slovenia and the 
Army which was seen as Serb dominated and supportive of only Serb interests.  It also unified the 
opposition in Slovenia and pushed the Slovene leadership closer to the nationalists and dissidents.  
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Mladina continued its criticism of military activities in Kosovo.824  There was also an important 
development during one of Janez Janša’s absences from prison in 1989 when he attended the founding 
meeting of the Slovene Democratic Alliance; a non-communist political party.  At this meeting Janša 
proposed that each republic should have a ‘parallel army’ created from the Territorial Defense Units that 
already existed in each republic in addition to the YPA.  “…Few observers would have believed that such 
an idea might one day actually lead to full scale armed conflict between the JNA and local armed forces 
in Slovenia.”825  
  Milošević was moving to centralize power not only in Serbia but also over Vojvodina, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo.  Before his move on Kosovo the Federal Party leadership tried to stop 
Milošević, but found that they could not remove him because he remained the head of the Serbian 
Communist Party.  Milošević was able to use the federal structure as needed to promote centralization but 
at the same time used the rules that devolved power to the republics to circumvent any federal attempt to 
stop him. Milošević’s takeover of Kosovo was not quick or easy. A key event was a rally held in Slovenia 
in support of Kosovar miners and against Milošević.  Slovene President Kučan realized that if Milošević 
succeeded in controlling Kosovo along with Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Serbia that he would control 
half the votes in the Presidency. Kučan and the Slovene Communist Party leadership took part in the rally 
siding with the dissidents in support of the Kosovar miners and expressing opposition to the Serbian 
policy of repression in Kosovo. The rally was broadcast in Serbia and a massive and hostile crowd 
gathered in Belgrade forcing the Federal Parliament to declare a state-of-emergency in Kosovo (over 
Kučan’s objections) to allow deployment of the YPA and Serbian police. Under the ‘protection’ of the 
YPA the Kosovo Assembly passed the measure to subordinate itself to Serbia on 23 March 1989. 
On 28 June 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje, Milošević addressed a huge 
crowd of Serbs at Gazimestan Kosovo.  The battle is a key event in Serbian nationalist history but it was 
his comments on the future that marked the event as significant.  When Milošević’s said that: “Six 
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centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels; they are not armed battles, though such things 
should not be excluded yet” it was seen as a threat by some of the other republics, particularly Slovenia.826     
 The Slovenes found themselves under attack in all Serb media and under an economic boycott by 
Serbia.827  The Slovenes decided that if Serbia could change its constitution to further its interests 
Slovenia would as well.  The Slovene Assembly passed a number of amendments to its own constitution 
one of which was the right to unilaterally secede (hearkening back to the 1946 Yugoslav constitution). 
Another limited the right to declare martial law or a state-of-emergency exclusively to the Slovene 
Assembly. There was also a claim to the right to allocate the resources of the republic as well as to 
selectively implement Federal law (nullification).  Although the Federal Presidency condemned the 
amendments as unconstitutional the Slovenian Assembly was not intimidated and moved to legalize 
opposition parties in November 1989.  In December 1989 the Croatian Assembly also legalized 
opposition parties.  The move to party pluralism spread throughout Yugoslavia.828   
     The next step in the disintegration of Yugoslavia occurred during the Fourteenth Party Congress 
in January 1990.  The Slovene leadership had developed a number of proposals to reform the League of 
Communists.  The Slovene view was that the League of Communists could become a loose association of 
parties that would maintain the autonomy of the party in each republic.  Milošević wanted to recentralize 
the federal party and would not compromise.  All of the Slovenian proposals were defeated.  The Slovene 
delegation then walked out of the congress and the Croatian delegation declared it would not participate 
without the Slovenes.  The Fourteenth Party Congress went into a recess and never reconvened; the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia had disintegrated.829  
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 The last Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Marković, assumed office in March 1989.  Marković 
was able to make substantial progress in addressing Yugoslavia’s economic problems.  Although he 
reduced the federal bureaucracy and pushed forward a package of reforms that cut taxes and the federal 
budget while limiting borrowing and promoting investment, Marković was frustrated by the failure of 
some republics to follow reforms.  In December 1989 Marković pushed new reforms as urgent measures 
requiring only a two-thirds approval rather than unanimous consent by the republics.  The new reforms 
devalued the Yugoslav currency and pegged it to the German Mark making it convertible.  Marković got 
measures passed for wages to be frozen and prices to be liberalized as well as ending government 
subsidies to unprofitable enterprises.  These reforms were very successful and within just a few months 
inflation dropped from two thousand percent to under ten percent and Yugoslavia’s foreign currency 
reserves doubled by the end of February 1990. Ante Marković became quite popular and had strong 
support from the federal League of Communists, the Federal Assembly, the YPA and Croatia. Yugoslavia 
also gained international support as Marković’s reforms and moves toward a market economy took effect.  
Marković’s success and popularity mitigated some opposition but the republics still had considerable 
power.  When the League of Communists disintegrated Marković declared that the federal government 
would continue to govern without the LCY and would eventually hold multiparty elections.  Slovenia and 
Croatia moved forward with their own multiparty elections in April, other republics held elections later in 
the year the last being in Serbia.  Milošević authorized a large increase in wages and pensions to hold 
onto power.  The money was from an illegal loan for 18 billion dinars (currency unit) from Serbia’s 
central bank to the Serbian government.  This act sabotaged Marković’s reforms and inflation began to 
rise as the economy slowed. Marković tried to keep Yugoslavia together but ended up resigning in 
December 1991.830    
 The opposition party coalitions that won the elections in Slovenia and Croatia in April 1990 were 
nationalist yet their positions on the futures of their republics were not set on independence; most favored 
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confederation.  The elections entrenched opposing views of Yugoslavia, confederation vs. centralization, 
both of them springing from nationalist roots, in the governments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia.831    
The new Slovene government asserted its autonomy.  It stopped sending money to the Federal 
Fund for Undeveloped Regions. The Slovenian Assembly adopted a ‘Declaration on the Sovereignty of 
the State of the Republic of Slovenia” which reiterated its right to self determination and also proclaimed 
Slovene law to be superior to federal law within the republic, as well as proclaiming that the Slovene 
government should have authority over the YPA units stationed within Slovenia.  The new Slovene 
government also selected Janez Janša as its new Defense Minister despite (or because) of his being 
loathed by the YPA as a constant critic and most famous of the “Ljubljana Four”.  Janša quickly provoked 
the YPA by announcing his desire to end Slovenian soldiers being commanded by Serb officers, that 
Slovenia was contributing four times more to funding for the YPA budget than it should, and that he 
thought he could very quickly organize a Slovene Army to defend Slovenia.  The Slovene Assembly then 
requested the Federal Assembly to modify the law on military service to permit soldiers to perform their 
service within their own republic.832  These moves disturbed the YPA leadership. 
 The army was deeply troubled by the development of multi-party pluralism, the disintegration of 
the LCY, and the victory of nationalist opposition parties in Croatia and Slovenia.833 The dissolution of 
the LYC reduced the YPA’s constitutional mandate and party influence.  The YPA found its focus turned 
to combating what it saw as internal threats.834  For the Serbs that dominated the officer corps any move 
that threatened the unity of the state threatened their position and a confederal arrangement with separate 
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armies subordinate to each of the various republics would be a serious blow to their professional future.  
Furthermore, a division of the Serb population into minority enclaves in various republics was a 
distasteful idea. This put General Kadijević in a predicament.  Without the LCY and a unified central 
government the YPA and the defense industry were threatened by Slovenian and Croatian moves to make 
Yugoslavia a confederation with potentially separate armies.  The YPA budget depended on contributions 
from Slovenia and Croatia but those governments had indicated they were not going to support the army 
to the same extent as previously and wanted to reform the YPA.  General Kadijević personally disliked 
Milošević and did not support his use of Serb nationalism. Milošević and the Serbs however, wanted a 
centralized federal Yugoslavia as did General Kadijević who ended up supporting Milošević because for 
him there was no other option.835   
The military’s next step was to try and disarm the Territorial Defense Units in Slovenia and 
Croatia.  In May1990, soon after the new governments assumed power in Croatia and Slovenia the YPA 
issued orders to transfer the Territorial Defense Units’ weapons to YPA controlled installations.  The 
Territorial Defense Units in Croatia were disarmed completely.  In Slovenia President Kučan was made 
aware of the arms transfers by phone calls from a number of mayors. Kučan immediately ordered a halt to 
the operation but by then almost seventy percent of the weapons had been taken.  Janša the new Slovene 
Defense Minister then organized an arms smuggling operation to equip the seventy thousand soldiers in 
the Slovene Territorial Defense including anti-tank weapons which were shown on Slovenian TV; 
sending a message that it was arming itself.836   
After the YPA confiscated the Croatian TDF’s weapons the only armed security force in Croatia 
was its police force.  The Croatian government began to expel Serb police from the force while 
simultaneously launching a massive recruiting drive for young Croatian men.  In addition to recruits for 
the regular police force there were up to fifty thousand ‘police reservists’ recruited to provide a basis for a 
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Croatian armed force.  The new Croatian Defense Minister, Martin Špegelj set up a massive weapon 
smuggling operation bringing in arms by sea and land. He also created cells of loyal Croatian officers 
within the YPA garrisons in Croatia as well as arming Croatian village militias throughout the country 
enabling citizens to defend their own towns.837   So although the YPA had attempted to disarm both 
Slovenia and Croatia its efforts were unsuccessful.   
  By December 1990, General Kadijević had produced a secret report outlining how Croatia was 
smuggling arms and building a paramilitary force. The Federal Presidency rejected a proposal to allow the 
YPA to forcibly disarm the paramilitaries but called for all ‘illegal paramilitaries’ to voluntarily disarm.  
Croatia stated the only ‘illegal paramilitaries’ were the Serb militias in the Krajina region and did not 
disarm.  Both the YPA and the Croatian forces were placed on alert.  Although the YPA was prepared to 
disarm the forces in Croatia and Slovenia and impose martial law, it still considered itself subordinate to 
the Federal Presidency and needed their approval to act. Another emergency meeting of the Federal 
Presidency was held on 25 January but only the four Milošević controlled republics voted for YPA action.  
The Croatian leader then seemed to back down by agreeing to disarm and dissolve Croatia’s reserve 
police force and allow prosecution of some individuals for smuggling if the YPA stepped down from its 
combat alert.  The agreement prevented an armed clash in January 1991, but Croatia still did not disband 
its paramilitary force.838   
 From January to April 1991 there were a series of expanded Federal Presidency sessions designed 
to resolve the differing views of how Yugoslavia should be organized. The talks failed partly due to 
intransigence by the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes but also because events made compromise difficult.839  
A key event was the authorization by the Federal Presidency (persuaded by Borisav Jović, a Serb loyal to 
Milošević) for the YPA to secure vital buildings in Belgrade during an opposition demonstration. Two 
demonstrators were killed and ninety wounded, but more importantly the federal army had intervened in 
an internal political dispute and had been used to suppress opposition to Milošević.  The leaders of the 
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other republics as well as the Serb population saw that Milošević would use force to maintain power and 
that he appeared to have the support of the army.840  Jović the head of the Federal Presidency called 
several emergency sessions of the Federal Presidency but failed to get authorization for a state-of-
emergency and declaration of martial law to allow the YPA to disarm the Slovenian and Croatian 
‘paramilitary’ forces. Jović then resigned on television and blamed the Presidency for allowing 
unconstitutional moves by Croatia and Slovenia to openly form their own armies.   
 On 16 March, Milošević made an announcement on television that Serbia would no longer 
recognize the authority of the Federal Presidency and government and was mobilizing police reserve units 
and militia with the intention to form his own armed forces.  He declared that “Yugoslavia is finished” 
effectively seceding from the country; doing what the Serbs had been accusing the Slovenes and Croats of 
planning to do.  Prime Minister Ante Marković sided with the remaining members of the Presidency 
calling on the YPA not to use force and cause a civil war and the YPA agreed it would not intervene.  
Milošević’s attempt to push the army into launching a military takeover failed.  Although General 
Kadijević had threatened to act he could not make the decision alone.  In the absence of a clear and 
constitutional authorization to act the YPA would not move.  Milošević’s miscalculation pushed him to 
reverse course and send Jović back to the Federal Presidency on 20 March.841   
 On the other hand his declaration that “Yugoslavia is finished” was correct.  There were several 
confrontations between Croatian forces and Krajina Serbs in which Jović persuaded the Presidency to 
authorize YPA intervention to separate the combatants. When Jović’s turn as head of the rotating Federal 
Presidency ended on 15 May a Croatian representative should have automatically taken office but the 
Serb controlled portion of the Presidency objected.  Despite negotiations led by Prime Minister Ante 
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Marković the impasse was not resolved and no one was selected effectively ending the Federal 
Presidency.842   
 Slovenia meanwhile had continued making preparations for independence. Slovenia had stopped 
sending recruits to the YPA but instead began reinforcing its own units.  In May Slovene recruits began 
reporting for duty to a Slovene controlled barracks for basic training rather than to YPA facilities.  It 
stopped sending customs and import revenues to the federal government.  Slovenia created and staffed 
agencies to take over federal functions in the republic including air traffic control, borders and ports.  On 
15 June, 1991, Slovenian and Croatian leaders met in Ljubljana to coordinate a simultaneous declaration 
of independence by both republics on 26 June, 1991.843   The leadership in Slovenia did not expect that 
the declaration would mean immediate independence since they did not believe any other state would 
recognize them.  What they envisioned was that it would initiate a process of disassociation during which 
a negotiated separation could take place (given Milošević’s assurance to Kučan that he would not fight to 
keep Slovenia in Yugoslavia) and they had developed proposals to deal with issues of debt and division of 
military forces.844  The Croatians and Slovenes knew that there was no international support for breaking 
up Yugoslavia based on meetings with the EC, OSCE, and U.S.  What the Slovenes and Croatians did not 
know was that U.S. policy included tacit support for a military crackdown to keep the country unified.845  
When both republics declared independence on 26 June, the Slovenes took over all border, port, and 
customs posts forcing the federal officials out and replacing all Yugoslav signage and flags with 
Slovenian markings and symbols.  They also began erecting border posts along the border with Croatia, 
something the Federal Government declared would be illegal.  Prime Minister Ante Marković called a 
meeting of the Federal Government which issued a decree of enforcement asking the Defense Minister 
and Interior Minister to deploy units “with the aim of safeguarding the state frontiers at the border 
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crossings.”  Although Marković claimed the intention was simply to recover the federal posts and restore 
federal control over the border, the YPA viewed it as constitutional authority to move against Slovenia.  
The YPA planed to retake the Ljubljana airport, thirty five border crossings and a seaport in a limited 
military policing operation.  They also maintained communication with the Slovene government and told 
them what they were planning to do; they never expected to face armed opposition. Kučan issued an order 
to the Slovene Territorial Defense units to defend Slovenia against the YPA.846  The YPA garrisons in 
Slovenia were surrounded and forced to surrender after having their electricity, telephones, and water 
cutoff.  The conscript YPA units moving into the mountainous and restricted terrain of Slovenia were 
repeatedly ambushed by better trained and motivated Slovene Territorial Defense units.  The conflict was 
over in 10 days resulting in a lopsided victory for the Slovene forces that surprised both the international 
community and the YPA.  The casualties on both sides were minimal. The important statistic was that 
over 3,200 YPA soldiers were forced to surrender, which was a humiliation for the YPA.  The European 
Community negotiated a truce on 7 July called the Brioni Accord, and the YPA decided to pull out of 
Slovenia completely soon after that.847  Although more significant and vicious bloodshed was yet to come 
as Yugoslavia completely disintegrated, the successful defense by the Slovenian Territorial Defense units 
against the YPA is the end of this narrative.  If the YPA had been able to reassert control over Slovenia, 
defeat and disarm its forces, there was a possibility of the army forcibly holding the country together and 
breaking the political deadlock; most likely with a recentralized and Serb dominated government 
supported by the international community.   
“The sequence of events remains important since the war for Slovenia, if successfully prosecuted 
by the JNA (YPA), might have halted further secession from other republics. If the Slovenes had 
failed, then the entire modern history of Yugoslavia would look fundamentally different”848 
Instead, Slovenia had won its independence and the Amalgamated Security Community of Yugoslavia as 
it had been created at the end of World War II formally ended. 
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4-5. (b).  The Government 
 4-5. (b). 1.  The 1974 Constitution.   
 The 1974 Constitution remained in force through the breakup of the country. The State 
Presidency was made the supreme command for the armed forces and in charge of foreign policy.  The 
Federal Assembly was restructured into a Federal Chamber and a Chamber of Republics and Provinces.  
The 1974 Constitution expanded representation from the republics and provinces to all federal institutions 
and policy forums from the State Presidency to sports and cultural bodies.  The key executive agency of 
the government was the Federal Executive Council which conducted the day to day operation of the 
government.  It also had the power to set the agenda for the Federal Assembly and to propose legislation.  
It consisted of the Prime Minister and two deputy prime ministers as well as the secretaries of the major 
departments in the government.  The FEC reviewed and debated all federal issues within five standing 
committees which included members from the various republics executive councils which made the FEC 
the central agency for political debate and compromise.  As the republics pushed their interests to the 
point of political gridlock, the FEC was able to use a constitutional procedure that allowed it to 
promulgate temporary measures having the force of legislation that could not be blocked (e.g. portions of 
Ante Marković’s economic reforms).  The Tenth Party Congress in 1974 also followed the pattern of 
equal representation by confirming the right to parity of representation for the republics and autonomous 
provinces within the LCY’s Federal organizations effectively making the LCY a federation of parties.  An 
extremely important decision was that in the restored Central Committee of the LCY the Yugoslav 
Peoples Army was given 15 seats, the same number allocated to the autonomous provinces.  This made 
the YPA the ninth corporate member of the federation of parties that made up the LCY and gave the YPA 
a unique formal political role in the structure of Yugoslavia.    After 1974 the LCY only had the rump 
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federal element of the State Security Service (SDB) and the YPA as institutions that would respond to 
party directives since the party itself had devolved into a federation.849              
 4-5. (b). 2. Military as part of the political structure.  In Communist systems there is a link 
between the party and the military usually created to make sure the armed forces remain loyal, but it also 
provides a means for the military to have a legitimate role by becoming ‘the party in uniform’.  The YPA 
had a primary role in domestic politics.850  This participation in domestic politics was not praetorian in 
nature, the YPA did not intervene in politics to replace the political leadership or even become involved 
in the process of leadership selection.  The YPA was a professional, expert, and corporate institution that 
was willing to participate in politics according to its assigned and constitutional role.  Tito stated it was a 
responsibility for the YPA to participate in political affairs.851 The YPA’s participation in domestic 
politics began in 1971 when it played a key background role in persuading Tito to crackdown on Croatian 
nationalism.852  The 1974 Constitution granted the military a specific constitutional role to defend both 
the country and the system of “socialist self-management.”  To the YPA leadership this constitutional role 
gave it a broad mandate to defend the regime not only against foreign threats but also against domestic 
political enemies.853  James Gow writing in 1988 correctly predicted YPA behavior borne out during the 
disintegration of the country.  He said that: 
“The army will only act constitutionally.  This means that it will only usurp the political process 
if no civil element remains to protect the Constitution. So long as some central civil authority 
remains, the army will, constitutionally, be the coercively instrumental partner in an alliance.”854   
This explains the actions of the YPA in that while it clearly identified the threats to the unity of the state 
and was prepared to act, it did not act time and time again because it did not have constitutional 
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authorization to do so.  It finally only acted against Slovenia after receiving what it interpreted as 
authorization from a constitutional political authority.   
 After 1974 the YPA was not only the ‘party in uniform’ it was a significant political actor. Army 
representation on the Central Committee of the LCY was larger than its allocation of 15 delegates since 
five representatives from other republics were from the army making the total army presence twenty 
delegates which was twelve percent of the 166 member body.  Also the Defense Minister and the Army-
Party Organization Secretary, both YPA Generals, were members of the Presidium of the Central 
Committee.855  LYC control over the military on the other hand was minimal but the large number of 
military members of the LCY made the YPA a significant constituency pursuing their interests within the 
party.  The Army LCY committee in effect formed a military branch of the party, and the President of the 
Army LCY committee usually became the Defense Minister.856  The YPA became an important political 
actor because its focus and loyalty was to Yugoslavia not to any republic.  After Tito’s death and the 
weakening of the federal government and party the YPA was the only unitary and centralist pan-Yugoslav 
institution.857 This gave it a unique and central political role in defending the regime.858 
4-5. (b). 3.  Military and Economy.  Yugoslavia had a well developed defense industry that was 
controlled by the YPA.  The Defense Ministry decided what part of the defense budget would be allocated 
to the defense industry (not the civilian government) and determined development and production of new 
weapons. All contracts required prior approval from the YPA and it made all decisions on exports.  This 
was no small matter because Yugoslavia was one of the world's 10 leading arms producers, and the 
defense industry was one of the main sources of hard currency.  Yugoslavia exported about 30 percent of 
                                                 
855 Gow, Legitimacy and the Military; The Yugoslav Crisis, 59-60. 
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filled that vacuum.” Gow, Legitimacy and the Military; The Yugoslav Crisis, 25. 
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its production and earned $20 billion from arms exports in the 1980’s which was more than from tourism 
and was roughly ten percent of all of Yugoslavia’s exports.  The span of economic control of the defense 
industry was also quite large.  The defense industry, the Association and Industry of Armament and 
Ministry Equipment (ZINVOJ), had 56 specialized factories with 8000 scientists and 72 000 workers.  
There were also 1000 subcontractors with between 100,000 to 200,000 workers.  The ZINVOJ produced 
400 different weapons and items of military equipment. In 1990, the YPA got three-fourths of its 
equipment form the ZINVOJ, and about 90 percent of all weapons and equipment were designed 
domestically.  Defense factories were spread out in such a fashion among the republics as to make them 
dependent on parts from other factories in different republics.  This interdependence not only made sure 
the YPA maintained overall control of the process but it reduced the possibility that any republic could be 
self sufficient in defense production.  The exception was that the YPA built a corresponding plant in 
Serbia or Montenegro for any defense factory built in another republic.859  On the other hand Yugoslavia 
tended to keep large stockpiles of older equipment it had received from a variety of sources while it sold 
new equipment abroad.  “Using equipment from the Soviet Union, the U.S., and other countries, the army 
had serious logistical problems, including irregular ammunition supply and maintenance of many 
nonstandard weapons systems.”860 
4-5. (b). 4.  Legitimacy and the Military.  According to James Gow the relationship between 
Military Legitimacy and Civil Legitimacy is an interaction such that weak Civil Legitimacy is a 
precondition for a significant and successful political role for the military.  However, the military can only 
act politically if it has its own legitimacy.861  The foundation for this legitimate participation in domestic 
politics had several aspects.  First, the YPA was a creature of the LCY; it was created by the Communist 
Party to fight for national liberation and revolution.  The YPA and LCY had an intertwined relationship 
based on this history; a relationship that subordinated the army to the party but also included the army in 
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the party.862  Second, the YPA had been created with a pan-Yugoslav character.863  The Party and the 
YPA were ‘Yugoslav” rather than having a basis in one of the constituent nationalities.864  The YPA 
remained outside the reforms associated with ‘self-management’ and devolution.  As the YPA 
transitioned from a guerilla force into a conventional army focused on military technical issues it was 
separated from society and remained a hierarchical, centralized, cohesive and monolithic institution with 
a supra-national pan-Yugoslav character.  Finally, in 1968 the adoption of the All-People’s Defense 
Concept initiated an ‘opening to society’ process in which contact between the YPA and the people was 
encouraged. This process moved the YPA into the political arena and served as a factor in its political 
legitimacy.865       
“In 1971, as the coalition seemed to be falling apart, the army joined course again with the 
revolution. The revolution’s legitimacy was weak; the YPA provided the necessary backbone to 
redress that frailty.” “The Constitutional amendments of 1971, fixed in the 1974 Constitution, 
suggest that not only was the YPA dependent on the federal state, but the Yugoslav Federation 
was dependent on its ninth partner- the military.”866 
 4-5. (b). 5. Government Structure and Ethnic Identity. National identity was a key concern for 
founders of Yugoslavia who had witnessed the bloody inter-ethnic fighting in Yugoslavia during World 
War II.  They also wanted to prevent any single nationality from dominating the new Yugoslavia as the 
Serbs had dominated the previous one.  The communists believed that through the ‘National Liberation 
Struggle’ Yugoslavia’s people were bound by a revolutionary pan-Yugoslav patriotism; a communist 
‘Yugoslavism’ opposed to parochial nationalism but connected to the worldwide socialist movement.   
The communists believed that they had designed a system and policies that would eventually get rid of 
Yugoslavia’s ethnic problems.867  There is another twist to the issue of identity and government in 
Yugoslavia.  Individual nationality was a matter of choice not birth; i.e. nationality was subjective.  
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Article 41 of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution stated that an individual was not required to declare a 
nationality and was not required to even have a nationality.  The problem was that Yugoslavism was seen 
by the state bureaucracy as being non-national and that declaring oneself to be a Yugoslav was in effect 
declaring no nationality and often not accepted by the bureaucracy.  The dilemma was that many 
‘Yugoslavs’ did consider Yugoslav as a national identity and the refusal to be recognized as such directly 
contradicted the constitutional right to choose (or not) their own nationality.868  On the other hand, despite 
the possibility of choice in nationality, the various nationalities were granted, through the federal 
structure, a national home republic. This established a territorial nationality that became the basis for the 
Serbia to assert that its role was to protect Serbs wherever they lived.  Territorial nationality was at odds 
with personal nationality and can be seen as the rational behind the increased support for the principle of 
self determination as the republics considered secession.869  
 Did government structure and policies have any impact on issues of identity?  Some scholars 
have argued that ethnic nationalism as a primordial identity clearly triumphed over any attempts to create 
an identity (e.g. instrumentalist or constructivist approaches) in Yugoslavia and dismiss any findings of a 
Yugoslav identity or integration through mixed marriages as either faulty data or as insignificant to the 
final outcome in which ethno-nationalism clearly was the driving force. For them tolerance and 
coexistence is a myth and Yugoslavia was fated to disintegrate from the moment it was founded.870  Other 
scholars have taken a different view.  Using census data from 1961 through 1981 there was a general 
increase in the number of people who declared themselves to be “Yugoslav” over time except when the 
category of Muslim on the census allowed Muslims to change categories from Yugoslav to Muslim.871 
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Furthermore, they found that self identification was strongly related to people having an urban residence, 
participation in the communist party or community political structures, being a minority nationality or of 
mixed parentage, and more importantly the young were most likely to identify as Yugoslavs.872  This 
would seem to indicate that the general trend of increasing numbers of people declaring themselves as 
“Yugoslav” would have increased given more time.  Perhaps a more general rebuttal to the idea of purely 
primordial ethno nationalism that predetermined the failure of Yugoslavia is that most of Yugoslavia 
(except Slovenia) was in fact ethnically mixed and had managed to live together peacefully for quite some 
time.  If there was inherent ethnic hatred in Yugoslavia the various groups should have self segregated, 
but ethnic cleansing and the creation of ethnically pure zones was a byproduct of conflict during the 
breakup.  Prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia the people were beginning to integrate or transcend ethnic 
nationalities.  By 1981 there were some six million people who had become related by intermarriage 
which indicates some degree of social integration.  People had found ways to coexist peacefully.  
“Interethnic relations deteriorated only when the approaching war forced civilians to declare loyalties and 
take sides. At that point neighbors tuned against neighbors.”873  It was the mobilization of ethno 
nationalism for political purposes (primarily in Serbia) that created the conditions for ethnic conflict.  
Government policies had born fruit in terms of the creation of a Yugoslav identity.  It is clear that 
increasing numbers of people considered themselves to be Yugoslav and that trend was increasing 
especially among the young and urban residents.  On the other hand government policies that allowed 
territorial nationalism and a loose confederal structure set up forces that would compete with a pan-
Yugoslav identity.   
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   4-5. (b). 6. Government Structure and ASC Failure.  
Was the structure of the state then responsible for the failure of Yugoslavia as an ASC?  Institutions and 
structures are important, and as noted previously state breakdowns are the result of the failure of the 
administrative functions of the state.  Federal structures or devolution of power leading to increased local 
autonomy has been considered a method to mollify ethno nationalist ambitions in multiethnic states.  
Empirically there are states that have increased autonomy and devolved power from a highly centralized 
government and did not disintegrate (e.g. Spain).  Other scholars have viewed federalism and increased 
autonomy as a slippery slope towards ethnic mobilization and eventual ethno nationalism and conflict 
leading to secessionism.  Recent work however, notes that a significant inclusion of minority groups in 
the central government, in both the legislature and executive policy making bodies, is an important 
method for preventing a slide towards secession for territories with significant local autonomy.874  Tito 
and the other founders of Yugoslavia clearly intended to use federal structures to contain ethnic 
nationalism and provide a stable government post-Tito.  Devolution did make decision making more 
difficult as each republic sought to pursue its own interests and the end of one party rule also seems to 
have eliminated an element of central government control.  However, although the demise of the LCY 
certainly ended the pretense of a single party and resulted in multiparty pluralism, it is clearly not a 
primary cause for Yugoslavia to come apart.  In response the Prime Minister, FEC, and state 
administrative apparatus announced they would continue to govern without the LCY and did so.  In fact 
Ante Marković was able to govern effectively for the period of time that saw his economic reforms have a 
significant positive effect which also resulted in Marković becoming quite popular throughout the 
country.  The FEC and Prime Minister were able to rule through ‘temporary measures’ that were 
constitutional. Furthermore, the Slovenes and Croatians were pushing for a new confederal Yugoslavia 
(in large measure to protect themselves from Milošević) not for the destruction of Yugoslavia (opposed 
by the international community). What then was the failure of the administrative functions of the state in 
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Yugoslavia, or more precisely what was the source of weakness in the central government, that led to 
state breakdown?  On the surface the weakness of the central government would appear to be the inability 
of the system to deal with Milošević and his manipulation of both political structures and fiscal structures.  
There is however, a more critical weakness that preceded Milošević’s rise and not only failed to prevent 
Milošević from abusing the political and financial systems but enabled and aided him.  The critical 
weakness was not the federal structure but the failure of the YPA to be a pan-Yugoslav force that could 
legitimately serve the function it was supposed to and preserve the regime.  After Tito’s death the only 
unitary and centralist institution was the YPA.  The YPA functioned as the party in uniform and was the 
“ninth partner” in the coalition of parties that made up the LCY.  It lent its legitimacy to the regime as the 
only remaining pan-Yugoslav institution.  It had a constitutional mandate to preserve Yugoslavia.  The 
failure of the YPA is that it ceased to be seen as a pan-Yugoslav institution.  The YPA came to be seen as 
a Serb dominated institution that was interested in advancing Serb interests rather than those of 
Yugoslavia.  It was YPA forces in Kosovo that ensured Milošević’s victory there and YPA forces that 
suppressed the anti-Milošević opposition in Serbia.  The YPA had lost its military legitimacy to act 
impartially to preserve the federation and its ability to prevent Milošević’s power grab. The weakness of 
the central government can be found in the YPA and the change from an integrated ASC to a partially 
integrated ASC beginning in 1968 to a disintegrated ASC in 1990.    
4-5. (c). Defense Integration & Disintegration 
4-5. (c). 1. 1945 to 1968.  At the end of World War II the Partizan People’s Liberation Army 
became the Yugoslav People’s Army on 1 March 1945 and demobilization began later that year. Laws 
passed in 1946 and 1947 changed the organization of the YPA so that it became a regular standing 
military with an air force, navy, and land army.  The YPA was changed from a volunteer to a conscript 
force and the officers underwent training to turn them into a professional cadre.  This reorganization was 
modeled on the example of the Soviet Red Army.875  The YPA also used a system of recruitment and 
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assignment that took recruits from one area of the country and posted them to serve in a different area.  
This system was designed to weaken and potentially eliminate national and regional identity by 
cultivating a supranational pan-Yugoslav identity; particularly for the professional soldiers.876  The YPA’s 
legitimacy was also enhanced by its role in rebuilding the country.877 In addition to its military academies 
the army was involved in overt ideological and political education.  The YPA had a political school and 
over ten percent of officers received additional political or social science education at other 
universities.878   The intention of this political education was tied directly to the YPA’s role as a pan-
Yugoslav institution and as a symbol of Yugoslav identity. 
“The result of this education, other political work within the army and, presumably, peer-group 
pressure, was the nurturing of a ‘brotherhood and unity’ spirit and the ‘Yugoslav’ idea.  In all its 
activities and in its nature, the YPA attempted to be an army of all Yugoslavs.  An emblem of 
national unity from its creation and in its continued existence, the YPA sought and, to an extent, 
performed a symbolic role. A consequence of the YPA’s role as everybody’s army in such a 
patchwork society as Yugoslavia’s was to make the sociopolitical imperative of being 
representative of society peculiarly significant”879       
The YPA between 1945 and 1968 was a large conventional force focused on the static defense of 
Yugoslavia’s cities in case of invasion by the Soviets or the West. This caused Yugoslavia to allocate 
more of its resources to defense than anywhere else in the world. In 1948 Yugoslavia had the second 
largest military force in Europe with 350,000 active troops and about the same number of reserves.880  By 
1952 the build up of forces increased the YPA to 500,000 troops and total defense spending equaled 22 
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percent of Yugoslavia’s GDP.  The normalization of relations with the Soviet Union led Yugoslavia to 
turn to the USSR for technologically advanced defense items such as aircraft and missiles, as well as to 
reduce the size of the YPA.  By 1968 the YPA had been reduced to only 200,000 active troops and 
defense spending had dropped to 6 percent of GDP.881   
4-5. (c). 2. 1969 – 1989 Creation of a partially amalgamated ASC.  The Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 shocked the Yugoslav leadership and led to a drastic and far reaching change in 
defense policy and structure of the YPA that had a huge political impact as well.  It clearly indicated that 
the USSR was a threat and that they were not prepared to resist such an attack.882 It prompted a significant 
change in organization and tactical doctrine.883 The Law on National Defense adopted in February 1969 
provided the legal basis for the implementation of the new doctrine called “Total National Defense” 
(TND).  The TND concept was in many ways similar to the nation-in-arms concept used by Switzerland, 
but different in that weapons were not kept by the individual and the Swiss Army was made entirely of a 
country wide federal militia.884  To implement this concept two new forces were formed; a Civil Defense 
Force and the Territorial Defense Force (TDF). The TDF in wartime would include males between 15 and 
65 years old; potentially three million troops. TDF would support the YPA defense and as a last resort 
revert to guerilla warfare. The Yugoslavs estimated that it would require two million enemy troops to 
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subjugate the country and that would deter any potential invader.885  Normally there were about 860,000 
troops being trained or doing other duties in the TDF on an annual basis. Most TDF troops were former 
YPA conscripts that had finished their active duty obligation. The force was very cost effective with an 
estimated cost for the entire TDF as approximately 1 percent of GDP annually.886  Tactically the force had 
a number of advantages.887  The creators of the TND realized however, that TDF units had to have 
autonomy to act on their own in a decentralized command system in order for the force to wage an 
effective guerrilla campaign.  The problem with the TDF was that it was not part of the YPA and it was 
created as a local militia with a decentralized command structure. Under the 1969 Defense Law, the TDF 
was not subordinated to the YPA. Instead Yugoslavia’s armed forces were composed of two separate and 
equal forces; the YPA and the TDF.888  Every ‘social-political unit’ (each republic, commune and even 
lower local bodies) had a responsibility to “organize Total National Defense and to command the battle 
directly.”  The YPA remained the responsibility of the federal government but the independent TDF 
military force was a significant reduction of the authority of the YPA.889   
The TDF depended on the YPA for much of its support such as schools, armories, and 
warehouses, along with obtaining old YPA weapons to equip the units.  The TDF units used YPA 
resources (funding, personnel, logistics, and training assets) but the YPA had no direct control over 
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them.890 The YPA did not like the command system but accepted it because of military necessity.891 
Another critical point is that the TDF was organized and funded by the republics and autonomous 
provinces.  The TDF units were creations of the local governments and were managed by those 
governments which included passing legislation for their TDF.  TDF units used local national languages 
for command and administration. Since management was the responsibility of the republic’s staff, there 
was no General Staff for the TDF so the TDF commanders in the republics were selected, with the 
consent of each republic, by the Commander in Chief (Tito then the Presidency) and were usually from 
that republic.  Many TDF professional officers were YPA retirees or loaned from the active force and 
after many years in the YPA they tended to be ‘Yugoslav’ in outlook and not ethnic nationalists.892 
Having YPA officers in the TDF however, did not alter the structural fact that the TDF belonged to the 
republics and this structure carried over into the 1974 Constitution.893 
The TND concept and the organization of the TDF fit well with the Yugoslav concept of ‘self-
management’ and increased the republic’s influence on defense issues.894 One justification for the new 
doctrine was that it promoted ‘the socialization of people’s defense’ according to the principles of self-
management.895  The doctrine of a nation-in-arms increased the social prestige, political power, and 
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influence of the military in Yugoslav society but it was the TDF that made the most gains.896  TND “met 
civilian demands for self-managing principles to be applied to the armed forces, bringing defence into line 
with the decentralizing, confederative tendencies of society at that time.”897   
“In the form and context in which it was initiated, territorial defense threatened the professional 
and institutional integrity of the YPA.  It was apparent that the Army would become subject to 
pressures for republican control and internal reforms to accommodate a pervasive federalization. 
Two early sign of this were increased pressures for national posting practices (i.e. stationing 
ethnic Serbs, Croats, and others within their own republics) and use of multiple command 
languages.”898 
Pressure for greater control and influence over military matters materialized quickly in the republics. 
During the debate on Croatia’s internal republic defense law in early 1971, “opposing notions of federal 
and republican armed forces took on a mutually exclusive character”. 899 Croatian nationalists later in 
1971 demanded that Croatia should have its own army which was a key trigger for the suppression and 
purge that followed.900  The Croatian nationalist crisis in 1971 illuminated the potential danger of separate 
defense forces; especially locally organized and funded militias.  
“The Croatian disturbances of 1971, however, revealed the great political dangers inherent in 
Article II of the National Defence Law, in that the Croatian TDF, under the political control of 
the then LCC, could have easily become the ‘Croat Army’ that Tito so strongly objected to in 
1971.”901   
The YPA was determined to restore its primacy in the Yugoslav defense system and successfully pushed 
for a redefinition of command relationships.  There was a need operationally for decentralization and 
there was a need to preserve the concept of self-management in defense matters so the TDF was not 
merged into the YPA and the YPA was not placed in direct control of the TDF. The YPA became the 
predominant force under the 1974 Constitution but the TDF remained decentralized. It was not until 1980 
(after Tito’s death) and the creation of the Council for Territorial Defense that the YPA was able to 
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indirectly control the TDF.  The Council for Territorial Defense became responsible for the organization 
and command of the TDF taking responsibility from the local authorities.  The Council was composed of 
representatives from all republics and autonomous provinces TDF headquarters and representatives from 
the federal secretariat for national defense.902  Despite various author’s assertions that the recentralization 
measures and creation of the Council for Territorial Defense resolved all issues related to the political 
control over the TDF events showed that the TDF remained a potential problem for the YPA.  
Furthermore, the republics remained involved with the TDF in a significant way. 
“It became increasingly apparent that the YPA would direct TDF units in combat, except in 
enemy controlled areas or in case of a disruption in the chain of command. Despite losing control 
over their TDF organizations, the republics and autonomous provinces continued to bear the 
financial burden of supporting them. Those jurisdictions were still required to provide 
infrastructure and logistical support to TDF units operating on their territory.”903 
The YPA only regained operational control of the TDF units with the new Defense Law in 1974 (which 
still proscribed a decentralized TDF) and the creation of the Council for Territorial Defense.  The TDF 
were never directly subordinated to the YPA; the YPA did not create them or directly maintain them.  The 
TDF units were still funded and logistically supported by their local governments and so therefore 
remained “their” military force.  The continued potential for TDF units to constitute an ethnic national 
army was recognized by the YPA and resulted in the elimination of the TDF in Kosovo after an uprising 
in 1981 (after the YPA had supposedly gained control over the TDF)904 and by the actions of the YPA to 
disarm the Croatian and Slovenian TDF’s.905 
The creation of multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to create military capability congruent 
with local ethnic nationalities is the obvious structural element that transformed Yugoslavia from an 
                                                 
902 Ibid., 37. 
903 Yugoslavia a Country Study, ed. Glenn E. Curtis, 252. See Also; Bennett, Yugoslavia’s  Bloody Collapse, 76. 
904 Bebler, “The Yugoslav People’s Army and the Fragmentation of a Nation,” 46. See Also; Bieber, "The Role of 
the Yugoslav People’s Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia; The Army Without a State?” 304. 
905 “Thanks to the recognition that the Territorial Defense Forces were beholden to the republics and not necessarily 
the federal government JNA leaders feared that the TDF units would respond to only selfish interests. Thus, the 
entire notion of a two-tiered defense system came under fire; furthermore, the allegiance of the TDF was questioned 
in case of domestic troubles. The JNA felt it was necessary to reform this situation and make the state more secure 
from within and without. One more caveat complicated things even further; namely, the failure to recognize that if 
domestic disorder spread to fighting, the multi-ethnic JNA might also suffer from desertions or sabotage by the 
ethnic group(s) in revolt.” Niebuhr, “War in Slovenia: Doctrine and Defeat,” 501. 
 320
integrated Amalgamated Security Community to a partially integrated ASC.  There is another factor that 
involves identity.  The YPA which considered itself a pan-Yugoslav and integrative institution devoted to 
producing a ‘Yugoslav’ supranational identity in its soldiers, was itself responsible for the disintegration 
of the Yugoslav ASC because it failed to be a pan-Yugoslav integrative institution. Instead, the YPA was 
seen as favoring one ethnicity (Serbs) over the other elements in Yugoslav society which in turn produced 
a backlash and rejection of the YPA by the other nationalities as the military force that represented them, 
i.e. the YPA lost its Military Legitimacy with the other ethnic groups.  It will be seen that this occurred 
much earlier than the process involved with the actual breakup of the country, and was in fact already 
evident in the debates (1970) leading up to the Croatian nationalist crisis of 1971.      
Although the issue of bias towards Serbs in the security services was made public in the 17 June 
1970 issue of a Croatia newspaper, the numbers and percentage of the composition of various 
nationalities in the officers' corps was first revealed in the Belgrade journal Nin on 20 September 1971, 
and then confirmed in the Western press.906  If there is one fact about the YPA that is repeated by every 
source on the subject, it is this ethnic imbalance in the officer corps in which the Serbs and Montenegrins 
were greatly over represented in comparison to their proportion of the general population.  The Serbs 
consistently made up about 60 percent of the YPA officer corps and with the Montenegrins they made up 
about 70 percent of the total. Ethnic representation among the generals and high ranking commanders was 
more balanced. Albanians and Muslims that had demographic distributions with larger numbers of young 
people tended to be over represented among the enlisted recruits in relation to their percentage in the 
population. The result was that one ethnic group provided a majority of officers while other groups 
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provided a greater share of soldiers.907  This problem was recognized by the Yugoslav leadership and the 
YPA as being critical to the military legitimacy of the armed forces.908   
The 1974 Constitution, Article 242, made balanced regional recruitment into the army a legal and 
constitutional obligation. Despite significant expense and effort this imbalance in the officer and NCO 
corps was never remedied.909  The YPA considered the problem of proportional composition of the officer 
corps to be extremely important for its own identity.  The tradition of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ that 
melded various ethnic groups into a successful fighting force during WWII impelled the YPA to adopt 
policies that would create and maintain a proportional officer corps. 910   
“Equal representation of nationalities was (and would remain) paramount for the YPA. To sustain 
its tradition of ‘brotherhood and unity’ and maintain itself as a symbol of ‘Yugoslavness’, it had 
to be seen to be the army of all Yugoslavs.” 911 
The vast majority of officers in the YPA truly did believe in Yugoslavia and that the YPA was a pan-
Yugoslav integrative institution that was carrying forward the ideals of the Partizans.912 The YPA’s 
policies and processes of creating a supranational pan-Yugoslav identity in the officer corps worked on a 
majority of officers.  The YPA leadership revered the memory of Tito and was committed to the ideology 
of Yugoslavism.913 The YPA tried various methods to address the imbalance in the officer corps including 
quotas based on nationalities for military schools and scholarships that paid forty percent more than 
elsewhere in the country.  In 1973 it was noted that “if the number of Slovene officers continues to 
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decline, Slovenes will soon have almost no cadres at the command level.”914  Writing in 1976 Robert 
Dean described a congruence of ethnicity in the TDF and reserves but a continuing imbalance in the YPA 
despite significant efforts.  He also notes that to recruit sufficient Croatian officers, quality standards had 
to be significantly lowered.915  Problems recruiting Albanian officers were ascribed to educational and 
language problems.916   
Explanations for the inability of the YPA to make any significant improvement in the imbalance 
in the officer corps include socioeconomic factors such as the greater economic opportunities available to 
Slovenes and Croatians whereas in poor areas with limited opportunities a military career would be seen 
as more attractive.  This explanation fails to explain the low numbers of poor Albanians, Muslims, and 
Macedonians in comparison to the Serbs.  A cultural explanation is that there was a greater respect for a 
military career in Serbia and Montenegro and that the Partizan officer corps was also populated by Serbs 
who may have encouraged their children to follow them into the military. Various scholars indicate there 
may have been a combination of factors that led to the overrepresentation of the Serbs in the officer corps 
of the YPA.917  What is not stated and is critically important is that the continued imbalance in the officer 
corps of the YPA despite strenuous efforts to address the issue represents a rejection of the YPA as a 
career by the other ethnic nationalities.  This rejection may have been due to other YPA policies that were 
more welcoming towards ethnic Serbs; in particular the language policy.      
A single language for Command and Control functions is required for any military to operate and 
is one of the basic elements of military integration. Language policy was also a tool of the YPA to try and 
reduce ethnic identity within the officer corps.  According to Article 243 of the 1974 Constitution 
“equality of languages and alphabets of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia shall be ensured in the 
Armed Forces.  In matters of command and military training in the YPA one of the languages of the 
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nations of Yugoslavia may be used, and in parts of the country the languages of the nations and 
nationalities.”  YPA policy violated this provision.  Serbian was the only language in the YPA; for 
command, training, education, administration, and for communication with civilian authorities and the 
public.  The YPA used Latin script rather than Cyrillic.  The YPA High Command forbade the use of any 
language other than Serbian even in reserve units that were ethnically homogeneous.  The language policy 
was tied to the policy of extraterritorial recruitment and assignment.  The policy was deliberately 
designed to weaken national ethnic identity and foster a supranational pan-Yugoslav identity among 
professional YPA soldiers.918   
“Exterritorial posting, national uprooting and official communication exclusively in the Serbian 
language had led to frequent and at least partial assimilation of non-Serbs, mostly into a 
‘Serboslav’ culture”919 
Recruiting non-Serb ethnicities into a culturally ‘Serboslav’ institution would be quite difficult when the 
expectation is that the person would spend the majority of his life in that culture and would most likely 
become ‘Yugoslav’ in the process.  This was a significant sacrifice for potential officers from the other 
nationalities but was no sacrifice for the Serb and Montenegrin recruits.  
“Since the language of the armed forces was Serbo-Croat, Slovenes, Hungarians, Macedonians 
and especially Albanians often felt ill at ease serving in the military”920 
 There is an additional facet of the problem rooted in the history of the Yugoslav army.  The Royal 
Yugoslav Army was also dominated by Serbs and was used against the other nationalities to promote 
Serb interests.  Writing in 1976 Robert Dean shows that the perception of the YPA as a tool to promote 
Serb interests by other ethnic groups occurred long before the rise of Milošević.921 The fact is that the 
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YPA was predominantly officered by Serbs and Montenegrins and was therefore perceived as a Serb 
institution.922  Long before the rise of Milošević the other ethnic nationalities clearly rejected the YPA as 
being ‘their’ army and they responded to the YPA with hostility.  In 1988 Marko Milivojevic noted that 
the YPA’s Achilles’ heel was nationalism.923 
The clearest example of adversarial civil-military relations was in Slovenia.  The scarcity of 
officer recruits from Slovenia resulted in part from a prevalent anti-military attitude among Slovene 
youth.  Civil-military relations in Slovenia were permanently and severely damaged by the trial of the 
Ljubljana 4 because it was conducted in a military court in the Serbian language despite the venue being 
in Ljubljana and the defendants being Slovenian.  The secret document they were being prosecuted for 
possessing (Ljubljana Military District Order 5044-3) was seen as a plan for an Army crackdown on 
Slovenia.  These factors were seen by the Slovenes not only as the Army getting even with the journalists 
but also that the trial was anti-Slovene.924  
“Both the documents and the arrest of journalists polarized public opinion in Slovenia against the 
army and the federal state and effectively pushed the Slovene party leadership eventually in 
opposition to the army.”925  
“The trial took Slovenia one step further from Yugoslavia. It unified the tiny republic against the 
JNA (YPA) – the symbol of the Communist Federation.”926 
Besides fighting to regain operational control of the TDF, the YPA undertook a major reorganization 
called the 'Jedinstvo' (Unity) plan in 1988 that reduced territorial military districts from five to three 
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military districts that deliberately did not match the boundaries of the republics in order to break up 
relationships between the republics’ leadership and the military districts.  Along with this restructuring, 
the policy of appointing military district commanders from the republic that corresponded to the district 
was ended.927 This reorganization was handled differently than previous reorganizations in that it was 
done quietly without public discussion.  In Slovenia this resulted in the elimination of the Ljubljana 
Military District and was seen as a reprisal by the YPA against the republic.928 
 Despite its claims to be a pan-Yugoslav institution the YPA could no longer function as a symbol 
of Yugoslavism.  It lost its ability to function as a unifying institution.  In the process of trying to hold 
Yugoslavia together the decision by the YPA leadership to align with Milošević completely ruptured any 
possible claim to be anything other than a tool of the Serbs.929  In addition most of the central military 
institutions, YPA elite units, and the largest defense industries were located in Serbia.930 By aligning itself 
with the Milosevic and the Serbs the YPA undermined the basis of its military legitimacy, being a pan-
Yugoslav integrative institution, and harmed the perception of the YPA as a ‘Yugoslav’ army in areas 
such as Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia.   Despite its ideological commitment to Yugoslavism 
and its desire to reinforce the central government and its privileges within the Yugoslav system, the 
YPA’s actions worked against its goals.931  This loss of legitimacy by the YPA resulted in widespread 
rejection of the YPA as ‘their’ military force by several non-Serb ethnicities.        
“By mid-1990 popular antipathy to the federal military in Slovenia and Croatia – a sentiment that 
had been on the rise in those republics for several years- became extremely intense.”  “Survey 
results indicated that citizens in Slovenia (78 percent), Kosovo (65 percent), and Croatia (54 
percent), felt strongly that there should be a reduction of republican funding for the federal 
military.” Yugoslav researchers interpreting such data concluded that the ‘high percentage of 
citizens from Slovenia and Kosovo supporting a decrease in assistance reveals how, within such 
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areas, the JNA (YPA) is considered a means for internal repression, and not as a force for 
defending Yugoslavia.” 932  
The importance of identity and military force for the continuation of an Amalgamated Security 
Community in this example is quite clear. First, TDF units provided a structural division of military 
forces into federal and local forces; the federal forces adopting a ‘Serboslav’ culture that was not 
welcoming to other ethnic groups while the local TDF units were usually ethnically homogeneous.  
Second, Serb overrepresentation in the officer corps of the YPA undermined military legitimacy by 
provoking other ethnic groups to view the army as being a tool of the Serbs and not an institution that 
would provide security for them but rather potentially would be used against them to advance Serb 
interests.  Since the YPA was no longer perceived to be a legitimate military force that would protect the 
people of Slovenia and Croatia, the governments of those political entities decided to create their own 
military forces.  Thus the disintegration of the partially integrated ASC began.  
 4-5. (c). 3. 1990 -1991. Disintegration of the Yugoslav ASC.   The YPA leadership correctly 
identified the TDF forces as constituting a prospective basis for national ethnic armies in the republics 
and that they had the potential to permit armed secession.933 The YPA had already disbanded the Kosovo 
TDF and was implementing the Jedinstvo plan designed to divide the republics from military matters and 
marginalize the TDF.934  Anton Bebler describes the disarming of the Slovene and Croatian TDFs by the 
YPA as a “preemptive mini-coup’ designed to deprive the new non-communist governments of their own 
armed force.935  It simply prompted Slovenia and Croatia to undertake a large arms smuggling operation 
and “the first significant confrontation between the newly elected governments and federal authorities 
centered on the issue of military affairs.”936  Croatia and Slovenia however, refused to back down and 
continued to build their own forces in opposition to the desires of the YPA.  
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“Such opposition increasingly took the form of paramilitary groups. The YPA came under 
challenge as the sole military instrument of state through the creation of paramilitary groups in 
the various republics and their subordination to local police. By spring 1991, Slovenia had 
organized a militia of about 30,000 men, and Croatia had raised a force of about 40,000 militia 
and another 4,000 Special Forces troops to fight terrorism. The creation of such forces 
represented a serious challenge to the sovereignty of the SFRY and the legitimacy of the 
YPA.”937   
The failure to disarm the forces of Slovenia and Croatia has already been described as well as the YPA’s 
operational failure against the Slovenian TDF.  The point is that the Yugoslav Amalgamated Security 
Community was in the process of disintegration once Slovenia and Croatia decided to create their own 
armed forces.  It completely disintegrated when these armed forces were not disarmed and the YPA failed 
to defeat them.     
4-5. (d). Measuring Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities and 
the capacity to produce military capability  
 
Previous chapters examined Amalgamated Security Community formation in which the key act is 
security integration which is a tipping point.  This chapter investigates state dissolution in which the key 
act is security disintegration as sub-state elements establish independent capacity to generate military 
capability.  This is key because it indicates a lack of trust and unwillingness to depend on a combined 
military for security thereby redefining who is included as a ‘brother-in-arms’; i.e. redefining the ‘us vs. 
other’ identity at the most basic level. The independent variable is the degree of integration of military 
capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability.  In the case of Yugoslavia the independent 
variable will be measured by category during three time periods; 1945-1968, 1969-1990, and 1990-1991 
which should show a progressive decline in military integration based on the evidence presented. 
Category 1 - Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces. 
a. 1945-1968.  During this period the NLA became the YPA and transitioned from a guerilla partisan 
force operating under the control of different commands and political organizations to a single unified 
force.  The transition also included becoming a conventional army and part of the communist party 
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regime.  The Military staffs, administrative support, and operational forces were all part of the same 
organization and they all responded to the same command structure.  The Yugoslav armed forces were 
completely integrated in this category during this time and will be scored as a 4.  
b. 1969 – 1990. During this period the TDF became co-equal to the YPA.  The TDF was initially not part 
of the same command structure nor did it receive its funding or logistical support from the YPA.  
Administration for the TDF was the responsibility of the governments of the various republics. The YPA 
was able to reassert operational control of the TDF so that it became subordinate to the YPA command 
but it did not eliminate the link between the TDF and their respective republics for funding or logistical 
support.  This partial integration of TDF combat forces but not the administrative function is a low level 
of integration and is scored as a 2. 
c. 1990 -1991.  Croatia and Slovenia established completely separate armed forces from the YPA.  Those 
forces were not under the command of the YPA and they received all administrative support from their 
own republics.  There was no integration between the YPA and these forces so this must be scored as a 0.    
Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production. 
a. 1945-1968.  Yugoslavia established itself as a leading arms producer and exporter.  Since it was outside 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact it felt a need to be mostly self sufficient.  Although it received large amounts 
of U.S. arms and aid in the 1950’s it did however adopt mostly Soviet bloc designs for its own weapons.  
The Association and Industry of Armament and Ministry Equipment (ZINVOJ) was tightly controlled by 
the Defense Ministry.  Furthermore, the policy of the Defense Ministry and ZINVOJ was to separate the 
factories involved in the production of weapons so that they were interdependent and no republic (except 
Serbia) would have the capacity to be self sufficient in arms production.  There is no question that during 
this period Yugoslavia was integrated in this category and so it is scored as a 4.    
b. 1969 – 1990. The Yugoslav defense industry did not change during this period except for a drop in 
demand for production and so this period must also be scored as a 4.  
c. 1990 -1991.  The YPA attempted to disarm Slovenia and succeeded in disarming Croatia.  Croatia and 
Slovenia were not able to produce their own arms during this period but engaged in extensive smuggling 
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operations to supply their forces.  Once armed hostilities began, the distributed interdependent defense 
industry suffered from the obvious disruption of supply and manufacturing that the conflict caused.  
Sharing in defense production in terms of that production supplying both the forces of Croatia and 
Slovenia as well as the YPA ended when the YPA decided to disarm the TDF units.  Therefore there was 
no integration in this category during this period and must be scored as a 0.     
Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces. 
a. 1945-1968. There was no large difference in the equipment used by the YPA during this period.  
Although different units during this period were provided with U.S. equipment the overall technological 
level was roughly the same, i.e. WWII and late 1950’s equipment that was relatively simple.  To account 
for the different technology from different sources this period is scored as a 3.5 
b. 1969 – 1990. One of the interesting aspects of Yugoslav defense policy was that the country kept large 
stockpiles of older weapons even as it sold large quantities of new hardware overseas.  TDF units were 
primarily provided with older weapons and for the most part the TDF units were equipped as light 
infantry.  The YPA was organized as a mechanized force but still used some older US and Soviet artillery, 
tanks, and equipment from other countries.  Given difficulties within the YPA in using different 
technologies, the TDF forces use of even older equipment could have presented some difficulties.  The 
reason that this was not a crippling problem was that TDF was supposed to be able to operate 
independently in enemy held areas, i.e. without close coordination with the YPA.  There was use of basic 
common equipment and some key items so that in this category integration can only be seen as being 
between a low to medium level and is scored as a 2.5.  
c. 1990 -1991.  The smuggling operations to equip the Slovenian TDF and Croatian National Guard 
primarily provided light arms and some anti-tank weapons.  Overall the technological differences with the 
YPA were about the same as the TDF in the previous period.   So although the Slovenian TDF and 
Croatian National Guard were not intending to be integrated with the YPA, if a confederation proposal 
had been adopted they would have had an integration in this category of a low to medium level of 2.5. 
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Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, 
and Soldiers. (DTLOMS).  
a. 1945-1968.  During this period the YPA went through several doctrinal changes such as adopting a 
static defense of population centers and All People’s Defense that saw the creation of independent 
partisan units under control of the YPA. Importantly the doctrinal changes applied to the total force as a 
unified entity.  Training was centrally managed for the entire force.  Leader development was 
accomplished through a series of NCO and officer education institutions from military academies through 
technical schools to a command and staff college that were all managed by the Defense Ministry.  The 
YPA went through several organizational changes; from a guerilla force to a conventional force based on 
the Soviet Red Army, to a conventional defensive force to a more mobile force that would use 
conventional and partisan units.  But all of these changes were done across the YPA as a whole.  Again 
material was roughly similar during this period although it came from different sources.  Recruitment and 
assignment of conscripts was deliberately done on an extraterritorial basis throughout the country.  
Personnel polices were implemented throughout the YPA as an integrated force.  During this time in this 
category the force was completely integrated and is scored as a 4.   
b. 1969 – 1990.  During this period the TND doctrine actually split the tactical doctrine to be followed by 
the YPA and the TDF.  The YPA was a conventional mechanized force and the TDF was a partisan force 
using light infantry tactics to harass delay and attrit enemy forces.  Although basic military training was 
provided through the YPA the focus of sustainment training followed function in that the TDF training 
focus on light infantry and guerrilla tactics only partially overlapped that of the regular forces.  Leader 
development and military education remained under the control of the YPA.  The Yugoslav military 
organization was obviously split by the creation of the TDF units and the involvement of the republics in 
the creation funding and administration of those units. YPA units were multiethnic and the TDF units 
were mostly composed of a single local ethnicity.  The provision of older equipment to the TDF units, 
while economical, was another point of divergence with the YPA.  The TDF and the YPA’s reserve force 
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competed for recruits.  The TDF soldiers were administered by the governments of the republics, not the 
YPA.  Integration in this category is only in basic areas and can only be given a score of 2. 
c. 1990 -1991. During this period the YPA was attempting to eliminate the TDFs altogether while the 
Slovenians and Croatians were creating completely separate organizations based (in Slovenia) on TDF 
doctrine.  The Slovenes and Croatians trained their own forces and did not use the YPA central training 
facilities.  Although leaders in the Slovenian and Croatian forces for the most part had been educated by 
the YPA, the YPA military education system during this period was not going to provide leaders or leader 
education to the forces it was trying to eliminate.  The forces were completely separate and independent 
organizations.  The material used by the Slovenes and Croatians was for the most part provided by 
smuggling organized by the republics defense ministers. The Slovene and Croatian soldiers were 
administered by the governments of the republics.  During this period there was no integration in this 
category and is scored as a 0. 
Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) Communications, 
Logistics. 
a. 1945-1968.  The YPA had a unified Command and Control system as well as a central communications 
system.  Logistics, while made difficult by the different types of equipment from multiple sources, was 
still provided by the YPA to the force as a whole.  During this period this category was completely 
integrated ad is scored as a 4.   
b. 1969 – 1990.  During this period the creation of the TDF broke up the unified Command and Control 
of forces.  The TDF units were so decentralized that local communities could be in command of their own 
forces in wartime.  It was not until the reorganization of the late 1980’s that the YPA restored operational 
C2 over the TDFs.  The same is true of communications in that the TDF units were under local control 
and would not be directed by the YPA.  Logistics for the TDF however remained the responsibility of the 
republics’ governments. To account for the decentralization and then partial recentralization in this 
category the score is between a medium to low level of integration and is therefore a 2.5  
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c. 1990 -1991.  During this period there was a complete break in command and control of separate 
organizations that responded to different command authorities. There was no integration in this category 
and is scored as a 0.  
Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing. 
a. 1945-1968.  The entire force was funded by the central government and so there was complete 
integration in this area during this time so it is scored as a 4. 
b. 1969 – 1990. The YPA was funded by the federal government and the TDF was funded by the 
republics.  It would seem to be a complete lack of integration but the YPA did provide training facilities 
and conducted basic training for TDF soldiers.  As a result there was some overlap in this category but at 
a low level and is therefore scored as a 1.    
c. 1990 -1991. The Slovene and Croatian forces were completely funded by those republics so there was 
no integration in this category so it is scored as 0. 
When all of the scores of the categories of the independent variable are taken together by time 
period they clearly demonstrate a progression of disintegration in the independent variable.  For the 
period 1945-1968  (Category 1=4, Category 2=4, Category 3=3.5, Category 4=4, Category 5=4, Category 
6=4) the result is an average score of 3.92 which indicates a high level of military integration overall 
during this period.  For the period 1969-1990  (Category 1=2, Category 2=4, Category 3=2.5, Category 
4=2, Category 5=2.5, Category 6=1) the result is an average score of 2.33 which indicates a low to 
medium level of military integration overall in this time.  For the period 1990-1991  (Category 1=0, 
Category 2=0, Category 3=2.5, Category 4=0, Category 5=0, Category 6=0) the result is an average score 
of .4 which indicates an almost complete lack of any military integration which is not surprising since the 
intent was to establish their own separate military forces.   
The entire process through which Yugoslavia disintegrated is marked by issues related to the 
structure of the military and its role in society and politics.  Starting with the creation of the TDF in 1969, 
the structure changed from a unified integrated institution founded on ‘Yugoslavism’ and ‘Brotherhood 
and Unity’ that adopted policies to foster a Yugoslav identity, to one in which multiple jurisdictions had 
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the capacity to generate military capability.  The failure of the YPA to truly live up to its vision of itself as 
a pan-Yugoslav institution due to the overrepresentation of Serbs and the ‘Serboslav’ culture within the 
YPA led to a loss of military legitimacy and rejection of the YPA by other ethnic nationalities as ‘their’ 
military. The sociopolitical bond between various segments of the population and the military was 
broken. This is seen as early as 1970-1971 during the Croatian crisis when the public calls for a “Croatian 
Army” moved the YPA to push Tito to authorize a crackdown.938 The military then strengthened the 
regime and became more politically active.  That did not prevent a downward spiral in civil-military 
relations in Slovenia where the youth rejected the YPA. The rejection of the YPA engulfed the entire 
Slovene population during the trial of the Ljubljana four. Finally, the alignment of the YPA with the Serb 
government assured that other ethnic groups would consider the YPA to not only be dominated by Serbs 
but to be an instrument used to protect Serb interests.  The result was that new governments in Slovenia 
and Croatia determined to build their own armed forces to protect their interests thereby redefining who 
was included as a ‘brother-in-arms’. The ASC came apart completely when the YPA failed operationally 
to forcefully keep Slovenia in Yugoslavia.  It was a vicious cycle of distrust based on military 
disintegration of the ASC that destroyed Yugoslavia.  This case supports the proposal that the key act in 
state dissolution is security disintegration as sub-state elements establish independent capacity to generate 
military capability.  
4-6. Czechoslovakia: Peaceful Dissolution of an ASC 
 
This case is a crucial test of the second part of the argument of this study which is that for state 
dissolution the key act is security dis-integration as sub-state elements establish independent military 
generation capability (the decision to dis-integrate would be the tipping point).  This is examined using 
the independent variable which is the degree of integration of military capabilities and the capacity to 
produce military capability.  Based on this the null hypothesis is that Amalgamated Security Community 
formation or dissolution can occur without integration of military capabilities or dissolution of military 
capabilities.  The case of Yugoslavia demonstrated that dis-integration of a previously integrated military 
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led to the violent failure of that ASC, and provides a better description of why that ASC failed than 
previous explanations.  The Czechoslovakian case is critical because all of the literature on the subject 
proposes that the breakup was caused either by structural weakness of the federation, structural 
decentralization, economic disparities, regional political parties that mobilized ethnic nationalism, or the 
actions of particular élites and leaders (who lacked statesmanship) that caused the “Velvet Divorce.”  
There is no disagreement that in the end it was a negotiated and reasonably smooth separation.  There is 
also no hint in the academic literature of any involvement by the military or threat of force involved with 
this ASC dissolution. Only a few minor scuffles were reported during the period.  Therefore, this case in 
which there is no apparent connection to the military could conclusively refute the second half of the 
argument of this paper.  On the other hand, if a clear connection can be made to military dis-integration, 
particularly decisions made prior to the breakup, that resulted in the failure of the ASC then the second 
half of the argument should be seen as quite strong and the null hypothesis completely rejected.    
4-6. (a).  History of Czechoslovakia’s Breakup 
 The main period under consideration in this case is from the end of the “Velvet Revolution” on 
December 29, 1989 to the “Velvet Divorce” on 1 January 1993, a period of only slightly more than three 
years.  There must however, be a bit of background history to establish the context for this case and the 
fact that this was an Amalgamated Security Community.   
 Background context. Following the defeat in 1866 the Emperor established the Dual Monarchy 
of Austria-Hungary in 1867. This created two virtually independent states, each having its own 
parliament, government, administration, and judicial system, but they were united under the Emperor as a 
common ruler as well as having a joint foreign policy and some shared finances.  The Czechs were under 
the administration of the Austrians while the Slovaks were under Hungarian control.  Although Czech and 
Slovak movements worked for autonomy in their separate jurisdictions, by 1898 some Czech and Slovak 
intellectuals began to support the idea of a "Czechoslovak" political entity.  Part of the basis for their 
initial affinity is their significant linguistic similarity (although having their own dialect the Slovaks read 
and wrote in Czech into the mid-1800s) as well as linkages between protestant sects in the two 
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communities.  Their cultural affinity and the term Czecho-Slovak predated the idea of forming a 
"Czechoslovak" political entity.   What is probably the greatest motivator for creating an idea of there 
being a "Czechoslovakia" was the Hungarian push for the “Magyarization” of the population of Hungary.  
The idea of Czechoslovakia continued to develop to the point that students of the Czech leader (later first 
President of Czechoslovakia) Tomas Masaryk, who strongly supported Czech-Slovak cooperation, 
formed the Czechoslovak Union and published the journal Hlas (The Voice) in 1898.939   During World 
War I neither the Czechs nor Slovaks had much desire to fight for the Austrians or Hungarians; as a result 
many of them deserted and formed the Czechoslovak Legion on the Russian front.  The Czechoslovak 
Legion grew from 1100 men in 1914 to over 40,000 by 1917, and it fought in numerous battles.  After the 
Russian Revolution some of them had to fight to return to Czechoslovakia leaving through Vladivostok 
and returning in 1920.  Others were able to make it to the Western Front where they joined with other 
Czechoslovak units that had been fighting as part of the French Army creating a unit of over 10,000 that 
fought at Arras, Champagne and the Argonne.  Another Czechoslovak unit of a thousand soldiers fought 
alongside the Serbian Army.  In Italy a Czechoslovak unit of over 4,000 fought alongside the Italian 
Army on the Piave River.940  In Western Europe and the U.S., Tomas Masaryk along with Eduard Benes 
and the Slovak war hero, Milan Stefanik, created the Czechoslovak National Council in 1916, which 
worked to gain Allied recognition.  In the summer of 1918 the Allies recognized the Czechoslovak 
National Council as the supreme organ of a future Czechoslovak government.941  Meanwhile, Czech MPs 
announced on 30 May 1917 in the imperial parliament that there should be a united approach to the self 
determination of the Czechs and Slovaks.  Slovak political leaders made their decision to leave Hungary 
and join with the Czechs in May 1918 at a secret meeting whose results were sent to Czech politicians.  
Only in October 1918 did a Slovak politician inform the Hungarian parliament of the intended split and 
                                                 
939  Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Czechoslovakia a Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak  
(Washington DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 28. See Also; Zdenek Suda, "Slovakia in Czech 
National Consciousness ” in The End of Czechoslovakia, ed. Jiri Musil  (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, distributed in the US by Oxford University Press, 1995), 107-111. 
940 Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic and its Armed Forces (Prague: Military 
Information and Service Agency, 2001), 18-19. 
941 Czechoslovakia a Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak, 29. 
 336
that the Slovak National Council intended to determine their own future.942  The Czechoslovak National 
Council in Prague declared the independence of Czechoslovakia on 28 October, 1918.  Hungary was not 
disposed to let Slovakia go especially since none of the initial treaties ending the war addressed the 
boundary between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.  Hungarian forces demolished the Slovakian economy 
moving whole factories to Hungary while military forces occupied the area.  In response (with Allied 
assistance and approval), Czech forces occupied Slovakia, and the Hungarians were forced to withdraw 
after some skirmishes in which 1000 Czechoslovak soldiers were killed and 3,700 were wounded. 
Czechoslovakia held the area under martial law for several years after the Treaty of Trianon established 
the border.943   The constitution of 1920 created a centralized government in a unitary state but established 
Czech and Slovak as two official languages and proclaimed the equality of the two branches of the 
Czechoslovak nation, a formulation favored by Masaryk.  The Slovak war hero, Milan Stefanik pushed 
for a conception of one Czechoslovak nation without branches, with one language, and for a program of 
migration and intermarriage to ensure a single community developed; he died in an airplane crash in 1919 
and so did his idea.944  
 The narrative thus far allows the newly formed Czechoslovakia to be seen as an Amalgamated 
Security Community.  First, there was a longstanding intellectual understanding of a Czecho-Slovak 
cultural/linguistic affinity.  Second, it took the crisis of the First World War to free both nations.  More 
importantly, during that war there were Czechoslovakian units in which Czechs and Slovaks became 
brothers-in-arms to fight against their common enemy on several fronts.  Third, there was a subsequent 
voluntary political agreement between Czech and Slovak leaders to become subject to a common 
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government.  Finally, Czechoslovak and Allied forces had to fight a short conflict against Hungarian 
forces to determine the final borders of the state.   
“Fear of a resurgence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, from which the region had just been 
liberated, as well as concern over the strong presence of non-Slavic (particularly German and 
Hungarian) minorities in the country, led Czech and Slovak leaders to opt for union over 
separation for security purposes. Thus, two nationalities, which shared a similar language but few 
other cultural characteristics, formed a union based on an instrumental concern for their mutual 
security.”945 
 It is not necessary here to review the well known story of how Czechoslovakia fared in the face of 
an aggressive Germany. What is important is to note that on 14 March, 1939, Slovakia declared 
independence creating the short lived Slovak Republic.  Although done at the behest of the Germans it 
left a significant mark on how the Czechs viewed the Slovaks (a stereotype of Slovak betrayal).  Of 
course the Slovaks had their own stereotype of the Czechs as being patronizing, expansionist and 
impious.946    
 The reconstitution of Czechoslovakia following World War II can be seen as restoring an 
Amalgamated Security Community.  At the end of the war all of the political parties (except those 
deemed to be too close to the Nazis) formed a National Front coalition government when the Third 
Republic was created in April 1945.  Because of the disappointment with the West after Munich and the 
popularity of the liberating Soviet armies the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) gained a 
plurality of the vote in the May 1946 election, gaining control of the Prime Minister’s office and the 
Ministry of Interior.  In January 1948 the Ministry of Interior began to purge the Czechoslovak security 
forces, and by February had conducted a coup using police regiments and a workers’ militia they had 
armed. The army remained in its barracks.947  Czechoslovakia became a "people's democracy," a satellite 
of the Soviet Union, and founding member of the Comecon and Warsaw Pact.   
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 The next significant event was the “Prague Spring,” of 1968 that resulted in the Warsaw Pact 
invasion on 20 August.  There was a clear difference in the goals of the two communities at this time. The 
Czechs wanted greater democracy but the Slovaks wanted a reorganized and truly federal state.948  
Dubcek was too popular to remove immediately despite the military occupation of the country but the 
Soviets were able to replace him in April 1969 with Gustav Husak.  Afterwards there was a policy of 
"normalization" and centralization which entailed a return to ideological conformity through political 
repression in which all reformists were purged from the government and party.949  “The most common 
attitudes toward political activity since the 1968 invasion have been apathy, passivity, and escapism.”950  
This passivity continued during the transition period as well.  A significant result of the invasion and the 
political repression that followed was a deep resentment of the Soviet Union and Husak government. 
 “Velvet Revolution” to the “Velvet Divorce.”   Following the fall of the Berlin Wall riot police 
suppressed a student demonstration in Prague on 17 November.  The response was massive protests 
across the country that eventually led to the fall of the regime. Czechs and Slovaks were united in their 
opposition to the former regime and all opposition elements were united in seeking the removal of the 
Husak government. Husak resigned on 10 December, Dubcek became the speaker of the federal 
parliament on 28 December and Václav Havel was selected to be President of Czechoslovakia on 29 
December.  Officials and representatives committed to democratic reform replaced the officials form the 
previous regime, but the governmental structure remained the same.  One of Václav Havel’s first acts was 
to propose to the parliament they should change the name of the country by dropping the word “socialist” 
from Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.  What was thought to be a modest proposal actually led to what 
was called the “Hyphen War” in which the Slovaks advocated a return to the usage Czecho-Slovakia 
which had ended with the 1920 constitution.  This highlighted a recurring Slovak demand for “visibility” 
for Slovakia. In the end all groups agreed to a new name; the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic 
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(CSFR).951   The governments of the two constituent republics negotiated an agreement that each should 
pay for itself from its own taxes; this unworkable idea was opposed by the federal government which had 
not been party to the negotiations. No other significant changes were made prior to national elections in 
June 1990.  The election brought Vladimir Meciar to power as head of the Slovak government.  At this 
time he gave no indication of being a separatist but rather was focused on achieving the national 
ambitions of Slovakia within the federal structure.952   One issue that gained significance for Meciar was 
the transition to a market economy strongly supported by the Federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus 
(later head of the Czech government).  The people of Slovakia were much more opposed to the loss of 
government support and loss of jobs through large scale privatization than the Czechs.953  The 1990 
elections set the stage for negotiations between various groups over the future structure of the federation.  
A new power sharing law that amended the 1968 Constitution was passed in December 1990.  A threat by 
Meciar during negotiations to make Slovak law supreme if the agreed text was changed by the Federal 
Assembly prompted President Havel to offer two additional proposals; to create a constitutional court, 
and another that would require a referendum to resolve intractable political disputes (such as an attempt at 
dissolving the federation) so that the republics would not attempt to gain independence.  The power 
sharing amendments law transferred most administrative functions to the republics but the federal 
government kept significant authority over key policy areas (e.g. defense, monetary policy, tax policy, 
economic policy, transportation, customs, and nuclear issues).954   The Constitutional Court was created in 
1991.  The referendum law was passed in July 1991 which was supposed to be the ultimate means of 
resolving the issue of the continuation of the common state, with the stipulation that if more that 50% of 
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voters in either republic voted to secede, the federal state would be dissolved within a year.955   Also in 
1991 in response to a political split in the Slovak coalition, the Presidium of the National Council using 
the 1968 Constitution dismissed Meciar and several ministers.  Large protests supporting him erupted and 
he became the most popular politician in Slovakia.956  In the fall of 1990 a commission was established to 
begin writing the draft for a new constitution, but it was unable to do so.  President Havel ordered a draft 
to be written by experts, and then be reviewed by the commission; that also failed to produce results. The 
Federal Assembly began to change what parts of the constitution that it could, but it could not produce a 
complete document.  By February 1991 President Havel began a series of negotiations among the political 
factions.957 A complete review of the negotiations is not necessary.  However, a text was agreed to at 
Milovy and approved by the Czech National council on 11 February 1992 but was rejected by one vote in 
the Slovak Presidium on 12 February.958  Elections in June 1992 returned Vladimir Meciar to power as 
head of the Slovak government and Vaclav Klaus became the head of the Czech government.  On 3 July 
1992 the Federal Assembly was unable to re-elect Václav Havel as President because of Slovak 
opposition; Meciar had a grudge against Havel because of his dismissal.  Havel resigned as President on 
17 July (his term expired in October) after the Slovaks approved a Declaration of Sovereignty.959  
Meanwhile, Klaus and Meciar had been negotiating the future of the federation between themselves.  
Initially welcomed by President Havel as a breakthrough on constitutional issues he quickly became 
alarmed at the scope of the negotiations and agreement, pointing out that the constitutional division of the 
state was possible only through a referendum.  Neither Klaus nor Meciar wanted a referendum on the 
division of the state because they did not believe it would pass so they worked to find a solution to divide 
the federation without one.  The Slovaks did not want a complete split but a much looser federation; 
something the Czech side did not accept.  The final decision to end the federation on 1 January 1993 was 
                                                 
955 Ibid., 126. 
956 Ibid.,  91-94. 
957 Zak, "The Velvet Divorce – Institutional Foundations,” 257-258. 
958 Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup, 172.  (Stein provides an in-
depth review of the negotiations as he was an international advisor to the process). 
959 Ibid., 190, 209-210.  
 341
reached between Klaus and Meciar on the night of 26 August 1992. The Federal Assembly then passed 
the law on the dissolution of the federation on 25 November 1992.960   
 The breakup of Czechoslovakia has presented the academic community a significant problem.  To 
begin with, as measured by numerous opinion polls, a significant majority of Czechs and Slovaks 
opposed the breakup of the federation.  Although differences existed in each community and certain 
stereotypes of the other existed, polls in May 1992 showed 64 per cent of Czechs and 72 per cent of 
Slovaks had good relations with the other community (to include large percentages with friends and 
relatives in the other republic).  Over 80 percent of the population (both Czech and Slovak) supported a 
referendum on continuing the federation with a small minority indicating they would vote to dissolve it.  
Also over 80 per cent of both communities blamed politicians for using nationalism for their own 
purposes and that only the citizens should determine the fate of the federation through a referendum; not 
the politicians.  Large majorities in both republics believed that dissolving the federation would have a 
negative economic effect.961  So despite the use of nationalism by politicians the people recognized it and 
rejected it as a reason to separate from the other community.  The structure of the government would have 
seemed to meet the requirements for a consociational political system that protected minorities and 
enabled sufficient autonomy so that a negotiated settlement should have been the result.962 
“Czechoslovakia’s dissolution in 1993, and the failed attempts to keep the country united in the 
years preceding it are puzzling both to outside observers, as well as Czechs and Slovaks 
themselves. After all, the objective differences between Czechs and Slovaks were small at the 
time of the dissolution, with Czechs and Slovaks sharing similar histories, speaking mutually 
intelligible languages, and practicing the same religion. Public opinion was also staunchly 
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opposed to the breakup and all major political parties in the postcommunist period sought to 
maintain the country’s unity.”963  
The academic response to the peaceful breakup that caught most people by surprise was to propose 
various explanations; most of them contradictory, and none of them completely satisfactory.  Some 
explanations include; structural weakness of the federation, structural decentralization, economic 
disparities, regional political parties, mobilized ethnic nationalism, and the selfish actions of particular 
élites and leaders.964   There is no agreement in the academic community on what caused the “Velvet 
Divorce.”   Abby Innes in Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye argues that the breakup should not have 
occurred.  From her argument the reason that there is no satisfactory theory would be that the breakup 
was a manipulated and historically preventable outcome. For Innes Czechoslovakia was quietly and 
quickly dismantled against the wishes of the people by leaders who manipulated the separation process to 
increase their own power.965  A very important aspect that must be emphasized is that this took place 
within a very short time, during a transition period of uncertainty, while institutions, parties, political 
leadership and political issues were in a state of flux.  After a brief look at the government and an 
interesting aspect of the economic structure, a review of what was happening in the military arena during 
this turbulent time may be able to provide additional insight into this riddle of what caused the “Velvet 
Divorce.” 
4-6. (b).  The Government 
 The original government structure of the Czechoslovak ASC was a centralized unitary 
government which was ended by the Second World War.  Although the 1920 Constitution gave Slovaks 
their own local governments for the first time, there were soon widespread demands for greater 
autonomy. The main demand was for a Slovak regional parliament to serve as the basis for a regional 
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government. There were also demands for parity in proportion to population (Czech to Slovak ratio being 
2:1) in the federal civil service.966 This desire for greater Slovak autonomy became a constant fixture of 
Czechoslovak politics.  The 1948 Constitution created what some have called an asymmetric federation.  
Slovakia had its own legislative body and governmental structure but there was no similar structure on the 
Czech side which was governed directly by the central government.  The actual power structure was very 
centralized especially after the Slovak Communist Party was absorbed and downgraded to a regional 
organization of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party.967  The 1968 Constitution (a result of the Prague 
Spring reform movement) created a true federal structure and this structure continued through to the 
breakup of the ASC.  It created a bicameral Federal Assembly with a Chamber of the People, and a 
Chamber of the Nations made up of equal numbers of Czechs and Slovaks that had jurisdiction over 
certain areas and which required consent of a majority of each half (Czech and Slovak) to make decisions.  
The federation was composed of "two equal fraternal nations," the Czech Socialist Republic and the 
Slovak Socialist Republic, which each had their own governmental structure and administration.  The 
federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs, national defense, resources, and 
economic policy, while other functions of the central government were allocated to the republics many 
however, were dual federal and republic jurisdictions.  Of course the real power remained in the hands of 
the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and the process of “normalization” under the Husak government 
further centralized decision making so that while the structure was federal the government was run by the 
party.968 
 There is another interesting aspect to the 1968 Constitution dealing with defense.  Under the 1968 
Constitution Defense Councils were established within the governments of both the Czech Socialist 
Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic, despite the retention of defense as the responsibility of the 
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federal government. The members of the Defense Councils in the republics were appointed by and could 
be dismissed by the chairman of the (federal) State Defense Council, so they were subject to federal 
authority.  The purpose and function of these Defense Councils in the republics was not made clear.969  It 
is reasonable to assume that it had some relationship to the network of organizations that conducted 
paramilitary and civil defense training such as; the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, the 
Czechoslavak Socialist Union of Youth, the Pioneers organization, the Czechoslovak Physical Culture 
Association, and the Association for Cooperation with the Army (SVAZARM) that sponsored defense 
training through special interest groups that centered mostly on sports such as glider and basic flight 
training, parachuting, rifle-shooting, dog-handling, and amateur radio operation.  There was also an armed 
People's Militia involved in civil defense that grew out of armed guard units formed in factories, mines, 
and other installations after World War II.970  Whatever their function, and despite being subordinate to 
the federal government, they did provide the government in each republic some administrative capacity to 
deal with defense issues.     
 Economic disparity and disagreements over economic policy between the two republics are some 
of the reasons given as potential motives for the breakup.  The fact that both Czechs and Slovaks believed 
a split would be economically harmful would seem to negate this.  There was however, real disagreement 
over economic policy that has an interesting twist.  When Czechoslovakia was created the new state 
inherited 70 to 80 percent of all the industry of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, most of which was in the 
Czech Lands.  Slovakia lagged behind economically until the Husak government adopted a policy to 
industrialize Slovakia. This policy was very successful in bringing the two republics to rough economic, 
social, and educational parity by the early nineties.  Slovak industrial output rose from 13 percent of total 
GDP in 1948 to 30 percent by 1989.  The process of industrialization was very rapid and consisted in 
many cases of large plants located in small cities where they became the dominant employer. This rapid 
industrialization was at the command of the government to support the economic and strategic goals of 
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the Soviet bloc.  One scholar refers to the result as the “well-know one-sidedness of new Slovak 
industry.”  By this he means that the heavy industry built in Slovakia was focused on arms production.971  
The concentration of over sixty percent of the armaments industry in Slovakia was not only done to 
develop Slovakia but to protect it from the enemy in the West.  Czechoslovakia was a major arms 
exporter in the international market, with only thirty percent of production being used by the Czech 
military.  The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) was the seventh largest weapons exporter in 
the world, and on a per capita basis the leading arms manufacturer.  The weapons included tanks, jet 
aircraft, radars and a vast quantity of other material.  The end of the Cold War sharply reduced demand 
for arms exports.  The new post-communist government in an effort to improve its international image 
and to move toward a market economy announced that arms sales to other countries would be stopped 
and that the arms industry would be quickly converted to civilian production. This was found to be 
unworkable so it was determined that exports would be suspended to areas of tension.  Because of the 
concentration of the military industry in Slovakia the federal government’s plans created a political 
problem.  The military chief of arms production LTG Kovacik, stated that between 120,000 to 150,000 
workers in Slovakia would be affected by these policies and the government planned on helping only 13 
out of 111 affected factories in the conversion to civilian production.  Workers in Slovakia protested and 
engaged in strikes while the issue became a political problem as unemployment in Slovakia rose to three 
times that in the Czech lands.972  Meciar argued that the Slovak Republic's economic problems were 
directly caused by the federal economic policies.  Federal Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus (later Czech 
PM) refused to modify the privatization process and transition to a free-market economy despite the 
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complaints of Slovak politicians.973  The devolution of power in 1990 however, let the Slovaks push back 
against the drastic changes to the arms industry, as can be seen in continued sale and production of 
tanks.974 
“The location of arms plants in Slovakia caused the Slovak government to play an active role in 
formulating a Czechoslovak foreign policy (in a way that ran counter to the declarations of 
federal officials), and it forced the federal government to modify its policies in a manner that ran 
counter to Czechoslovakia’s interests”975  
“The domestic problems entailed by the cutback of armaments production (economic and ethnic) also led 
to the continuation of the policy of arms exports, proclamations by Havel and Dienstbier 
notwithstanding.”976  The point to this exploration of the arms industry in Czechoslovakia and its 
involvement in the domestic political competition between Slovakia, the Czech republic, and the federal 
government is because it involves two categories of the independent variable of this study (Category 2. 
Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production; and Category 4. Creation of combat 
power; Materiel).  The development of Slovakian political opposition to federal policies to end arms 
exports and transition factories, to the point of successfully obstructing those policies to some degree, 
indicates that at least to some extent there was a partial dis-integration of the capacity to produce military 
capability in these two categories. 
4-6. (c). Defense and Level of Integration 
 The Czechoslovakian Military was faced with a serious problem after the Velvet Revolution; it 
completely lacked any Military Legitimacy.  It was a component force of the Warsaw Pact that followed 
the doctrine, training, organization, and policy of the Soviet Union.  It was seen as an extension of the 
politically repressive Husak regime and closely linked to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces that invaded 
the country in 1968.977 Other than the Czechoslovak units fighting in World War I in other countries’ 
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armies, the Czechoslovak military had not defended the state since the formation of the country.  The 
Czechoslovak military did not fight Hitler, it stayed in its barracks during the communist coup in 1948, 
and in 1968.  It had no legacy of military operations, no credibility as a fighting force and therefore no 
functional military legitimacy.  The Czechoslovak military had no sociopolitical base of legitimacy either.  
There was a strong undercurrent of anti-military sentiment in Czechoslovak society; a popular literary 
folk hero was taken from The Good Soldier Svejk, a pacifist who avoids fighting by continually getting 
lost. He was seen to represent a Czech national trait of passive resistance to authority and the armed 
forces.  This was partly due to historical context of being subsumed into the larger empire after losing the 
Bohemian State in the 1600s which meant that any participation in military activity was for the benefit of 
a foreign authority.  The Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 amplified this view and had a crushing effect on 
Czechoslovakia’s military forces’ morale.  The “normalization” process that followed led to purges in the 
officer corps, a massive exodus of junior officers which were not replaced either in quality or quantity 
because new officers could not be recruited to attend officer schools despite significant incentives.978  A 
deep antipathy toward the Soviets in society directly affected the soldiers who were short term conscripts 
leading to chronic low morale.  The society, which reacted to political repression with a type of passive 
resistance by avoiding politics and contact with government, generated a strong increase in pacifism as 
the military was seen to simply be a part of a repressive system.  Opinion polls consistently demonstrated 
that the military lacked prestige and had a negative stereotype; it was even considered to be 
unnecessary.979  This passive anti-military outlook seems to have been pervasive.980 After the “Velvet 
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Revolution” the new political elite had little positive to say about the military, with President Havel 
remarking that he would prefer that Czechoslovakia had no military at all.  General Miroslav Vacek  
Minister of Defense during the Velvet Revolution, became very frustrated with the predominant negative 
view of the military. Vacek publicly campaigned for the acceptance of the military as a necessary 
institution stating in a TV appearance;    
“If you, esteemed citizens, give me the opportunity to voice only one wish, then I ask you, if this 
is possible for you, to change gradually your attitude toward our Army, and if you cannot love it, 
then at least for the beginning, cast off the hostility.”981 
A final indication of the low morale and distaste for military service was in the mass exodus of officers 
and soldiers who ran for the exit when given the opportunity.  A competency screening for officers that 
also included a required new oath did screen out undesirables but it also allowed others to leave service 
without sanctions; by September 1990 over 15 percent of the officer corps left the military.  Soldiers left 
in droves after an alternative service law was passed in March 1990 that not only allowed a civilian to opt 
out of military service prior to being drafted, but also let soldiers opt out while serving.  By October 1990 
the army was short 40,000 troops, was only able to fill 40 percent of mid level command positions, and its 
training and combat readiness had been reduced.982 
 The Czechoslovakian Military completely lacked any Military Legitimacy.  It had no functional 
legitimacy and of the sociopolitical bases of legitimacy, it was not seen to engage in political activity, nor 
engage successfully in any aspect of military agency, and it had a hostile relationship with its society.  
Because of this lack of Military Legitimacy the Czechoslovakian Military could not function to either 
develop or reinforce a super-ordinate identity in the Czecho-Slovak ASC. Not having a military that could 
perform these functions at a minimum weakened the potential bonds between the two communities 
leaving the ASC vulnerable to fracture. Perhaps over time (some observers noted it would take at least a 
decade) it could have developed itself and its relationship with society to the point of being able to 
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exercise those functions (this was advocated as the path that should be taken by the Czechoslovakian 
Military by Western military observers983) but it was not given the time as any positive transition was cut 
short by the Velvet Divorce. 
 Organizational Turmoil and transition. This brings up the next aspect that affected the 
Czechoslovakian Military in the three years between the revolution and divorce and that is it was a period 
of turmoil and transition.  In 1989 the Czechoslovakian Military was a Warsaw Pact Soviet Army clone.  
It derived everything from this relationship beginning with its strategic direction and purpose.  All of its 
doctrine, training, leader development, organization, equipment, technology, command and control, 
communications, logistics, and manning structure were derived by copying the Soviet model.  Almost 
overnight the Czechoslovakian Military was put in the position of having to change all of these critical 
components.  With the end of the Cold War it had no direction and no enemy during this period of 
transition to focus its efforts.  A new strategic doctrine that called for a smaller lighter force to be used 
only in defense of the territory of Czechoslovakia was not submitted to the Federal Assembly until 
October 1990.984  It wasn’t until 1991 that the new “Military Defense Doctrine” and new Defense Act 
were approved by the Federal Assembly.985  Although President Havel was able to chart a more 
independent foreign policy (such as the establishment of the Visegrad Group after Feb.‘91) there was still 
a need to move carefully since Soviet troops did not leave Czechoslovak territory until June 1991 and the 
Warsaw Pact did not dissolve until July.986  The removal of dubious officers and communist officials as 
well as the rush for the exit by officers and soldiers has been noted, but the impact on the organization, 
structure, and its ability to function must also be taken into account as another element of turmoil during 
this period.  President Havel replaced General Vacek as Defense Minister in October of 1990 with Mr. 
Lubos Dobrovsky, a civilian deputy foreign affairs minister with no military experience.987  Although it 
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established civilian control over the military it did not improve management effectiveness during the 
transition period as a number of critics pointed out.  Critics of the military both within and from the 
outside abounded during this period.  An opposition group within the military formed in November 1989 
was called Military Forum, which was closely linked to the civilian opposition group Civic Forum.  It 
pushed for a complete depoliticization of the military that would have been a massive purge leaving only 
junior officers and soldiers in uniform (an indication of the great distrust between junior and senior levels 
in the armed forces).  Military Revival Association was a group of civilian and military personnel who 
had been purged in 1968 that wanted rehabilitation of those who had been purged but also acted as a 
watchdog recommending reforms.  Two trade unions for soldiers, the Union of Professional Soldiers and 
the Young Servicemen’s Association, were established along with a union for civilian employees in 1990.  
An external civilian group that was distrustful of the military, the Military Commission of the Civic 
Forum Coordinating Center (VKKCOF) was also established as a watchdog group.  As dissatisfaction 
with the reforms in the military increased some of the members of the Military Forum created a more 
radical group in 1990, the Free Legion, which pushed for a quick, comprehensive, and radical reform of 
the military.  The Association of Slovak Soldiers will be explored in more detail below.988  The point is 
that during this period multiple advocacy and watchdog groups were created focused on the military and 
desiring particular reforms that caused even more turbulence for neophyte civilian leaders as they 
attempted to manage the Czechoslovakian Military.    
 The Czechoslovakian Military had another issue and that was its geographic location.   In 1990 
all of its forces were located in the western part of the country (i.e. Bohemia) and in order to conform to 
its new territorial defense strategy there would have to be a large scale redeployment and rebasing done 
concurrently with any reorganization.  The result was “Plan 2005” that described a gradual redistribution 
of forces to bases vacated by Soviet units in Slovakia.989 It was a three phase plan. By 1992 the military 
would be reduced in size, reorganized and equipment changed to reflect a defensive strategy (and to 
                                                 
988 Szayna, The Military in a Postcommunist Czechoslovakia, 29-32. 
989 Ibid., 37. 
 351
comply with CFE requirements).  By 1996 half of the force was to be professional soldiers.  The General 
Staff was to have overall command of all forces but only the Air Force and air defense forces would be 
directly subordinate to it. The rest of the armed forces were to be organized into Czech, Moravian, and 
Slovak territorial commands.  Each territorial command would also be a field command with subordinate 
divisions, and would also handle mobilization issues within its area.  Two of the five Czech divisions and 
both Slovak divisions were to be active with three Czech divisions kept at a lower readiness level.990  The 
personnel changes and impacts of the opt out legislation has been noted, but there is another personnel 
change with greater implications.  Part of the law on military service was designed to ‘humanize’ what 
had been dismal conditions for conscripts by reducing hazing and official punishments. A key policy 
change on humanitarian grounds was that conscripts were to be allowed to serve close to their home area 
by 1993.  The impact is that as the forces were being redeployed the mostly conscript force would result 
in ethnic Slovak units stationed in Slovakia and ethnic Czech units stationed in the Czech Lands.991 
 Although it wanted a gradual orderly redeployment and rebasing, events pushed the military to 
begin moving troops into Slovakia by late 1990.  In early 1990 Hungary distanced itself from the Treaty 
of Trianon that set the border between Slovakia and Hungary.  As Hungary began to redeploy its own 
troops internally the Slovak politicians began to accuse Hungary of interference in Slovakia in the 
Magyar community as well as planting intelligence agents there. Meciar began to call for rapid 
redeployment of Czechoslovakian troops to Slovakia against the threat of Hungarian or Ukrainian 
irredentism. The military was reluctant to do so because the Magyar community viewed the stationing of 
troops as an attempt by Slovak politicians to intimidate them and they did not want to be drawn into a 
political confrontation with possible international repercussions.992   Additional pressure was created by a 
fear of a flood of Soviet Refugees.  Meciar used this to call for more rapid redeployment of forces to 
Eastern Slovakia and criticized the federal government for not providing security.  The limited movement 
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of units was accelerated to a full scale movement of units by April 1991. The main impediment to the 
redeployment of troops was funding, the military budget was cut forty percent in 1990 and the 1991 
budget was significantly lower.993       
 The result of all of this restructuring, reorganizing, and redeploying turmoil is that the military 
was in no position to attempt to affect the outcome of the political ‘divorce’ proceedings in contrast to the 
Yugoslavia case.  Furthermore, the level of military integration was being impacted by various policies. If 
the measures of the independent variable are looked at in light of this evidence there is at least some dis-
integration taking place in almost all of them. Category 1, Military forces; consisting of administrative 
staffs and operational forces, were being split between territorial commands that were to handle 
mobilization issue and would become ethnically distinct over time.  Category 2 was touched on above.  
Category 4, Creation of combat power; doctrine was in a state of flux,  training had almost ground to a 
halt, leaders had been purged and there was a dearth of new ones, the organization was being completely 
overhauled, materiel was being replaced, and policies regarding soldiers had allowed a mass exodus, and 
had the potential to reinforce ethnic divisions. Category 5, use and sustainment of military forces; the 
entire command and control structure was being changed to territorially defined basis, communications 
would have to be reorganized as would logistics to support the reorganization.  Only Category 3, military 
technology and Category 6, regarding burdensharing, would have remained integrated. 
 Up to this point it is evident that there were significant problems and changes affecting the 
Czechoslovakian Military in this case.  It does not indicate that the military had disintegrated but that a 
combination of factors was heading in that direction and could only be said to have reached a partial level 
of military integration.  If this were all the evidence then this case would not support this study.  There is 
however an additional aspect that provides the ‘smoking gun’ to validate the inclusion of this case. 
4-6. (d). The Pivotal Point.  
The Slovak National Party, which openly advocated Slovak independence, published an article in 
October 1990 calling for Slovak soldiers to form an Association of Slovak Soldiers (ASV) as well as 
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calling for the formation of two separate armies.  The ASV was formed in January 1991.  It made 
multiple accusations that Slovaks were being discriminated against by the more numerous Czechs.  It 
claimed that the percentage of officers was not proportionally representative (although when the numbers 
were released the claim was clearly false), it wanted Slovakian military academies run by Slovaks even 
though most military schools were in Slovakia with majority Slovakian staffs. By 1991 Slovakian media 
called for solving the ‘Slovak problem’ in the military.  Slovak officers were reported to attend and 
vocally support the ASV at nationalist rallies in Bratislava calling Czechs unwanted older brothers. Bitter 
exchanges occurred in the press between Czech and Slovak officers regarding the ASV. Slovak 
government officials defended the ASV (including the Slovak Prime Minister Carnogursky – Meciar’s 
replacement when he was dismissed) and the ASV had governmental contacts since the head of the ASV 
was an advisor to a Slovak nationalist party.  The ASV watched the disintegration of Yugoslavia and 
learned a lesson from the Slovene victory.994 
“Seemingly spurred by the example of the Slovenian territorial militia’s success in fighting the 
Yugoslav federal army to a standstill, calls for the formation of a similar force emerged in 
Slovakia.  What is significant is that the deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council, Jan 
Klepac, made the call for clearing the way to form a Slovak Home Guard. The announcement 
showed not just that militants had become powerful within the single-goal Slovak ethnic 
nationalist movements, but also that the issue had been favored by members of most Slovak 
political groupings in Slovakia. The measure almost passed in the initial vote in July 1991 by the 
Slovak National Council, with 47 deputies for, and 53 against.”995 
The ASV stated that a Home Guard would not be subject to the federal government but come under the 
jurisdiction of the Military and Security Committee of the Slovak National Council (the defense council 
created back in 1968 in each republic).  The ASV justified the creation of a Home Guard with the slow 
pace of military redeployment to Slovakia, and the need for security from Soviet refugees, Hungary, and 
as a force to be used in case of natural disaster.  President Havel and the federal Defense Minister spoke 
out against a Home Guard and in favor of a united federal military.  The Home Guard concept made no 
military sense as it would not be able to defend against the Hungarians, Soviets, or deal with refugees and 
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the Czechoslovak Army was more than capable of assisting with natural disasters.996 Slovak government 
officials including Meciar, Carnogursky, and the Minister of the Interior continued to support the concept.    
“The calls for the formation of a Slovak Home Guard have a clear secessionist goal.  The Home 
Guard would be a purely Slovak military force already in place if and when Slovakia were to 
proclaim independence. This seems to be a clear attempt to apply the Slovenian example to 
Slovakia. The Czechoslovak federal government would then be confronted with a sizable military 
operation if it tried to occupy Slovakia by force. Under such conditions, the Home Guard would 
also attract Slovak soldiers from the federal army, for some of them would undoubtedly defect.  
Thus, calls for the formation of a Slovak Home Guard amounted to the establishment of a nucleus 
of a Slovak military – a development that moved Slovakia further along on the path to 
secession.”997 
There were even more extreme positions than the official support for a Home Guard.998 Below the surface 
of what would appear to be an integrated federal Czechoslovakian Military there were growing fractures 
in an organization under stress.  Given the strident nationalism of the ASV and the public exchanges 
between Czech and Slovak officers in the press it was likely that ethnic tension within the military would 
have risen. A conscript military that reflects the society would not be able to counter such a trend 
especially when the policies involved in redeployment and stationing troops in their home region would 
lead to ethnically segregated units.  
“The increasingly divisive Czech Slovak ethnic conflict has spread to the military. The military’s 
own plans – to station conscripts closer to their home and to redeploy forces so that they are 
distributed equally throughout the state - unwittingly plays into the hands of Slovak ethnic 
nationalists and will result in a de facto Slovak army in Slovakia. The potential creation of a 
Slovak Home Guard may bring the issue to a head even faster.”999 
The breakup of Czechoslovakia came before either a Home Guard or de facto Slovak army was created, 
so one final element is needed; the political decision and the impact on trust.   
“Negotiations between the leaders of the two major parties, Klaus and Meciar, quickly broke 
down. The issues were predictable; Meciar introduced a proposal for a loose confederation that 
would permit Slovakia to issue its own currency, carry out its own economic reforms, and 
maintain an independent military. Klaus rejected the idea. This disagreement led to a rapid 
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998 “But Slovak officials continue to press for their home guard. Extremist groups have called for the creation of a 
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disintegration of authority at the center, and the dissolution of the federation seemed to have 
become a foregone conclusion overnight.”1000 
The breakup of Czechoslovakia did not require the actual formation of an independent Slovak military; 
though policy trends would have resulted in that outcome.  This study argues that the key to creation of an 
Amalgamated Security Community is the decision to integrate military forces and the capacity to create 
military capabilities.  It was the decision to dis-integrate military forces by the Slovaks, the advocacy for 
a Home Guard or an independent army that broke up the Czecho-Slovak ASC.  In effect the Slovaks 
declared that they no longer wished to be brothers-in-arms with the Czechs.  The Czechs for their part 
could no longer trust the Slovaks as partners in an ASC after the Slovaks openly announced they wanted a 
separate military.  This explains the contradictory position of the Slovaks who still wanted to belong to a 
loose economic and defense confederation with the Czechs – but as equal partners / allies, and why the 
Czechs rejected this formulation.  The Czechs clearly saw the Slovak demands as breaking trust and 
ending the ASC.   
 Interestingly the split of military forces on a 2:1 ratio based on the population of the republics 
was hailed as a peaceful and smooth operation that moved 14,000 pieces of equipment and 73,500 tons of 
material between 1 November, 1992 and 30 October, 1993.  It is also clear that the General Staff and 
military command had not anticipated the breakup of the federation.1001  However, “Plan 2005” was 
already moving the Czechoslovakian Military in that direction and they only had to modify it and speed 
up the process.  This supports the contention that the policies of the military would have resulted in an 
eventual segregation of the forces.    
4-6. (d). Summary of Czechoslovakian case.   
 This case is provides strong evidence that even in a situation that has no apparent military 
connection, the operative mechanism in the process for Amalgamated Security Community failure by 
dissolution hinges on the decision to dis-integrate military forces and the capacity to produce military 
                                                 
1000 Cox and Frankland, "The Federal State and the Breakup of Czechoslovakia: An Institutional Analysis," 71.   
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1001 Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, The Czech Republic and its Armed Forces, 46-47. See Also Stehlik, 
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capabilities.  On the basis of the results of this case the null hypothesis in this study can be completely 
rejected.  Furthermore, this explanation provides insight into why there is such disagreement in the 
academic community as well as why the breakup occurred so rapidly.  Until now, there has not been an 
investigation that approaches the structure of the military as an organization as being a potential cause of 
the breakup.  Only in journals related to military or civil-military affairs is there an indication that this is a 
possibility.  This case should highlight that this approach is a very useful tool. This case also highlights 
the importance of the act of decision to dis-integrate the military of an ASC.  An ASC built on the trust of 
two communities deciding to become brothers-in-arms is just as quickly torn apart when that bond of trust 
is broken by the decision of one or more communities to create their own separate military force and 
capability to produce military capabilities.    
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5-1. Brief Outline of the History of Post WWII European Integration  
 As can be inferred from the broad series of theoretical explanations for European integration 
reviewed in the first chapter this is not a new subject and has an extensive history.  The bleeding of 
Europe in the two World Wars convinced a number of Europeans post World War II to attempt some 
method to prevent future carnage among the peoples of Europe.  Not least among them was Winston 
Churchill who proposed in a September 1946 speech in Zürich Switzerland to create a “United States of 
Europe.” Several of the key points of that speech point to the path that Europe has taken: “a partnership 
between France and Germany”, “a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship”, “Small nations 
will count as much as large ones”, “we must recreate the European family in a regional structure”, The 
structure … will make the material strength of a single State less important”, “the first practical step will 
be to form a Council of Europe.”1002 
The first step of European integration was in fact to create the “Council of Europe” (COE) in 
May 1949 which created the flag and anthem later adopted by the EU as well.1003  The COE is not the 
same as the “European Council” which is the intergovernmental executive body of the EU.  The COE is 
an intergovernmental institution focused primarily on human rights, promoting democracy, and the rule of 
law.  During negotiations leading to its creation several states wanted to call it the “European Union.”1004  
                                                 
1002  European Navigator Digital History Library, “Address given by Winston Churchill on 19 September 1946 in 
Zurich” (Switzerland) available from,   
http://www.ena.lu/address_given_winston_churchill_zurich_19_september_1946-020000044.html  Internet; 
accessed 13 August 2009 
1003  Council of Europe Homepage, available from, http://www.coe.int/  Internet; accessed 13 August 2009 
1004  John McCormick, The European Union: Policies and Politics (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1999), 44-46. 
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The first movement toward creating what would develop into the EU began shortly after the end 
of World War II when six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands) signed the treaty establishing the European Coal & Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.  The 
desire of its founders was to economically integrate these basic commodities which are essential for arms 
production in such a way as to ensure that the nightmare of another European war did not occur.  By 
surrendering a part of their national economic sovereignty to the supranational ECSC, France and 
Germany could overcome collective action problems based on relative gains concerns regarding industrial 
production of steel and thereby make optimal use of the material essential to rebuilding both their 
economies and militaries.  The supranational nature of the ECSC would ensure that no state could rearm 
itself without the consent of the other.  The ECSC was a success and it also established the embryonic 
forms of the EU Commission, Council of Ministers, Parliament, and Court of Justice.1005   Six years after 
the establishment of the ECSC, (four years after an attempt to create a European Defense Community and 
a European Political Community failed) the members decided to extend their integration to all sectors of 
their economy and created the European Economic Community (EEC-Treaty of Rome 1957) 
headquartered in Brussels, and a nuclear regulatory body, Euratom.   The EEC allowed the free 
movement of workers, goods and services, as well as the abolition of customs duties on manufactured 
goods and the creation of common policies on agriculture and commerce.  It was not until 1973 that the 
EEC expanded to include the UK, Ireland, and Denmark.  In 1979, in order to stabilize currency exchange 
rates, a European Monetary System was developed, and Greece joined the EEC in 1981.  In 1984 the 
European Parliament approved a "Draft Treaty establishing the European Union". Although not adopted 
by the European Council, it influenced the Maastricht Treaty and draft constitution.1006   In 1986 the EEC 
adopted the Single European Act which was designed to create a common market among all members; in 
addition. Spain and Portugal joined the European Community.  The Single European Act also added 
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1006 European Parliament Altiero Spinelli - European Federalist. available from 
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functional jurisdiction for the environment as well as regional policy that included funding for structural 
and cohesion policies aimed at less developed regions.  
The "Maastricht Treaty" is the most important treaty since it created the European Union in 1993.   
It announces that it is part of the “process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe”.1007  This treaty confirmed the supranational and federal nature of the EU and established 
European citizenship, committed the EU to a common currency, a common foreign and security policy, as 
well as internal security (police) cooperation policies.   It also established three categories or “pillars” of 
EU competency.  The first pillar covers most all of the economic and social functions of the EU.  The 
second pillar is a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), while the third pillar covers cooperation in 
criminal justice and immigration.  The Maastricht treaty was controversial due to the sovereignty issues it 
included, and it took two referendums (as with the Irish and the Nice treaty later in 2002) before Danish 
voters approved it.  The revisions included opt-out provisions used by Denmark and the UK.   In 1995 the 
Schengen Accords went into effect which eliminated all border controls between the member states; also 
Sweden, Finland, and Austria joined the EU that year.1008 
The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 addressed human rights issues and the possibility of subgroups 
within the EU to enhance their cooperation even if all of the member states did not wish to participate. 
The Amsterdam Treaty reinforced basic human rights so that a European Citizen (any one holding 
citizenship in a member country) is guaranteed the right to: live, work (except in the army, police, and 
diplomatic corps) and travel anywhere in the EU; to equal treatment in taxation, social rights, welfare 
benefits, and vocational training;  freedom of association and collective bargaining, safe working 
conditions and health protection, protection of children, the elderly and disabled; to appeal directly to the 
EU for redress of grievances;  to vote and stand for municipal and European elections; to not be 
discriminated against on the basis of nationality, sex, race, religion, age, and sexual orientation; and 
                                                 
1007  “Treaty On European Union,” text, available from, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html  Internet; accessed 13 August 2009 
1008 Pascal Fontaine, Europe in 10 Points, European Documentation, European Commission (Luxembourg: Office 
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violations of basic human rights are sanctionable by EU law.  This is by no means an exhaustive list but 
does illustrate the extent to which individual rights were incorporated into EU law.   
The treaty of Nice went into force in February of 2003 and began to address the issue of 
institutional change necessary for the EU to function as it expanded.  It removed the right of a member 
state to veto enhanced cooperation between other member states and established procedures for Council 
and Commission approval for such cooperation.  This allows deepening of integration between those 
states that desire it without having to wait for a majority of the other states to agree or participate.  The 
treaty of Nice provides for the imposition of sanctions against a Member State (Article 7).  A very 
important part of the treaty is Article 17 dealing with increased security cooperation including the 
“progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense”.  It was this 
article that created opposition in Ireland as a possible infringement of its traditional neutrality that 
necessitated a second vote.  Article 17 states that any common security and defense policy must be 
compatible with NATO obligations of member states and points to ‘Petersburg Tasks’ (humanitarian 
assistance, search and rescue, peacekeeping and peacemaking) as being the focus of a common security 
and defense policy.1009    
The Treaty of Nice did not however provide the institutional reform needed as the EU expanded. 
The EU Council adopted the Laeken Declaration in December 2001 outlining the problems of the EU as 
an institution to be a start point for the work of institutional reform.  First and foremost the document 
calls for the EU as an institution to be “more democratic, more transparent and more efficient”.1010   These 
are key areas in which the EU has faced continual public criticism.  There is a perceived democratic 
deficit in the EU stemming from the weakness of the EU Parliament.  The EU Commission and the EU 
Council are criticized for making decisions in closed door sessions without public involvement.  The 
bureaucracy of the EU in Brussels is often targeted as an example of a micro-managing and inefficient 
                                                 
1009 European Union, “The Treaty of Nice.” available from, http://eur-
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1010 European Union, “Laeken Declaration Annex 1.,” available from, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/68827.pdf  Internet; accessed 12 September 
2009 
 361
organization.  The basic problems in efficiency however, have more to do with the complex decision 
making apparatus, and the division of responsibilities and powers between the various institutions that 
make up the EU.  For this reason the Laeken Declaration points out that “the important thing is to clarify, 
simplify and adjust the division of competence between the Union and the Member States”.1011  The 
Laeken Declaration authorized a “Convention on the future of the European Union” designed to move 
toward a “Constitution for European citizens”.1012     
The use of a “Constitutional Convention” was itself an attempt to make the process more 
transparent and open to a wider range of participants rather than just to heads of state and their respective 
diplomats.  The Constitutional Convention lasted from February 2002 to July 2003.1013  The highlights of 
the proposed draft Constitution included: a Charter of Fundamental Rights for European citizens; a 
withdrawal clause for Member States; a President elected for two and a half years eliminating the 6 month 
rotating Presidency; the head of the Commission would be elected by the European Parliament; the 
Commission reduced to 15 Commissioners; a Minister for Foreign Affairs as part of the EU Council; 
seats in the European Parliament distributed on a proportional basis; a revised qualified majority voting 
system where the majority of the Member States representing three-fifths of the population equal a 
qualified majority in the Council; and finally the joint adoption of European laws by the EU Parliament 
and the Council.1014  These proposals would greatly increase the power of the EU Parliament and 
streamline the decision-making process.  It also proposed several key policy items including;  
“- The pillar structure is to be abolished: the second (common foreign and security policy) and 
third (justice and home affairs) pillars, which were hitherto subject to the intergovernmental 
method, are brought within the Community framework.  
- The common foreign and security policy is strengthened with the creation of a European 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the progressive definition of a common defense policy with the 
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creation of a European Armaments Agency and the authorization to initiate enhanced 
cooperation.”1015 
The significance of these proposals was that the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) would no 
longer be a matter for decision-making only between states in an intergovernmental process but would be 
made within the EU that would include input from all the EU institutions including the Parliament and 
Commission.  In other words this proposal would mandate an integrated foreign and security policy as 
well as a common defense policy with the possibility of enhanced (deeper) cooperation between Member 
States.  An Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) from October 2003 to June 2004 revised the proposed 
draft Constitution and produced a document that signed in Rome on 29 October, 2004 called “A 
Constitution for Europe.”  There were several adjustments to the proposed decision making process; the 
key one concerned qualified majority voting in the Council.  Spain and Poland opposed the new system 
since they would lose votes and wanted to preserve their relative influence gained from the weighted 
voting system adopted at Nice.  In the end the IGC changed the threshold for a qualified majority to 55% 
of the Member States representing 65% of the population and a blocking minority must comprise at least 
four Member States.  In addition the IGC did not extend the scope of qualified majority voting to the 
extent proposed by the Convention (to 20 policy areas). Furthermore, if there is only a narrow voting 
majority then the minority of states in the Council can request a continuation of discussions.  Another 
adjustment was that the Commission would not be reduced but would consist of one Commissioner from 
each Member State until 2014 because the small States wanted to be represented.  In terms of policy the 
Constitution did not include the provisions to move CFSP out of the intergovernmental process but kept it 
in the Council with each Member State having a veto, and the same procedure applied to defense policy.  
On the other hand Article III-312 of the Constitution allowed for “permanent structured cooperation in the 
field of security and defense among Member States that fulfill the criteria and have made the 
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commitments on military capabilities set out in a protocol annexed to the Constitution.”1016  The European 
Defense Agency would be established by Article I-41(3).1017  In the end the Constitution for Europe died 
when it was rejected by French and Dutch voters with significant majorities on 29 May and 1 June 2005 
respectively.  The EU enacted a “two year period of reflection” after this collapse of everything they had 
worked on since the Nice Treaty.   
 In June 2007 the EU Council decided to try again and called for another IGC to address the issue 
of institutional reform. This IGC was to prepare a new treaty by the end of 2007 in order for the treaty to 
be ratified prior to the 2009 EU Parliamentary elections.1018   This IGC met from July to October 2007.  
The Treaty of Lisbon (signed on 13 December 2007) kept most of the reforms included in the failed 
constitution.  However, it was not proposed as a constitution because it sought to amend previous treaties 
not replace them as the constitution would.  It was ratified by a majority of EU Member States but Irish 
voters rejected it in June 2008.  Ireland was the only EU Member State to have a popular vote on the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  As in other cases of treaty rejection a way was found for the Irish to get a repeat vote.  
At the EU summit in June 2009 the Government of Ireland agreed to hold another vote in October 2009 in 
exchange for “legally binding assurances that the treaty would not undermine its military neutrality or 
infringe on its right to set taxes and policy on ethical issues such as abortion.”1019  After approval from 
Irish voters the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009.  With the Treaty of Lisbon the 
EU has adopted most of the reforms contained in the defunct constitution.  The key provisions include: 
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- A permanent full-time President of the European Council with a two and a half year term that can be 
renewed once.  Former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy became the first President of the 
European Council on 1 December 2009. 
- A High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy responsible for 
steering foreign policy and common defense policy. 
- A new European External Action Service to support the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy.       
- Qualified majority voting in the Council with the previous system remaining through 2014.  
- The EU Parliament has the power of co-decision with the Council extended into forty policy areas 
making it essentially equal regarding the passage of legislation. 
- Member states now have a legal right to withdraw from the European Union.   
- A new role for national parliaments to examine draft European legislation and the national parliaments 
can take legislation to the European Court of Justice.1020 
The reform not adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon of interest to this paper is that the CFSP and defense 
policy will remain subject to the intergovernmental process rather than being fully integrated within the 
EU.  On the other hand Article 42 paragraph 2 of The Lisbon Treaty states:   
“The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common 
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting 
unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of 
such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”1021 
This is a modification of the proposed wording which adds a caveat that a common defense will be based 
on a unanimous Council decision.  This does not mean however, that movement toward integration must 
wait for a final unanimous Council decision.  Several other items in the Lisbon Treaty indicate that 
movement toward integration is ongoing and encouraged. First the scope and range of the Petersberg 
Tasks has been expanded.  Second, the provision on ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense,’ first 
proposed during the Constitutional Convention as a method for more advanced members to move ahead 
with cooperation on sophisticated defense programs, has been modified to be a more inclusive instrument 
that is trying to incorporate as many member states as possible.  Permanent Structured Cooperation in 
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Defense as set up in the Lisbon Treaty establishes criteria for participation and will for the first time have 
participating states enter into binding commitments in the area of defense to be monitored by the 
European Defense Agency which would assess their performance on an annual basis.1022   So although 
defense policy is subject to intergovernmental procedures there is significant movement in terms of 
merging defense and foreign policy at the EU level.  It is also most impressive that when viewed over the 
long term, the process of European integration continued (albeit in fits and starts) despite the many 
pronouncements by its critics that it would fail or come unglued.     
5-2. The EU as a Government 
The “theory” or more accurately the description of governance that most closely reflects what is 
found in the EU is "Multilevel Governance."  This Public Administration approach was created in 
response to the developments in the EU after the Maastricht Treaty.  Multilevel Governance creates 
conceptual space for EU policy and activities to be more than just intergovernmental agreements but the 
result of a wide range of political actors in a context that is similar to domestic politics within a state.1023 
The EU by appearance is a government with federal characteristics because it is a supranational 
organization with sovereignty in those areas in which it has jurisdiction (which have greatly increased 
over time), and whose regulations supersede national laws in those areas. The Court of Justice of the EU 
is the key institution in this regard.  There are few policy areas in which EU national member 
governments can issue regulations without having to ensure that their domestic laws are in compliance 
with EU provisions.  Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome explicitly obligates member states to comply with 
EEC (EU) law and to refrain from adopting measures interfering with the purpose and or the effect of EU 
law.1024   This independent and supreme judiciary provides a method of enforcement to ensure compliance 
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by all parties. The Court of Justice of the European Union is an EU institution, not an intergovernmental 
one, comprised of judges from member states that serve six year terms. The Court of Justice ruled in 1963 
that treaty provisions could be self executing, and that the EU (EEC at the time) constituted a new legal 
order that the member states had created by limiting their sovereignty in certain areas for the benefit of 
all.  This new legal order counted not only among member states but also extended to the citizens of the 
member states.  In 1964 the Court ruled that EU law should prevail when national laws are contrary to EU 
law.  This ruling established EU legal supremacy over national law, requiring member states national 
judges to interpret laws so that they are in compliance with EU provisions.  It has therefore established 
not only the supremacy of EU law, but its own right of judicial review.1025  It acts to ensure compliance by 
EU institutions with treaty provisions, often ruling on the legality of national regulations and decisions, 
and annulling those contrary to EU treaty provisions.   
The EU also considers itself to be composed of citizens that have legal recourse through EU law.  
The Maastricht treaty created a "European Citizenship", and the Amsterdam Treaty enumerated basic 
human rights.  The Lisbon Treaty reinforced citizen’s rights by granting the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights the same binding legal status as the founding treaties.  This mandates that EU institutions respect 
citizens' civil, political, and economic rights.  The Lisbon Treaty also added to EU citizens’ rights by 
including a provision for citizens’ to submit  petitions that would have the Commission submit a proposal 
based on that petition in any area of EU competence; this includes the repeal of legislation as well.1026  
Citizens of the member states have legal standing and can sue EU institutions, businesses, and member 
states governments in those areas in which the EU has jurisdiction.  A high profile case brought by an 
individual regarding worker rights, resulted in a ruling that the German Military had to open all jobs to 
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from, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20091009STO62247  Internet; accessed 6 October 2010.  
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women if they met the requirements for that job.  This demonstrates the power of legal supremacy when 
the EU can determine how a member state recruits its military (a foundation of national sovereignty).       
Another critical aspect in the functioning of the EU system related to the supremacy of EU law is 
the role of the Court of Justice in the expansion of jurisdiction and accumulation of power at the EU 
federal level.  In creating a common market it has been involved in regulating interstate commerce from 
its inception.  It has functioned as an independent and activist court, pursuing policy goals that have 
strengthened the EU federal government as well as expanding EU jurisdiction based on its charter to 
create a common market.  The EU has not only harmonized customs duties, VAT taxes, regulations 
governing professions, and product standards but also areas of social concern such as environmental 
policy, education, health (including drug addiction), culture, youth and consumer protection.  Moreover, 
with the free flow of goods and people (especially after the Schengen Accords went into effect) the EU 
has taken on responsibilities in law enforcement, immigration, asylum, organized crime, human rights, 
and border controls.  It is the incorporation of these typically national and non-economic policy areas that 
strengthens the federal character of the EU.1027   This court, more than any other organ in the EU, is what 
gives the EU its supranational character.  Furthermore, as it cannot be undone without destroying the EU 
itself, it will continue to promote EU integration on this functional basis.   
  The European Central Bank (ECB) has had a significant effect on EU integration.  The right to 
print money is a virtual sine qua non of a sovereign state. The ECB is the key component of a common 
currency, because it sets monetary policy for the Euro.  The countries that adopted the common currency 
freely gave up control of monetary policy, and therefore a significant part of their economic sovereignty 
to the ECB.  This European Monetary Union is a continuation of the vision of its founding proponents for 
“an ever closer political union” and at one point was described by Helmut Kohl as a matter of “war and 
peace”, not economic necessity.1028 The binding effect of the common currency administered by the ECB 
                                                 
1027 Elies Steyger, Europe and its Members: A Constitutional Approach (Brookfield, USA,: Dartmouth Publishing 
Group, 1995), 21-22. 
1028 "The main begetters of EMU a decade ago were President Francois Mitterand of France; Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl of Germany; and Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission.  They saw it as a means to bind 
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limits the ability of anti-federal elements to reduce the centralization of power in the EU since no state 
can be the master of its economic destiny outside of the EU without significant costs.  
The EU has other federal governmental structures.  The European Parliament and the EU 
Commission are federal legislative and executive structures.  The Parliament is elected every five years 
by direct universal suffrage and seated by party affiliation not by state of origin.  The EU Parliament 
started as a very weak consultative body, but has gained powers over time.  Currently the Parliament is 
co-equal with the Council in the legislative process able to amend or reject proposed legislation.  There 
are still some policy areas (e.g., taxation, foreign policy and defense) where the Council retains primacy, 
and where decisions require unanimous consent, but it must consult Parliament.  It is co-equal in terms of 
budgetary powers with the Council, and has gone as far as rejecting budgets in the past to influence 
policy.  It sets the rules for its elections, and votes on the agenda set forth by the Commission twice a 
year.  Finally, it has the power to approve the appointment of the President of the Commission and pass a 
motion of censure by a two - thirds majority to force the Commission to resign.  This power forced a 
resignation-in-mass of the entire commission in 2000 before the Parliament passed a motion of censure.   
"Prior to this if a Commissioner was called to present an issue to the Parliament or one of its 
committees, and the Commissioner had a prior engagement he would send a deputy.  Now when 
they are called they respond.  Power has shifted from the Commission to the favor of 
Parliament".1029     
This indicates a balancing of powers between the various institutional branches of the EU.  The Treaty of 
Lisbon makes co-decision with the Council the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ by extending the EU 
Parliament’s jurisdiction to about forty policy areas, of which the new areas of justice and home affairs 
are the most important, but there remain areas where the Council has primacy. This makes the EU 
                                                                                                                                                             
Europeans more closely together.  They believed that it would strengthen the supranational institutions of the 
European Union.  Indeed, it was precisely this potential for political transformation that made monetary union 
attractive.  Economic gains were a secondary consideration: they appeared relatively small, if they could be 
calculated reliably at all.  Nobody pretended that a system of national currencies was provoking widespread 
dissatisfaction.” “Euro Brief: The Power of Eleven,” Economist, 5 December 1998. p. 97. 
1029 Former EU Commissioner Renee Haferkamp, interview by author, 30 November 2000, from notes taken at the 
University of Kansas.  
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Parliament almost a co-equal institution to the Council.  It also adds a role for National Parliaments 
working with the EU Parliament to impact EU Legislation.1030    
The Commission and its staff work for the EU not the Member Sates.  The European Commission 
is the executive branch of the EU and enjoys a great deal of independence.  Commissioners are appointed 
by member states for five year terms, but as Commissioners they do not represent their national 
governments.  The Commission is responsible for negotiating treaties with third countries, managing the 
EU budget, and ensuring implementation of EU legislation.  It has standing with the Court of Justice to 
bring cases to ensure EU law and the various treaties are being enforced, and has significant power in the 
conduct of common EU policies.  The most important federal aspect of the Commission is in its sole 
power to initiate legislation and intervene at any point in the legislative process.1031 
The Council of Ministers and the European Council are primarily intergovernmental in nature. 
The Council of Ministers is the intergovernmental executive that meets according to functional area of 
responsibility. The minister in attendance depends on the policy area under discussion (e.g. all 
Transportation Ministers).  The Council enacts EU legislation as a shared function with the European 
Parliament.  It also shares control over the budget with the Parliament.  In this regard it can be thought of 
as an upper chamber of the EU legislature where members directly represent their national governments.  
The Council must approve international agreements negotiated by the EU Commission.  The European 
Council is composed of the President of the Commission and the Heads of Government with the Foreign 
Ministers of all Member States.  It meets twice a year, and is the forum for the launch of new political 
initiatives and resolution of political conflicts. The Treaty of Lisbon significantly changed the Council by 
providing for a permanent full-time President replacing the rotating six month presidency held by member 
states. The President of the Council may not hold national office.  The president chairs the Council and 
                                                 
1030 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU; “Information Note: Treaty of Lisbon, December 2009.” available 
from, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111652.pdf  Internet; accessed 6 
October 2010. See Also; European Parliament. “10 things about the Lisbon treaty you should know.” available from, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20091009STO62247  
Internet; accessed 6 October 2010. 
1031  Steyger, Europe and its Members: A Constitutional Approach, 5-6. 
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presents a report to the EU Parliament after each Council meeting.  He also represents the EU at the level 
of Heads of State or Government.1032    
There is a federal aspect to the Council.  The Council when it approves legislation can do so with 
a qualified majority which means it has the ability to force states to accept EU legislation against their 
will.  This power still excludes policy areas in which states have the right to "opt out".  The Treaty of 
Lisbon incorporates a change to qualified majority voting that is described as ‘double majority voting’.  
After November 2014 ‘double majority voting’ becomes the procedure to be used in the Council. For a 
measure to pass it must receive the votes of at least 55 percent of the EU Member States (currently 15 out 
of 27), and those Member States must represent at least 65 % of the population of the EU. Conversely to 
block a measure there must be at least four Member States in opposition.1033   
Besides creating the position of Permanent President of the Council, the Treaty of Lisbon created 
the position of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.  This 
position has three functions.  First, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chairs 
the EU Foreign Affairs Council (the Council meeting with all the Foreign Affairs Ministers) and conducts 
the Union's common foreign and security policy.  The High Representative is involved in negotiations 
representing the EU at the ministerial level or in international organizations. Second, the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is a Vice-President of the Commission which was 
done to ensure consistency and coordination of EU foreign policy across all areas where the EU has 
jurisdiction. Third, it is responsible for steering the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which 
includes taking over the functions previously the responsibility of Javier Solana (Head of the CFSP, all 
aspects of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) e.g. Head of the European Defense Agency 
(EDA) and all other Defense organizations Satellite Center, Defense Institute, etc…) as well as exercising 
                                                 
1032 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU; President of the European Council available from, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Background-President_of_the_EC_EN.pdf  Internet; accessed 6 
October 2010. 
1033 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU; “Information Note: Treaty of Lisbon, December 2009.” available 
from, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111652.pdf  Internet; accessed 6 
October 2010.  Note: until 2017 a Member State can request the current weighted voting system be used for a 
particular issue. 
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authority over the newly created European External Action Service (EEAS) and over EU diplomatic 
delegations in third countries and international organizations.1034   
 The Treaty of Lisbon creates a consolidated federal EU diplomatic agency to support the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.  The European External Action Service (EEAS) 
consolidates the parts of the Council and Commission that deal with foreign and defense policy.  The 
EEAS not only helps to ensure that EU foreign policy is coordinated and consistent by working with the 
foreign ministries of the member states but also prepares policy proposals and implements them once 
approved by the EU Council.  It is staffed with personnel from the Council and the Commission, as well 
as staff seconded from national diplomatic services.  Organizationally it has; several geographic 
directorates along with multilateral and thematic desks, an administrative directorate, and a crisis 
management and planning directorate.  This directorate will include the EU Military Staff and the EU 
Situation Centre as well as the civilian capabilities planning staff.1035   The creation of the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EEAS is a major consolidation of foreign 
and defense policy at the EU level. 
The EU fulfills the definitional requirements as a voluntarily formed government for the 
existence of an Amalgamated Security Community.  In fact the EU governmental structures are stronger 
than is the case in several other examples of Amalgamated Security Communities.   Furthermore, the 
governmental aspect of the EU not only has increased over time but is continuing to expand.    
5-3. Historical Origins of ESDI: WEU & NATO 
Since its operational capability and assets are now subsumed into the EU, a look at the history of 
the WEU can offer insight into the origins of ESDI.  There is a tremendous amount of literature, 
                                                 
1034 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU; High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. available from, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111301.pdf   Internet; accessed 6 October 
2010. 
1035  “Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service. 
Brussels, 20 July 2010.” available from, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11665-re01.en10.pdf 
Internet; accessed 6 October 2010.  See Also; General Secretariat of the Council of the EU; High Representative of 
the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. available from, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111301.pdf   Internet; accessed 6 October 
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reporting, and research considering US policy and its reactions to the development of ESDI and its 
relationship with NATO.  Although important, it is tangential to the argument of this paper and will not 
be addressed.   The WEU was created in March 1948, (prior to NATO in April 1949) with the purpose to 
join the UK, France, and the Benelux into a formal mutual defense treaty whose obligations were more 
proscriptive (it mandates a military response to an attack whereas NATO members can take action as they 
deem necessary) than NATO’s Article V.1036  The WEU played an important role in the re-integration of 
Italy and Germany into European collective defense when those states joined it in May 19551037.  Though 
created prior to NATO it was later superseded by it due to its inherent inability to offer the same level of 
security as an alliance that included one of the two superpowers.  The WEU was reactivated in 1984 after 
many years, primarily as an effort by France to compete with NATO.  The reinvigorated WEU 
championed greater cooperation in European security and defense issues. The critical proclamation is 
found in the "Platform on European Security Interests" adopted by the WEU Ministerial Council on 27 
October 1987; also known as the Hague Platform. The WEU Hague Platform is a decision taken prior to 
end of the Cold War and the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty creating the EU.   The Hague Platform 
preamble states that:  
"We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European 
Act, which we all signed as Members of the European Community. We are convinced that the 
construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include 
security and defense."1038   
 
The decision to announce that Europe’s integration would never be complete as long as it did not 
include security and defense is the decision that determined the path followed by the Europeans.  In 1987 
                                                 
1036  “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High 
Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford 
the Party so attacked all military and other aid and assistance in their power.” (Article V Modified Brussels Treaty) 
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise 
of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, 
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.” (Article V The North Atlantic Treaty) 
1037 Alfred Cahen,  The Western European Union and NATO (London: Brassey’s, 1989), 1-5. 
1038  Western European Union, WEU History; Reactivation of WEU: from the Rome Declaration to the Hague 
Platform (1984-1989) available from, http://www.weu.int/History.htm  Internet; accessed 10 December 2008. 
(underline  by author)     
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the WEU resolved to strengthen the European alliance and added several new members over the next few 
years to the point where in 1991 the WEU invited all the countries that were European members of 
NATO to be associate members of the WEU. After 1987 the WEU engaged in several very limited 
operations and tried to build its military organization and capabilities.1039  It developed a satellite imagery 
center, an institute for security studies, a planning cell, the Western European Armaments Group 
(WEAG) and the West European Armaments Organization (WEAO).   The WEAO and WEAG were 
attempts to harmonize and increase European cooperation in the defense industry.  In addition the WEU 
was allocated for planning a limited set of forces that member countries pledged to contribute when 
necessary, the most prominent being the EUROCORPS, EUROFOR, and EUROMARFOR (a 
multinational heavy land Corps, a multinational light division, and a multinational naval force in the 
Mediterranean) these so called “forces answerable to the WEU” gave it the potential to engage in a 
contingency operation.   
The 1992 Petersburg Declaration outlines the "Petersburg Tasks" that the WEU believed it should 
be able to conduct such as humanitarian and rescue operations, peace keeping and peace making, and 
crisis management (non-Article 5 tasks).  The importance of this development was that national defense 
remained tied to NATO for the Europeans but limited military missions short of war were the real focus 
of action envisaged for non-NATO WEU lead operations.  In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty that created the 
European Union designated the WEU as the agency that would implement decisions it might take related 
to defense. In 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty revised the treaty on European Union and incorporated the 
Petersburg Tasks into the EU treaty while also tightening the relationship between the EU and the WEU.  
As part of the Maastricht Treaty the WEU was to strengthen the "European Pillar" of the Atlantic 
Alliance by developing a ESDI and increasing the military capabilities of the WEU so that it could fulfill 
that function.  In order to increase the military capabilities of the WEU beyond the modest contributions 
                                                 
1039  (Persian Gulf minesweeping 1987-1988, Yugoslavia embargo monitoring in the Adriatic Sea and on the Danube 
1993-1996, a Police contingent for the EU Administration of Mostar 1995-1996, a Police advisory element in 
Albania 1997-2001, a Demining Assistance Mission in Croatia 1999-2001, and WEU Satellite Centre security 
surveillance mission of Kosovo 1998-1999)  WEU History; Reactivation of WEU: available from, 
http://www.weu.int/History.htm Internet; accessed 10 December 2008. 
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of its members, it turned to NATO.  After the Alliance Summit in 1994 NATO agreed to two key items.  
The first was that NATO agreed to make the collective assets of the alliance available to the WEU with 
the approval of the North Atlantic Council.  The second item was the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
concept, which adapted the alliance’s structures to new missions and improved cooperation with the 
WEU by providing a mechanism for the WEU to use NATO assets and capabilities. The CJTF is a 
method where a sub-headquarters of NATO or the WEU set up a multinational (or combined) military 
force to conduct a specific operation.  In this way the European members of NATO could use NATO 
assets even though the entire alliance is not involved.  In terms of a public goods perspective, the 
Europeans by using a CJTF for an operation would not have to pay twice for the same type of defense 
goods. 
     Two other NATO meetings; the Berlin NAC in 1996, and the Washington Summit in 1999 were 
critical in the continuing development of the WEU / NATO partnership. The ‘Berlin plus’ agreement 
resulting from these two meetings assured the WEU access to NATO planning capabilities, other pre-
identified NATO capabilities and assets, and an adaptation of NATO’s Defense Planning System.  By 
1997 the WEU was providing input to the NATO defense planning process.  NATO completed its work 
in the areas of CJTF and the development of agreements to facilitate its partnership with the WEU, to 
include the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) who is a European, being 
designated as the primary commander of any WEU led CJTF type mission.  The organizational 
arrangements between NATO and the WEU were in place by 1999 and were tested during a joint crisis 
management exercise in February 2000.1040 
 At the last WEU Council meeting in Marseille in November 2000 it was decided to transfer all 
operational capability and assets to the EU.  Javier Solana, previously Secretary General of NATO and 
the head of the EU CFSP was named the WEU Secretary-General to facilitate the transfer.  The WEU did 
                                                 
1040 NATO Handbook, Sections; NATO-WEU Cooperation. available from, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0402.htm, Internet; accessed 5 June 2009.  See Also; “The Washington 
Summit.” available from, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb010303.htm, Internet; accessed 5 June 2009. 
See Also; “NATO’s relations with the European Union.” available from, http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-
eu/index.html  Internet; accessed 5 June 2009. 
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not disappear in one very important aspect; the modified Brussels Treaty with its proscriptive Article V 
security guarantee requiring military assistance in case of an attack remained in force, but the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 which contains a mutual defense clause, most likely will be seen as 
having superseded the modified Brussels Treaty.   
5-4. The EU and ESDI 
 It was a meeting in December 1998 between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac at St. Malo that 
changed the development of the European Security and Defense Identity from being a WEU to an EU 
undertaking.  British policy had long prevented significant military capability from being included as part 
of the EU, partly out of practical views about NATO and the futility of the EU trying to duplicate it as 
well as an opposition to French policy. The UK conducted a Strategic Defense Review in 1998 that 
recognized the need for transformed forces able to rapidly deploy in support of Petersburg tasks.1041  Tony 
Blair noted in an EU Summit in Austria in October 1998 that the EU CFSP was weak, confusing, 
unacceptable, and must be reformed either within NATO or by bringing the WEU into the EU.1042   The 
UK also agreed in November 1998 to the creation of an EU Arms Agency which gave another indication 
that its views on EU defense were changing.1043  The 4 December 1998 joint British and French 
declaration on European defense announced at St. Malo really was a crucial change that moved defense 
issues squarely into the EU’s policy arena and signaled the end of the WEU as the vehicle for European 
military integration.  The St. Malo declaration specifically stated that:    
“the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, 
the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises.”1044 
 
The next step in developing ESDI under the aegis of the EU was taken a year later at the Helsinki 
European Council summit in December 1999.  The EU adopted a “Headline Goal Task Force” as a target 
                                                 
1041  UK Ministry of Defense, Policy Paper No 3. European Defence, (London: DCCS Media, 2001).  
1042  Margarita Mathiopoulos and István Gyarmati, “Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense,” The 
Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1999): 65.   
1043 “European Allies Agree to Create Arms Agency,” Washington Times, November 17, 1998, p.14 
1044 “Franco-British summit Joint declaration on European defense, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998.” available from, 
http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html  Internet; accessed 5 December 2008. 
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to guide the development of the EU’s defense capability.  The “Headline Goal Task Force” was an 
agreement to create a force of between 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers able to deploy within 60 days, be 
sustained for a year, and able to conduct the full spectrum of Petersburg tasks by 2003.1045  The EU 
Council also decided to develop several other defense agencies including a Political and Security 
Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff, and by November 2000 a conference had been 
held to identify forces to meet the Headline Goal.1046  In addition it was decided to add 5,000 police 
officers to better deal with missions dealing with conflict prevention, rule of law assistance, and crisis 
management operations that fit within the scope of those envisioned by the Petersberg Tasks.1047 
ESDI completely transitioned from the WEU to the EU with the Nice Treaty. There were several 
major outcomes resulting from the Nice Treaty related to ESDI.1048  EU crisis management would 
incorporate military and non-military tools in the entire spectrum of Petersberg tasks, but the EU would 
only act militarily when NATO as a whole does not chose to act.  NATO is recognized in the treaty as the 
collective defense organization for Europe. There are also very important organizational structures that 
were built in the EU to link its CFSP to its new role in formulating a European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) within ESDI.  These structures include; a Political and Security Committee (which is 
subordinate to the General Affairs Council which in turn is subordinate to the European Council) that has 
oversight of a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, and an EU Military Committee 
which is supported by an EU Military Staff.   What is significant is that this organization roughly parallels 
the structure of NATO.  The European Council is at the same level as NATO’s North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) when it is meeting at the President/PM level, most of its membership being the same people.  The 
same is true for the General Affairs Council which is equal to the NAC meeting at minister level.  The 
                                                 
1045 UK Ministry of Defense, Policy Paper No 3. European Defence, (London: DCCS Media, 2001). 
1046  Martin Richard, The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective (Burlington, VT.: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 2006), 67. 
1047 “Presidency Conclusions; Santa Maria da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000,” available from,  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/00/2000&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en  Internet; accessed 5 September 2009. 
1048  “Nice Treaty, Article 17.” available from, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/htm/C_2001080EN.000101.html  Internet; accessed 5 September 2009. 
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Political and Security Committee is at the same level as the NAC meeting at the permanent ambassador 
level, while the Military Committee is the same as the NATO Military Committee that is composed of the 
various Chiefs of Defense of the member countries, and again its members are mostly the same Generals.  
Only the Military Staffs of the two organizations are completely distinct.1049  NATO and the EU are both 
based in Brussels, which facilitates this dual membership situation.  By January 2001 the relationship 
between the EU and NATO began to be formalized with exchanges of memorandums outlining their 
scope of cooperation and the beginnings of regular meetings by various EU agencies with their NATO 
counterparts.1050  The relationship between the EU and NATO was also greatly enhanced by having Javier 
Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO, as the head of the EU CFSP as well as the Secretary 
General of the WEU during the transition of its operational functions to the EU.1051  At the November 
2002 NATO Prague Summit, NATO reaffirmed its commitments made at the Washington Summit (to the 
WEU) to the EU thereby giving the “EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which 
the Alliance is not engaged militarily.”1052  This was quickly followed by the December 2002 NATO-EU 
Declaration on ESDP that lays out the parameters for increasing cooperation.  Joint meetings now are a 
regular occurrence and both organizations have established permanent liaison elements at each other’s 
headquarters.1053  Future cooperation will include adapting to the new EU institutions created by the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
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The close cooperation with NATO led to the EU undertaking several operations; initially 
beginning in Bosnia in 2003 with an EU police mission, and then in December 2004 NATO SFOR 
transitioned its mission to the EUFOR Operation ALTHEA.  ALTHEA began with 7000 troops but has 
been reduced to only about 2200 currently.1054  EUFOR Operation ALTHEA is composed of an 
International Police Unit, Liaison Observer Teams spread throughout BiH, and a Multinational Maneuver 
Battalion.  The Multinational Maneuver Battalion has four companies and about 526 soldiers.1055  A small 
(about 200 people) ongoing deployment was authorized by the EU at the request of the Republic of 
Moldova and the Ukraine to assist with border and customs enforcement in 2005.1056  Another small 
deployment is an EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) of again about 200 people that 
began in June 2007.  There is a military advisory mission in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau authorized in 
2008 1057  as well as an effort to train Iraqi police, judges and prison guards in adopting western notions 
and practices of rule of law (training conducted in EU countries not deployed in country).1058  The largest 
and most extensive deployments undertaken under the aegis of the EU outside of Europe have been in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The first was Operation ARTEMIS undertaken in 2003 and led by the 
French with support of Germany, Sweden, UK, and Belgium that included over 1800 troops and was 
successful in restoring stability to the targeted region.1059  EUPOL Kinshasa provided a police mission 
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Jonathan R. Strand and Kyle L. Raney, “Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for a Stronger 
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from 2005 to 2007 in the capital which was expanded to EUPOL DR Congo of some 50 people to train 
national police through 2009.  In 2006 responding to a UN request to provide elections security a 4 month 
deployment was conducted called EUFOR RD CONGO.  Germany provided the Operation’s HQ based in 
Kinshasa (several hundred troops) and had a battalion worth of combat troops also on call in Gabon.1060  
Another major EU deployment of about 3,700 soldiers in Africa (Eastern Chad and North East part of the 
Central African Republic) called EUFOR Tchad/RCA, was conducted from January 2008 to March 2009.  
The mission was to protect and maintain order in the Darfur refugee camps and has been taken over by a 
UN force.  This mission had the most EU Member State participants (22) of any mission to date.1061   
There is also an ongoing advisor mission of sixty people focused on reforming the Congolese Army 
called EUSEC DR Congo.1062  The EU is conducting its first naval mission currently off the coast of 
Somalia. EU NAVFOR - Operation ATALANTA is a task force of about 15 frigates and support vessels 
(provided by the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Norway, Italy, and Sweden) with a 
mission to protect World Food Program vessels delivering aid to Somalia from pirates as well as to assist 
other trade vessels moving through the area from pirates as well.1063   
Despite these EU Operations which do demonstrate some operational capability,1064 the ability to 
meet the Helsinki Headline goal of having a deployable Corps sized element of 50,000 to 60,000 troops 
was not met.  The solution to provide smaller more rapidly deployable forces of 1500 troops was called 
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the Battlegroup concept and was based on the success of Operation ARTEMIS which used a lead nation 
framework to produce a rapidly deployable capability.  The concept was adopted quickly.  The UK, 
France, and Germany issued a “food for thought paper” in February 2004 outlining the concept. By April 
a meeting of EU Defense ministers called for creating several Battlegroups by 2007, and in June 2004 the 
EU Military Committee approved creating EU Battlegroups, and they were formally included in the 
Headline Goal 2010.  Finally in November 2004 thirteen Battlegroups were agreed to at a Military 
Capabilities Conference.1065   EU Battlegroups became operational in 2007, with 2 being on call for a 
year’s duration.  They are deployable within 5-10 days for a period of 30 days which can be extended to 
120 days.  They can be formed by a lead nation or from a multinational grouping.1066   The response to the 
Battlegroup initiative has been positive with 2 annual rotations being filled from 2007 through 2010.1067  
Although this is a limited capability, it does provide the EU with a basis to work from should a need arise 
to use military force. 
As the EU developed its capabilities it also adopted an EU Security Strategy in December 2003 as 
a guiding document that outlined the threats to the EU, the EU’s strategic objectives, and policies that 
would be necessary to accomplish these objectives.1068  The EU has also created or incorporated a number 
of organizations to assist in implementing ESDI of which several were noted before such as the EU 
Military Staff, the Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee.  Other organizations 
were integrated from the WEU including the Satellite Center and the Institute for Security Studies.  
Additional organizations were created such as the European Security and Defense College which provides 
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strategic level training for civilians as well as military personnel, and most significantly the European 
Defense Agency.1069  
Finally, the EU in 2004 established a method to fund its various military operations called 
Athena.  Athena is controlled by a special committee composed of a representative from each 
participating member state who must approve the budget for the operation.  It is managed by an 
administrator appointed by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU who in conjunction with the 
operational commander drafts the budget presented to the special committee.  There is also an accounting 
officer who manages the finances of the operation once the budget is approved.  Funds are generated by 
contributions from each participating member state in accordance with their GNP.  This is in accordance 
with the funding method outlined for the EU in Article 28 of the Maastricht Treaty (The GNP amount is 
revised during each year’s budget cycle and the contributions would be based on the previous year’s 
budget calculations).  The type of operational costs that are the responsibility of Athena during an 
operation includes: for Headquarters units - exploratory missions and preparations, local civilian 
personnel (interpreters and drivers), incremental costs required for strategic, operational, force and 
component HQs, Transport costs, Administration, Barracks and lodging/infrastructure, and Public 
information; for the entire force – Public works for deployment/infrastructure (joint use facilities such as 
airports, harbors, roads/railways, water/sewage, electric power, storage facilities, etc..), Identification 
marking (cards, badges, flags), Medical services, and intelligence/information; for the Operation 
Commander when requested -  Essential additional equipment and critical theatre-level capabilities such 
as chemical, biological or nuclear protection.1070  This list is important because it indicates that for an EU 
operation the EU funds in common most if not all of what are the service and support functions for the 
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entire force during an operation.  The Treaty of Lisbon introduces a new "start up fund" to be created 
according to the Athena process outlined above, that will allow rapid access to funds for tasks not charged 
to the EU budget dealing with crisis management.1071 
The Treaty of Lisbon significantly enhances EU structures dealing with the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) by making the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) an integral part of 
the CFSP which codifies all of the developments since 1999 into the EU treaty.  The new structures 
created by the treaty have already been noted but several other points should be noted.  The previous list 
of possible EU missions known as the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ has been expanded by the Lisbon Treaty 
(Article 43(1) TEU) significantly to include the task of ‘peacemaking’ (which is a more robust combat 
mission than peacekeeping) and fighting against terrorism.1072 Another very important part of the treaty is 
the inclusion of an explicit mutual security guarantee in Article 42(7) which states:  
“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States 
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and 
cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their 
collective defence and the forum for its implementation.”1073 
The Lisbon Treaty also establishes guidelines for ‘permanent structured cooperation’ in defense in Article 
46 and a separate Protocol that will be touched on below. 
5-5. European Defense Cooperation  
Not only does the post World War II desire for closer European defense cooperation have a long 
history (European Defense Community (EDC 1954), Fouchet plan 1961-1962, Elysée Treaty 1963) but 
there is a great deal of actual defense cooperation that has developed.  NATO is the key impetus to a great 
deal of this and it is worth noting some of the ways in which NATO has engendered cooperation, 
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commonality, and interoperability because these are crucial first steps to any eventual movement towards 
integration.    
The first facet of cooperation is based on the unique integrated command structure of NATO.  
This integrated command structure not only puts officers of various nations working together in numerous 
Headquarters across Europe it requires a common command and control, communications, intelligence, 
and operational doctrine be used for planning and operations.  Officers learn to work in a multinational 
environment. Commonality in NATO includes things like orders which have a prescribed format as do 
communications even down to the use of a phonetic alphabet.  These are based on NATO Standardization 
Agreements called STANAGs developed by the NATO Standardization Agency and adopted by the 
alliance members.  This is the second aspect of NATO engendered cooperation which deals with 
interoperability. To achieve interoperability common military equipment is not what is required but rather 
that the equipment of various NATO members can use common facilities, common fuel, common 
ammunition, and can communicate with each other’s equipment.  STANAGs are the method used to 
achieve this.  These agreements cover almost every area of military equipment and logistics, as well as 
doctrine and tactics.  For example STANAGs regulate the caliber of ammunition fired from rifles, 
artillery, and tanks as well as the types of fuel used in vehicles and aircraft.  This allows forces from one 
country to use the ammunition and fuel from another country in an emergency or for single source 
logistics provided by one country during a deployment.  Maps used by NATO all have common symbols 
and markings.  These are only a few examples; there are over a thousand STANAGs that when viewed as 
a body of regulation reduces duplication and allows combining of resources among NATO members.  
Another key component of standardization is language.  NATO has two official languages, French and 
English, but English is the standard language used for military operations (in large part due to the French 
withdrawal from the integrated command structure in 1966)1074    
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The third aspect of cooperation fostered by NATO is the creation of multinational forces. These 
are composed of units from several member countries, and have been part of NATO since 1960.  These 
include multinational land forces (Corps, Divisions, and Brigades) as well as air and naval forces.  In 
1980 the creation of NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) squadrons was the first 
use of an internationally crewed unit at the individual level.  In 2003 NATO created a Multinational 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Battalion which is a similar high skill, high tech, 
and high demand force on the ground.1075      
A critical aspect of European Defense cooperation is the trust built among alliance members over 
decades of joint planning, training and exercises during the Cold War as well as operations in the Balkans 
and Afghanistan that put their militaries to the test in operational situations.  European NATO members 
are habituated to not only working with each other but on depending on each other for their joint defense.  
An example of continuing cooperation is the European Air Group that was created in 1995 based on the 
collaboration of the UK and French air forces in Desert Storm and operations in the Balkans.  The 
European Air Group has seven participating members (UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, 
Netherlands, and Spain) that cooperate in to improve the tactical capabilities of their air forces.1076  
A less well known but important aspect of European Defense Cooperation taken under the aegis 
of NATO was the Eurogroup.  The Eurogroup was an informal grouping of European NATO members 
(Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and 
the UK.) that met twice a year at the Defense Minister level to set policy.  The head of the group rotated 
among the members and there were ad hoc meetings of the members Permanent Representatives to 
NATO as well as a Staff Group composed of the Defense Counselors from the member delegations at 
NATO HQ.  Although it was an “informal” grouping it had staff support from the UK delegation to 
NATO.  The Eurogroup was a UK initiative created in 1968 following the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia “responding to a widespread desire for closer European cooperation within the 
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Alliance.”1077   In order to foster greater European defense cooperation the Eurogroup created seven 
subgroups: EURONAD a grouping of National Armaments Directors to encourage joint defense 
equipment procurement; EUROLONGTERM which was to develop operational concepts that then drive 
the specifications for new equipment; EUROCOM to develop communications systems; EUROMED to 
develop close cooperation in military medicine; EUROLOG to develop closer cooperation in logistics,  
EURO/NATO TRAINING  to develop joint training and schools, and EUROSTRUCTURE to exchange 
information on organization issues such as recruitment, mobilization, and organization structure of 
units.1078  The Eurogroup last met at the Defense Minister level in 1992 and was dissolved in 1993 as the 
Maastricht Treaty went into effect and European defense cooperation shifted to the WEU as the agent of 
the EU in matters related to defense.  
Obviously NATO has fostered standardization and procurement of some similar equipment 
across the alliance.  There are tangible examples of European Defense cooperation in the realm of defense 
equipment / arms production and procurement.  The arena of arms production and associated technologies 
are key symbols of national sovereignty as well as relative gains concerns that tend to limit cooperation.   
The Europeans have overcome these barriers to cooperation and indeed have achieved cooperation in 
equipment and arms production not seen in other regions.  Again the development of cooperation in this 
area is not new but has a history; even back to the founding of the ECSC when the basic material for 
armaments is considered.  The concept for a European Armaments Agency was included in the failed 
EDC and migrated as a concept to the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) created in 1976 by 
the Eurogroup (an informal grouping under NATO) as a stimulus for armaments cooperation.1079  The 
IEPG however, had only opened between 10 to 20 percent of the West European arms market to 
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cooperation by 1992.1080   In 1992 the functions of the IEPG (a NATO affiliated organization) were 
transferred to the WEU.1081  The desire for Europe wide armaments cooperation led to the creation of the 
WEU Armaments Committee and more importantly the Western European Armaments Group WEAG 
(focused on opening national defense markets to Europe wide competition) and the Western European 
Armaments Organization WEAO (which focused on defense research and technology).1082   The problem 
however was that despite the Single European Act of 1986 creating a single market for almost everything 
else, Article 296 of the Rome Treaty gives member states an opt out for defense related items.1083  In 
addition some states such as Germany were reluctant to do away with these provisions since a truly open 
market in arms would favor the UK and France.1084    This does not mean that cooperation in European 
defense equipment / arms production and procurement did not progress.  In addition to licensed 
production agreements (which are not truly cooperatively created, although they do contribute to 
standardization) there are a significant number of jointly produced cooperative programs that were 
developed.  Among these were the: Tornado multirole Fighter Aircraft (UK, Germany, Italy); FH-70 
155mm Howitzer (UK, Germany); Roland surface to air missile, Milan and HOT anti-tank missiles, 
Alpha Jet trainer aircraft, Tiger helicopter (France, Germany); and the in production Eurofighter Typhoon 
(UK, Germany, Italy, Spain).  These joint ventures and transnational collaborations did not require states 
or the various national defense companies to give up control of their national domestic arms market.  
Through the mid-1990s European states were not amenable to allowing “foreign” ownership of their 
domestic defense firms or of giving up their controlling interests in those companies.  They had obvious 
anxiety regarding the possible attenuation of their sovereignty as well as political backlash from workers 
who would loose jobs during mergers. The various national defense firms were also not eager to merge 
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and abandon their ‘privileged’ status within their respective national markets for the uncertainties of 
multinational competition.1085   
Although the systems listed above are tangible examples of cooperative defense equipment and 
arms production development and procurement, there was a clear desire to see an actual European 
Defense Industry take shape.  This began to develop post Cold War in response to declining defense 
budgets and defense industry consolidation in the US which threatened to make national armaments 
producers in Europe unviable.1086 There was a consolidation of the European Defense Industry just like in 
the US.  There are several key consolidated companies that now dominate the European arms market and 
are significant competitors in the global arms market as well.  The largest in Europe is BAE Systems 
(British Aerospace Electronic Systems) which was formed in 1999 with the merger of British Aerospace 
and Marconi Electronic Systems.  Although BAE Systems was formed from British companies it is not 
just another national defense company but rather a multinational giant.  It acquired various Swedish and 
US firms, and has partnership interests in the Eurofighter, the Gripen fighter (Saab), the European missile 
systems company MBDA and produces land, sea, and air systems with associated training and 
maintenance in Europe and North America.1087   The other defense giant in Europe is the European 
Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) which is the third largest aerospace company in the 
world (after Boeing and Lockheed Martin).  EADS includes Airbus Military aircraft, Eurocopter, and 
space ventures such as the Ariane rocket and Galileo Global Positioning System. EADS is a partner in the 
Eurofighter, as well as a partner in the European missile systems company MBDA.  EADS is also 
involved in training, logistics and technical support activities as well as modernization of a variety of 
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aircraft.1088   THALES Group is the third largest multinational defense company in Europe which began 
as a French company.   MBDA deserves special mention as the “first truly integrated pan-European 
European defence company with a single unified management and operating structure.” 1089  MBDA was 
created in December 2001 by the merger of the missile sections of EADS, BAE Systems, and 
Finmeccanica. It produces missiles for land, naval, and air forces.1090  Terrence Guay and Robert Callum 
described the transformation of the European Defense Industry:   
“In just over a decade this sector has transformed itself from a collection of medium-sized, 
nationally orientated firms to one dominated by two giants, with several smaller firms closely 
linked to these leaders.”1091 
Significantly they point out that the EU had a hand in fostering the consolidation of the European Defense 
Industry.  The economic success of creating the common market and adoption of the Euro along with 
policies developed by the Commission that covered dual use products helped make consolidation more 
palatable. Although limited by Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome from directly regulating the defense 
industry, the Commission and Parliament were pushing for greater EU involvement in the defense 
industry by 1994.1092  Guay and Callum note that while economic integration helped, it was the inclusion 
of CFSP as the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty and the development of ESDI that really gave 
defense industrial consolidation the political cover it needed to proceed.1093    
 The consolidation of the European Defense Industry has occurred primarily among European 
companies and not between European companies and those outside of Europe.1094  While this trend makes 
Europe less dependent on outside sources of defense equipment and armaments, it does make them very 
much reliant on each other, or more importantly, on the European defense market as a whole. Budget 
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pressures have an impact as well on EU Member States becoming more reliant on each other and willing 
to increase their mutual defense cooperation.  As reported in chapter one (for 2005 to 2007), while Europe 
had a larger overall GDP and greater governmental spending, their defense spending was less than half 
that of the US, and that defense spending as a percentage of GDP continued on a downward spiral. EDA 
data that compares the levels of defense investment year to year within Europe for 2005 to 2007 again 
shows a continual decrease in Research and Development, and a slight increase in spending which is less 
than the rate of inflation so that in budget terms the spending was flat.1095  The Europeans themselves 
understand that they have structural inefficiencies that add to the problem of efficient generation of 
military capabilities.   Redundant national training facilities and schools, duplication of infrastructure and 
support elements, as well as maintaining a large proportion of their forces that are non-deployable all add 
to inefficiencies and wasted monies. For example, duplicate tank schools, artillery schools, flight schools 
etc... all require staff, facilities, supplies, and an operating budget while all performing the same task with 
a small number of students.  Lord Robertson the former Secretary General of NATO clearly identified the 
result of the inefficiencies following the poor showing of European forces in Kosovo as he prodded the 
Europeans to support the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).  
“This is not purely an issue of finding new money for defence. It is about getting a good return on 
investment -- literally "getting more bang for your buck". Today, the European Allies spend about 
60% of what the United States spends on defence, but nobody would suggest that the European 
Allies have 60% of the capability.”1096 
In the end the Europeans did not support the DCI nor did they reach their Helsinki Headline Goal.  
European defense spending does not appear to have any prospect of increasing in the foreseeable future 
especially in light of the largest recession since the Great Depression; in fact it is very likely that even less 
will be spent.  This increasing budget pressure is forcing EU Member States to pool resources or forgo 
capabilities and rely on other EU states to provide them.  This trend was reinforced at the 2002 NATO 
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Summit in Prague.  There NATO agreed to what was called the Prague Capabilities Commitment.1097   
This attempt to improve allied capabilities was different in that it focused on those areas that the 
Europeans were severely lacking vs. US capabilities rather than trying to get the allies to improve 
capabilities in general.  These focused capabilities were in the following areas; deployability and 
mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability, targeting, command and control, and what were called 
Niche capabilities.1098  The idea behind Niche capabilities is that smaller states should forgo general 
defense capabilities and forces in favor of providing specialized capabilities.  While this may be 
advantageous to the alliance the flip side of this is that those states that adopt this path may decide to 
entrust the defense of their country to others.  By forgoing general defense capabilities these states would 
become integrated and dependent on their partners.  With the increasing pressure of declining budgets 
more states are forgoing capabilities and becoming more dependent and integrated in terms of defense 
with their European neighbors.  The most recent and clear example is the enhanced cooperation and 
limited integration in some support areas announced by the UK and France on 2 November 2010 that will 
be discussed below. 
5-6. Movement to Integration  
 Seth Jones in “The Rise of European Security Cooperation” finds that there has been a significant 
increase in post Cold War European cooperation in the area of defense.  There has been an increase in 
defense industry cooperation, in the creation of military structures, and in multinational forces.  If that 
were all the evidence then the EU would certainly be a ‘tightly coupled’ Pluralistic Security Community.  
However, there is additional evidence and it involves a move toward integration as some aspects of 
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fiscal and strategic sense.  The smaller Allies cannot be expected to develop large expeditionary forces, but they 
should be encouraged to develop deployable units in particular high-demand areas. The same amount of money, for 
example, could be used to purchase a few fighter aircraft or maintain a state-of-the-art brigade specializing in 
chemical and biological protection or emergency medical care.  But it is clear that in today's strategic environment a 
specialized brigade will be far more useful in the Alliance's missions than a few additional fighters.”   NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly 170 DSCTC 05 E – “Progress on the Prague Capability Commitments.”  available from,  
http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=684 Internet; accessed 8 September 2009. 
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European security are integrated already and additional elements become integrated in the future.  
Integrated means that there is one whole element, not reducible to component parts without the 
destruction of that element, which is different from cooperative, combined, or joint elements that can be 
broken down into the original constituent parts without the destruction of those parts.  In addition a state 
that forgoes providing for its general defense but rather makes a specialized contribution to an integrated 
common defense (e.g. by providing a niche capability) and relies on other states to protect it is at least 
partly integrated into that common defense as well as having given up a significant part of its sovereignty.  
This is because even though that specialized capability can be returned to the state that provided it, 
defection from the integrated common defense arrangement destroys the common defense and its 
protection for that state.  
 The first aspect of integration is found in the organizations developed to support ESDP such as 
the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff.  In addition 
since January 2007 there has existed an on call capability for an EU Operations Centre to be activated.  
This permanent facility is located in Brussels and has the necessary equipment for 89 officers and 
civilians.  It is normally staffed by a cadre of 8 officers and has the required secure communications to 
military headquarters as well as to the EU organizations.1099  In addition there have been five EU military 
command post exercises to test planning and command and control of an EU military operation.  The last 
one was MILEX 10 in June 2010.1100  There is a secure communications network called EU Operations 
Wide Area Network (EU OPS WAN) that already exists and connects all of the institutions in Brussels 
                                                 
1099  The EU Operations Centre. available from, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070228-
EU_OpsCentre.pdf  Internet; accessed 9 September 2009. 
1100   EU Military Exercise 2010 (MILEX 10). available from, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/115159.pdf   Internet; accessed 1 
November 2010.  Note; The first Military Exercise (MILEX 05) was conducted in November 2005, the second 
MILEX 07 including the first activation of the EU OpsCentre in Brussels was conducted in June 2007, the third 
Military Exercise (MILEX 08) was conducted in June 2008 and the fourth in June 2009.  
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and the various EU Force Headquarters.1101 The new organizations created by the Lisbon Treaty, 
particularly the EEAS, will play a significant part in further centralizing the ESDP. 
 The European Defense Industry has undergone a significant restructuring that has virtually 
eliminated national defense firms and markets in favor of large multinational firms that are the most 
efficient at servicing the entire European defense market.  The problem in creating a truly integrated 
defense market is the legal opt out contained in Article 296 of the Rome Treaty. The Commission 
investigated the use of this provision and in 2004 published its findings that found widespread abuse.  
Instead of being used in exceptional cases it was being used by Member States to exclude almost all 
defense contracts from EU trade regulations.  The European Defense Agency (EDA) gets around this 
problem by having “participating member states” who voluntarily agree to have the EDA promote a 
common defense market among them.  The EDA was created in July 2004 by a vote of the Council of 
Ministers before the rejection of the EU Constitution.  In April 2005 The EDA Steering Committee 
decided to absorb the activities of both the WEAG and the WEAO.1102  By November 2005 the EU 
Defense Ministers had approved a Code of Conduct on Defense Procurement that was to be applied to 
purchases of defense equipment when Article 296 of the EC Treaty would normally apply.  This formed 
the basis of the voluntary ‘Intergovernmental Regime to Encourage Competition in the European Defense 
Equipment Market’ that went into effect in July 2006.  It was started with 22 participating Member States 
and now includes 25 Member States and Norway (Denmark does not participate).1103  The participating 
members realized that in order to keep a competitive Defense Industrial and Technical Base in Europe 
they would have to create an internally open European defense market.  Since part of this process would 
be ensuring that all of the members would benefit, smaller firms are encouraged to become subcontractors 
                                                 
1101  “Council conclusions on ESDP.” May 2009. available from,  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/107909.pdf   Internet; accessed 9 
September 2009.  See also;  EU Parliament, “The Battle Groups: Catalyst For a European Defence Policy.” available 
from,  http://www.frstrategie.org/barreCompetences/securiteEuropeenne/doc/BattleGroup1500.pdf  Internet; 
accessed 9 September 2009. 
1102  EDA, “European Defence Agency Steering Board Agrees Transfer of WEAG/WEAO Activities to EDA.” 
available from,  http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=2&id=15 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009.  
1103  EDA, “Intergovernmental Regime to Encourage Competition in the European Defence Equipment Market.” 
available from, http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=153 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
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to larger firms in the more open market.  A voluntary ‘Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain’ was 
adopted to foster transparency, fair competition and increased opportunities for all firms providing 
defense related material; especially for small and medium-sized firms.1104  An ‘Electronic Bulletin 
Board’, managed by the EDA, was created in July 2006 and assists firms throughout Europe in bidding on 
contracts posted by participating members.  The EDA also has a monitoring capability to ensure 
compliance with agreed to practices. 
 These were important efforts that helped to begin the creation of an integrated defense market, 
but the next steps taken in September 2006 were vital.   The EDA approved both ‘Security of Supply’, 
and ‘Security of Information’, agreements that truly impacted the market. The Security of Supply 
agreement commits participating Member States to do everything within their power to assist another 
Member State in times of emergency, crisis, or war to obtain defense material goods and services from 
their suppliers, expedite transit, and even to provide supplies from their own stocks.1105  This agreement 
addresses a prime concern of a state that if it depends on external suppliers of defense goods that they 
might be vulnerable to being cut off in time of conflict.  If the supply of defense items is guaranteed in 
time of conflict then the state could rely on external suppliers.  This in turn is vital to creating an 
integrated defense market.  The agreement on Security of Information is critical because the defense 
market is unique in the realm of classified government information, in addition to commercially sensitive 
information, that is above that found in regular proprietary secrets common in most industries.  In the 
Security of Information agreement, participating Member States are guaranteed that their classified 
government information will be protected and in return they will not discriminate against external firms 
and that defense firms’ commercially sensitive information will be protected by the Member States.  
Furthermore they agree to use EU Council security regulations for the protection of classified information 
when a bilateral agreement is not appropriate and to use the EDA’s ‘Common Minimum Standards on 
                                                 
1104  EDA, “The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain.” available from, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=159 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
1105  EDA, “Framework Arrangement for Security of Supply Between Subscribing Member States (sMS) in 
Circumstance of Operational Urgency.” available from, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Reference&id=163 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
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Industrial Security’ for their own procurement.1106   There are several key points to this, one of which is 
the extent to which technical military relative gains concerns among participating states are almost 
completely expunged by this agreement.  Second, the use of EDA and EU Council security regulations 
indicates the extent to which the EU as an entity has entered into the most intimate part of a state’s 
sovereignty; the realm of regulating classified defense secrets.  Finally, the Security of Information 
agreement opens the defense market to firms in East European Member States that would not have been 
able to compete because of Cold War era regulations.   
 Besides the significance of the Code of Conduct, the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, 
Security of Supply, and Security of Information agreements in fostering a European Defense Market, 
there is more to the EDA and it is worthwhile to look at the organization and functions of the EDA.1107  
The EDA has a Steering Committee made up of the Defense Ministers of the participating Member States 
and the EU Commission, with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as the 
head of the agency and Chairman of the Steering Committee.  The organization of the EDA is important 
because it ties in with the four functions given to it by the EU Council.  These functions are to; develop 
defense capabilities, promote defense research and technology, promote armaments cooperation, and to 
create a competitive European Defense Equipment Market while strengthening the European Defense 
Technological and Industrial Base.1108    
The EDA Capabilities Directorate is tasked to support the “ESDP as it stands now and will evolve 
in the future” so that it is not only concerned with developing new and interoperable defense systems but 
it is also involved in determining what those new future capabilities will be.  The EDA Capabilities 
Directorate works with the EUMC to determine possible solutions to future requirements outlined in the 
                                                 
1106 EDA, “Security of Information Between Subscribing Member States.”  available from, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Reference&id=164  Internet; accessed 10 September 2009.  
1107 The EDA Organization Chart is at Appendix III page 465 of this study.  
1108  “EDA Background.” available from, http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Background&id=122 
Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
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EDA Long Term Vision, EU Security Strategy, and political guidance from the Council/PSC.1109  There 
are two reasons that this is significant.  Although the translation of requirements into capabilities currently 
requires a Member State (or States) to program the funding and oversee production, the ability to 
influence what future capabilities will be adopted gives the EDA (and therefore EU)  a significant role in 
determining the items that future spending and budgets will be used to purchase.1110  This of course will 
also assist in ensuring the interoperability of future EU forces, but it is important to note that this is being 
done at the EU level by an EU agency not by a random grouping of states involved in a one off 
collaboration on an item of defense equipment as in past cooperation efforts previously noted.   It also is a 
tremendous potential facilitator of a future EU force that has been guided in its creation by the adoption of 
capabilities generated through the EU/EDA comprehensive capabilities development process.    
The Research and Technology Directorate is also significant not just because it is trying to 
preserve the European Defense Industrial and Technology Base and increase spending on defense 
research and technology, but rather that in addition it is involved in ‘establishing agreed European 
Research and Technology priorities.’1111   Setting priorities in this area and pooling resources gives the 
EDA tremendous influence over what direction future research takes.  The EDA already has had success 
with a Joint Investment Program on Force Protection and in 2008 began a second Joint Investment 
Program on Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies with eleven participating states and a 
budget of 15.58 million Euros.1112    
The Armaments Directorate promotes and proposes new cooperation, assists in the coordination 
of existing programs (e.g. maintenance and upgrades), identifies best practices (lessons learned) and can 
                                                 
1109  “EDA Capabilities Development.” available from,  
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=115 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
1110  This is analogous to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process that is used in the US to help the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identify, assess, and prioritize military capabilities. Charter of the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council, CJCSI 5123.01B, p. A-1, Department of Defense, 2004.   
1111  “EDA Research and Technology.” available from,   
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=117 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
1112  EDA, “Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme on Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies.” 
available from, http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=368  Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
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be involved in managing specific programs.1113  This last item is significant because it gives the EDA a 
nascent ability to partially manage procurement programs.  In cases where the Member States want it to 
(and provide a budget) the EDA can manage a program up to the point of implementation by a contractor 
when it would then turn management over to OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière 
d'ARmement - the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation).1114   
The Industry and Market Directorate’s mission is the fourth function of the EDA which is the 
creation of an internationally competitive European Defense Equipment Market and to strengthen the 
Defense Technical Industrial Base (DTIB).   Their work related to the creation of a European Defense 
Equipment Market revolves around the intergovernmental Regime in Defense Procurement and its 
supporting documents described previously.  In working to strengthen the DITB the Industry and Market 
Directorate follows the 2007 EDA Steering Board approved ‘Strategy for the European Defense 
Technological and Industrial Base’ which in part states:    
“we must therefore press on with developing a truly European DTIB, as something more than a 
sum of its national parts. We cannot continue routinely to determine our equipment requirements 
on separate national bases, develop them through separate national R&D efforts, and realize them 
through separate national procurements. This approach is no longer economically sustainable – 
and in a world of multinational operations it is operationally unacceptable, too. We need therefore 
to achieve consolidation on both sides of the market in Europe: aligning and combining our 
various needs in shared equipment requirements; and meeting them from an increasingly 
integrated EDTIB.” “This EDTIB must also be more closely integrated with the wider, non-
defense European technological and industrial base, with less European dependence on non-
European sources for key defense technologies.”1115 
The EDA is an incredibly significant organization and step in the integration of military capabilities and 
especially the capacity to produce military capability in the EU.  Article 296 opt outs still exist for very 
sensitive items such as nuclear weapons and emergency purchases for operations.  
The EDA is not the only agency that has been working on creating an integrated European 
Defense Equipment Market.  The Commission issued an Interpretative Communication in December 
                                                 
1113  EDA Armaments Cooperation. available from,  
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=108 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
1114  Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation. available from, http://www.occar-ea.org/ Internet; accessed 10 
September 2009. 
1115 EDA, “A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.” available from, 
 http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=211 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009.  
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2006 that emphasized Article 296 opt out provision should only be used in exceptional cases and gave 
guidance for Member States’ on whether defense procurement contracts can be exempted or should 
follow EU trade rules.1116  There have been two recent EU legislative actions that dramatically impact the 
creation of an integrated European Defense Market.   Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of the European Union was adopted in May 2009 and will ‘harmonize’ the various 
rules and procedures among the Member States that impede the movement and transfer of defense related 
products.1117   The other legislative act is Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of the European Union and should have a truly integrative effect on the European defense 
market.1118  This legislation does two things.  First it provides specific rules governing the contracting for 
defense material that had not been covered by previous common market rules.1119  Second and most 
importantly this new legislation curtails the use of Article 296 opt outs to the absolute minimum, and 
those must be reviewed case-by-case at the EU level.   This EU law is legally binding and mandates that 
Member States procurement and contracting for defense material follow common market rules.  There 
can be no argument that the actions of the Commission and the EDA are creating an integrated arms 
                                                 
1116  EU Commission, “The EU Single Market, Defence Procurement.” available from,  
   http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/dpp_en.htm  Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
1117  Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. available from,   
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:146:0001:01:EN:HTML  Internet; accessed 11 
September 2009. 
1118 “The new Directive 2009/81/EC on defense and security procurement entered into force on 21 August 2009. The 
Directive will be the cornerstone of a truly European Defense Market supporting the development of the European 
defense-related supplier base. Up until now, the vast majority of defense and sensitive security procurement 
contracts have been exempted from the Internal Market rules. One of the reasons for this is that the existing EU 
procurement rules are considered to be ill-suited for most defense- and security-related purchases. The new 
Directive will greatly improve this situation by providing tailor-made procurement rules for defense and security 
contracts. Member States now have at their disposal Community rules they can apply to complex and sensitive 
transactions without putting at risk their legitimate security interests.”  Europa Press Release; “New Directive on 
Defence and Security Procurement Enters into Force.” available from, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1250&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en  Internet; accessed 11 September 2009. 
1119  “Directive 2009/81/EC applies to arms, munitions and war material, subject to Article 296. This means that, in 
principle, all military equipment which is on the list of 1958 comes under the new Directive. Only in cases where 
the rules of Directive 2009/81/EC are not sufficient to safeguard Member States essential security interests, Member 
States may use Article 296 to exempt the procurement of such equipment from the Directive. Whether this is the 
case or not must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The criteria for this assessment have been explained in the 
Interpretative Communication of December 2006 and remain valid.”  “Defence Procurement – Frequently Asked 
Questions,” Brussels, 28 August 2009. available from, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/faqs_28-08-09_en.pdf  Internet; accessed 12 
September 2009. 
 398
market and defense industrial base within the EU.  That means that the EU is well on the way towards an 
integrated capacity to produce military capability. 
 In addition to the EU working towards creating an integrated capacity to produce military 
capability, there are some existing integrated capabilities and capabilities that are in the process of being 
produced.  The European Union Satellite Center has already been mentioned but it is the single space 
based intelligence agency of the EU.  It provides ‘Geospatial Intelligence’ (mapping, charting, satellite 
and aerial imagery analysis, and imagery intelligence) in support of EU (and UN when requested) 
operations.   The Satellite center also conducts training for imagery analysts and works with the EDA and 
EUMS to develop EU intelligence capabilities such as a common Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, 
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) management tool.1120     
The Galileo global navigation satellite system is under construction by the European Space 
Agency as a joint initiative with the EU Commission.  It is designed to provide Europe with its own 
satellite navigation system independent of the US (GPS) or Russian (GLONASS) systems.1121  Although 
the signals will be interoperable with the other systems it gives the EU the capability to conduct 
operations using satellite navigation technology even if the US or Russia were to object and withhold 
access to their systems.   Currently only a few satellites have been launched, so the system is not yet in 
operation.  Although it is advertised as a civilian controlled system to be used for civilian applications, 
there are obvious military applications for the EU such as targeting, navigation, and search and rescue that 
will also use the system.      
 The Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) was created in 2007 with the merger of the 
European Airlift Centre with the NATO sponsored Sealift Coordination Centre at Eindhoven Airbase, 
The Netherlands.  The MCCE provides strategic airlift, sealift, and Air-to-Air Refueling support to any 
                                                 
1120  The EUSC. available from,  
http://www.eusc.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=10  Internet; accessed 12 
September 2009. 
1121 ESA; Galileo Navigation System. available from,  http://www.esa.int/esaNA/GGGMX650NDC_galileo_0.html  
Internet; accessed 12 September 2009.  
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EU led operation as well as to NATO.1122  Past support includes EU operations in the Congo and Darfur.  
Also located at the Eindhoven Airbase is the Strategic Air Lift Coordination Cell that oversees the 
Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution (SALIS) contract.1123  Future European strategic transport is linked to 
the still to be delivered A400M Airbus Military Transport which is a true single source production for the 
European market.  It is a clear example of the integration of the Defense Industrial Base as well as the 
European Defense Market. The EADS/Airbus Military contract was signed with OCCAR representing 
seven European states for the delivery of 180 aircraft.1124   The European Air Transport Command 
(EATC) is another initiative involving The Netherlands, France, Germany, Luxemburg and Belgium in 
which;  
“the overall objective is to gradually transfer and integrate within one single multinational 
command all relevant national responsibilities and personnel, whose responsibility would be to 
direct the force generation and the mission execution of combined air transport capabilities.”1125  
The EDA is also moving forward with the creation of a ‘European Air Transport Fleet’ (EATF).   In 
November 2008 a declaration of intent to participate was signed by 12 EU Member States.   EATF would 
initially involve pooling aircraft, resources, and support such as training and maintenance.  The 
declaration of intent includes the creation in the future of a multinational A400M unit as part of the 
EATF.1126  An additional step was the signature of an EATF Letter of Intent, on 17 November 2009 by 
fourteen Ministers of Defense (and later by Romania bringing the total participants to 15) which is a 
                                                 
1122  MCCE Background. available from,  https://www.mcce-mil.com/  Internet; accessed 12 September 2009. 
1123 The SALIS contract gives; “assured availability of two AN124-100 under full time charter for any national 
purpose of the Participants and for the rapid deployment of forces in support of NATO/EU supported operations, 
and the assured availability of up to four (4) additional AN124-100 aircraft on priority call for the rapid deployment 
of forces in support of NATO/EU supported operations.” Welcome to the SALCC. available from,  
https://www.mcce-mil.com/  Internet; accessed 12 September 2009. 
1124 Airbus Military A400M History. available from,  http://www.airbusmilitary.com/commitment.html Internet; 
accessed 14 September 2009. See Also; EADS A400M. available from, 
http://www.eads.com/1024/en/businet/airbus/airbus_military/a400m/a400m.html  Internet; accessed 14 September 
2009. 
1125  NATO Parliamentary Assembly: Visit to The Netherlands By The Sub-Committee On Transatlantic Defense 
And Security Co-Operation. available from,  http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1260 Internet; 
accessed 14 September 2009. 
See Also; ESDP Development of European Military Capabilities,  p.5 available from, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090720%20Factsheet%20capacites%20militaires%20EN.pdf 
Internet; accessed 14 September 2009. 
1126 “European Air Transport Fleet Launched.” available from,  http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=422 
Internet; accessed 14 September 2009. 
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formal commitment to the program.1127  The MCCE, SALIS, ETAC, and EATF all demonstrate that in the 
area of transportation there is a definite movement toward integration of capabilities and organizations in 
Europe.   
 Another area of integration is found in various units formed first for use by the WEU and now by 
the EU.  Eurocorps was formed in 1993 following the success of the French-German Brigade that became 
operational in 1991.  By 1993 Germany, France, Belgium and Spain had formed the integrated Corps 
Headquarters unit.  In 2000 Eurocorps had its first mission as the KFOR Headquarters.  In 2002 
Eurocorps was designated by NATO as a rapid reaction headquarters and in exchange opened its 
membership to all NATO and EU members.  From August 2004 to February 2005 it was the 
Headquarters for ISAF in Afghanistan, and in 2006 it was the on call NATO Response Force 
Headquarters.  There are several integrated units that are part of the Eurocorps.  The first is a headquarters 
staff of about 450 people, the second is the 380 person multinational Headquarters Support Battalion 
composed of three multinational companies. The third integrated unit is the Multinational Command 
Support Brigade which includes a Communication and Information Systems Company and the 
Headquarters Support Battalion as well as its own staff.1128  The remainder of the units assigned to the 
Corps (up to 60,000 troops), except for the French-German Brigade, are not necessarily “integrated” but 
are units assigned as the mission requires and participating states can provide.    
 There is an example of an integrated naval element in Europe, and it is a long term (since 1965) 
bi-national agreement between Belgium and The Netherlands that created a Naval Mine Warfare School 
at Oostende (Belgium).  Belgium and The Netherlands shares the school’s support staff, instructors and 
                                                 
1127 “European Defense Agency Annual Report 2009.” p.22, available from, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=17&id=660  Internet; accessed 5 October 2010 
1128 Eurocorps Organization. available from, 
http://www.eurocorps.org/home_page/organisation/organisation.php?lang_default=ENG&id_video=12. Internet; 
accessed 14 September 2009.  See Also; History of Eurocorps. available from,   
http://www.eurocorps.org/home_page/eurocorps/history/History_of_the_Eurocorps.pdf  Internet; accessed 14 
September 2009. 
 401
budgets between them.1129   Another long standing bi-national integrated force is the UK Netherlands 
Amphibious Force created in 1973.  Responding to budget pressures of the time it saved the Dutch 
Marines from elimination, and now this force is a brigade of 5000 with the Dutch providing a battalion 
and support troops of about 1100 troops.1130  These are good examples of pooling resources in response to 
budget pressures that resulted in integrated forces.  This is the most likely response for the EU states (as 
can be seen with ETAF and ETAC) that will result from the current economic downturn.   
The most dramatic example of defense cuts leading to integration is the recently announced 
French – UK ''Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation'' signed on 2 November 2010 by Prime 
Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.  On 19 October the UK government 
published a Strategic Defense and Security Review undertaken as the result of financial difficulties.  The 
result is that the UK will cut about 8 percent of its defense budget and make significant reductions in its 
force structure and capabilities.1131  The ability of the UK to conduct a military campaign on its own will 
become quite limited with these reductions.  This prompted the UK to make a defense deal with the 
French to integrate in some areas and significantly enhance cooperation in others.  This move was greatly 
facilitated by the French return to the Integrated Command Structure of NATO.  The French – UK 
''Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation'' includes several key items.  First, there will be joint 
facilities for testing nuclear warheads and materials at the Valduc research centre in France and the 
technology development centre at Aldermaston in the UK staffed by both French and British scientists.  
Nuclear forces and weapons will remain under national control.  Second, the UK will replace its current 
aircraft carrier capability with the creation of a naval task force built around the French carrier Charles de 
Gaulle while it equips its future aircraft carrier with catapults so that both countries’ fighter jets can fly 
                                                 
1129 Belgian-Netherlands Naval Mine Warfare School. available from, http://www1.eguermin.org/  Internet; accessed 
14 September 2009. 
1130  The Dutch Contribution to the UKNL Amphibious Force. available from,  
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/brinkman.pdf  Internet; accessed 14 September 2009. 
1131 “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,” (including links to 
fact sheets and National Security Strategy), available from,  
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence-security-resilience/national-security/strategic-defence-security-
review.aspx  Internet; accessed 3 November 2010  See Also, RUSI: SDSR: “What Next for Britain?” available from, 
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4CBE8B5AF32D7/  Internet; accessed 3 November 2010 
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from each other's naval vessels. The goal is to synchronize maintenance schedules so between them they 
will always have one carrier available for what will become by the early 2020s a ''UK-French integrated 
carrier strike group''.  Third, a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (including air, land and naval forces) 
will be developed.  This capability will not be a standing force but one available for use once notified and 
structured for  NATO, EU, UN or other operations in anything up to ‘high intensity’ conflicts.  This will 
include developing joint military doctrine and training programs with combined land and air exercises 
scheduled to begin sometime next year.   Fourth, there is a stated intention to align ‘wherever possible our 
logistics arrangements’ to include integrated support for both countries' soon to be acquired A400M 
military transport aircraft fleets and co-operation in training of the crews.  Finally, cooperation will be 
extended in a large number of other areas such as; strengthening the defense industrial and technology 
base, implementing a combined 100 million euro annual research and technology budget, joint 
development of the next generation of unmanned aerial systems, complex weapons, submarine 
technologies, marine mines, satellite communications, cyber security and for France to possibly use spare 
capacity in the UK air-to-air refueling fleet.1132  This unprecedented increase in defense cooperation and 
integration between France and the UK reflects the perception that each state has of the other as more 
than just allies.1133 
In addition to bi-lateral moves toward integration, Article 46 of the Lisbon Treaty codifies 
‘permanent structured cooperation’ in defense within the EU.  EU Member States that want to participate 
must meet the criteria set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation and then have to notify 
both the Council and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Then the Council, 
                                                 
1132  Ministry of Defense, “UK-France Defence Co-operation Treaty announced.” available from, 
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/UkfranceDefenceCooperationTreaty
Announced.htm  Internet; accessed 3 November 2010.  See Also; Telegraph “Anglo-French Defence Treaty: at a 
glance.” available from,  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8105134/Anglo-French-
defence-treaty-at-a-glance.html  Internet; accessed 3 November 2010 
1133 “The document said that Britain and France have ''reached a level of mutual confidence unprecedented in our 
history'' and ''do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either nation could be threatened without the 
vital interests of the other also being threatened''. So the two countries will ''enable our forces to operate together, to 
maximise our capabilities and to obtain greater value for money from our investment in defence''. Telegraph 
“Anglo-French Defence Treaty: at a glance.” available from,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8105134/Anglo-French-defence-treaty-at-a-
glance.html   Internet; accessed 3 November 2010 
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in consultation with the High Representative, votes to approve the list of participating states. If a Member 
State wants to participate later it must go through this same process. When a participating Member State 
no longer meets the criteria or commitments outlined in the Protocol the Council can suspend that State’s 
participation.  States can also voluntarily withdraw.1134  The Protocol on Permanent Structured 
Cooperation sets out the criteria for participation. First a Member State must participate in the European 
Defense Agency as well as in the battle group program by either providing a battle group or part of a 
multinational battle group (combat units and support units ready to deploy within 30 days and sustained 
in theater for up to 120 days).  Second, they are to develop their forces by; reaching an approved level of 
defense expenditures on equipment; “by harmonizing the identification of their military needs, by pooling 
and, where appropriate, specializing their defense means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation 
in the fields of training and logistics;” by “enhancing the availability, interoperability, flexibility and 
deployability of their forces;” by rectifying the “shortfalls perceived in the framework of the ‘Capability 
Development Mechanism’;” and take part in the development of “equipment programs in the framework 
of the European Defence Agency.”  Finally, participating Member States agree to allow the European 
Defence Agency to conduct annual assessments of their contributions with regard to capabilities and to 
report the results to the Council which will serve as a basis for Council recommendations and decisions 
regarding Permanent Structured Cooperation.1135  Based on the description in the Lisbon Treaty and as 
outlined in the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation in defense, the Member States that 
participate in this program will allow the EU to structure and monitor the development of their armed 
forces capability in conformity with EU established goals and criteria.  Though they may nominally 
                                                 
1134 Article 46, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. available from, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:EN:PDF  Internet; accessed 5 October 
2010 
1135 Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article 28A of the Treaty on European Union. 
available from,  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0153:0155:EN:PDF  
Internet; accessed 5 October 2010  See Also; European Union Institute for Security Studies, “Permanent Structured 
Cooperation: In Defense of the Obvious,” by Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, June 2010. available from, 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Permanent_structured_cooperation_01.pdf  Internet; accessed 5 October 
2010 
 404
remain the armed forces of a state, they will have effectively become an integral part of a larger defense 
establishment responding to its standards.   
In addition to annual Command Post exercises previously mentioned, training under the aegis of 
the EU / EDA is an area that is receiving increasing attention. Doctrine development along with 
operational and strategic studies is being done by the European Security and Defense College (ESDC) 
and the EU Institute for Security Studies.  The EU Institute for Security Studies is an agency whose board 
is chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and whose stated goals are; 
“to find a common security culture for the EU, to help develop and project the CFSP, and to enrich 
Europe’s strategic debate.”1136  The European Security and Defense College’s purpose is to provide 
“strategic-level education in European Security and Defence Policy, now Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP)” to “civil servants, diplomats, police officers, and military personnel” from participating 
member states.  It is a ‘network college’ with several national universities, academies, colleges and 
institutes that contribute to the ESDC which is the “key CDSP training provider.”  So far it has trained 
over 2500 people in its various courses.1137     
“The objective of the ESDC is to provide Member States and EU Institutions with knowledgeable 
personnel able to work efficiently on CSDP matters. In pursuing this objective, the College makes 
a major contribution to a better understanding of CSDP in the overall context of CFSP and to 
promoting a common European security culture.”1138 
Another training program at the opposite end of the training spectrum that was initiated in 2008 is the 
‘Military Erasmus’ program for the exchange of young officers; primarily military academy cadets.  This 
program now has developed a standard reciprocal exchange agreement and a credit transfer system to 
                                                 
1136 The European Union Institute for Security Studies, Background, available from, http://www.iss.europa.eu/about-
us/  Internet; accessed 5 October 2010 (underline by this author) 
1137 European Security and Defense College, “Promoting a European security culture.” available from, 
http://esdc.mil-edu.be/index.php/home  Internet; accessed 5 October 2010. See Also; “European Security and 
Defense College in Short,” available from, http://esdc.mil-edu.be/index.php/component/docman/cat_view/26-csdp-
knowledge-base/90-esdc/91-basic-documents Internet; accessed 5 October 2010. 
1138 Ibid. (underline by this author) 
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recognize work done at another academy. The stated aim of the program is to; “encourage European 
officers to share a common strategic culture from the very early stages of their training.1139  
There is an integrated EU training program at the tactical level.  In response to a lack of available 
transport helicopters for a number of EU operations a helicopter training program was created.  The 
problem was not availability of aircraft but that most crews were not trained to fly in demanding desert or 
mountain environments. Improving helicopter crew training for deployment has become a major training 
program under the EDA.  In 2009 there was an initial training program for Czech helicopter crews 
deploying to Afghanistan and them a much larger flying exercise in Gap France in March 2009 (funded 
by Luxembourg) with eleven participating member states.  This was such a success that in November 
2009 the EU Defense Ministers created the European Helicopter Training Program. The program consists 
of two live exercises per year; one focused on individual training the other on interoperability and 
operational tactics. The EDA clearly intends to increase its involvement in helicopter training.  In October 
2010 the EDA proposed to study helicopter basic flying training with the view to ‘increase efficiencies’ 
(i.e. consolidate under the EDA) in the provision that type of training.1140  Another very important EU 
training program that is being proposed (currently in a pre-contract phase) is the Advanced European Jet 
Pilot Training System.1141  Should this program be adopted there is no doubt that it would be an integrated 
training program involving all aspects of the capacity to create military capability in the area of fighter 
aircraft.  This would be a very significant integration under the aegis of the EU.  
                                                 
1139 European young officers exchange scheme, available from, http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/documents/Fact%20sheets/11E_Military_ERASMUS_rev.pdf?PHPSESSID=f3137d60 Internet; 
accessed 5 October 2010  See Also;  Military Erasmus homepage, available from, http://www.emilyo.eu/ Internet; 
accessed 5 October 2010   
1140  European Defense Agency Annual Report 2009. pp.19-20  available from, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=17&id=660 Internet; accessed 5 October 2010. See Also; 
“Defence Ministers launch European Helicopter Training.” available from, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=2&id=552 Internet; accessed 26 October 2010.  See Also; 
“Helicopter Basic Flying Training Study.” available from. 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=11&id=695 Internet; accessed 26 October 2010  
1141 “The aim of the Advanced European Jet Pilot Training System (AEJPT) Category B project is to develop a 
common Integrated Training System (ITS) to train future fighter pilots. This system will most likely comprise not 
only the aircraft but also the basing infrastructure including Ground Based Training, Academic Training, Mission 
Planning/Debriefing Systems and the logistics to support the full system.” Advanced European Jet Pilot Training 
System. available from. http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=28&id=585 Internet; accessed 6 October 
2010  
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   In looking at a movement towards future defense integration the EU Parliament produced a very 
interesting resolution in February 2009.  The Parliament has over time produced a number of documents 
that have contained concepts that later were included in EU treaties.  Although it has increased in 
legislative authority it is unlikely that the Parliament would produce a document on policy that did not 
have some support in the Commission and Council. The context for this resolution includes the French 
return to the Integrated Command Structure of NATO announced in March 2009 by French President 
Sarkozy subsequently approved by the French National Assembly.1142  France got what it wanted in 
exchange for rejoining NATO’s Integrated Command Structure (American acceptance of an independent 
European defense capability and a leading French role in NATO’s command structures).1143  The French 
want to beef up the EU’s existing planning capacity for operations with an EU planning headquarters, 
revise funding mechanisms for operations, increase EU training, and improve military capabilities.1144   
Dr Hans-Gert Poettering the President of the European Parliament, and ally of Angela Merkel, 
spoke strongly in favor of the EU Parliament’s resolution of 19 February, 2009, that advocated the 
creation of what would be called Synchronised Armed Forces Europe' (SAFE).1145  The ideas contained in 
the resolution are very important given the precedent for EU Parliament influence on treaties. There is a 
likelyhood that many of the details outlined below will be incorporated into the CSDP which may 
eventually be called “SAFE”.1146 
                                                 
1142 “France ends four-decade NATO rift.” available from, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7937666.stm Internet; 
accessed 10 September 2009. See Also; “Sarkozy wins French NATO re-entry vote.” available from,   
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/03/17/france.nato/index.html Internet; accessed 10 September 2009.  
1143  “Sarkozy, a Frenchman in a Hurry, Maps His Path.”  New York Times September 24, 2007. available from,   
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/24/world/europe/24sarkozy.html Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
See also: “France edges closer to NATO.” available from, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7039108.stm  Internet; 
accessed 10 September 2009. 
1144 Daniel Keohane, Defensive Realignment. ISS Opinion, Published by European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, September 2008.  
1145 President Poettering; “Your votes will strengthen the European Parliament!” available from,  
http://www.euromil.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=158&Itemid=28 Internet; accessed 13 
September 2009. 
1146 (see Appendix IV page 466 of this study for selected text) European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009 
on the European Security Strategy and ESDP. available from, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2009-
0075&format=XML&language=EN  Internet; accessed 13 September 2009. 
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Although the use of the word synchronized instead of integrated in the resolution is more 
palatable politically, if these measures are adopted they would effectively create an integrated European 
Force.  There is nothing new in suggesting the elimination of duplication and the pooling and sharing of 
capabilities, or the joint development of new capabilities for more efficient use of defense spending.  
However, when added to calls for specialization (paragraph 46) and a Europe-wide division of labor in 
military capabilities (paragraph 54) there is the potential for states to forego providing defense for 
themselves and becoming a provider of a capability while other states provide different capabilities as 
part of a whole force.  The resolution also advocates common weapons systems (paragraph 62), common 
training, and common standards (paragraph 65).  One of France’s key desires noted previously is 
obtaining greater ability to conduct operations by “establishing an integrated civilian and military 
strategic planning structure for ESDP operations and missions” (paragraph 56) as well as an “autonomous 
and permanent EU Operational Headquarters” (paragraph 58) and interestingly to “enhance the 
development of a specifically European security culture” (paragraph 64).  The most radical and likely to 
result in integration is the call for a “European statute for soldiers” (paragraph 53). 
53.  Approves the idea of a European statute for soldiers within the framework of SAFE 
governing training standards, operational doctrine and freedom of operational action, issues 
relating to duties and rights, as well as the level of equipment quality, medical care and social 
security arrangements in the event of death, injury or incapacity; 
This would be taking over the function of how military forces are recruited, trained, organized, and 
compensated, that along with “the opening-up of armies to citizens of other EU Member States,” 
(paragraph 65) would be directly creating an EU wide integrated force.   This certainly seems to be the 
vision of Dr Hans-Gert Poettering former President of the EU Parliament;  
“Ultimately, the answer does not simply lie in closer cooperation between autonomous national 
armies, but rather in quantum improvements in the areas of joint command structures, equipment 
and operations. If we want to achieve these aims, we need a link between the current situation, 
characterized by armed forces which are partly interoperable, but still organized on a purely 
national basis, and the distant objective of a European Army. Partly because it has positive 
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associations and is easy to remember, that link could be given the name SAFE; 'Synchronized 
Armed Forces Europe'.”1147 
Importantly the Lisbon Treaty gives the EU Parliament a greater say in defense and foreign policy 
matters.1148  Should the EU Parliament chose to push the SAFE proposal, it seems given the pressures to 
economize and specialize, that it may well be adopted within a decade.  That would certainly produce 
what would be considered an “EU Army”.  At that point the EU would become a strongly integrated 
Amalgamated Security Community. 
5-7. Measuring the Independent Variable – The degree of integration of military capabilities and 
the capacity to produce military capability.  
 This paper argues that once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, especially the 
integration of the capacity to produce military capability, an Amalgamated Security Community (a state 
or state like entity) will form as a result, and that this process is the mirror image of state dissolution.  The 
independent variable is the degree of integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce 
military capability.  Measurement of the independent variable by category in the case of the EU based on 
the evidence that has been presented is outlined below.   
 Category one - Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces.  There 
are concrete examples of permanent integrated units in Europe, e.g. Eurocorps, French-German Brigade, 
the UKNL Landing Force, NATO’s Multinational CBRN Battalion, Dutch-Belgian Naval Mine Warfare 
School, and the MCCE.  There are also Operational Forces that have been put together for deployments or 
                                                 
1147 “New developments and approaches to a defense of Europe,” Dr Hans-Gert Poettering President of the European 
Parliament, speech in Berlin November 2008. available from, http://www.daten.euro-
defence.eu/2008/poettering_e.pdf   Internet; accessed 13 September 2009. 
1148 Article 36 states “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly 
consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security 
policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that 
the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Special representatives may be involved in 
briefing the European Parliament.” “The European Parliament may address questions or make recommendations to 
the Council or the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common 
foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
on European Union. available from, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:EN:PDF  Internet; accessed 5 October 
2010.  See Also; EU Parliament, “The Lisbon Treaty and its Implications for CFSP / CSDP.” available from, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/201/201009/20100928lisbontreaty_cfsp-
csdp_en.pdf  Internet; accessed 5 October 2010  
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are on standby as an integrated unit such as the Multinational Battlegroups and various EU deployments 
such as Operation ALTHEA which has a Multinational Maneuver Battalion as well as other small 
deployments such as military advisory groups.  These units are either small Headquarters units or bi-
national/multinational tactical units of a Brigade size or smaller.  The vast majority of operational units in 
Europe however, do not fall into this category, even though they may rotate through a multinational unit 
or deployment from time to time, they are part of national military forces.  The overall assessment of 
operational forces in the EU is that although there are some integrated units so far there is only a very low 
level of integration.  As for Administrative Staffs, integrated administrative support is almost completely 
absent.  Recruiting, paying wages, assignments, and services such as morale and welfare, are primarily 
covered by national armed forces.  There is some combined support for some deployments as well as 
operational funding through Athena, but there is no true EU Administrative Staff that provides integrated 
administrative support.  The overall assessment for category one – military forces; must be very low 
which equals a score of 1.      
 Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production.   
This category has seen the greatest change in the post Cold War period.  As outlined in the discussion 
above there has been a significant increase in the consolidation of the means of production both as a 
reflection of market pressures and most importantly as the result of activity by the EU Commission and 
the EDA.   Not only is there now an open market for all basic equipment, there is definitely considerable 
sharing in the production of high tech and prestigious equipment such as the A400m, Eurofighter, and 
Galileo satellite system.  Despite this there is still the possibility of Article 296 opt outs for very sensitive 
equipment (e.g. nuclear forces).  Therefore this category can only be assessed as being at a medium level 
of integration which is scored as a 3.  
Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces. 
This category (like a couple of others below) is supported by NATO STANAGS that assist in making 
interoperability among forces a priority.  What is found in Europe is that there is a wide variety of combat 
equipment still in use produced by various national companies during the Cold War.  This is very true of 
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vehicles, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers that were produced by the UK, Germany, France, 
and Russia that can all be found throughout various EU forces and will not likely be replaced anytime 
soon. On the other hand these are all the same generation of vehicles produced in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Aircraft are another area where there are a number of different systems but they are all of the same 
generation.  The consolidation of the defense industry also has an impact here because future upgrades of 
vehicles or aircraft will end up being produced not by national companies but rather by European 
companies providing the same systems to all customers.  There are some European militaries however, 
primarily the smaller East Europeans States, whose general defense forces lag behind but who participate 
by fielding Special Forces units or Niche capabilities that are of comparable quality to any others in 
Europe.  For this category there is a general compatibility of key equipment (due in large part to the 
efforts of NATO) but there is still a variation so that this category can only be assessed currently as being 
at a low level of integration which equals a score of 2. This category is very likely to increase its 
integration over time as new equipment is fielded. 
Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, 
Materiel, and Soldiers. (DTLOMS) 
This category is greatly assisted by NATO (and PFP) efforts as well.  NATO Doctrine is pretty well 
uniformly accepted as the basis for operations (adjusted to UN requirements when on a UN deployment).  
In addition English is used as the operational language.  Training at the Strategic level is conducted for 
the EU by the European Security and Defense College.  NATO training at the operational level is carried 
out at the NATO School (located in Oberammergau, Germany) and Marshal Center.  The EU conducts 
training exercises (MILEX) at the operational level to test its command posts and planning ability (this 
also impacts the Command and Control sub-category below). The EDA is beginning to become involved 
in training (Helicopter training program) and will likely become more involved in training activities.  
Training is also conducted for deployments and during deployments by the various integrated units (e.g. 
battlegroups, Eurocorps,).  NATO Training standards also assist in determining what topics and level of 
proficiency should be taught.  There is at least bi-national training conducted by the Dutch-Belgian Naval 
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Warfare School and in the UKNL Landing Force, however, most training takes place within a national 
framework of staff, equipment, and facilities at national schools.  This area can only be seen as being at a 
medium level of integration.  Leader Development is affected by training offered in multinational venues 
and by NATO requirements.  There tends to be a similar set of schools in each country dedicated to 
officer development.  Usually there is an academy, a company grade officer’s course, a field grade 
officer’s course, and a senior war college.  There are usually exchange officers that attend the courses 
hosted in each country which helps to familiarize the students with each other’s militaries.  This is not 
however, an integrated system since each state maintains its own school system.  Only at the level of the 
European Security and Defense College and the NATO schools is there an integrated officer 
development.  This area can only be assessed as being at a very low level.   Organization of European 
military forces is very similar. Thanks to years of the NATO integrated command structure, doctrine, and 
PFP interactions, military forces in Europe are organized in a very similar manner.   Materiel is an area in 
which there is considerable diversity.  Equipping soldiers, airmen, and sailors is still done primarily 
through national supply methods and purchases but this appears set to change with the consolidation of 
the Defense industry and the work of the EDA.  In the future if there is an EATF equipped as a single unit 
with A400Ms purchased by a single contract for that unit it would be the first case of integration in terms 
of the sub-category of Materiel.  Until that (or something similar) happens this must be assessed as not 
integrated.  “Soldiers” is shorthand for the personnel aspect of force generation and includes recruiting, 
and all aspects of human resource management such as promotion or assignment.  The only real 
integration in this area is the application of EU labor laws.  EU laws were applied for instance to allow 
females to integrate into the German Army.  Otherwise in this area there is little to no integration as 
human resource management remains the domain national militaries.  This can only be assessed as being 
very low in terms of integration.   This category; Creation of combat power based on DTLOMS can be 
assessed as: Doctrine high 4, Training medium 3, Leader Development very low 1, Organization high 4, 
Materiel not integrated 0, Soldiers very low 0.5.  Overall this category is assessed as being at a low level 
with an average score of 2.   
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Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) 
Communications, Logistics. 
Command and Control is perhaps the most integrated aspect.  There is clear integration at the strategic 
level with the EU Political and Security Committee, EU Military Committee, EU Military Staff and EU 
Operations Center.  The EU conducts Command Post Exercises to ensure its ability to function in this 
category.  At the operational level the Force Headquarters have either been multinational or a lead nation 
augmented to function as an integrated command for the operation.  Again NATO procedures provide the 
background standardization and habituation for the successful working in a multinational integrated 
headquarters.  This is also the area in which the EU Satellite Center and Galileo navigation systems would 
assist in planning and controlling forces.  Therefore Command and Control integration must be rated as 
high.  The first area that must be integrated for any force to possibly work together is communications.  
For the EU an integrated communications system already exists through the EU Operations Wide Area 
Network (EU OPS WAN).  In addition there is again a NATO influence regarding operational language, 
radio procedures interoperable equipment etc…  Communications integration must also be rated as high.  
Logistics for European operations can be accomplished through a lead nation for support that may or may 
not be the overall lead nation for an operation or it can also be done through contracting and the Athena 
process.  There is one key single source logistics area and that is in the area of transportation where the 
MCCE is the single source for sea and air transport.  That being said there are still considerable national 
forces that receive their logistic support through national means.  Therefore logistics can only be assessed 
as being integrated at a low level.  This category; Use and sustainment of military forces can be assessed 
as: Command and Control high 4, Communications high 4, Logistics low 2.  Overall this category is 
assessed as being at a medium level with an average score of 3.3. 
Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing. 
There are significant issues regarding burdensharing in Europe.  There are EU member States that provide 
quite a bit of military funding and capabilities and those who only provide a small amount.  Most defense 
spending is done by Member State governments for national forces.  In regards to equipping their forces 
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the spending is primarily for themselves (as indicated in the Material category above).  However, these 
forces are assigned or allocated on a rotating basis for both EU and NATO uses.  No state maintains 
separate units for each commitment but uses the same units to meet various commitments.   Therefore, a 
good deal of spending is on joint public goods in terms of defense capabilities not just on singular 
national purposes.  Even the Nuclear forces of France and the UK may be seen in the light of joint public 
goods when applied to their commitments in the EU.   The various EU agencies such as the EDA, 
Satellite center, Defense College, Military Staff etc… all are funded through the EU budget.  The budget 
for EU operations does in fact have its own source of funding which is the Athena financial process that 
allocates cost based on GDP to the participating states.  For example EUFOR Operation ALTHEA in 
Bosnia has annual common costs of 27 million Euros that is paid through the Athena process.   On the 
other hand majority of spending is done by member states, so although there is funding of key functions 
from a single multinational source this category can only be rated as being at a medium level of 
integration which is scored as a 3.   
 When all of the scores of the categories of the independent variable are taken together (Category 
1=1, Category 2=3, Category 3=2, Category 4=2, Category 5=3.3, Category 6=3) the result is an average 
score of  2.38 which indicates a low level of integration overall.   
 The continuation of integration in European defense appears to be on solid footing.  The greatly 
consolidated defense industry and common defense market indicates that the capacity to produce military 
capabilities is increasingly integrated.  The measurement of the independent variable demonstrates that 
some portion of the EU military is integrated at a low level.  This level of integration appears to be on the 
rise, especially if elements of the Lisbon Treaty such as ‘permanent structured cooperation’ and the SAFE 
concept begin to be adopted.  The EU is a functioning government composed of independent states that 
have voluntarily and formally merged portions of their sovereignty.  This merger (Maastricht Treaty) took 
place five years after the Hague Platform began the process of defense integration.  The final result then is 
that, according to the definition of this paper, the EU is an Amalgamated Security Community, albeit a 
partially integrated weak ASC which may suffer from the problems noted in chapter three.  
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6-1. Review   
 6-1a. Definitions and Delimitations.   
Amalgamated Security Communities (ASC) largely have been ignored by the academic 
community except as a side note when the origins of Pluralistic Security Communities are examined.  
This is because as Adler and Barnet noted in their seminal work on Security Communities, Deutsch’s 
conceptualization of security communities “scared off future applications” because of its “various 
theoretical, conceptual, and methodological problems” which, although addressed by their work on 
Pluralistic Security Communities, they clearly indicated that these problems for Amalgamated Security 
Communities were not addressed in their work.1149  Furthermore in Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area Deutsch found that Amalgamated Security Communities were more difficult to attain and 
preserve than Pluralistic Security Communities.  He also found that ASCs were much more prone to 
violent failure so that Pluralistic Security Communities provided a more promising approach to the 
elimination of war over large areas.1150  These problems identified by Deutsch, along with Adler and 
Barnet’s work focused on Pluralistic Security communities, have resulted in Amalgamated Security 
Communities being ignored.  This paper on the other hand is focused squarely on Amalgamated Security 
                                                 
1149 Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, 8, 30. 
1150 Deutsch, et al., eds., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 28-31. 
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Communities and accepts all of the work done by Adler and Barnet in Security Communities and believes 
that their work on Pluralistic Security Communities can be applied to ASCs except for one particular area.  
According to Adler and Barnet one of the indicators for tightly coupled Pluralistic Security Communities 
is: “A high level of military integration."1151  Substituting military cooperation in lieu of military 
integration in the description of tightly coupled security communities makes the description more precise 
and corresponds better with multiple actors in a pluralistic security community.  In making this change a 
differentiation can be made between tightly coupled security communities and Amalgamated Security 
Communities where ASCs are characterized by having some level of military integration.  The 
operational definition for Amalgamated Security Communities proposed by this paper is:  Amalgamated 
Security Communities are states (de facto or de jure) composed of two or more previously independent 
political entities that have integrated a portion of their respective militaries and that have voluntarily and 
formally merged so that they are subject to some form of common government.   
 Besides the proposed definition for Amalgamated Security Communities the scope of this study is 
restricted to looking only at ASCs.  The cases chosen were restricted to those in which the various 
previously independent political entities voluntarily and formally merged.  This excludes cases in which 
political entities were conquered or forcibly absorbed.  This restricts the potential number of possible 
cases; on the other hand there are a sufficient number of instances in different geographical areas, in 
different cultures, and in different time periods so that investigating Amalgamated Security Communities 
seems to be a worthwhile endeavor. Excluded from consideration were some cases included by Deutsch 
in his work as examples of Amalgamated Security Communities (e.g. the union between Sweden and 
Norway) because they did not meet the criteria under the definition for ASCs in this study of voluntary 
amalgamation with some form of military integration.    
6-1b. Theory   
As reviewed in Chapter 1, the official explanation for the creation of an EU Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI) as a European pillar of NATO is completely undermined by the evidence of diminishing defense 
                                                 
1151 Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, 56. 
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spending as would be expected by public goods theory in which free riding by EU states would increase 
as the result of the lack of a serious military threat.  Other major theories of integration (Federalism, 
Functionalism, Neo-functionalism, and Transactionalism) also fail to explain not only what is happening 
with the creation of the ESDI but also do not shed any light on the formation process of Amalgamated 
Security Communities.  Realism, Neo-Realism, and Neo Liberalism, other dominant theories in 
international relations are not able to address Security Communities or the process of Amalgamated 
Security Community formation. Realism and Neo-Realism cannot explain cooperation in a system of 
anarchy outside of Balance of Power Politics and Neo Liberalism can only go as far as describing 
collective security; not the process of amalgamation. Through the process of elimination of other theories 
of international relations and integration theories, Constructivism is left as the potential theoretical 
explanation for the creation of Security Communities and the process for the formation of Amalgamated 
Security Communities.  Adler and Barnett’s work approaches the topic from a constructivist perspective 
and this work seeks to build upon what they did.   
 Constructivism highlights the process of how ideas and identities are created, how they evolve 
and how they shape the way states and political entities understand and respond to their situations. The 
interests or policy choices of political entities and actors are not assumed to be identical but are 
constructed by the interplay of culture, norms and identities of each political entity and its relationship to 
other political entities. Constructivism stresses the importance of norms, identity, and culture in how 
policies of political entities are chosen.  Constructivism as an approach proposes that subjective ideas 
shared among actors determine the interests and identities of those actors.  This is because these shared 
ideas (e.g. what constitutes self and other) give meaning to material objects and forces.  Meaning or 
purpose is therefore constructed from the shared perceptions of identities and interests which are in turn 
ideationally based.  These identities and interests shape the behavior of actors, and this behavior either 
reinforces existing ideas about their identities and interests or gives new meaning to them.  This 
intersubjective knowledge is the basis for a structure constraining and shaping behavior through social 
interaction.  Through a socialization process actors ‘co-constitute and co-determine’ each other within this 
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structure.  So though the structure shapes the actors, the structure itself is also constructed and altered by 
the interaction of its constituent actors. This portrays actors as having identities and interests that are both 
historically path dependent, yet also highly changeable depending on the context and behavior of other 
actors.  An actor can change its identity and interests either in reaction to other actors, or as an act of will 
to change a structure that is disadvantageous.1152   
This study argues that it is the decision to become “brothers-in-arms” that is crucial to the 
development of an “us” vs. “others” identity.  It is military integration that creates and reinforces a new 
identity among and between amalgamated political entities rather than being a byproduct of an identity.  
This identity cannot fully develop without the assurance that the members of the security community are 
not only not a threat but are in fact fighting to defend the collective whole together as part of a force that 
is in some way integrated rather than each constituent providing military forces separately.  This 
connection between military integration and identity formation is a critical foundation of this study. 
 6-1c. Identity process and Military Integration 
What is the connection between military integration and identity formation?  The first and critical 
point is that this connection is focused on collective identities, not individual identities. The argument of 
this paper is based on the impact of integrating military organizations not on individual psychological 
identity mechanisms; although those do have some effect.  The focus of the argument is on the integration 
of organizations and structures that determines who is a soldier, for whom the soldier fights, and what 
agency equips, trains, and organizes those soldiers.  The process of the creation of Amalgamated Security 
Communities is through the integration of military structures which then has a subsequent impact on 
identity formation, 
This is similar to the argument made by Ronald Krebs that rejects the concept that national 
identity is an aggregation of individual identities and therefore the idea that individual psychological 
                                                 
1152  Refer to: AlexanderWendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 
23 (1998). 
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mechanisms are tied to the construction of national identity.1153 Krebs argues that since national identity is 
a collective identity resulting from a process of political contestation and negotiation that the military as 
an organization has a critical role.  The military as an organization can participate in the process of 
political contestation which shapes and reshapes imagined national identities.  Krebs does allow that 
military service has an impact on individual identities through socialization and contact, but his critique is 
that they have only a modest effect and are not sufficient to form a collective identity.   
 Second, militaries have particular functions that are related to the formation and reinforcement of 
collective identities.  One is the role they play as an institution in the community.  Military institutions are 
“formal bounded frameworks of rules, roles and identities.”1154  This includes but is not limited to aspects 
such as laws, regulations, standard operating procedures, professionalism, ritual, ceremony, and 
symbols.1155  This is a part of military culture that extends back to primitive warrior bands before recorded 
history that continues today.  They bind individuals within a military force to each other and are critical in 
developing unit cohesion and willingness to fight for each other.  They also have a wider application in 
the community they defend when the armed forces incorporate rituals, ceremonies and extensive 
symbolism designed not only to create, but also to affirm, a communal identity.  In terms of collective 
identity, rituals serve both an integrative function as well as to delineate distinctions.  Rituals do not 
however, have to be separate from common group practice on special occasions; they can function to 
affirm group identity when common practice is ritualized.1156 
Other functions that are related to the formation of a collective identity by military organizations 
and structures are illustrated in part by the concept of Military Legitimacy as outlined by James Gow, 
                                                 
1153 “Nations are collectives, and processes of "collectivization" (as opposed to aggregation) are necessarily political, 
as groups negotiate and continually renegotiate the boundaries of their community.” “First and foremost the product 
of intergroup contest, the nation does not spring whole from individual decisions with regard to affiliation. The 
internal structures of militaries can exert a profound impact on their surrounding society and politics and even on the 
definition of the national political community, but not through apolitical and individualist mechanisms such as 
formal socialization and informal collaboration and communication.” Ronald R. Krebs, “A School for the Nation? 
How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might.” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 120. 
1154  H. George Frederickson, and Smith Kevin, The Public Administration Theory Primer (Boulder, CO.: Westview 
Press, 2003), 72.  
1155  Ibid., 73. 
1156 Joseph C. Hermanowicz and Harriet P. Morgan, “Ritualizing the Routine: Collective Identity Affirmation,” 
Sociological Forum 14, no. 2 (1999): 197-214. 
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which has two parts; functional legitimacy and the sociopolitical base of military legitimacy. The 
sociopolitical base of legitimacy includes all the non-functional tasks given to the military and is divided 
into three categories; political activity; agency; and the nature of the relationship between the armed 
forces and society.   Political activity is not always present, particularly in liberal democracies, but 
authoritarian systems do have militaries that participate in the political process either as a ‘party in 
uniform’ or in the form of praetorian military intervention. Military agency is found in almost all political 
communities.  Collective and organizational aspects of military agency includes the military’s “role as a 
symbol of political unity; its contribution to the socioeconomic infrastructure of the state; and its 
operating as an instrument of education and socialization.”1157  Militaries may function as a symbol of 
national pride and unity through military tradition and previous actions and it can also be used as an 
‘emulative model’ to encourage sacrifice on the part of the population reinforcing national unity through 
the perception of shared hardships; the military then functions as both symbol and model.  A military’s 
contribution to the socioeconomic infrastructure of a state can be quite significant, especially in a 
developing country.  Military agency that influences individual identity includes its function as the 
‘school of the nation through military education and socialization. As indicated by the incorporation of 
Ronald Krebs critique, socialization and contact through military service has only a modest effect and is 
not sufficient to form a collective identity.  It must be included however, as a junior component of the 
process.    
 The most significant sociopolitical basis for Military Legitimacy according to Gow is the nature 
of the relationship between the armed forces and society.  The military must have an ‘identity with a 
society at large’ in such as way so that its organization and quality reflects the society.1158 The concept of 
                                                 
1157 Gow, Legitimacy and the Military; The Yugoslav Crisis, 28-29. 
1158 “Army personnel in an appropriate way must embody values widely held in sectors of the political community – 
and the armed forces’ composition must be generally representative of social and ethnic cleavages within society. 
The legitimacy of the armed forces is considered suspect if significant discrepancies exist.”  “Some nationalist 
content is inevitable where one military role is to be a national symbol, one of the ‘trappings of national 
sovereignty’. But this is not the limit of such a role.  The nationalist element is important in generating community 
support of the military. As stated already, the armed services’ legitimacy is dependent, to some considerable extent, 
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Military Legitimacy helps to illustrate why the process of military integration ties to the process of 
identity construction.  The sociopolitical base of military legitimacy and the nature of the relationship 
between the armed forces (as an entity) and society are the relevant points.  Consider the new integrating 
military force of an Amalgamated Security Community that is being formed.  Besides a direct political 
role, an integrating military could be conducting numerous functions of military agency simultaneously, 
playing a role as a symbol of political unity, engaged in building the socioeconomic infrastructure of the 
state, and at the same time performing activities directly related to education and socialization.  A new 
integrating military force of an Amalgamated Security Community will have a relationship with its 
society.  The nature of this relationship between the military and society involves the reflection of the 
society by the military in its organization and quality, and the identification of the population with the 
military.  The result is that the military’s identity as an entity reflects the society and the society’s identity 
(i.e. national unity) is impacted by the military.  This process then involves an intersubjective construction 
of identity between the military and its society and should be more salient during the process of creating a 
new Amalgamated Security Community than in an established society. 
Third, there is a distinct mechanism though which the military, as an organization, facilitates the 
creation of a new collective identity as a byproduct of the integration of the militaries and the capacity to 
produce military capabilities of previously separate political entities.  The process of military integration 
(in contrast with military cooperation) reduces the range of identity choices available to a population.  
Research regarding social identity and self-categorization theories found that when people identify with 
broader groups they deemphasize competition, conflict, and negative assessments among the members of 
subgroups nested within those broader groups, and that when people re-categorize others from being 
members of an out group to being members of a shared in-group, the same biases that increase the 
positive assessments of in-group members will be directed toward these new members of their in-group.  
In terms of policy, when a sub-group identity is salient, e.g., an individual state, the focus will be on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
on their congruence with the society that spawns them. Patriotism increases the identification of the population with 
the military.  Even within army ranks, it is the fountain-head of political loyalties in the junior cadre.” Ibid., 30-31. 
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consequences of a policy for that state, whereas if a superordinate identity is salient, e.g., the nation, then 
the focus will be on the consequences of a policy for the nation.1159  The relationship of this work to the 
process of military integration is that the process of integration eliminates the sub-group identity of local 
or sub-state military forces leaving only the superordinate identity of national military forces; i.e. the 
forces of the Amalgamated Security Community.  The structural choice of integrating military forces has 
an impact on potential identity formation by eliminating a previous identity carried by the former military 
organization and substituting a new identity associated with the new military organization.  This 
mechanism in turn reinforces the new collective identity in an Amalgamated Security Community.  
Therefore, as the number of common (integrated) military institutions increases the sense of “us” or a 
common bond of identity will increase.  This proposed process of identity development based on the 
integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability will, over time, produce 
an increased sense of identity in the context of state formation.  Military institutions, shared combat 
experiences, the perception of being “brothers in arms”, and above all integrated military structures over 
time will engender a sense of identity in contrast to “others” who are not part of the community.  In this 
manner military integration would lead to identity formation rather than identity producing military 
integration as previously considered by other scholars using a Constructivist approach.  It is also 
important to note that the military is seen by some scholars as a crucial component of national 
identity.”1160  It seems clear that how military capabilities are created and the structure of jurisdictions that 
have the capacity to create military capabilities has a direct impact on the identity of that force and the 
state or political entity.  
6-1d. Research Design. 
As explained in Chapter One, this study uses a Multiple Case Study design that examines the 
process of integrating military forces and capabilities to generate military power in the context of the 
                                                 
1159 John E. Transue, “Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American National 
Identity as a Uniting Force,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 78-91. 
1160 Melissa T. Brown, Designing GI Joe: Congress, the Military, and National Identity. (Prepared for delivery at the 
Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17-20, 2004). 
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formation of an Amalgamated Security Community.  This allows the logic of an experimental design to 
be followed and results can be generalized although the behavior of the subject cannot be manipulated or 
controlled.  The unit of analysis is the state, including possible states in the context of state formation. 
The proposition is that once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, especially the integration 
of the capacity to produce military capability, an Amalgamated Security Community (a state or state like 
entity) will form as a result, and that this process is the mirror image of state dissolution.  This proposition 
leads to a dichotomous dependent variable: state formation / state dissolution.  For Amalgamated Security 
Community formation the key act is security integration which is a tipping point, while for state 
dissolution the key act is security disintegration as sub-state elements establish independent military 
generation capability.  The independent variable is the degree of integration of military capabilities and 
the capacity to produce military capability.  The null hypothesis is that Amalgamated Security 
Community formation or dissolution can occur without integration of military capabilities or dissolution 
of military capabilities.   
With a multiple case study design each case can assume the role of an experiment as the different 
variations in the categories of the independent variable outlined below are examined to analyze the 
resulting change in the dependent variable.  The degree of integration of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability (independent variable) has been divided into a number of 
categories that will be used to compare cases.  As a review these are:  
- Category 1. Military forces; consisting of administrative staffs and operational forces.   
- Category 2. Arms production and Technology as a factor in arms production.  
- Category 3. Military technology as a factor in operational (combat) forces.   
- Category 4. Creation of combat power; Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, 
Materiel, and Soldiers. (DTLOMS)1161  
- Category 5. Use and sustainment of military forces; Command and Control (C2) communications, 
logistics.   
- Category 6. Budget issues regarding public goods and burdensharing.   
As explained in chapter one the cross case comparison views the degree of integration (high, medium, 
low or none scored as 4 through 0) between cases, not the technological, organizational, or fighting 
                                                 
1161  Lieutenant General Frederic J. Brown, U.S. Army, Retired, “Imperatives for Tomorrow,” Military Review 82, 
no. 5 (September-October 2002). 
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abilities of various militaries against each other across time periods.  In addition these are enduring 
categories that can examine the issue of integration regardless of the specific time period involved due to 
the particular nature of organizing men to fight. 
 6-2 Cross Case Analysis.  
The cases examined and examples presented in this study include; the creation of the Zulu 
kingdom, unification of the Mongols under Genghis Khan, creation of the German Empire, The Dutch 
Revolt, USA - American Revolution to Articles of Confederation (1775-1781), USA under the Articles of 
Confederation (1781- 1789), USA 1789 to the Civil War 1861, USA - Military Integration: 1862 to the 
National Defense Act of 1916, Switzerland, Kurds in Iraq, Hanseatic League, Zollverein Parliament, 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the European Union.  Some examples were not scored by the 
Independent Variable because they were either known to be completely integrated (USA –NDA 1916, 
Czechoslovakia) or not integrated (Hanseatic League, Zollverein Parliament) or insufficient information 
precluded assigning a score (Mongols), but they are included in the study as useful examples.  There are 
13 scored cases and seven that are not scored resulting in an N population size for this study of 20.  
Scores of the independent variable range from not integrated, with a score of 0.4, to highly integrated, 
with a score of 3.96, within a 5 point scale (0-4). The scored cases are shown together below to present a 
side by side comparison. 
Integration Scores of the Independent Variable by Case 
Case C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5 C-6 Average score 
Zulu  3  4  4  4  4  1 3.3  Medium to high 
N.G. Conf 3.9  4  4 3.9  4  4 3.96  High 
Baden  3  4  4 3.96  4  1 3.3  Medium to high 
Württemberg  1  4  4  3  4  0 2.6  Medium 
Bavaria  1  0  0  2  4  0 1.1  Very low  
Dutch  3  4  4  3.5  3  4 3.6  High 
USA Revolution 0.5  1  2  1 2.5  0 1.16 Very low 
USA Articles  0  0   2 0.5 0.5  0 0.5 Not integrated 
USA Constitution  1  1  2  0  2  3 1.5  Low 
Yugo 1945-1968  4  4 3.5  4  4  4 3.92  High 
Yugo 1969-1990  2  4 2.5  2 2.5  1 2.33 Medium 
Yugo 1990-1991  0  0 2.5  0  0  0 0.4 Not integrated 
EU  1  3  2  2 3.3  3 2.38 Low to Medium 
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6-2 a. Initial Observations. There are a number of observations that can be made based on what 
cases and examples were found that met the criteria to be considered Amalgamated Security 
Communities.  First, the scope of the phenomena of Amalgamated Security Communities covers a wide 
variety of circumstances.  ASCs are found in almost every geographic area. They occur in numerous 
different cultural settings.   ASCs are found during widely separated and different periods in history, and 
span widely different economic systems.  Second, Amalgamated Security Communities are found in both 
authoritarian and liberal democratic systems.  ASCs are not limited to a Western or Liberal Democratic 
context.  Therefore, as presented in this study, the phenomenon of Amalgamated Security Communities 
has wide application across the field of international relations, as well as political science in general.  This 
stands in contrast to the current conceptualization of other integration theories as well as Pluralistic 
Security Communities which seem to be limited to a modern Western liberal democratic context. 
There are several common themes that presented themselves as research into each case 
developed. Not all are present in every case.  However, these themes seem to offer an additional way to 
compare the various cases and therefore should be mentioned. One such theme is that military integration 
and amalgamation depended on the presence of a key person in several cases.  Another is that military / 
technical innovation played a role in several instances.  In several cases military integration was partially 
based on a restructuring of the social order in the political entity. The presence of an external existential 
threat appeared to be important in bringing communities together over a period of time to the point of 
military integration.  The political stability of the ASC was also a recurring issue, as Deutsch noted in his 
original work (political stability being potential division or fracture of the ASC; not issues of succession).  
These themes have the potential to lead down the path of trying to explain why a particular ASC formed.  
That is not the point for using them as this study is not concerned with why the decision to merge 
militaries is taken but rather to illustrate the process and the key role of military integration in the 
formation of an ASC.  Therefore these themes will simply be used to contrast the context of the various 
cases and illustrate the wide scope as well as some commonalities between ASCs.      
 
 425
6-2 b.  Strong Amalgamated Security Communities 
The cases and additional examples of strong Amalgamated Security Communities should provide clear 
evidence of how they are formed and the importance of the independent variable; the degree of 
integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability.  They should show that 
the key act is military integration and that it is a tipping point in the process.  If that is true then it 
demonstrates that there is a correlation between the proposed explanation and the actual process.  
The Zulu Kingdom was the first case.  It is a non-Western, non-democratic, case with primarily 
preindustrial technology, as well an economic system based on cattle.  Several of the themes noted above 
were present in this case.  The amalgamation process depended on a key individual; Shaka.  Shaka was 
responsible for military / technical innovations that made his military success possible. He restructured 
the social order of his society away from its basis on clans using an age based regimental system. He also 
changed the economic structure by his allocation of captured cattle.  There was also an external existential 
threat early in the amalgamation process; the Ndwandwe.  However, the key component of this case is the 
integration of the Zulu and Mthethwa. This merger of the Zulu and Mthethwa was preceded by military 
integration.  Shaka had first transformed every able bodied male Zulu into a warrior on the same basis as 
one of the warriors from Shaka’s Mthethwa Izi-cwe regiment.  The merger occurred after the death of 
Dingiswayo, Shaka’s mentor and Chief of the Mthethwa.  The Mthethwa military formations looked to 
Shaka for leadership and merged with his forces voluntarily prior to the merger of the tribes.  Following 
the defeat of the Ndwandwe, only three years after becoming chief of the Zulus and only a year after the 
death of Dingiswayo; 
“The clans began to identify themselves with the Zulus, even to refer to themselves as Zulus, and 
the clan basis of activity began to fade. The political voices of the future would speak not for two 
or three thousand clansmen, but for a nation of a quarter of a million”1162   
In the case of the Zulus, creation of a national identity was clearly based first on military integration. The 
independent variable in this case shows that Shaka’s reforms led to a significant level of military 
                                                 
1162 Morris, The Washing of the Spears, 64. 
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integration. This military integration is what led directly to the construction and spread of the Zulu 
identity.  
 The Mongols under Genghis Khan provides another example of a non-European, non-
democratic, aggressively expansionist entity formed by an initial voluntary amalgamation with interesting 
parallels to the Zulu case in the story of Genghis Khan’s rise to power and methods to reorganize society.  
Amalgamation depended on a key individual; Genghis Khan. Genghis Khan also faced an external 
existential threat early in the amalgamation process.  Like Shaka he developed elements of his 
government administration and was responsible for military innovation (the reorganization of the army) 
that made his military success possible. Genghis Khan referred to his people not by any ethnic or tribal 
name but as ‘the People of the Felt Walls’ constructing an identity for a group that came from different 
clans.1163 He reorganized Mongol society restructuring the social order and integrated the tribes through 
the organization of his army.      
“The entire Mongol tribe became integrated by means of the Army” “Temujin, however, not only 
utilized the system as a military tactic for war, but he also employed it as the permanent structure 
for the whole society.”1164 
The example of the Mongols reinforces the findings of the Zulu case; military integration can lead 
directly to the formation of a new identity as a result of the process of forming an ASC.  
German unification 
 
This case is set in a European context but includes several of the common themes noted previously, as 
well as being in an authoritarian system.  Although there was a key person in the process (Bismarck) 
amalgamation and military integration was not based on, or focused on, him personally as was the case 
with both Shaka and Genghis Khan.  There were other important actors (Kaiser, von Roon, von Moltke) 
involved in the process as well.  This case also includes significant military / technical innovation 
(telegraph, railroad, breach loading rifle, Prussian General Staff) that made the Prussian army very 
effective as well as providing methods to tie the Amalgamated Security Community together.  The 
                                                 
1163 Leo de Hartog. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World, 42-54.  See Also, Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the 
Making of the Modern World, 52-54.  See Also; Man, Genghis Khan: Life, Death, and Resurrection, 106. 
1164 Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World, 53.   
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opposition to unification under Prussian auspices was openly stated to be fear that the social order would 
be restructured to conform to the needs of the army or what was seen as Prussian militarism.  There was 
no constant or common external existential threat that forced the entities together.  In fact various South 
German states were quite friendly towards both Austria and France prior to unification.  This case 
provides examples of various levels of military integration among the constituent states of the empire 
which did seem to impact the degree to which political units were able maintain varying degrees of local 
jurisdiction, power, and ability to raise revenue within in the federal system.  Therefore the case of 
German unification crosses over somewhat into the partially Amalgamated Security Community category 
as well.  Another significant factor in this case was the failure of economic integration to lead to political 
integration.  The Zoll parliament which had some success in economic matters was used by the Southern 
German states to block anything of significance regarding greater unification.  In this case economic 
considerations and nationalist desires could not overcome political obstacles and local interests to form a 
German state.  The critical path to unification is found during 1866 to 1870 when the only tangible 
movement toward German unification was military cooperation and limited military integration based on 
the terms of the treaty ending the war and the offensive and defensive alliances that placed the armies of 
the South German States under the wartime command of the Prussian King. The effect of military 
integration overcame tremendous cultural and political obstacles to unification in the case of Germany.  
Unification was never a foregone conclusion. It was the opportune moment as all the “German” Armies 
fought against the French that provided the basis for a negotiated constitutional union.  The effect of 
military integration continued to build an overarching “German” identity after the end of the Franco-
Prussian war.1165 This case also clearly supports the proposition that military integration can lead to the 
formation of a new identity as a result of the process of forming an Amalgamated Security Community.  
Dutch Revolt to Independence 
The previous cases and examples take place in the context of the warrior culture of the Zulus and 
Mongols as well as the Prussian state; often seen as the archetype of a militarized society.  They also 
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occurred in a relatively short time frame. This case takes place in the context of a non-militarized entity 
that took quite a long time to coalesce.  It includes the factor of mercenary troops.  It also involves the 
creation of one of the first republican (but not very democratic) states in Europe that was non-
expansionist in its immediate region (Europe) fighting defensively to preserve its independence.  Several 
of the common themes are present. This case involves several key people; William of Orange, and his 
son, Maurice of Nassau, but also a key enemy (Philip II) whose decisions set conditions that allowed the 
Dutch to be successful.  Amalgamation and military integration in this case, like the German, was not 
based on, or focused on, the key people personally but also involved other actors.  This case involved 
military innovation when Maurice of Nassau reformed the army and truly integrated and standardized it.  
The presence of an external existential threat is very prominent in this case.  The governing capacity of 
the Dutch ASC was solid and survived the assassination of William of Orange.  The main challenge to 
political stability involved the generation of military capabilities by constituent provinces outside of the 
control of the Captain-General of the Army and the States General.  This significant challenge was based 
on the jurisdiction over who controlled the capacity to generate military capabilities.  Once the issue was 
decided it established the absolute right of the States General to create military capabilities.  This case 
involves an Entrepôt economy which differs from other cases.  Their diversified economy and 
predominant position in trade and finance along with sound credit was crucial to the United Provinces 
long term military success.  There was also an interesting parallel to the United States case in that the 
States General was responsible for some territories directly; the so called Generality lands which were 
outside the boundaries of any province.  The US case involved land administered by the federal 
government under the Northwest Ordinance; which essentially made it fiscally solvent.  In a reform 
similar to what was implemented by Shaka and Genghis Khan, Maurice of Nassau replaced command 
based on social relationships to one based on a system of standardized rules and universal discipline. 
Officer commissions depended on knowledge and competence.  This led to a restructuring of the social 
order based on the military in a long term sense by reducing the importance of social standing vice 
competence. This case also heavily involved naval warfare and all of the admiralties were integrated 
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federal organizations.  It would be a mistake however to conclude that unity or the formation of an 
Amalgamated Security Community was a forgone conclusion.  The provinces that united were a 
heterogeneous group of political entities with no previous “Dutch” identity.  The Union of Utrecht (the 
founding document) of the United Provinces established a temporary defensive alliance that developed 
into an ASC over time that created a “Dutch” identity when for a great majority of the time the only 
strong bond between them was a common military force and a common foe.1166  This case highlights the 
construction of identity through military integration. 
USA Military Integration, 1862 to the National Defense Act of 1916 
Although contained in a separate chapter than the other examples in this section, this segment of US 
history clearly belongs with the other strong ASCs.  This example is quite different from the previous 
examples.  It occurs in the context of an expansionist Western democratic republic with an industrial 
economy.  It does not include any key person, or military / technical innovation.  There is also no 
restructuring of the social order in the political entity based on the military.  There is no external 
existential threat in this case.  The political stability of the ASC is resolved by the Civil War and is not in 
question during this period.  Like the Dutch case the process of military integration leading that created a 
strong ASC takes place over an extended period of time.   
The process of military integration started with the limited conscription of the Civil War period 
but did not really get going until the late 1870s when the National Guard movement began to transform 
the state volunteer militia units.  The Spanish American War and the conflict in the Philippines showed a 
transition in the process of the generation of military capabilities when federal volunteer regiments were 
directly recruited, trained and organized by the federal government. These volunteer units set a precedent 
                                                 
1166 “The provinces that adhered to the Union of Utrecht, did not constitute any obvious natural unit.  The frontier 
between rebel and Spanish-occupied territory did not correspond originally to any national, religious, social, 
historical, or linguistic division. In and era when men thought that religious unity and political unity went hand in 
hand, the northern provinces contained at least as many Catholics as Protestants.  The Union itself was a military 
alliance of seven very different provinces with different interests and strongly separatist instincts.  It was essentially 
a defensive reaction against Spanish oppression, not the outcome of a positive Dutch national feeling which 
already existed.”  Haley, The Dutch in the Seventeenth Century, 12. 
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used to create national citizen soldier armies.1167  The Dick Act of 1903 repealed the Militia Act of 1792 
and mandated that the National Guard receive federal support. The National Guard was given equipment 
and modernized, officers attended Regular Army schools, joint maneuvers and training were held at 
federal expense including the National Guard soldier’s pay.  In exchange for federal support the National 
Guard was required to follow Regular Army standards for training, equipping, and organizing its units or 
lose federal funding. In 1908 the President got the power to call the National Guard directly into federal 
service without a time limit.  The National Defense Act of 1916 completed the process of military 
integration.  The act reaffirmed the obligation of universal military service as an obligation to the nation.  
The War Department determined the organization of the National Guard, imposed uniform enlistment 
contracts, set standards for officer’s commissions, and increased training requirements.  National Guard 
soldiers were required to take both state and federal oaths and could be drafted into federal service.1168  
This made the National Guard a partly federal and partly state force in peacetime but completely federal 
in time of war.  This federalization of the National Guard made it an extension of the Regular Army.  The 
National Defense Act of 1916 put an end to multiple jurisdictions having the capacity to produce military 
capability in the United States.  This created a strong Amalgamated Security Community.   
 This review of the process of the creation of this strong ASC (from a weak partially integrated 
ASC prior to the Civil War) shows that the process was based on bureaucratic contestation between the 
supporters of a central federal force and those who wished to retain the capacity to generate military 
capability at the state level.  In exchange for increased funding, equipment and training the supporters of 
the National Guard accepted conditions that stripped the National Guard of its autonomy as well as its 
local identity.  It is from this example that the shift in identity focus can be seen as previously local forces 
were made into state troops and then federalized National Guard units.  Mass conscription ensured that 
the military was seen to be a national force rather than a collection of various state and local units with 
local identities.  This example supports the proposition of the construction of identity through military 
                                                 
1167 Linn, The Philippine War: 1899-1902,125. 
1168 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 344-350. See Also; Lyons and Masland, “The Origins of the 
ROTC,”  1-12. 
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integration.   The process of military integration eliminated the local and state military forces as actors as 
well as sub-ordinate institutions leaving only the superordinate national military as a force for boosting 
national identity in a strong Amalgamated Security Community. 
The case of the “Richardson Light Guard” in Massachusetts demonstrated the effect of the 
integration process on identity.  As the unit progressed from being supported by the town to the state and 
finally the federal government, the identity functions shifted focus from the local and state to the national 
level.  This is an important example that highlights how an incremental process can integrate military 
structures by changing funding, equipment, training, organization etc… (categories of the independent 
variable in this study), apparently to make these forces more militarily effective. This method of turning 
local and state militias into a “National Guard” (even the name change implies a super-ordinate identity) 
may be a useful road map to integrate other partially integrated ASCs.  
6-2 c.  Partially Integrated Amalgamated Security Communities 
In “Political Community and the North Atlantic Area”, Deutsch found that Amalgamated 
Security Communities were significantly more prone to disintegration or failure than Pluralistic Security 
Communities, and that disintegration tended to be quite violent in a number of cases.  This resulted in 
Amalgamated Security Communities being ignored in favor of Pluralistic Security Communities as a 
potential mechanism to reduce the probability of interstate conflict.  This is unfortunate because it 
removed from consideration, and any possibility of understanding, why Amalgamated Security 
Communities would be prone to violent breakups.  Understanding why this happens could be quite 
valuable in informing both the academic community as well as policy makers so that measures could be 
taken to prevent such violence and bloodshed.   
Having more than one authority with jurisdiction over the creation of military capabilities and the 
capacity to produce military capability within an Amalgamated Security Community is what defines it as 
partially integrated.  A weak or partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community will therefore be 
at a fairly low level of military integration.  The cases and additional examples of weak or partially 
integrated Amalgamated Security Communities demonstrate the importance of the independent variable; 
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the degree of integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability.  They 
show that partial military integration has repercussions not only in regard to identity development but also 
to the political development of the ASC and its political stability.  If there are different outcomes for weak 
or partially integrated Amalgamated Security Communities than for strong ASCs, then that would 
validate the distinction made in the independent variable regarding the importance of the degree of 
integration.  It also shows that there is a correlation between the proposed explanation and the actual 
process.  
American Revolution to Articles of Confederation (1775-1781) 
Deutsch pointed to the USA as the prime example of an Amalgamated Security Community in “Political 
Community and the North Atlantic Area”.1169   On closer examination the USA was found to have passed 
through several different phases and that each should be its own case. In this case, the period from 1775-
1781 highlights several important points that reinforce the argument of this study.  On the other hand the 
themes mentioned previously only partially are seen in this case.  Of course George Washington was an 
important figure but integration was not based on him personally and there were numerous other actors in 
the process.   There was no military or technical innovation in this case nor was there a restructuring of 
the social order.  There was however an external existential threat to bind the constituent political entities 
of the colonies / states together.  The political stability in this case was very fragile with a real possibility 
of fracture.  
That brings up the very first point; in this case there was not an ASC that meets the definition 
proposed by this paper.1170  The states had not voluntarily submitted to some form of common 
government.  Congress did not function as a government during the American Revolution prior to the 
ratification of the Articles of Confederation.  It did not have any administrative capacity, coercive 
capacity, or legislative ability.  Although it appeared to accept the responsibility for “national” financial 
                                                 
1169 Deutsch, et al., eds., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 6. 
1170 Amalgamated Security Communities are states (de facto or de jure) composed of two or more previously 
independent political entities that have integrated a portion of their respective militaries and that have voluntarily 
and formally merged so that they are subject to some form of common government. 
 433
obligations, Congress could not tax, raise revenue from commercial sources, or set monetary policy to 
finance the war effort, but was kept afloat by loans from foreign governments.  There was no common 
government but rather an assembly of representatives of independent states that worked to coordinate 
their efforts against a common enemy.   
 The Second point in this case is that the colonies / states are the entities that had the jurisdiction 
and capacity to create military capabilities through the militia system. There was no real ability to create 
significant military capabilities outside of that system based on multiple jurisdictions.  The states created 
the forces for the Continental Army as well as forces for the parallel conflicts against Native American 
tribes and the loyalist/Tory forces. States refused to organize their units to match Continental Army 
standards. The colonies / states also provided their own naval forces. One clear identity issue was the 
refusal of units and soldiers from different colonies to serve together in the same unit except where 
another identity was salient such as frontiersman or German-American.  It was politically popular to 
credit the state militia forces with carrying the main burden of fighting the British and to denigrate the 
contributions of the Continental Army.  This view of the militia as the primary fighting force vs. a 
standing regular army was the critical debate as the USA developed into an ASC. 
The third key point is in this case is that there was some military integration in this case at a very 
low level.  Washington was able to integrate some elements of the Continental Army such as specialty 
units, support elements, equipment (French supplied), doctrine and training.  The military integration in 
this case was based on military necessity to fight the British.  This military integration was not based on a 
decision by the constituent states to integrate their military forces or their capacities to produce military 
capabilities.  Because it was not based on a political decision to integrate it could only have a limited 
effect and did not cause a tipping point to occur to form an ASC.   
 Articles of Confederation (1781- 1789) 
This is a continuation of the preceding case but it is distinct.  The common themes mentioned 
previously only apply to a small degree in this case.  George Washington plays an important role but it is 
in addition to numerous other actors in the process.   There was no military or technical innovation in this 
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case; no restructuring of the social order, and the external existential threat was basically eliminated.  On 
the other hand the political stability in this case was also very fragile with a real possibility of fracture. 
 The antipathy towards keeping a standing army was increased by the confluence of the three 
events; the Newburg Address, the Philadelphia mutiny and flight of Congress, and the Society of the 
Cincinnati. In June 1784 Congress dismissed all of the remaining troops from the Continental Army 
except for fifty-five caretakers at West Point and twenty-five at Fort Pitt.1171  At this point there was 
effectively no integrated military force whatsoever; all of the administration and field forces that had been 
constructed for the Continental Army during the war were gone.  This end to any military integration is 
reflected in the measurement of the independent variable which is an average score of 0.5 indicating an 
almost non-existent level of military integration in this case. In fact it is less than half the score of 1.16 for 
the very low level of military integration achieved out of military necessity in the previous case.  With no 
military integration this case cannot be considered as an ASC. 
The Treaty of Paris that ended the conflict recognizes a plurality of states not a single political 
entity called the United States.  The Articles of Confederation ratified in March of 1781 created a formal 
defensive alliance among the states. Congress was the only national level organ but it existed as an 
assembly of state representatives. It was not a government but the agent of the states.  However, a 
“national” domain was created by the Northwest Ordinance (similar to the Dutch Generality lands) and a 
limited “national” bureaucracy was developed that allowed the new government to begin to function in 
1789.  Again, with no government and an almost non-existent level of military integration this case does 
not meet the requirements to be an Amalgamated Security Community in this paper.  
 This case illustrates a key point regarding the differentiation made at the beginning of this 
chapter between tightly coupled pluralistic security communities and Amalgamated Security 
Communities.  It validates the distinction made between a high level of military integration and a high 
level of military cooperation.  Military cooperation is clearly not the same as military integration.  To 
create the conceptual space necessary for examining the process of creating Amalgamated Security 
                                                 
1171 Wright, The Continental Army, 182. 
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Communities this distinction must be see as real and having different outcomes.  This case illustrates this 
distinction. The decrease in military integration to an almost non-existent level in no way impacts the 
continued military cooperation required by the formal defensive alliance established under the Articles of 
Confederation.  This lack of military integration does not prevent the United States under the Articles of 
Confederation from continuing to evolve into a tightly coupled pluralistic security community.  There was 
a continued high level of military cooperation (e.g. the states provided the officers and units for the First 
American regiment) while military integration dropped sharply after the war.  Establishing government 
under the constitution with the ability to raise armies moved the United States from a tightly coupled 
pluralistic security community to a partially integrated Amalgamated Security community.  
USA as a Partially Integrated ASC; 1789 to the Civil War 1861. 
This case demonstrates the danger of political instability caused by the partial military integration 
of an ASC.  This case is a continuation of the previous two but the only recurring theme here is political 
instability (e.g. Nullification crisis, Hartford Convention).  This case is a clear example of a partially 
integrated Amalgamated Security Community in which the central government does not have the 
preponderance of capacity and authority to generate military capability. 
 Although the adoption of the US Constitution formed an ASC through the voluntarily 
amalgamation of the constituent states subject to a common federal government, there was only partial 
military integration.  Congress was able to collect taxes and borrow money necessary to raise and support 
navies and armies as well as establishing rules for regulating them.  However, the nationalists’ attempt to 
have a nationalized militia failed.  The result was that multiple land forces were institutionalized by the 
Constitution; the state militias and the federal army.1172   The Regular Army, while integrated and 
standardized, was only one of the military forces of the United States during this period and must be 
considered as a separate force that had to work with other forces generated by the states.  The capacity to 
produce military capability was retained in multiple locations subject to multiple jurisdictions.   
                                                 
1172  U.S. Constitution.  See also; Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United 
States of America, 93. 
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 This non-integration of the militia was a political choice by the constituent states. It was the 
ideology of the early republic that so feared standing armies and the possible tyranny of a powerful 
central government that resulted in the continued control of the states over their militia. Furthermore, this 
ideology inherently maintained that state control over the militia was considered essential in order to be 
able to oppose the central government.  The provision and maintenance of a tool whose purpose was 
justified politically as necessary to fight against the central government became a self fulfilling prophecy.  
This ability of each state to generate military capability gave it the means to back up its claim to 
sovereignty.  
 The danger posed by Amalgamated Security Communities that are only partially integrated 
militarily comes from there being only a partial trust between the constituent elements of an ASC.  The 
components of the community do not trust each other enough to become fully integrated and reserve to 
themselves the means to engage in civil war should the various components of the community enter into a 
vicious cycle of increased distrust.  Partial military integration reflects a stagnation of the virtuous cycle 
of trust between communities as they go through the process of forming an ASC. This has the potential 
for violent fracture because the constituent components retain the tool (military capability) to choose 
violence.  Furthermore, partial military integration stymies the formation of a new identity that surpasses 
the old identities.  Having multiple military forces allows for multiple identities; an identity at the federal 
level reinforced by the federal military, and a state identity reinforced by the state militia.  The division of 
families and brother fighting brother boil down to the availability of multiple choices of identity, and 
those choices were available directly because of the multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to produce 
military capability.   
 While the score of the independent variable is an average of 1.5 which indicates a low level of 
military integration this does not negate the fact that the U.S. was an Amalgamated Security Community 
by the operational definition of this paper.  Despite the low level of military integration overall, the naval 
force, coastal defense works, and the US Army were very much integrated and were supported by the 
central government for the benefit of all the component states. The key in this case is the part of the 
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operational definition that ASCs have integrated a portion of their respective militaries.  It is the multiple 
jurisdictions with the capacity to create military capabilities that made the U.S. a partially integrated 
Amalgamated Security Community in this case. 
Switzerland 
This is another example of a partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community that 
illustrates that the dangers outlined above exist in other cases under different conditions.  Its transition to 
a strong ASC also supports the proposition that strong ASCs are created by having complete military 
integration.  In addition it clearly supports the proposition that the military as an organization has a 
significant role in identity formation.  One feature of this example is that there are clear cultural, religious, 
and linguistic cleavages between the various Protestant, Catholic, German, French, and Italian Cantons. In 
addition several of the common themes are present in this example.  General Dufour was a key person in 
the resolution of the Civil War in such a manner as to make a quick reconciliation and preservation of the 
union possible.  There was a military technical innovation in the establishment of the initial ASC of Swiss 
Cantons as they used pike formations to defeat the Austrians.  There was also a long term external 
existential threat posed by the Hapsburgs.  As the military technical innovation of pike infantry made 
them famous as fighters there was some restructuring of the social order as the cantons hired their militia 
out to foreigners as mercenaries.  There was also a restructuring of the social order as Switzerland became 
“a nation in arms” after 1848.  The political stability of the Swiss Confederation as an ASC was fragile 
given the various religious and cultural cleavages that existed in the country. 
The key point of this example however, comes following the Napoleonic Conflicts when the 
Federal Pact of 1815 reinstated multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to create military capabilities in 
Switzerland; there was an on call federal force and multiple cantonal militias.  This permitted various 
cantons to choose to resort to force to resolve their differences with the other cantons and led directly to 
the Sonderbund War of 1847. The Constitution of 1848 changed the nature of the Swiss military 
organization.  It gave the federal government jurisdiction over all manpower and equipment.  It made the 
militia a federal force subject to federal organization, standards, training, legal regulations and dependent 
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on the federal government for its arms and ammunition.  The Swiss Constitution of 1848 eliminated the 
multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to create military capabilities in Switzerland.  This created a 
strong completely integrated ASC.   
There is also an item of identity development as well. The 1848 Constitution transformed the 
Swiss militia into a nation in arms because each soldier kept his equipment, clothing, and arms at home. 
Each man was required to attend shooting practice and keep his equipment in good order, as well as 
attend periodic training. The only exemptions from service were for physical disability or essential 
government work.  This made the Swiss Army very democratic in that all classes, professions, and 
occupations worked side by side in the Army.1173  Over time this had an integrative effect.1174  
Switzerland is a very heterogeneous polity with differences in religious affiliation, urban vs. rural 
tensions, it is multi-lingual and multi-cultural.  It also has a multiplicity of political parties.  On the other 
hand there is a strong Swiss identity.  The key common institution after 1848 was the Swiss Army.  That 
doesn’t mean that an identity did not exist prior to 1848.  On the other hand the cultural societies, 
shooting societies, and political movements fostered by the liberals and progressives consciously to 
promote Swiss national identity during the restoration period was not enough to prevent civil war.  The 
cantons maintained sufficient control of the jurisdiction and capacity to create military capabilities so that 
they could make the choice to pursue their perceived interests by force. In the end, obligatory universal 
service in the Swiss Federal Army provided a common democratic institution for integration and identity 
affirmation.  As noted by one Swiss official “Switzerland does not have an army. Switzerland IS an 
                                                 
1173 Text of the Swiss Constitution found in; McCrackan, The Rise of the Swiss Republic: A History, 364-394. See 
also; Grande, A Citizens' Army: the Swiss System, 27-30.  See also; Delmé-Radcliffe and Lewis,  A Territorial Army 
in Being: A Practical Study of the Swiss Militia, 23-28. 
1174 “In the nineteenth century, the army was a leader in the process of forming a national state and the centralization 
of state functions at the federal level.” Director, Swiss Federal Archives, Prof. Dr. Chr. Graf, and Chief of the 152 
EMA Army Archives, Col. Rudolf Jaun. “Introduction to Volume 1” Index of Sources on Swiss Military History 
Translated from French (p.16) and Italian (p.19) by this author.  Swiss Confederation, Federal Department of 
Defence Civil Protection and Sport; Index of Sources on Swiss Military History Volume 1: Military items of the 
cantonal archives. available from 
http://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/vbs/en/home/documentation/emb_katalog/chmilarchives.html Internet; accessed 
13 May 2010. 
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army.”1175  The impact of the Swiss military on identity formation is particularly impressive given the 
heterogeneous nature of the country which supports the idea that it must be a very powerful aspect in the 
formation of a national identity.   
Kurds in Iraq 1991 to 2010 
This is another example of a partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community that 
highlights the difficulty of military integration even within an ethnic group threatened by outside forces.  
It is a case of an ASC being formed within an ASC at a sub-state level that has claim to significant 
elements of sovereignty. It also demonstrates how critical the issue of constitutional structure regarding 
multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to produce military capabilities is for policy makers.  The 
common themes found in this case include the presence of an external (to the Iraqi Kurd community) 
existential threat as well as the political stability of both the Iraqi Federation ASC and the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) ASC. The key people in this case are the leaders of the main Kurdish 
political factions (the KDP and PUK) who agreed to merge their organizations under the KRG to form an 
ASC.  There is no military or technical innovation in this case and no restructuring of the social order.   
 The Kurds in Iraq provides a current example of what claims to be a federal system but includes 
multiple jurisdictions with the capacity to produce military capabilities.  In this instance the multiple 
jurisdictions are the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).  This example 
includes the Kurdish forces, the Peshmerga (those who face death) because they are sanctioned as 
‘Guards of the Region’ by the 2005 Iraqi Constitution maintained by a recognized regional government 
and are not an ‘unauthorized militia’.  During the process of drafting the constitution the Kurds were able 
legalize the Peshmerga while other structural factors ensured that their regional government would have 
significant autonomy to the point of being almost co-equal to the central government.  The KRG views 
                                                 
1175 McPhee, La Place de la Concorde Suisse, 53. 
Note: in 1989 a referendum to abolish the army got over a third of the vote. This led to a reduction in service 
obligation in a reorganization called ‘Army 95’ and eventually to a drastic overhaul called Army XXI in 2004 that 
reduced the number liable for continued service almost in half.  Switzerland is no longer a nation in arms and the 
reorganization also eliminated the organizational structures linked to the cantons.   
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itself as having voluntarily joined the Iraqi state.  It also voluntarily had some of its Peshmerga forces join 
with the Iraqi Army.  Because of this the Iraqi state can be seen as a partially integrated ASC. 
Protected by the Peshmerga who manned the ‘green line’ (an internal border dividing the KRG 
controlled area from the rest of Iraq) the Kurdish region became peaceful and prosperous (as well as a de 
facto sovereign entity).  It was in 2006 following the decision to merge the separate KDP and PUK 
administrations into one regional government (located in Arbil) that the KRG truly became an ASC.  This 
is because the power sharing agreement included the creation of a Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (i.e. 
Ministry of Defense).  In November of 2009 the integration of Peshmerga forces into one unified army 
under the control of KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs was announced.  The issue of control over Kurd 
populated areas in the provinces of Tamim, Diyala and Nineveh in 2008 – 2009 nearly led to armed 
clashes between the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga.   Only U.S. mediation diffused the tensions which 
resulted in three party joint patrols of U.S. Army troops, Peshmerga, and Iraqi Army units in the disputed 
areas which continued as of May 2010.  This is an indication that the partially integrated Amalgamated 
Security Community between the KDP and PUK seems to be getting stronger while the partially 
integrated Amalgamated Security Community between the KRG and the central government in Iraq 
remains weak.  In this example the end result is not clear but the inherent dangers of multiple jurisdictions 
with the capacity to generate military capabilities would seem to be abundantly clear.   
This example also highlights the importance of the decision to integrate military forces.  There 
were two decisions. One was to integrate the Peshmerga forces completely into one army under the KRG 
MoD.  The result seems to be the strengthening of the Kurd ASC.  The other decision was to integrate a 
portion of the Peshmerga forces under the control of the Iraqi Army.  This decision seems to have created 
a weak partially integrated ASC composed of the KRG and the Iraqi Federal government.  Again this 
example highlights the importance of the independent variable, the degree of military integration, in the 
process of forming an ASC.  
Identity issues in this case are quite salient between Kurd, Arab (Sunni / Shia), Turcoman, and 
other groups and may lead to the fracture of the Iraqi state.  These issues are complex and would require 
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an extensive discussion.  For the purpose of this paper the Kurd ASC seems to have overcome political 
divisions between KDP and PUK factions to the point that loyalty is now significantly focused on the 
Kurdish Regional Government.    
The EU 
This case was the reason for this entire study as the puzzle of EU military integration led to an 
investigation of the process of Amalgamated Security Community formation.  It provided the basis for the 
examination of integration theory and an understanding of amalgamation under a supranational 
government.  This case is interesting in regard to the themes mentioned throughout the other cases.  In the 
EU case there is no key person, no military or technical innovation, no restructuring of the social order, 
and no political instability of the ASC.  The external existential threat was gone by the time that the 
governments voluntarily joined with each other under the Maastricht Treaty.  So in this case none of the 
other themes are present.    
In this case there is a lengthy history of overall European integration post World War II, most 
obviously in the economic arena, but which also extends to “forming an ever closer union.”  There is a 
lengthy history of attempts to integrate European defense, but the real beginning of European Defense 
integration was the WEU Hague Platform of October 1987. The continuation of integration in European 
defense under the EU appears to be on solid footing.  The fact that there is a greatly consolidated defense 
industry and common defense market indicates that the capacity to produce military capabilities is 
increasingly integrated.   
The independent variable in this case has an average score of 2.38 which indicates a low level of 
integration.  If the methodology of this study is accepted, then this demonstrates that there is a portion of 
the EU military that is integrated at a low level.  This level of integration also appears to be on the rise, 
especially if elements of the Lisbon Treaty such as ‘permanent structured cooperation’ and the SAFE 
concept proposed by the EU Parliament begin to be adopted.  This case also shows that the EU is a 
functioning government composed of independent states that have voluntarily and formally merged 
portions of their sovereignty.  This merger (Maastricht Treaty) took place five years after the Hague 
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Platform began the process of defense integration.  The final result then is that, according to the definition 
of this paper, the EU is an Amalgamated Security Community, albeit a partially integrated weak ASC 
which may suffer from problems of political stability (as have the other cases of partially integrated 
ASCs) although to date that has not happened.  This may be the result of the ASC being composed of 
liberal Western Democracies but that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6-2 d.  Amalgamated Security Community Failures 
Amalgamated Security Communities fail in two ways; either they fail to form (potential ASCs 
that do not coalesce) or they disintegrate and fracture.   It is important to investigate failure to form in 
order to isolate the independent variable (degree of military integration) from other potential alternative 
explanations for the integration of ASCs.  These include integration based on economic or political 
factors that would occur without military integration and should enable the rejection of potential 
alternative explanations such as Federalism, Functionalism, Transactionalism, and Neo-functionalism. 
These are examples where voluntary integration occurred in one area but the integration process was 
stymied by a lack of military integration.  The danger to be avoided here is to prevent the argument 
presented in this paper from becoming simply a definitional argument; i.e. because Amalgamated 
Security Communities require some degree of military integration, a lack of military integration indicates 
there is no ASC.   To preclude this, it is important to look at examples where there was the potential to 
form an ASC initially through mechanisms such as economics and politics rather than military integration 
and where military integration could have been the result rather than the cause of ASC formation. 
The second type of failure is the disintegration of Amalgamated Security Communities.  Previous 
cases demonstrate how Amalgamated Security Communities are formed by the integration of military 
capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability, as well as the instability and danger stemming 
from partial integration, in which multiple jurisdictions retain the capacity to produce military capability.   
For ASC dissolution the key act is security dis-integration as sub-state elements establish 
independent military generation capability (the decision to dis-integrate would be the tipping point).  The 
examination of this problem is important because it should demonstrate the mirror image of the formation 
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of ASCs as they break up through the dissolution of integrated military capabilities and the capacity to 
produce military capability.  This would demonstrate that the independent variable has validity not only in 
terms of the virtuous cycle of identity formation as an ASC coalesces but also in the vicious cycle of 
creating divisions and differentiating between what constitutes us and other as former ‘brothers-in-arms’ 
become separated from each other.   
The Hanseatic League 
This case is very important to this study because it is a clear example of a potential ASC that did 
not form, and it did not form directly because of a failure to integrate militarily. This case takes place over 
an extended period of time.  There are no key people and no military technical innovation.  There was no 
restructuring of the social order but there were several external existential threats over the centuries; the 
most important being Denmark.  Political stability was uncertain during the entire life of the Hanseatic 
League.    
 The Hanseatic League absolutely had the potential to become an ASC.  First, various scholars 
prefer to call it a community rather than a League, and it absolutely was a security community that fought 
wars not only to advance its commercial interests but also in defense of the members of the community.  
Second, there was an identifiable minimal common identity partly based on citizenship requirements as 
well as North German language and culture.  Third, objections to the possibility that the Hanseatic League 
could have formed an Amalgamated Security Community might include the lack of sovereignty of the 
member “city-states” who owed allegiance to multiple territorial princes and that the Hanseatic League 
was too dispersed and non-contiguous.  The answers to these objections is that other contemporary 
communities of the Dutch and Swiss, that were composed of entities that owed allegiance to different 
sovereigns, managed to form their Amalgamated Security Communities, and that the Baltic and the rivers 
tied the Hanseatic League together more tightly than most contemporary contiguous land based states in 
an era when waterways were the most rapid and efficient method of moving not only goods but moving 
and sustaining military forces as well.  Fourth, although it had a minimal organization it did function as a 
government; regulating commerce, negotiating treaties, imposing sanctions etc…  Scholars have called it 
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a ‘singular institution of the middle ages’, a ‘community of interests’, and an ‘organization that resembled 
a federation but lacked the legal elements of a federation’.   
 A more fitting potential explanation is that the Hanseatic League was a Pluralistic Security 
Community.  The history of the Hanseatic League clearly demonstrates its evolution from a “nascent 
community” through an “ascendant” to a “mature” pluralistic security community.   There were some 
elements that mark a tightly coupled pluralistic security community in the history of the Hanseatic 
League.  There is obvious evidence of cooperative and collective security in the various conflicts it fought 
against external threats. There was clearly policy coordination against “internal” threats.  The free 
movement of people and goods was one of the founding principles of the Hanseatic League.  The 
Hanseatic League however, does not quite meet the criteria to be a tightly coupled pluralistic security 
community.1176  The key weakness of the Hansa as a mature pluralistic security community was the 
failure to identify common threats and take common action in more than a few cases, because it lacked a 
high level of military cooperation; a key requirement to be a tightly coupled pluralistic security 
community.  The lack of solidarity in foreign policy and military affairs, and pursuit of individual rather 
than collective interest in terms of threats and willingness to sacrifice militarily or financially within the 
collective security framework of the Hanseatic League, is recounted time and again as the chief weakness 
and sign of divisiveness within the league by numerous scholars.  The low level of military cooperation 
was the major impediment to Hanseatic League integration and did nothing to build trust or a common 
identity; rather it did the opposite and is noted as being part of the reason the Hanseatic League failed to 
remain united by many authors.   
The Hanseatic League failed to transition from a Pluralistic Security Community to form an 
Amalgamated Security Community (as happened in the US case) primarily because the Hansa failed to 
participate in any minimal partial integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military 
capability.  Although it fought multiple conflicts and defeated Denmark decisively, and had the potential 
to form an ASC, it was the lack of military integration that relegated it to eventual dissolution.     
                                                 
1176 Adler and Bamett, eds.,  Security Communities, 50-57. 
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Zollverein Parliament 
Another example that demonstrates economic integration does not lead to any type of military 
integration or to the formation of an Amalgamated Security Community is the Zollverein Parliament.  
This case had the potential to form an ASC because it did form one; but not as the result of economic 
integration.  This example is important because it was created by Bismarck immediately after the Austro-
Prussian War with the express purpose of fostering German unification through the North German 
Confederation under the guidance of Prussia.  Bismarck believed that a Zoll Parliament, including 
representatives from both northern and southern Germany, elected by universal male suffrage, would 
create a community of interest that would remove prejudices against closer political union.  Bismarck 
based this belief on the fact that chambers of commerce, trade associations, merchants, and industrialists 
all favored greater political unification in Germany as being economically attractive (much the same way 
as standardization of regulations and transaction costs in the EU help foster commerce).  This logic would 
seem to reflect most of the proposed mechanisms in various integration theories (Functionalism, 
Neo-functionalism, and Transactionalism).  The reality was that the South German States blocked 
anything of significance regarding greater unification in the Zollverein Parliament and in several 
instances dealt a crushing defeat to the German nationalists. It is clear in this example that economic 
considerations and nationalist desires could not overcome political obstacles and local interests to form a 
German state. 
 Other cases of failed potential Amalgamated Security Communities 
In the process of looking for failures of potential Amalgamated Security Communities to form it has 
become evident that there is a lack of empirical evidence (other cases) for any Amalgamated Security 
Community to have formed through a different mechanism (economic or functional or political 
integration) that then resulted in political integration which caused subsequent military integration.  All 
the other cases of ASC formation in this study demonstrate a cause and effect relationship in the 
formation process where military integration precedes or is at least simultaneous with the formation of a 
common government.  This is the beginning of the virtuous cycle of consolidation and identity 
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construction.  These two cases of a potential ASC formation show that economic integration does not 
have the same effect. What history demonstrates empirically is that other forms of integration without 
military integration fail to create ASCs.  Amalgamated Security Communities empirically are the result of 
military integration not the cause of military integration.  The logic of other integration theories does not 
lead to the formation of an Amalgamated Security Community.   
Yugoslavia 
Deutsch found that ASCs were particularly prone to disintegrate and fracture often quite 
violently.  The US case under the Constitution up to the Civil War and the Swiss case both resulted in a 
strong ASCs rising from the ashes of conflict.  More importantly the US Civil War and the Swiss Civil 
War provide two additional examples of Amalgamated Security Community failures based on the key 
factor of security disintegration as sub-state elements mobilized an independent capacity to generate 
military capability.  What the Yugoslav case shows is the complete failure of an ASC.  It is a key example 
of an Amalgamated Security Community failure because as an integrated ASC it devolved into a partially 
integrated ASC and then completely disintegrated.  It is also a critical case because there are several 
competing theories of why the state disintegrated.  The alternative explanation for the failure of the 
Amalgamated Security Community that was Yugoslavia proposed by this study was examined and the 
critical fact is that military disintegration preceded the breakup and caused the vicious cycle resulting in 
the failure of Yugoslavia.  This makes this case a powerful example of the mirror image of ASC 
formation; state disintegration.  This reinforces the validity of the independent variable as a critical 
measure.   
 There are several of the common themes noted previously at work in this case.  There was a key 
person, Tito, who was quite important to the formation of the state and its governance.  There was some 
military technical innovation in the wide spread use of partisans a main pillar of defense.  There was an 
external existential threat for most of the Cold War; the USSR.   There was a restructuring of the social 
order in the political entity during the formation of the Yugoslav ASC.  The political stability of the ASC 
became increasingly volatile after 1968 and the devolution into a partially integrated ASC. 
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 In 1968 regionally organized Territorial Defense units (militia forces) were created and were co-
equal to the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA).  This resulted in a partial military integration and 
subsequently in the formation of military and security forces answerable only to the governments in 
Slovenia and Croatia.  These forces then presented the opportunity for Slovenia and Croatia to assert 
independence in the face of the probable use of armed force by the federal armed forces to preserve the 
integrity of Yugoslavia.  This case is instructive in several ways; there was a Yugoslav identity as well as 
other strong historic sub-ordinate identities, the YPA saw itself and was viewed as an integrative 
‘Yugoslav’ institution, the YPA was willing to use force to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia but was 
constrained by constitutional limits, the YPA recognized the danger inherent in the creation of security 
forces outside its control responsible only to the constituent republics but was unable to prevent their 
formation, and the leaders of the constituent republics clearly recognized the ramifications of the creation 
of their own security forces.   
Scores for the independent variable clearly demonstrate a progression of disintegration in the 
Yugoslav ASC over time.  The independent variable for the period 1945-1968 has an average score of 
3.92 which indicates a high level of military integration during this period.  For the period 1969-1990 the 
result is an average score of 2.33 which indicates a low to medium level of military integration.  For the 
period 1990-1991 the result is an average score of 0.4 which indicates an almost complete lack of any 
military integration which is not surprising since the intent of the various constituent political entities was 
to establish their own separate military forces.   
 Another key issue highlighted in this case is that the entire process through which Yugoslavia 
disintegrated is marked by issues related to the structure of the military, its role in society and politics, 
and its role in identity formation.  Starting with the creation of the TDF in 1969, the structure of the 
military changed from a unified integrated institution founded on ‘Yugoslavism’ and ‘Brotherhood and 
Unity’ that adopted policies to foster a Yugoslav identity, to one in which multiple jurisdictions had the 
capacity to generate military capability.  Furthermore, the failure of the YPA to live up to its vision of 
itself as a pan-Yugoslav institution due to the overrepresentation of Serbs and the creation of a 
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‘Serboslav’ culture within the YPA led to a loss of military legitimacy and the rejection of the YPA by 
other ethnic nationalities as ‘their’ military; the sociopolitical bond between various segments of the 
population and the military was broken. The rejection of the YPA engulfed the entire Slovene population 
during the trial of the Ljubljana four. Finally the alignment of the YPA with the Serb government assured 
that other ethnic groups would consider the YPA to not only be dominated by Serbs but to be a willing 
instrument used to protect Serb interests.  The result was that new non-communist governments in 
Slovenia and Croatia determined to build their own armed forces to protect their interests. The ASC 
finally came apart completely when the YPA failed operationally to forcefully keep Slovenia in 
Yugoslavia.  The vicious cycle that marked the disintegration of the ASC is directly related to the creation 
of sub-state militaries as the prime cause of what destroyed Yugoslavia.  It also shows a clear relationship 
between the military and identity formation of who is “us” vs. “other”.  This case supports the proposal 
that the key act in state dissolution is security disintegration as sub-state elements establish the 
independent capacity to generate military capability.  
 Czechoslovakia 
The case of Yugoslavia has demonstrated that dis-integration of a previously integrated military 
led to the violent failure of that ASC, and provides a better description of why that ASC failed than 
previous explanations.  The Czechoslovakian case is critical because all of the literature on the subject 
proposes that the breakup was caused either by structural weakness of the federation, structural 
decentralization, economic disparities, regional political parties that mobilized ethnic nationalism, and the 
actions of particular élites and leaders that caused the “Velvet Divorce.”  There is no disagreement that in 
the end it was a negotiated and reasonably smooth separation.  There is also no hint in the academic 
literature of any involvement by the military or threat of force involved with this ASC dissolution. On the 
other hand the academic community has a significant problem explaining the breakup.  A significant 
majority of Czechs and Slovaks opposed the breakup of the federation and claimed to have had good 
relations with the other community. Most supported a referendum on continuing the federation while the 
politicians opposed it fearing that the people would not agree to the dissolution of the federation. Large 
 449
majorities in both republics believed that dissolving the federation would have a negative economic 
effect.  The structure of the government would have seemed to meet the requirements for a consociational 
political system that protected minorities and enabled sufficient autonomy so that a negotiated settlement 
should have been the result.  The academic response to the peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia was to 
propose various explanations; most of them contradictory, and none of them completely satisfactory.  The 
breakup took place within a very short time, during a transition period of uncertainty, while institutions, 
parties, political leadership and political issues were in a state of flux. 
At the time of the Velvet Revolution in December 1989 The Czecho-Slovak ASC had a federal 
government but in the aftermath of the end of the communist regime the authorities and jurisdictions of 
the various elements of the federation were in the process of being negotiated.  The Slovaks consistently 
wanted visibility and greater autonomy but did not push for the destruction of the federation.  One source 
of friction was the distribution of the majority of the arms production industry in Slovakia which caused 
the Slovak government to obstruct federal policies meant to end arms exports and conversion of those 
facilities to civilian production.  This resulted in at least a partial dis-integration of two categories of the 
independent variable of this study (Category 2 and Category 4).   
 The Czechoslovakian Military completely lacked any Military Legitimacy. It was seen as an 
extension of the politically repressive Husak regime and closely linked to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
forces that invaded the country in 1968.  It had no legacy of military operations, no credibility as a 
fighting force and therefore no functional military legitimacy.  The Czechoslovak military had no 
sociopolitical base of legitimacy either.  It was not seen to engage in political activity, nor engage 
successfully in any aspect of military agency, and it had a hostile relationship with its society.  Because of 
this lack of Military Legitimacy the Czechoslovakian Military could not function to either develop or 
reinforce a super-ordinate identity in the Czecho-Slovak ASC.  Not having a military that could perform 
these functions at a minimum weakened the potential bonds between the two communities leaving the 
ASC vulnerable to fracture. 
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 The Czechoslovakian Military was also suffering from organizational stress and turmoil resulting 
from efforts aimed at restructuring, reorganizing, and redeploying the force.  Because of this the military 
was in no position to attempt to affect the outcome of the political ‘divorce’ proceedings in contrast to the 
Yugoslavia case.  Furthermore, the level of military integration was being impacted by various policies. If 
the measures of the independent variable are looked at in light of this evidence there was at least some 
dis-integration taking place in most of them. Only Category 3, military technology and Category 6 
remained integrated. 
 A further problem was that the policies enacted to restructure, reorganize, and redeploy the force 
(Plan 2005 and Defense Law) were serving to ethnically segregate the army on a territorial basis.1177  
Conscripts were to be allowed to serve close to their home area by 1993.  The impact is that as the forces 
were being redeployed the mostly conscript force would result in ethnic Slovak units stationed in 
Slovakia and ethnic Czech units stationed in the Czech Lands.1178   
 The real pivotal point in the process came about because of the policies advocated by the 
Association of Slovak Soldiers (ASV). The ASV supported the creation of a Home Guard separate from 
the federal military under the jurisdiction of the Slovak government.  President Havel and the federal 
Defense Minister spoke out against a Home Guard and in favor of a united federal military.  Slovak 
government officials however, including Meciar, Carnogursky, and the Minister of the Interior continued 
to support the concept. 1179  Slovakian governmental officials openly advocating and then demanding a 
separate independent military force was the critical political decision and it had an immediate and 
destructive impact on the bonds of trust between the two communities.1180 The breakup of Czechoslovakia 
                                                 
1177 LTC Thomas, “Armed Forces and the Nation: Searching for Trust in Czechoslovakia,” 52 (underline by this 
author).  See Also; Szayna, The Military in a Postcommunist Czechoslovakia, 62-63. 
1178 Szayna, The Military in a Postcommunist Czechoslovakia, 54. 
1179 “The calls for the formation of a Slovak Home Guard have a clear secessionist goal.  The Home Guard would be 
a purely Slovak military force already in place if and when Slovakia were to proclaim independence. This seems to 
be a clear attempt to apply the Slovenian example to Slovakia. … Thus, calls for the formation of a Slovak Home 
Guard amounted to the establishment of a nucleus of a Slovak military – a development that moved Slovakia further 
along on the path to secession.” Ibid., 76. 
1180 “Negotiations between the leaders of the two major parties, Klaus and Meciar, quickly broke down. The issues 
were predictable; Meciar introduced a proposal for a loose confederation that would permit Slovakia to issue its own 
currency, carry out its own economic reforms, and maintain an independent military. Klaus rejected the idea. 
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did not require the actual formation of an independent Slovak military, although policy trends would 
likely have resulted in that outcome.  This study argues that the key to creation of an Amalgamated 
Security Community is the decision to integrate military forces and the capacity to create military 
capabilities.  It was the decision to dis-integrate military forces by the Slovaks, the advocacy for a Home 
Guard or an independent army that broke up the Czecho-Slovak ASC.  In effect the Slovaks declared that 
they no longer wished to be brothers-in-arms with the Czechs.  The Czechs for their part could no longer 
trust the Slovaks as partners in an ASC after the Slovaks openly announced they wanted a separate 
military.  The Czechs clearly saw the Slovak demands as breaking trust and ending the ASC.  On the 
basis of the results of this case the null hypothesis in this study can be completely rejected.   
6-3. Results of the study  
The contribution and purpose of this study was to propose a process for the creation of 
Amalgamated Security Communities; a topic that has received very little attention. It is an attempt to 
provide a more precise illumination of the specified phenomena of military integration in the context of 
state formation and does not attempt to reject or replace other theories relating to the formation of 
alliances, collective security organizations, or cooperative regimes leading to integration in economic or 
other policy arenas.  The argument is that once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, 
especially the integration of the capacity to produce military capability, an Amalgamated Security 
Community (i.e. a state or state like entity) will form as a result.  A crucial caveat is that the degree of 
integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability has a direct and serious 
impact on the internal coherence, war fighting ability, and survival of the resulting state or state like 
entity.1181  In this schema the administration and bureaucracy (or organization) associated with defense 
activities are critical to preparation for war and the founding of an Amalgamated Security Community.  
The integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability is the elemental 
                                                                                                                                                             
This disagreement led to a rapid disintegration of authority at the center, and the dissolution of the federation 
seemed to have become a foregone conclusion overnight.” Cox and Frankland, "The Federal State and the Breakup 
of Czechoslovakia: An Institutional Analysis," 71 (underline, bold, by this author). 
1181  Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics, 5-22. 
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step in the creation of a state.  This is a variation of Charles Tilly’s argument that “war made the state; 
and the state made war,”1182 in that preparation for war makes the state.  In the case of defense integration 
the tipping point or crucial act is the decision to integrate military forces and capabilities to generate 
military power.  It is vital to understand that this is an integration of organizations and structures that 
determines who is a soldier, for whom the soldier fights, and what agency equips and organizes those 
soldiers. Moreover, as the number of integrated military institutions increases in an Amalgamated 
Security Community the sense of “us” or a common bond of identity will increase.  This process of 
proposed identity development is that integration of military capabilities and the capacity to produce 
military capability will, over time, produce an increased sense of identity in the context of state formation.  
Military institutions, shared combat experiences, the perception of being “brothers-in-arms”, and above 
all integrated military structures will, over time, engender a sense of identity in contrast to “others” who 
are not part of the community.  In this manner military integration would lead to identity formation rather 
than identity causing military integration. How the military is created and the structure of jurisdictions for 
the capacity to create military capabilities has a direct impact on the identity of that force and the nation.   
 This study set out to examine the phenomena of Amalgamated Security Communities, 
particularly the process of their formation and how that correlates to military integration and identity 
formation.   Besides finding that this phenomenon of ASC formation has a wide scope historically, 
geographically, economically, culturally, and politically, there are clearly a wide range of possible 
circumstances that can lead to the formation of Amalgamated Security Communities.  As noted in the 
examination of cases, formation of an ASC can occur based on a single key person, involve military / 
technical innovation, include a restructuring of the social order, or involve an external existential threat.  
An ASC can also form without any of these, and a strong ASC can be the result of bureaucratic 
contestation.  This wide range of circumstances surrounding ASC formation is interesting because it 
indicates that there is no single path that leads to ASC formation.  The only absolutely common factor 
among the various cases, however, is that for an ASC to form there must be at least some sort of military 
                                                 
1182  Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 42. 
 453
integration.  Also in the cases examined the decision to merge military capabilities and / or the capacity to 
produce military capabilities occurs prior to, or simultaneously with, political amalgamation.  
Furthermore, this result is not based simply on the definition of an Amalgamated Security Community 
which requires some form of military integration, but on the basis that potential ASCs did not form 
despite integration in other areas when there was no military integration.  This result allows this study to 
completely reject the part of the null hypothesis that Amalgamated Security Community formation can 
occur without the integration of military capabilities.   
The second result is that the examples of ASC dissolution (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, US Civil 
War, and Swiss Civil War) allow this study to also completely reject the part of the null hypothesis that 
Amalgamated Security Community dissolution can occur without the dissolution of military capabilities.  
Yugoslavia is a key case because the disintegration of the ASC is shown to be directly related to the 
formation of sub-state military capabilities which would seem to displace the various competing theories 
of why that ASC disintegrated.  The Czechoslovakian case is the critical case because even in a situation 
where there was no apparent military connection to the failure of the ASC by dissolution noted in the 
academic literature, the details of this case demonstrate that the degree of military integration was in play 
and that the decision to demand a separate independent military force broke up the Czecho-Slovak ASC.  
This case also highlights the importance of the act of decision to dis-integrate the military of an ASC.  An 
ASC built on the trust of two communities deciding to become brothers-in-arms is just as quickly torn 
apart when that bond of trust is broken by the decision by one or more constituent communities to create 
their own separate military force and capability to produce military capabilities. Until now, there has not 
been an investigation that approaches the structure of the military as an organization as being a potential 
cause of the breakup.  Only in journals related to military or civil-military affairs is there an indication 
that this is a possibility.  The Czechoslovakian case highlights that this approach is a useful tool even in 
cases where the military is apparently not directly involved in the dissolution of an ASC.  The 
Czechoslovak case validates that the operative mechanism in the process for both Amalgamated Security 
Community formation and Amalgamated Security Community failure by dissolution, hinges on the 
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decision to either integrate or dis-integrate military forces and the capacity to produce military 
capabilities. 
The third very clear result is that partially integrated ASCs are politically unstable and prone to 
violent fracture.  This result helps explain Deutsch’s original finding that Amalgamated Security 
Communities were much more prone to violent failure.  This was not part of the original proposed 
argument, but as research progressed into various cases and it became clear that there were weak partially 
integrated ASCs, it was inescapable that this is an important aspect of the phenomena surrounding 
Amalgamated Security Communities.  The reason for this will be proposed in the next section.  
The fourth result is that the relationship between military integration and identity formation as 
well as the relationship between military dissolution and the fracturing of identity seems to be on solid 
footing.  The correlation between integration of organizations and structures of military forces and those 
involved in creating military capabilities and the subsequent formation of identity are born out in all of 
the cases in this study.  This will be explored a bit more below. 
 Finally, the argument of this paper seems to be confirmed.  The cases and examples present in 
this study demonstrate that once a decision is made to integrate military capabilities, especially the 
integration of the capacity to produce military capability, an Amalgamated Security Community (i.e. a 
state or state like entity) will form as a result.  The crucial caveat (confirmed by cases of partially 
integrated ASCs as well as examples of ASC failure by dissolution) is that the degree of integration of 
military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capability has a direct and serious impact on the 
internal coherence, war fighting ability, and survival of the resulting state or state like entity. 
6-3a. Military Integration and Identity Formation  
A key aspect of this study is that it takes a Constructivist approach to examine the phenomena of 
Amalgamated Security Communities.  The mechanism and rational for the linkage between the military 
and identity formation has already been presented.   This fits into the Constructivist approach because the 
creation of new military organizations and structures allows for the inter-subjective construction of 
identity within the new boundaries established by these organizations and structures.  The reason the key 
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point is the decision to integrate is that the act of establishing an integrated military (or devolving into a 
partial integration) is definitional.  It establishes new boundaries of “us vs. other” in which the process of 
inter-subjective construction of identity can develop.  It is also clear that there is a time period needed for 
this to happen.  In some of the cases presented, such as the Zulus and Mongols this process is fairly rapid 
while in others, such as the Dutch, it may take a much longer time.  That would seem to depend on 
circumstances such as the use of social reorganization based on military forces in the Zulu and Mongol 
cases and the heterogeneous and competitive nature of the Dutch provinces.  Regardless, the formation of 
identities based on military integration is not instantaneous and requires a period for the inter-subjective 
construction process to take place.    
 The claim of this study is not that military integration is the only or singularly most important 
basis of identity.  Identity can be based on many factors such as culture, language and religion. What is 
claimed is that military integration can generate a political identity and is absolutely essential for 
amalgamation of two separate entities.  Examples from this study of the creation of political identities 
include; The Zulus where clans began to identify themselves as Zulus and the clan basis of activity began 
to fade with in a year of the Zulu – Mthethwa merger.  The Mongols became ‘the People of the Felt 
Walls’ very quickly as Genghis Khan deliberately created a new identity.  A political “German” identity 
was developed as a result of military integration after 1866, and caused unification in 1871.  Dutch 
identity formed over a long period of time between heterogeneous provinces when the only strong bond 
between them was a common military force.  The Swiss provide another example of a very heterogeneous 
polity with the military as the main bond between them that developed a strong identity over time.      
One part of the argument regarding military integration and identity formation is that those forces 
united by such military integration become “brothers-in-arms.”  A central element of all of the integration 
theories is the concept of trust.  The difference between the theories is in describing how that trust is built 
over time, either through transactions, epistemic communities, federal structures, or social learning.  Trust 
is developed through an iterative process of interactions over time and is what allows cooperation 
between states in a system of anarchy.  Adler and Barnett plainly acknowledge “Trust” as being the 
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critical component in the creation of Pluralistic Security Communities which is built up over time through 
the process of interactions between two separate political entities, and that an accumulation of trust is 
needed to progress through the various stages in the process of creating a Pluralistic Security 
Community.1183 The reason that military integration is so powerful and results in the creation of 
Amalgamated Security Communities (despite cultural, religious, and local political obstacles), is because 
military integration is the ultimate level of trust between two political entities.  It is deeper than the trust 
in a Pluralistic Security Community described by Adler and Barnett because at the end of the day any 
member of that community will still retain the means to defend itself.  That is not true within an 
integrated Amalgamated Security Community.  On creating an integrated Amalgamated Security 
Community the constituent members take an enormous risk.  They place everything they treasure, their 
property, livelihood, and the lives of those they hold dear including their own life, in the hands of what 
had previously constituted another community.  The constituent members of an integrated ASC are 
absolutely dependent on the forces of the ASC to protect them.  They have no means to separately defend 
themselves and therefore risk everything by trusting in the newly integrated force for protection.  
Therefore, the reason that the decision to integrate the militaries of previously separate political entities is 
the critical act is because it is the demonstrable evidence of ultimate trust.  In this regard the peoples of an 
integrated ASC become an extended family of brothers-in-arms as they construct the identity and what it 
means to belong to that Amalgamated Security Community.     
 What then is to be made of partial integration?  Partial integration can be nothing less that partial 
trust.  The risk in partially integrated ASCs is greater than in Pluralistic Security Communities because to 
some extent the constituent entities must rely on forces and capabilities for their protection that are 
outside of their direct control.  This could be quite disadvantageous and even fatal in a conflict, so there is 
                                                 
1183 “Recall that trust always involves an element of risk because of the inability to monitor others’ behavior or to 
have complete knowledge about other people’s motivations; because the very contingency of social reality. 
Dependable expectations of peaceful change, the confidence that disputes will be settled without war, is unarguably 
the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena.” Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, 
414. 
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risk and demonstrable trust by the constituent members of the ASC towards each other more so than in a 
Pluralistic Security Community.  The other side of the coin is that retaining some forces and capacity to 
create military capabilities clearly indicates some level of distrust; of being prepared for a possible 
breakup.  In terms of identity development it causes multiple identities to be salient for the members of 
the community since the functions regarding identity formation and sustainment performed by the 
military occur at two different levels; the ASC and the constituent entity.  Both can be active at the same 
time as was seen in the cases of ASC failure by dissolution (Swiss and US Civil Wars, and Yugoslavia).  
Partially integrated Amalgamated Security Communities allow the possibility of selecting a sub-ordinate 
identity or a super-ordinate identity depending on how an issue is perceived.  Selecting a sub-ordinate 
identity either preserves (in the case of formation) or reanimates (in the case of devolution from a strong 
to weak ASC) cleavages in the polity.  If a partially integrated Amalgamated Security Community 
progresses to a fully integrated ASC (as in the US and Swiss cases) then the sub-ordinate military identity 
functions are eliminated and the cleavages in the polity can be overcome.  Unfortunately, partial trust may 
create conditions that enhance those cleavages and may precipitate a fracture.    
 Alternative explanations or theories of integration as noted above are based on trust.  Some of 
them have demonstrated utility in explaining integration in other spheres of human activity such as 
economic integration or functional integration of transnational policy issues.  They cannot however, 
explain amalgamation in which two previously sovereign entities voluntarily merge.  Only military 
integration of capabilities and the capacity to produce military capabilities produces the conditions that 
create Amalgamated Security Communities.  This is because such integration is the ultimate act of trust 
between two communities.   
6-3b.  Structure of Capacity to Create Military Capabilities 
The explanation above of why partial integration allows for multiple identities and the 
opportunity for selecting a sub-ordinate identity or a super-ordinate identity either enhances or mitigating 
cleavages in the polity is only part of the findings.  The real problem is with the retention of military 
capabilities and structure to create military capabilities or creation of new sub-ASC military organizations 
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when there is devolution from integrated to partial integration.   This study finds that multiple 
jurisdictions within an ASC with control over military forces and the capacity to produce military 
capabilities is extremely dangerous and unstable.  Absent the means to resort to violence various 
constituent entities of an ASC have to use other means such as political contestation to resolve policy 
disputes.  Having control over military capabilities and structure to create military capabilities provides a 
tool for politicians to resort to violence to achieve their political goals by other means.  It is also a clear 
indication of residual sovereignty and the inclination to fracture the ASC if necessary to maintain it.  The 
danger presented by multiple jurisdictions with control over military forces and the capacity to produce 
military capabilities is an unanticipated finding of this study; but one that has important ramifications.  It 
clearly indicates that how military forces are created, structured, controlled, equipped, organized, and 
paid, has political consequences.  It demonstrates that this is a topic deserving of attention by the 
academic community, not just military technocrats.    
6-4.  Impacts 
If the findings of this study are valid then there are impacts on both policy makers and 
international relations theory, limited primarily to situations involving Amalgamated Security 
Communities, but in some areas more broadly as well.  In the post-Cold War era numerous new states 
have been formed and others have been reconstituted, and some of them are Amalgamated Security 
Communities (e.g. Iraq).  For policy makers involved directly in this process or outside forces seeking to 
assist a new or reconstituted political entity in its formation, an understanding that how military forces are 
created, controlled, organized, equipped, and by whom, has a political impact on the formation of the 
political entity would seem to be quite useful.  Furthermore, an understanding that multiple jurisdictions 
with control over military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capabilities creates a 
politically unstable ASC, could persuade policy makers to avoid such an outcome if at all possible or to 
set in motion measures that could eventually result in full integration.  Such understanding could also 
persuade policy makers to take measures to ensure that an integrated ASC does not devolve into a 
partially integrated ASC.  This might appear to be a restatement of the obvious in that it is already known 
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that having multiple armed factions within a polity is inherently unstable.  The difference is that this study 
not only points to that instability but also to the way out of that situation.  Although most leaders will not 
be able to reorder their society to match their military structure as Shaka and Genghis Kahn did, they can 
follow the example of the unification of Germany, Switzerland after 1848, or the US post-Civil War.  It 
may not be possible to directly eliminate multiple jurisdictions with control over military capabilities and 
the capacity to produce military capabilities.  What can be done under the guise of increasing 
effectiveness and interoperability is to push technical integration, integration of communications, 
command and control, funding, training etc…, i.e. integrate over time using the categories of the 
independent variable presented in this study.  Making all forces and capabilities subject to national control 
in times of emergency or war (as in the U.S. case) is also advisable, especially remembering that was 
done in exchange for assistance in making those forces (National Guard) more effective.  If peace is a 
statesman's noblest objective, it is hoped that in a small way this study therefore has some utility for 
policy makers wishing to prevent conflicts.  
 Many scholars of international relations have also sought ways to reduce the probability of 
interstate conflict.  Karl Deutsch and his colleagues were expressly looking for the reason why some 
communities had stopped fighting each other as they investigated and developed the concept of security 
communities in order to perhaps lessen the probability of conflict.1184  Adler and Barnett were following a 
similar path in focusing on Pluralistic Security Communities as a means to reduce interstate conflict.  On 
the other hand Amalgamated Security Communities were ignored by the academic community because 
they were more difficult to attain and more prone to violent fracture.  The problem then is that the most 
probable condition that would result in armed conflict, Amalgamated Security Communities, has been 
ignored.  This study, by focusing directly on ASCs and determining the cause for violent fracture, has 
utility for also determining how violent fracture can be avoided.  In this way this study contributes to the 
goal of international relations theory in helping policymakers avoid violent conflict.       
                                                 
1184 Deutsch, et al., eds., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 4. 
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Another goal of international relations theory and political science in general is to be able to 
provide generalizeable results that allow the prediction of outcomes.  The results of this study do that.  By 
observing the objectively quantifiable level of military integration and whether multiple jurisdictions with 
control over military capabilities and the capacity to produce military capabilities exist within an 
Amalgamated Security Community, a prediction can be made regarding the stability of that ASC and the 
likelihood of its violent fracture.  This can be done reliably regardless of the geographic, cultural, and 
economic context of the ASC and whether it is an authoritarian political regime or not.     
 This study has implications for international relations theory beyond the confines of cases of 
Amalgamated Security Communities.  If the findings of this study are correct, it places Constructivism as 
an approach at the heart of the creation of military forces, as well as at the forefront of military fracture 
and civil war.  This is a clear invasion of territory long held by realist and neorealist theories and not truly 
challenged by previous work.  Furthermore, if the findings of this study are correct, it establishes a clear 
limit for other theories of integration as well as neo-liberalism, by showing that they can explain 
cooperation but can go no further.  This study demonstrates that to explain amalgamation you need 
military integration from a constructivist perspective.   In a concrete fashion this study places 
constructivism at the crossroads where realism / neo-realism as well as neo-liberalism come closest 
together (security studies), and demonstrates that constructivism is absolutely essential to achieving an 
understanding of an important phenomena (ASCs).  This echoes Adler and Barnett in their conclusion:  
“Our belief is that constructivism enables scholars to overcome the realist-idealist divide and to 
contemplate the relationship between structures, defined in material and normative terms, the 
practices that are made possible and imaginable by those structures, the security orders that are 
rendered reachable within that field, and how those security orders regulate or extinguish the use 
of force.”1185 
6-5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to weave together the various threads of theory, identity, military 
integration processes, and cross case analysis to validate the argument that is the basis for this study in 
such a way so as to form a tapestry that presents a clear picture of Amalgamated Security Communities.   
                                                 
1185 Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, 437. 
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This is the end of an endeavor that began many years ago with a desire to understand what was happening 
in Europe as the EU began to create a European Security and Defense Identity.  That has led to what I 
believe is a very fruitful examination of a heretofore ignored phenomena.  The cases and examples 
presented show that this topic has a wide scope and occurs under a wide range of circumstances, but that 
some form of military integration is the common factor and that the degree of military integration is 
crucial.  This study also demonstrates the relationship between military integration and identity formation 
so that a constructivist approach provides the best explanation of the phenomena of Amalgamated 
Security Communities.  The decision by previously separate political entities to integrate militarily is so 
extremely powerful because it is a demonstration of ultimate trust between two communities.     
The scope of this study was limited to Amalgamated Security Communities.  An examination of 
the literature on state disintegration indicates that there may be further utility to the methods used by this 
study.  A proposal for further study is to investigate the formation and break up of non-ASC states using 
the independent variable of the degree of military integration and the categories of the independent 
variable as outlined in this study.  
 There numerous significant scholars who have seen the military as a critical element in explaining 
political phenomena.  This study is only a small continuation of the efforts of others in this arena.  
Investigating the relationship between military structures and the context of their society has the potential 
to make a significant contribution to the field of political science.  If this study has a particular niche to 
fill it is hoped that it may fit with what Ronald Krebs has described and encourages further academic 
interest.1186  Hopefully, this study provides strong support for the entry of the military into the heart of 
scholarly analyses as an organization, as well as providing a starting point for additional research.   
 
 
                                                 
1186 Krebs, “A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might,” 123-124. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I.  Defense Spending By Europe     
 
Below are tables compiled from EDA data that compares the levels of defense spending between Europe 
and the US for 2005 to 2007.   
 
European - United States Defense Expenditure in 2007    
Europe*      US** 
Total Defense Expenditure:       €204 Bln  € 454 Bln 
Defense Expenditure as a % of GDP:   1,69%     4,5% 
Defense Expenditure Per Capita:  € 417    €1504 
GDP      €12072 Bln  €10102 Bln 
Government Expenditure   €5525 Bln  €3743 Bln 
*Europe means 26 EDA participating Member States (Denmark not a member) 
**Euro/Dollar exchange rate is based on average for 2007: 1.370 
Brussels, December 2008, the EDA1187     
 
European - United States Defense Expenditure in 2006 
Europe*      US** 
Total Defense Expenditure:       € 201 Bln  € 491 Bln 
Defense Expenditure as a % of GDP:   1,78%   4,7% 
Defense Expenditure Per Capita:  € 412   € 1,640 
(Comparative GDP and Govt. Expenditure data not provided for 2006) 
*Europe means 26 EDA participating Member States (Denmark not a member) 
**Euro/Dollar exchange rate is based on average for 2006: rate of 1,2556 
Brussels, 21 December 2007, the EDA1188  
 
European - United States Defense Expenditure in 2005 
Europe*      US** 
Total Defense Expenditure:       € 193 Bln  € 406 Bln 
Defense Expenditure as a % of GDP:   1,81%   4,06% 
Defense Expenditure Per Capita:  € 425   € 1,363 
(Comparative GDP and Govt. Expenditure data not provided for 2005) 
* Europe means 24 EDA participating Member States (Romania and Bulgaria not members yet) 
**Euro/Dollar exchange rate is based on average for 2005: rate of 1,2441 
Brussels, 19 December 2006, the EDA1189  
 
Below are additional tables compiled from EDA data that compares the levels of defense 
investment year to year within Europe for 2005 to 2007 which again shows a continual decrease in 
Research and Development, and a slight increase in spending which is less than the rate of inflation so 
that in budget terms the spending was flat.  The slight increase between 2005 and 2006 is explained by the 
addition of Romania and Bulgaria to the data set, which made no difference in the overall trend the 
following year.  
 
  
                                                 
1187  European Defense Agency, available from  http://www.eda.europa.eu/defencefacts/  Internet; accessed 12 
September 2009 
1188  Ibid 
1189  Ibid 
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National Defense Data of EDA participating Member States (pMS) 2006-2007 
Total Defense Expenditure in 2006: €201 Billion 
Total Defense Expenditure in 2007: €204 Billion 
Change 2006-2007: +1,5% 
 
Total R&D Expenditure in 2006: € 9,7 Billion 
Total R&D Expenditure in 2007: € 9,5 Billion 
Change 2006-2007:-1,4% 
 
Total Military Personnel 2006: 1 940 112 
Total Military Personnel 2007: 1 836 882 
Change 2006-2007: -5,3% 
Brussels, December 2008, the EDA 1190 
 
National Defense Data of EDA participating Member States in 2005 
Total Defense Expenditure in 2005: €193 Billion    (24 pMS) 
Total R&D Expenditure in 2005: €9,0 Billion 
Total European Military Personnel in 2005: 1,855,517 
Brussels, January 24 2007, the EDA  
 
The decline in European defense spending as a percentage of GDP really began in a pronounced way by 
1970 (See table below).   
G7 Defense Budget as a Percentage of GDP 
 
 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Canada 2.6 4.2 2.4 1.8 2.0 1.2 
France 5.5 6.5 4.2 4.0 3.5 2.6 
Germany 4.4 4.0 3.3 3.3 2.8 1.5 
Italy 4.3 3.3 2.7 2.4 2.1 2.1 
Japan n/a 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 
UK 6.6 6.5 4.8 5.1 4.0 2.5 
USA 5.1 9.0 8.0 5.6 5.3 3.1 
 
Source: Roger Middleton: “The Political Economy of Decline,” Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 3. (2006). 
See Also; “NATO Burdensharing,” Atlantic Review. available from, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1074-NATO-
Burden-Sharing.html  Internet; accessed 8 September 2009. 
 
 
                                                 
1190  European Defense Agency, available from http://www.eda.europa.eu/defencefacts/ Internet; accessed 12 
September 2009 
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Appendix II.  Organization Chart for the YPA and TDF 
 
This graphic shows the separate chain of command for the YPA and TDF.1191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1191 Graphic from: Pierre Maurer, "Defence and Foreign Policy: Switzerland and Yugoslavia Compared” in 
Yugoslavia’s Security Dilemmas; Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy, eds., Marko Milivojevic, 
John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), p.107, originally based on information 
from Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on East Europe, Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs; 
‘Defence School: The Yugoslav Armed Forces – Bulwark of Our Defence’, Front, 28 November 1980, p.44. 
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Appendix III. EDA Organization Chart.1192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1192  EDA Organization Chart. available from,  
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=119 Internet; accessed 10 September 2009. 
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Appendix IV  Selected paragraphs from: “European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009 on the 
European Security Strategy and ESDP.” (bold and underlined this author’s emphasis) 
 
46.  Points out that the EU Member States together spend more than EUR 200 000 000 000 per 
year on defense, which is more than half the defense expenditure of the United States; remains 
deeply concerned about the lack of efficiency and coordination in the utilization of those funds; 
therefore urges that greater efforts be made to eliminate unnecessary duplication between 
Member States, namely through specialization, pooling and sharing of existing capabilities, 
and joint development of new ones; commends the European Defense Agency (EDA) for the 
excellent work it has performed so far and calls on EU Member States to take full advantage of 
the EDA's potential; 
51.  Approves the dynamic further development of cooperation between national armed 
forces so that they become increasingly synchronized; proposes that this process and the 
armed forces be given the name "SAFE" – Synchronized Armed Forces Europe; 
53.  Approves the idea of a European statute for soldiers within the framework of SAFE 
governing training standards, operational doctrine and freedom of operational action, 
issues relating to duties and rights, as well as the level of equipment quality, medical care 
and social security arrangements in the event of death, injury or incapacity; 
54.  Approves in respect of SAFE the principle of a Europe-wide division of labor in military 
capabilities; 
55.  Advocates closer European cooperation in the area of training, maintenance and logistics 
as a crucial prerequisite for greater efficiency in defense spending; 
56.  Is of the opinion that the EU's capacity for autonomous foreign and security policy action 
should be improved through goal-oriented enhancement of its analysis, planning, leadership and 
intelligence capacities; in this context, welcomes the decision of the European Council to work 
towards establishing an integrated civilian and military strategic planning structure for 
ESDP operations and missions; 
58.  Calls for the setting-up of an autonomous and permanent EU Operational 
Headquarters with the capacity to undertake strategic planning and to conduct ESDP 
operations and missions; 
62.  Recalls that common weapons systems should be provided through a strong European 
defense industry which will be capable of satisfying the current and future requirements of the 
European Armed Force and will enable Europe to become self-sufficient and independent; 
64.  Considers it particularly important to strengthen the European Security and Defense College 
and to transform it into permanent structure which will further enhance the development of a 
specifically European security culture; 
65.  Calls for further initiatives concerning common training and common standards for 
personnel who are to be deployed and to work together in civilian and military operations, 
increased interaction between the armed forces and civilian personnel of EU Member 
States, coordination of crisis-related training, exchange programs among armed forces in 
Europe and the opening-up of armies to citizens of other EU Member States;1193 
 
                                                 
1193 European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009 on the European Security Strategy and ESDP. available 
from, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2009-
0075&format=XML&language=EN  Internet; accessed 13 September 2009. 
